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ABSTRACT
The last forty years have witnessed a proliferation of veiy small states, or micro- 
atates with populations of approximately one million or less. Most of these states are 
developing economies but in recent years even the smallest European micro-states have 
won acceptance in the councils of the organised international system. This study is a 
comprehensive examination of the international relations of these states in three principal 
areas of concern: issues of status and legitimacy; the conduct of diplomacy and the efforts 
of micro-states to achieve strategies of self-reliant economic development. While the 
research has confirmed the vulnerabilities of micro-states in all three areas which have 
been stressed in the literature of the last decade, it also reveals surprising opportunities for 
some micro-states to ameliorate their weaknesses and to achieve a constructive 
engagements within the international system. The international milieu and the many 
support systems at both the regional and global level have actually reinforced the 
sovereignty of micro-states while providing them with added resources to exploit the 
opportunities which an increasingly integrated global economy offers.
Unlike earlier studies in the field, this dissertation treats the experience of micro- 
states within the broad context of post-1945 history and thus provides an overall 
perspective for assessing the impact of very small size over 50 years, ft Also represents A 
departure from the existing literature in its determination to include both the developed
micro-states in Europe and the more commonly studied micro-states in the developing 
world. Finally, much of the analysis compares the experiences of micro-states with those 
pf forty larger small states in the next population class, an approach which has not been 
undertaken elsewhere. The impact of this comparison further confirms the genera] 
findings of the dissertation that the international system of the mid to late 1990s has 
evolved into a largely supportive milieu for micro-states in spite of the serious and 
occasionally dangerous problems which they continue to face.
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INTRODUCTION
The Emergence of a Small State System
At first glance the tapestry of the contemporary state system may seem to be a 
throwback to mid-19th century Europe with its many principalities, duchies and tiny 
republics. Dozens of small and, indeed very small societies, have achieved sovereignty in 
the post -war years. There are now 45 very small states in the international system, that is 
micro-states with populations of approximately one million or less. This represents nearly 
a quarter of the current list of sovereign states. But unlike their European counterparts 
over a century ago, this new generation of micro-states enjoys full access to regional and 
global councils just as they participate in their own choice of diplomatic agendas, often 
with surprising initiative.
For those contemplating the architecture of the post-war world in 1945, the 
proliferation of so many micro-states would surely have seemed fanciful. At the founding 
of the United Nations there were only two micro-states, Luxembourg and Iceland, with 
real claims to full participation in the international system. Both of them enjoyed a long­
standing separate identity but their recognition and acceptance did not suggest a 
precedent for other very small jurisdictions. If anything, these states seemed to be the 
exceptions to prove the rule that there were normal dimensions of statehood. In contrast, 
the smallest European micro-states, those outside the San Francisco conference, more 
closely resembled their continental predecessors, highly dependent on a neighbouring 
mentor state and largely excluded from the mainstream channels of international
diplomacy. It would be another 15 years, with the independence of Gabon and Cyprus, 
before other very small jurisdictions would be able to stake their claims within the 
organised relations of the international system.
With the dismantling of European colonialism, the siren call of self-determination 
reached even the smallest and most remote fragments of European bluewater empire. It 
was at first a tentative process, its full reach not really expected in the metropolitan 
countries or even among first generation political leaders in the small territories 
themselves. In many cases separate independence was granted because the imperial 
power, particularly Great Britain, had lost interest in a  prolonged colonial responsibility or 
because there was an absence of alternative solutions; or a combination of both. In others, 
aspirations to sovereignty were emboldened by the apparently successful independence of 
other very small territories, particularly among similarly placed neighbouring dependencies 
within the adjacent region. In the end, the emergence of so many micro-states across the 
developing world paved the way for the previously inhibited and marginal European 
micro-states lo assume a role in international diplomacy once considered preposterous. 
Today United Nations conferences may be held in Monaco or Liechtenstein as they are in 
Barbados or Malta. And the International Monetary Fund will send a team to report on 
the economy of San Marino as readily as it would for St. Lucia or Mauritius.
Nor is this proliferation of very small states necessarily exhausted. There are still 
those within a few remaining colonial territories, such as the Kanaks in New Caledonia, 
who look for separate statehood. And there are powerful separatist movements and de 
facto states across the ruins of the former Communist world: Abkhazia, Chechnya, Trans-
Dniester. The relaxation of the taboo against secession, albeit now sanctioned only 
through recognised and genuinely democratic exercises of self-determination, has 
encouraged a climate for further fragmentation. Even within many micro-states 
themselves, archipelagic island states in particular, aspirations for secession among 
dissident minority communities threaten even the smallest state’s territorial integrity. In the 
case of St. Kitts-Nevis, already having endured one experience of dismemberment with the 
separation of Anguilla, the separatist agenda in Nevis has become a very real threat in 
recent months.1 That the 10,000 islanders of Nevis could entertain separate independence 
to become the smallest sovereign state in the Americas illustrates just how far 
conventional notions of statehood have changed. In short, these forces of rampant 
particularism may justify Colin Clarke’s description of the international system in the late 
twentieth century as one of “miniaturism.”2
The notion that the currency of sovereignty was being steadily debased as even 
smaller and palpably weaker colonial fragments won sovereignty was a recurring lament in 
the earlier stages of micro-state decolonisation. Yet this was an irresistable pattern. It was 
impossible to erect or maintain objective criteria in the face of a determined movement for 
self-determination on one hand and the resignation and exhaustion of metropolitan 
governments on the other. One improbable state after another entered the system, even
1 The Globe and Mail (Toronto), August 30, 1996, A13.
The Miami Herald, April 17, 1997: http://www.herald.com/ameriqas/carib/doQs/053246.htm 
Consider too the case of Tobago
Ralph R. Premdas and Hugh Williams, “Tobago: the Quest for Self-Determination in the Caribbean,” 
Canadian Review o f Studies in Nationalism XIX (Nos. 1-2, 1992), 117-126.
2 Colin Clarke, “Third World States: Fragile and Dependent,” Third World Affairs (1987), 207.
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village states with populations of less than 10,000, and with each new level of acceptance, 
conventional criteria of statehood were overturned.
But an interest in small states was evident long before the full bloom of micro-state 
independence was fully appreciated. The position of such European neutral states as 
Finland and Austria seemed to raise new questions of small state survival given the 
rigidities of a bi-polar world. Similarly, the experience of the Latin American republics 
facing various waves of American hegemony, the tentative resistance of some Socialist 
states, and the decolonisation of a number of small dependencies in Africa and Asia all 
contributed to a burgeoning small states literature. Many of these earlier studies were 
historical and reflected a continuing fascination with the plight of the smaller European 
states during the inter-war years.3 What lessons might be gleaned from this period to 
assess the security concerns of small states in a new bi-polar international system?
This growing body of literature was premised on the notion that small size was a 
useful analytical tool in the classification of states: Small states faced particular
constraints and were inclined to recognisable patterns of behaviour because of their 
relative small size in the state system, Annette Baker Fox, for instance, emphasised the 
parochial orientation of the small state: "Small powers are almost by definition 'local* 
powers whose demands are restricted to their own and immediately adjacent areas, while 
great powers exert their influence over wide areas... the power of the small state is narrow
3 (X de Raoymaker, et. af, Small Powers in Alignment (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974).
August Schou and Arne Olave Brundtland (eds.), Small States in International Relations: Nobel 
Symposium 17 (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell; .New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971).
V. V. Sveics, Small Nation Survival: Political Defense in Unequal Conflicts (New York: Exposition 
Press, 1970).
in domain however much or little may be its weight."4 Fox concluded that it is this limited 
scope of attention which is the most distinctive charapteristic of small state behaviour, 
J)avid Vital stressed the vulnerability of the small state as the most distinguishing 
factor; "A small state is more vulnerable to pressure, more likely to give way under 
stress, more limited in respect of the political options open to it and subject to a tighter 
connexion between domestic and external affairs."5 However, model of the small state is 
the renegade state with at least some independent capacity. For Vital this means that 
many of the new small states have to be regarded finally as 'psuedo states',6
Robert Rothstein also argued that the small state is typically vulnerable in its relations 
with the outside world. But, he viewed small size to be a question of psychological 
handicaps as much as it is a problem of limited capabilities. Small states share a 
vulnerabilty which Rothstein called a "security dilemma."7 Weakness is an integral aspect 
of smallness and produces a different self-view and behaviour. It is an abiding sense of 
danger and the recognition of limited choices in the face of threat which characterises the 
small state's international relations.
Robert Keohane also stressed behavioural factors in the classification of states. He 
argued for a need to clarify traditional objective distinctions of power and/or size by 
incorporating the perceptions of state leaders. He suggested a fourfold classification of
j  Annette Baker Fox, The Power o f Small States (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), fh. 
p.3.
5 David Vital, The Inequality o f States (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1.967), p. 3.
6Ibid., p. 7.
7Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 24.
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systemic roles in which states are differentiated as a) system-determining, b) system- 
influencing, c) system-affecting or d) system-ineffectual8 It was assumed that most small 
states would fall into Keohane's fourth group, states with virtually no influence or role in 
the international system.
In a similar vein, Ronald Barston, after examining various criteria for distinguishing 
States along size variables, suggested that smallness be understood as a reflection of a 
state's relative influence in world politics. From this perspective small states are viewed in 
terms of role and performance rather than physical dimensions. He argued for a 
formulation of hypotheses about the international behaviour of small states in an effort to 
identify those shared characteristics which distinguish them from other states.9
Q f course, none of these earlier explorations into the nature and behaviour of small 
states concerned those veiy small states which are the central focus of this study. Indeed, 
micro-states were conspicuous for their dismissal in the mainstream literature of 
international relations. They were .generally treated, if mentioned at all, as psuedo-states, 
to use Vital’s term, with pretensions that far outreached the capacities normally 
understood to be those of sovereign statehood.
8 Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” International 
Organization XXIII (No. 2, Spring, 1969), 295-296.
K.J. IJolsti similarly wedded the psychological and objective dimensions of statehood in his scheme of 
national role perceptions. A state’s behaviour in international politics is rooted in the conceptions which 
policy-makers have about their country’s status and role. Self-image is as important as the assessment of 
capabilities in any typology of states.
K.J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies 
Quarterly XIV (NO. 3, September, 1970), 233-309.
9 Ronald Barston, The Other Powers: Studies in Foreign Policies o f Small States (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, Lts., 1973).
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Still, while the burgeoning interest in small states did not initially address the specific 
concerns of micro-states, many of which were waiting in the wings at the time, 
hypotheses about the impact of small size for the international relations of small states 
would find resonance, as we shall see, in the later literature of micro-states. Questions of 
parochial orientation, vulnerability, security consciousness, and limited influence on the 
external environment would be recurring themes in any subsequent discussion of micro­
states. Moreover, the ongoing debate over the taxonomy of states and the value of small 
size as an explanatory tool would continue to be a central question in the more specifically 
directed literature on micro-states. Indeed, a recurring question was whether micro-states 
were small states writ small or whether they constituted an entirely different class of states 
altogether with their own distinct problems (and perhaps opportunities) as actors in the 
international system.
Similarly, early efforts to appreciate the consequences of small size for the 
international economic relations of small states were not at all directed to the exceedingly 
small economies which now characterise the world of micro-states. The Lisbon 
Conference participants in 1957 treated a small economy as one with a population of less 
than 10 million, though it was clear that their principal focus was on much larger states 
such as Belgium and Switzerland. These are giants in comparison to the very small 
economies which assumed sovereign powers in ever-increasing numbers after 1960. Yet, 
the proceedings of the Lisbon Conference10 are still cited widely in most discussions of 
micro-state economies. Once again, themes common to all small states, the familiar
10 E. A. G. Robinson (ed.), The Economic Consequences o f the Size o f Nations (London: Macmillan,
1963).
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vulnerabilities of small open economies, continue to be relevant when assessing the 
opportunities and constraints facing micro-states in the global economy.
The Perennial Problems of Taxonomies
The growing momentum of decolonisation increasingly confirmed the evidence 
that perhaps the notion of the small state itself was being challenged as even more 
diminutive territories aspired to independence and then won their place in an increasingly 
open and tolerant international system. Clearly, this new generation of very small states 
represented a significant departure from the conventional capacities of statehood assumed 
to be within the reach of the small European and Latin American states. Finland, Norway 
and Czechoslovakia represented one model of small state international relations. Western 
Samoa, Djibouti, and Belize raised very different issues. Not surprisingly, then, early 
attention to these states was directed to issues of classification. To this day, many studies 
in the international relations of micro-states begin with an explanation of the parameters of 
small size relevant to whatever cases or comparative studies are selected-
In introducing the question in the United Nations, the former Secretary-General, 
U-Thant, referred to these very small states as “those entities which are exceptionally 
small in area, population and human and economic resources.” 11 In a subsequent 
UNITAR study ‘exceptionally small’ was understood to be a state with a population of 
approximately one million or less.12 In an appendix to the UNITAR study Charles Taylor
11 United Nations Document A/6701/Add. 1 (1967).
12 Jacques Rapoport, Ernest Muteba and Joseph J. Therattil, Small Stateq and Territories: Status and 
Problems A UNITAR Study (New York: Amo Press, 1971).
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constructed an impressive matrix of various indices of smallness to reach beyond the 
simplicities of population size.13 Though such an approach initially seemed to have much 
to offer, most scholars have continued to use a simple demographic classification usually 
with the argument that states within this class are small in almost every other respect.14 
The most widely used ceiling for very small states or micro-states is a population of 
approximately one million.
Some have preferred a lower figure of 500,000,15 300,00016 or even 150,000, to be 
sure we are discussing states which are clearly 'exceedingly small'17 in every respect. 
Others have sought to stretch the classification to a little over two million18or even five 
million19 to ensure a catchment that will include all those states which would seem to share 
the characteristics thought to be associated with very small size.
13 Charles L. Taylor, “Statistical Typology of Micro-states and Territories Towards a Definition of a 
Micro-state,” in Rappoport, Muteba and Therattil, ibid., 183-202.
14B.Persaud, “Small States: Economic Problems and Prospects,” in John Kaminarides, Lino Briguglio and 
Henk N. Hoogendonk, The Economic Development o f Small Countries: Problems, Strategies and 
Policies (Delft: Eburon, 1989), p. 16.
15J. C. Caldwell, G. E. Harrison and P. Quiggan, “The Demography of Micro-states,” World 
Development VIII (1980), 956.
16 Patricia W. Blair, The Ministate Dilemma Occasional Paper No. 6, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, October, 1967, p. 4.
17 Stanley A. De Smith, Microstates and Micronesia (New York: New York University Press, 1970), pp. 
5-6.
18 Harvey W. Armstrong, Ronan de Kervenoaet, Xiaoming Li and Robert Read, “The Growth 
Performance of Micro-States: Economic and Social Determinants Considered,” paper presented at the 
International Conference on Cultural Heritage in Islands and Small States, The Foundation for 
international Studies, Valletta, Malta, 8-10 May, 1997.
19 Paul Streeten, “The Special Problems of Small Countries,” World Development XXI , No. 2, 1993, 197- 
202 .
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The use of a simple population ceiling is usually accepted with reluctance and with 
due recognition of the problems of such arbitrary taxonomies particularly given the risks 
of mis-classification. Inevitably, there is some overlap between the largest micro-states and 
the smallest states in the next population group. There are micro-states at the upper end of 
the group (Mauritius, Gabon and Guyana)20 which might be expected to have more in 
common with Jamaica or Liberia than with Western Samoa, Liechtenstein or Dominica. 
Similarly, there are small states with populations between one and three million (the 
Central American republics, Congo, Estonia, Slovenia, Singapore) which seem to share 
many of the characteristics of micro-states. Seven of the ten states with populations 
between one and two million were micro-states until very recently: Kuwait, Lesotho, the 
United Arab Emirates, Bhutan, Trinidad and Tobago, Oman and Botswana. Doubts about 
a demographic basis for classification are most pressing with these states.21
There are further troubling issues of classification of states on the basis of very small 
size. First, as John Connell noted, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of smallness, 
peripherality and remoteness.22 For instance, over half of all micro-states are small islands
20 The latest statistics put Gabon and Mauritius just over the one million mark.
21 In the Gulf it may be argued that these are still micro-states. The growth in the population is deceptive; 
the majority is immigrant and, more importantly, transient. Bhutan, Botswana and Lesotho are all dwarf 
land-locked states whose geopolitical position and international status are still closer to the micros-states 
in this study than to other larger small states in the next population class. Nevertheless, we are treating 
these borderline cases as small states, rather than micro-states, except in historical references when they 
were very much smaller. In discussing the question of status, for instance, initial doubts concerning the 
legitimacy and viability of independence in Kuwait were based in large part on the shaikhdom's very 
small size.
22 John Connell, Sovereignty and Survival: Island Microstates in the Third World {Sydney: Department 
of Geography, University of Sydney, Research Monograph No. 3, 1988), p. 1.
James Crawford, “Islands as Sovereign Nations,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
XXXVni (April, 1989), 277-98.
19
or small archipelagic island societies. Many of the vulnerabilities of small size and 
islandness are concomitant. But there are particular characteristics of island geography 
that are widely and persistently recognised and addressed in the literature: insularity, 
remoteness, ecological vulnerability. Indeed, there are now international institutes and 
research programmes specifically directed to the special problems of small island 
jurisdictions. Within the United Nations itself, the establishment of the Association of 
Small Island States speaks powerfully to the very special concerns that link this particular 
group of states, most of which are micro-states. And a growing number of research 
institutes such as the Islands and Small States Institute at the University of Malta, the 
Island Institute in Rockland, Maine and the Institute of Island Studies at the University of 
Prince Edward Island have large research mandates to explore the particular 
characteristics of small island and archipelagic societies and jurisdictions over a wide range 
of issue areas. For some, like Percy Selwyn, this ongoing argument over the relative 
importance of islandness or smallness is an unhelpful distraction. Problems of peripherality 
and a declining self-reliance, he argues, are the key issues whether we are talking about 
small islands or small continental jurisdictions.23 Philippe Hein too reminds us that land­
locked small states or enclave small states are “mirror images” of small island states facing 
the same oft-cited litany of vulnerabilities that characterise the literature of small islands.24
23 Percy Selwyn, “Smallness and Islandness,” World Development VIII (1980), 945.
“The extension of ‘islands’ as a useful category from the concerns of naturalists and ecologists to those 
of social scientists . . . seems illegitimate. The social sciences abound with examples of the illegitimate 
extension of biological categories to social relationships. The biological peculiarities of islands are an 
insufficient foundation for any plausible social or economic theory.”
Ibid, 950.
24 Philippe Hein, “The Study of Microstates,” in Kaminarides, Briguglio and Hoogendonk (eds.), op. cit.,
p. 8.
20
A further concern which can undermine confidence in a taxonomy based on small size 
is whether this masks more profound distinctions in the structure of micro-state economies 
and thus their prospects for economic diversification and self-reliance. Clearly, the 
European micro-states now enjoy an enviably diversified base of economic activity with 
healthy development in both the manufacturing and service sectors. The resource rich 
economies, the petroleum states and Nauru, and even the oil refining states in the Western 
hemisphere, all enjoy enviable living standards relative to their developing neighbours. 
But, unlike their European counterparts, they have not developed an intermediate goods 
sector or a genuinely diversified base of economic activity, even allowing for a sometimes 
spectacular growth in the services sector. Most other micro-states still rely on primary 
production of products highly vulnerable to external fluctuations. Some are truly 
monocultural economies. The prognoses among these weakest micro-states are not 
encouraging but they may not be as bleak as they might first appear. Services, the 
advantages of a rentier economy, untapped offshore resources, and even as we shall see 
the exploitation of jurisdiction or sovereign status itself as a resource, all offer potential 
relief from familiar patterns of export concentration. Still, whatever the imperatives of 
very small size, however equalizing the demographic ceiling at the end of the day, there 
are major differences of opportunity and challenge within the classification of micro-states 
that must qualify particular cases in the larger conclusions based on the import of very 
small size.
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There is another disturbing tendency in much of the literature which relates to the 
selection of states within this group: Too often attention is focused exclusively on the 
developing states of the Third World. Indeed, apart from occasional pieces on 
Luxembourg and Iceland, and the more unorthodox celebrations of very small size, many 
of them historical, in the work of Leopold Kohr,25 the European micro-states have been 
largely ignored. To the extent that these states did receive scholarly attention it was their 
international legal status which was the focus of analysis. Typically, this involved a spirited 
defense of their sovereignty in spite of worrying evidence to the contrary. Arguments 
suggesting these states were not truly sovereign given their exceptionally small size, their 
limited participation in organised international relations and their seemingly excessive 
dependence on more powerful neighbours were meticulously countered with legal 
precedents, conventions and treaties.26 Virtually no attention was given in the comparative 
literature to issues of economic development or military security in these states.
Since the micro-state phenomenon is primarily a consequence of decolonisation, 
this is not surprising. Still, this exclusion seems a shame since a closer examination of the 
post-war experience of European micro-states will reveal some extraordinary success 
stories in economic development and diversification which could speak to the 
contemporary circumstances of micro-states in the developing world, particularly those
25Leopold Kohr, The Breakdown o f Nations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).
26 Much of this literature was centred on the constitutional status of particular micro-states. An excellent 
comparative treatment, however, can be found in
C. D’Olivier Farran, ‘The Position of Diminutive States in International Law,” in Erik Briiel et. al 
(eds.), Internationalrechtliche und Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen-Fetschrift fur Walter ScMtzel zu 
Seinem Geburtstag (Dusseldorf: Hermes, 1960)
A fine new contribution to this literature focuses on the smallest European micro-states; Andorra, 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican City.
Jorri C. Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations o f Microstates: Self-determination 
and Statehood (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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more advantaged and prosperous states with encouraging prospects in the manufacturing 
and service sectors. It is not that long ago, for example, that Iceland, surely a 
monocultural economy facing severe problems of remoteness, struggled with an 
underdeveloped infrastructure and a huge challenge of modernisation. Iceland until 
relatively recently was, like Ireland, one of the poorest countries in Europe. Iceland’s 
development and the subsequent successful diversification of the Icelandic economy has 
been essentially a post-war phenomenon.27 Liechtenstein too has been transformed in 
recent years and is now host to an astonishingly significant and profitable high value 
manufacturing sector in addition to its better known successes in financial services and 
tourism.28 Moreover, the case for including the European micro-states in international 
comparative analyses is all the more persuasive since these states have assumed full 
participation and a normal role in the mainstream of international diplomacy over the last 
seven years. Issues of small size and representation, for example, are as relevant for these 
states as for micro-states across the developing world.
Finally, there is the question of non-sovereign micro-jurisdictions. In many cases, as 
with Bermuda, these dependencies enjoy virtual independence with only rare interventions 
to rn  the metropolitan power. In some, as in the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, 
jurisdictional latitude has been sufficiently generous to allow for truly autonomous 
strategies of self-reliant economic development, strategies that could well speak to the 
needs of very small sovereign states in other parts of the world. Moreover, in some of
22 Jon Hjalmarsson, History o f Iceland: From the Settlement to the Present Day (Reykjavik: Iceland 
Review, 1993).
28 Hubert Buchel, Is There Anything Special About Liechtenstein's National Economy? (Vaduz: Amt fur 
Volkswirtschaft, 1996).
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these dependencies, in the Faroes, the Alands and the Cook Islands, governments enjoy 
even a measure of foreign policy autonomy and separate representation. The substantive 
distinctions between these autonomous territories and sovereign jurisdictions are not as 
vividly clear as we once assumed them to be. Perhaps further attention should be given to 
these very small jurisdictions if only to highlight the comparative advantages or 
disadvantages with sovereign states.
In some significant studies in the literature both the European micro-states and 
autonomous dependencies are included -but the picture is uneven.29 Elmer Phshke’s F977 
study, for instance, excluded the European micro-states which he referred to as 
“submicrostates” or “.quasi-nations,” even though -by then there were a  number of other 
micro-states of similar size and circumstances.30 John Kaminarides’ list is curious for its 
selectivity: Iceland, Ijaxembourg, the Isle of Man and “the Channel islands -(together) are 
included but not the smaller European sovereign states. Cambodia (!), Tuvalu and Niue 
are included but not Nauru. The Faroes are listed but not Aland, Gibraltar but not the 
Falklands.31
For our purposes in this study, the most commonly used ceiling of approximately one
A
million remains the most persuasive argument for micro-state classification in spite of all 
the pitfalls and anxieties. The problems of “apples and pears,” remain, to be sure, a 
perennial dilemma for comparativists. And the broad global reach of this study does little
29 Armstrong, de Kervenoael, Xiaoming Li and Read, op. cit.
30 Elmer Plischke, Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options (Washington: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), p. 12.
31 John Kaminarides, “The Small Developing Countries: An Introduction,” in Kaminarides, Briguglio 
and Hoogendonk (eds.), op. cit., xviii and xix.
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to inhibit anxieties over such an expansive net. Nonetheless, broadly comparative analysis 
is a powerful tool in the^social sciences ancf can offer insights which a more conservative 
and cautious drawing of parameters will not. At the same time, any classification based on 
such a fluid concept as small size must be flexible enough to allow particular situations at 
the margins of the taxonomy.32 Clearly, there are cases of former micro-states which have 
only recently graduated to another population group, that are relevant to our discussion, 
particularly in historical references. Similarly, there are cases of slightly larger states where 
an experience mirrors that of a micro-state counterpart and only draws attention to the 
problem of overlap. Where these examples are relevant and powerful, they will be cited 
throughout the study.
This study is confined to sovereign states even though there are striking parallels in 
pertain issue-areas with such autonomous jurisdictions as the Cook Islands. The reasons 
for this decision relate particularly to the first two sections of the dissertation. The first 
chapters explore the principle of sovereignty in the light of historical problems of status 
and legitimacy. The second third of the study is directed to issues of representation and 
the potential for adroit and skilful diplomacy in spite of obvious constraints of small size.
32 Peter Lyon has recently reminded us of the limitations of small size as an explanatory tool and of the 
need to be sensitive to the specific circumstances of each case.
Peter Lyon^J4 Small States Reconsidered,” The Round Table no. 340 (October, 1996), 402.
Some critics have been so exasperated with the imprecision of small size, they have dismissed its
analytical value altogether
William E. Paterson, "Small States in International Politics," Co-operation and Conflict VIII (No.2,
1969), 119-123.
Others have accepted the problem resignedly and have begun simply with the admission that "by itself 
the concept of the small state means nothing. . .To be of any analytical use a 'small state" should 
be...considered as shorthand for "a state in its relationship with greater states."
Erling Bjol, "The Small State in International Politics," in August Schou and Arne Olave Brundtland 
(eds.) Small States in International Relations (Nobel Symposium 170, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
Inc., 1971), p. 29.
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While status is an abiding concern for most autonomous dependent territories, indeed for 
many a central focus for further aggrandizement, and while external representation is 
increasingly an informal option, the central issues in these sections of the dissertation 
would, in our judgement, be blurred if we were to treat the autonomous dependent 
territories in the same fashion as sovereign micro-states. Moreover, there would then be a 
strong case for going beyond the dependent territories that appear in lists of micro- 
jurisdictions, to increasingly assertive regions within Europe or, for that matter, to states 
or provinces within federations, which in the case of Canada, enjoy huge areas of policy 
autonomy including external representation of their interests. For the purposes of this 
essay, though not for future consideration, this seemed a Pandora’s Box indeed. Thus, 
while we stress the importance of being conscious of the experience of autonomous very „ 
small jurisdictions, they are not formally part of this study. However, where relevant, the 
experience of these dependencies is noted in the dissertation, particularly in the final 
sections dealing with economic relations, and especially when insightful comparisons can 
be drawn with sovereign states.
In short, this study encompasses the 45 sovereign states within the approximately 
one million population threshold.33 We seek to be vigilant throughout in whatever issue
33 There are currently 192 sovereign states in the international system. All but seven (Switzerland, 
Taiwan and five micro-states, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, Tuvalu and the Vatican City) are members of the 
United Nations. Prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the admission of the former Soviet, 
Yugoslav and Czechoslovak republics, the micro-state presence in the United Nations stood at 
approximately one quarter of the world body’s membership. Some member states were micro-states upon 
their admission to the United Nations (Oman, Bhutan, Lesotho, for example) but are now in another 
population class. There are still likely micro-state members in the queue: those territories still aewaiting 
decolonisation and perhaps a number of potential break-away states sulking in the uncomfortable confines 
of newly seceded republics. The figure of 192 does not include the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic
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we are exploring to the variations within the classification be they economic structures, 
geopolitical location, historical circumstances and colonial experiences, cultural patterns 
and demographic composition, anything which might impose upon the priority of small 
population size assumed as the premise of the study. With these caveats in place, we risk 
our mix of apples and pears in this exploration of very small states.
Changing Directions in the Literature of Micro-states
The treatment of micro-states in the literature of international relations seems to have 
gone through different stages in terms of central concerns and preoccupations. Much of 
the early literature did not address substantive issues concerning the relationship of small 
size and prospects for development and security within this emerging class of states. Initial 
preoccupations were those of status, and particularly the impact of this on-going 
proliferation of micro-states on global institutions, especially the United Nations system.
-(Western Sahara) though it is a member of the O.A.U. and is recognised by nearly 100 states. Nor does it 
include the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or Chechnya.
Two of these states, the Vatican and Andorra, are not included for most purposes in this study. In the 
most literal sense the Vatican City is a micro-state. However, the international relations of the Holy See 
have very Kttle to do with its small size.
Andorra’s status has changed only with the March, 1993 referendum and consequently data collection 
has been difficult for many but not all sections of this study.
Tonv Horowitz, “Andorra- Tiny Country Faces Big Changes,” (originally in the Wall Street Journal), 
reprinted in The Globe and Mail (Toronto), April 28, 1993, p. 1+.
Though Andorra has generally been accepted as a separate entity, the sovereignty of the principality 
was not clearly established and it remained a fragmentary enigma for international lawyers. Note, for 
example,
Georges Riera, “L’Andorre,” Revue Generate de Droit Iintemational Public LXXII (AvriL/Juin, 
1968), 361-80.
Wilfried Van Hemelrijck, “ Andorre, Seigneurie Medievale ou Etat Modeme?,” Chronique de 
Politique Etrangere XXVI (No. 4, juillet, 1973) 423-34.
Andorra was not a party to the normal channels of diplomatic relations. France had always 
maintained that she was responsible for Andorra’s relations with other states since one of the two princes 
is th^ j president of the French Republic. Spain assumed this responsibility in 1989, though it is clear in 
the new constitution that Andorra will now be responsible for her own external relations. Indeed, the 
Principality has already established missions in New York, Madrid and Paris.
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Clearly, the recognition of sovereignty in very small territories raised questions 
concerning the corollary principle of sovereignty, the equality of states. And this in turn 
engendered a wide body of literature exploring alternatives to full membership or at the 
very least, variable voting arrangements for these states should they continue to be 
admitted to international institutions. In short, the micro-state question was seen initially in 
terms of status, and most importantly, in terms of the well-being of the international 
system itself, the workings of its central institutions and the credibility of its norms. 
Indeed, the still respected UNITAR study itself was largely concerned with these issues. 
For the most part, micro-states, either individually or comparatively, were not themselves 
the subjects of these early inquiries.34
Much of this initial discussion hinged on the issue of viability. Concerns about the 
prospects for micro-states were framed within the questions which this notion seemed to 
raise. It is not surprising that this should be the case. The standard of viability had long 
been a principal concern in any discussion of self-determination for dependent territories. 
It was certainly a central issue in the debates concerning the Mandates.35 Similarly, much 
of the discussion in the metropolitan countries, and indeed in the very small dependencies 
themselves, focused on the question of whether these very small entities could actually 
assume the responsibilities of statehood 36 For all of those who were led by their hearts
34 These issues are treated extensively and this body of literature is widely cited in Chapter Two of this 
study.
35 Walter Holmes Ritsher, Criteria o f  Capacity for Independence (Jerusalem: Syrian Orphanage Press, 
1934).
o r
Many of these issues were treated extensively in a major volume that was typical of the tone of the 
debate in the early 1960’s.
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choose sovereignty, there were others fearful of a lonely and perhaps impoverished 
existence once the support systems of the colonial administration were removed. Was it 
possible for such very small territories to maintain any semblance of self-directed 
economic development? Could these micro-states meet conventional notions of statehood 
in other respects; the conduct of an independent foreign policy, the responsibility for their 
own physical security; in general, would they capable of meeting their responsibilities to 
their own citizens? Or was statehood for such territories a sham, a cosmetic sop to self- 
determination when the reality was one of enduring dependence on international 
guardians?37
Questions of capacity were pressing for scholars who sought to explore the 
prospects for very small states to engage the international system, particularly when, for 
so many of them, it would be in the context of highly dependent and aysmmetrical 
relationships. Much of this work called upon a large body of American foreign policy 
scholarship, particularly associated with the work of James Rosenau and his colleagues, 
that stressed the porousness of small states and the very limited opportunities for them to 
protect their own interests and priorities in the face of the penetration of their societies by 
external players. For Vaughan Lewis, the conclusions were bleak indeed.38 Though he
Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era o f Decolonization (Cambridge, Mass.: Center 
for International Affairs, Harvard University, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, Number 9, 
December, 1964.
Even as late as the mid-1970’s when the smallest Caribbean states were debating the options of 
associate statehood and independence, the question of viability was still pressing. Note for example the 
essays in
Independence for Grenada: Myth or Reality? (St. Augustine: Institute of International Relations, 
University of the West Indies, 1974).
37Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990)
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recognised that diversification or dependence management rather than the elimination of 
dependency, was the most optimistic goal for small states, the prospects for achieving this 
were significantly and qualitatively different than that of larger developed states given the 
asymmetries of small size. Hence, for Lewis, many of these states are sovereign in law but 
non-viable in practice.
Calling upon a similar body of foreign policy scholarship, George Reid also 
examined the foreign policy behaviour of micro-states only to conclude that there were 
substantial barriers to full and genuinely autonomous participation in the international 
system including limited natural and human resources and excessive dependence on the 
external environment in most areas of the state’s competence.39 Further, there were 
severe limitations within the decision-making apparatus including a high degree of 
personalism, low levels of information, a low level of bureaucratic, legislative and interest 
group players in the foreign policy process and a high degree of penetration by external 
interests, In short, micro-state foreign policy both in its formulation and execution and in 
its orientation and impact is disabled in significant ways because of the constraints of small 
size.
Elmer Plishke also addressed the problems which confronted micro-states in their 
efforts to engage the international system. Unlike Lewis and Reid, Plishke stressed
38 Vaughan Lewis, The Structure o f Small State Behaviour in Contemporary International Politics. 
University of Manchester^ Ph.D. dissertation, 1970.
39George L. Reid, The Impact o f Very Small Size on the International Behavior o f Microstates (Beverly 
Hills and London: International Studies Series, Number 02-027, Volume 2,1974.)
See also
George L. Reid, A Comparative Study o f the Foreign Policies o f Very Small States with Spoecial 
Reference to the Commonwealth Caribbrean. University of Southampton, Ph.D. dissertaion, 1971.
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various options available to micro-states in terms of innovative practices of representation 
and conference diplomacy, including the seemingly perennial question of their role in the 
United Nations system. While the tone was less pessimistic it was clear that micro-states 
faced enormous problems in pursing their national interests on the global agenda, 
problems which clearly set them apart from more conventional small states.
Many of these disabilities were at the time judged to compromise fatally the 
sovereignty of these states and their long term viability within the state system. That 
Caribbean scholars particularly, were so sensitive to the congenital weaknesses of micro­
states is not surprising. They were starkly faced with the most dramatic asymmetries of 
power in a region which the world’s dominant power regarded as its backyard and where 
Jiistorically it had rarely been inhibited in exercising whatever discipline was necessary for 
recalcitrant small states within its purview. But the analysis of micro-state weakness iij 
these early years, indeed the alleged non-viability of micro-states, was assessed within the 
framework of models that were largely extraneous to the experience and contemporary 
situation of these smallest of states. In terms of issues of foreign policy and security, for 
example, the underlying and tacit bench mark was that of a large, self-driven and 
unyielding state. To what extent this abstraction could be generalised even within the 
European state system was questionable. These pure models of independence, and 
viability, the ghosts of another era, were echoed in any discussion of self-reliant economic 
development
In recent years, more and more students of very small states are questioning the 
appropriateness of such models, both political and economic, in assessing the
opportunities and the prospects for micro-states and other very small jurisdictions in the 
contemporary world. There is, if you like, a backlash against the wholesale import of 
models of development and diplomatic practice that bear no relationship to the specific 
tieeds and opportunities for very small jurisdictions in the contemporary world. We will 
return to this theme both in this discussion, in subsequent chapters and certainly in the 
conclusion. Suffice it to note at this point, that if inappropriate models and inappropriate 
expectations and objectives have discoloured the analysis of micro-state prospects in the 
international system, then much of this is rooted in the wrong-headedness of notions of 
viability which exaggerate weaknesses while obscuring constructive options.
The central problem with the concept of viability, and certainly with its most 
familiar explication, David Vital’s conception that ‘the viable state is one which can 
withstand stress on one hand and pursue policies of its own devising on the other.”40 
Rooted as it is in the Israeli experience, it seems completely irrelevant in a world of micro­
states. The notion of viability is riddled with inconsistencies wherever it is applied. It will 
inevitably disappoint those who expect it to provide a reasonable standard for 
distinguishing societies and jurisdictions according to systematic criteria. Yet the concept 
of viability is anything but systematic. It is relative and contextual; its vague conditions 
are met in unexpected circumstances, and difficult to recognise in others. More important, 
it is an ‘bxtemal judgement,” 41 conceived in the metropolitan centres, though it may very 
well be adopted by the timid within the small territories themselves. But, as Jake Jacobs
40 David Vital, The Inequality o f States (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 4.
41 Mike Faber, ^Island Micro States: Problems of Viability,” The Round Table no. 292 (October, 1984), 
372.
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pointed out, metropolitan interpretations of viability have little relevance for the people of 
a given territory. From the outside world, he argued, The Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, to use a particularly controversial case, may not seem viable, but it is certainly 
viable for the citizens who live there and interact with their government on a day to day 
basis. For Jacobs, then, viablility is a “seductive chimera ”42 For others, like Fawzi 
Mellah, it is a concept deeply rooted in both Realist traditions of Western political science 
and conventional market models of the economy.43 If the concept had any value at all, it 
would be within a more modest definition of survivability, in keeping with Patrick 
Emmanuel’s definition, that is "surviving and functioning in a changing environment."44 
That modest interpretation is relevant for micro-states at the close of the century. As 
Tony Payne noted, any other consideration is now a matter of historical record. Whether 
micro-states might have chosen a wiser course is another issue45. But certainly they have 
justified their right to exist and for a large number of scholars they are here to stay.46
42Jake Jacobs, “This Question of Viability: a coup de main,” a paper presented to the International 
Conference on Islands and Small States, sponsored by the Foundation for International Studies, the 
University of Malta, Valletta, Malta 23-25 May, 1991.
43 Mellah defiantly and, given subsequent events, poignantly rejected such a ‘reductionist’ concept in 
judging the international role and durability of his native Kuwait Minch, he argued,^was more viable than 
most states in the region.
Fawzi Mellah, “Is Kuwait a ‘Small State’? Reflections on the Notion of Viability of Small Nations,” in 
Kaminarides, Briguglio and Hoogendonk (eds.), op. cit „ esp. pp. 116-121.
^Patrick Emmanuel, ‘'Independence and Viability: Elements of Analysis,” in Vaughan A. Lewis (ed.), 
Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean (Kingston: Institute of Social and 
Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1976), p. 3.
45 Tony Payne, “Of beauty, vulnerability and politics: survival in the Caribbean,” Third World Affairs 
(1987), 2^2.
46 M. S. Rajan, “Small States and the Sovereign-Nation-State System,” International Studies XXV 
(Number 1, January-March, 1988), 7-8.
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The issue of viajbility, then, is largely behind us but a concern for the inherent 
weakness of very small states continues to dominate the literature. Now the emphasis is 
not so much on absolute criteria wedded to predictions of survival, but rather on the 
quality of independent statehood and the prospects for reducing constraints while 
maximising opportunities. The focus now is on the vulnerability of very small states 
which, while still discouraging in many respects, represents at least a constructive step 
beyond idle ruminations about the survival of small states, ruminations which seem all the 
more unconvincing given the ongoing centrifugal trends at play in the international system.
Much of the concern for very small states and much of the analysis of their weaknesses 
has been within the context of Commonwealth sources both in terms of Commonwealth 
bodies and Commonwealth based research activities. This is not surprising since it would 
not be an exaggeration to describe the Commonwealth as a largely micro-state grouping, 
home as it is to some 25 micro-states. If we also consider the number of genuinely self- 
governing and autonomous very small dependencies within the Commonwealth then the 
reach of the Commonwealth into the problems of very small jurisdictions is unparalleled.47
The Institute of Commonwealth Studies produced one of the first comparative studies 
of very small jurisdictions, a still regularly cited collection which addressed the problems 
of small size across a wide range of concerns.48 In this sense, it would be a genuine
47Among the Secretariat’s many publications concerning a wide range of issues especially relevant to its 
smallest members, one series is particularly helpful for the students of small states since it includes data 
for both Commonwealth and non-Commonwealfh states.
Small States: Economic Review and Basic Statistics (London: The Commonwealth Secretariat, II, May, 
1996).
48Burton Benedict (ed.), Problems o f Smaller Territories (London: University of London, the Athlone 
Press, 1967).
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precursor for much of the literature of the last decade. Moreover, the collection was all 
the more insightful for including established European cases (Luxembourg) along side 
developing territories (British Honduras, Swaziland and Polynesia). This broad, inclusive 
approach is one which we stress throughout this study.
It was in the Commonwealth small states themselves, particularly in the Caribbean, and 
in the Secretariat, the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and the pages of The Round 
Table that central attention was given to the problems and options facing very small new 
states. For instance, many of the themes which had been explored at the Lisbon 
Conference in terms of the consequences of small size, albeit for much larger states, were 
treated with a micro-state focus in early works by William Demas.49 His conclusions that 
the small size and the openness of micro-state economies would force a strategy of 
accommodation with international capitalism was central to a fierce debate throughout 
the Commonwealth Caribbean, not only in the pages of academic journals, but among 
Commonwealth Caribbean political leaders. Those challenging Demas’ analysis argued 
that small economies were not necessarily locked into the straitjackets of structural 
dependence if they pursued bold and genuinely self-reliant strategies of development 
particularly in collaboration with other small states.50
49Wiliiam G. Demas, The Economics o f Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the 
Caribbean (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965).
50 Note Alister Mclnyre’s distinction between structural and functional dependence in a  volume of essays 
which captures much of the spirit of the debate.
Alister McIntyre, "Some Issues of Trade Policy in the West Indies," in N. Girvan and P. Jefferson (eds.) 
Readings in the Political Economy o f the Caribbean (Mona, Jamaica: New World Group, 1971), pp. 165- 
183.
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The first official Commonwealth recognition of the problems facing its very small 
members, particularly the island micro-states, was at a meeting of Finance Ministers ip 
Barbados in 1977. Prior to that a number of Commonwealth conferences and seminars 
had explored problems of very small size. Now, however, the issue captured the attention 
Qf Commonwealth leaders. It has been a priority concern for the Secretariat in the years 
since the 1979 Lusaka Heads of Government meeting which endorsed the Secretariat’s 
programme to seek ways for the smallest states to overcome the concomitant problems of 
small size, remote location and limited resources.
However, it was the Grenada Crisis of 1983 which lent such urgency to the issue of 
micro-states and their prospects in the international system. To be sure, the physical 
vulnerability and geopolitical precariousness of so many very small territories had been 
evident throughout the period of decolonisation: the annexation of Goa, the absorption of 
West Irian, the integration of Sikkim, and certainly the invasions of East Timor, Western 
Sahara and the Falkland Islands. But, as worrying as these cases were for many micro- 
states whose sovereignty was only recently granted, particularly for the many very small 
states which faced recurring and often explicit irredentist threats, these were, in the end, 
jdisputes within the context of the decolonisation process. The contest was one of state 
succession. The invasion of Grenada, however, was the first occasion when a sovereign 
micro-state found itself in open conflict with a major power. Though the United States 
role had the support and collaboration of some if not all the Commonwealth Caribbean 
States, and though the mission might have even been judged to be humanitarian and 
constructive in the end, given the apparent support of the Grenadian people for a
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restoration of democratic government, it still drew considerable criticism both within the 
region and from Great Britain and her Western European partners. Whatever the long 
term consequences of the invasion and whatever the legal arguments mustered for military 
intervention, the events of October 1983 demonstrated vividly the asymmetries of power 
between very small states and major powers particularly when they share living space 
within the same region. The lessons were clear: very small states pursue independent 
policies and partnerships in the global system at their peril. If ever there was a case to 
arouse the concerns of both students of small states and the political leaders of micro­
states, Grenada certainly served as such a catalyst.
Moreover, the invasion was seen to represent a possible watershed for the micro-states 
of the Caribbean: the clear replacement of British influence in the region with that of the 
United States,5indeed the “deepening and widening” of American hegemony in the 
Caribbean basin,52 the further introduction of the Cold War into the Commonwealth 
Caribbean,53 the possible militarisation of hitherto staunchly civil regimes,54 the deleterious
51 This was the view of Tom Adams, then prime minister of Barbados.
Paul Sutton, “The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean,” Journal o f Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics XXXI (No. 2), 14.
Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 
1985), p. 180.
52 Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton and Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and Invasion (London: Croom 
Helm, 1984), pp. 224, 199-207.
53 Vaughan A. Lewis, “International, National and Regional Security Arrangements in the Caribbean,” 
in Anthony T. Bryan, J. Edward Greene, Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Peace Development and Security in 
the Caribbean (London: Macmillan, 1990), p.294.
54 Anthony P. Maingot, “The United States in the Caribbean: Geopolitics and the Bargaining Capacity of 
Small States,” in Bryan, Greene and Shaw (eds.). ibid., p.73.
Dion E. Phillips and Alma H. Young, “Towards an Understading of Militarization in the Third World 
and in the Caribbean,” in Alma H. Young and Dion E. Phillips (eds.), Militarization in the Non- 
Hispanic Caribbean (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1986), pp. 1-15.
37
impact on CARICOM including the exacerbation of divisions among Commonwealth 
Caribbean leaders and the likely weakening of regional co-operation,55 the defeat of 
socialism as an alternative strategy of political and economic development56 and the very 
real limitations of small state collective action.57
Following the events in Grenada, there was now an abiding concern in the literature 
for the security dilemmas of very small states. The evidence for their physical vulnerability 
was not confined to Grenada alone. The dangers of mercenary led invasions were 
apparent in the Seychelles, the Comoros and the Maldives, What was striking for so many 
Observers was that these states could be overrun or their governments overthrown by 
literally a few dozen armed men. It was estimated that Bernard Coard likely had fewer 
ihan 50 armed supporters to violently overthrow the government of his erstwhile 
colleague,58 Attention was now given to the geopolitical weaknesses of micro-states: the 
lack of a defensible hinterland,59 the inability to police bays and inlets or remote islands in 
the case of archipelagic states, the lack of intelligence-gathering facilities and resources for 
surveillance and policing,60 and the need for technical assistance and training for police 
forces, paramilitary units and the coast guard. 61 And greater attention was now directed
55 Payne, Sutton and Thorndike, op. cit., pp. 208-213.
56Ibid., pp. 213-224.
57Maingot, op. cit., p. 72.
58 George H. Quester, “Trouble in the Islands: Defending the Micro-States,” International Security VIII 
(Na 2, FalL1983), 161.
59 Ibid.
60 William M. Sutherland, “Struggle for sovereignty: self-determination and vulnerability in the Pacific 
islands,” Third World Affairs (1987), 228.
to the security threats increasingly posed by drug runners, arms dealers, money launderers, 
illegal refugees and a host of non-conventional invasion threats.62 Indeed, the prime 
minister of Belize conceded that the drugs trade was a greater threat to his country’s 
integrity than Guatemala’s irredentism!63
In the years immediately following the Grenada Crisis, several major studies explored 
these areas of micro-state insecurity with a clearly heightened consciousness. The 
Commonwealth Consultative Group’s assessment for the Commonwealth Secretariat was 
both comprehensive in its description of micro-state vulnerabilities and forward-looking in 
its suggestions for bi-lateral, regional, Commonwealth and United Nations support for 
micro-states.64 Some of these proposals, regional security arrangements for example, or 
the identification of very small states as a special class requiring particular consideration 
within the United Nations, have not been taken up with vigour or notable success. But 
many of the more modest suggestions for technical assistance and co-operation are 
constructive ways of meeting the security dilemma for many micro-states.
61 The Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society (London: 
Commonwealth Secretariat:1985), pp. 51-52.
62 Edward Dommen, “Reflections on the Security of Small Island Countries,” Journal o f World Trade 
Law XX (I), Jan.-Feb., 1986, 10.
Anthony Payne, “The Politics of Small State Security in the Pacific,” Journal o f Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics XXXI (No. 2), 126.
Paul Sutton, “The Politics of Small State Security in the Caribbean,” Journal o f Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics XXXI (No.2), 5, 22-23.
The Commonwealth Consultative Group, op. cit., p. 24.
Payne (1987), op. cit., 219.
63 The Commonwealth Consultative Group, op. cit., p. 27.
64Ibid.
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Concluding that “small is dangerous” a study group of The David Davies Memorial 
Institute of International Studies,65 identified many of the same areas of weakness and 
explored many of the same options for enhancing the security resources of micro-states. 
These abiding concerns were reflected across the literature, particularly within such micro­
state regions as the Commonwealth Caribbean. Of course, many of these anxieties were 
dramatically justified only a few years later with the Iraqi invasion and annexation of 
Kuwait in August 1990. In some respects, this episode was even more ominous for very 
small states than Grenada, as serious as that was. Not only was the level of destruction in 
Kuwait appalling, but this was an attempt not just to force a change of government but to 
eradicate the international legal personality of a sovereign state, a precedent which if it had 
Stood would have been cause for grave concern for other vulnerable small states across 
the globe. Of course, there are good reasons to believe that both the invasion and the 
rescue mission were exceptional events. Still, the fate of Kuwait seemed to justify the 
preoccupation of both the academic and the international public policy communities in the 
Security problems of micro-states which had surfaced in the wake of the Grenada crisis.
The notion of security was soon expanded to embrace a wide range of concerns; 
territorial integrity and political autonomy, economic freedom and security and 
environmental protection.66 Paul Sutton and Anthony Payne argue that security must be 
seen in terms of the core values of a society which will include not only conventional
65 Sheila Harden (ed.), Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1985).
66 Edward Dommen, “Reflections on the Security of Small Island Countries,” Journal o f World Trade 
Law XX (I), Jan.-Feb., 1986,10.
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concerns of territorial integrity and military defensibility, but the economic well-being of 
the society and the protection of its environment and its culture and identity. The threats 
to these very small states are qualitatively different than those facing developed countries. 
Moreover, the threats can be “difficult to detect” and “ambiguous in their source and 
intensity.”67
The argument that the security of micro-states should be seen in a broader context was 
reflected in a now abiding concern with the vulnerability of very small states across the 
broadest range of issue areas. Indeed, the identification of areas of vulnerability have 
seemed to involve an ever-widening catalogue of concerns: a list which has expanded 
from Dolman’s ten development constraints,68 Diggines’ set of 12 problems69, Jake 
Jacobs’ list of 1970 to Kaminarides’ identification of some 29 constraints facing very small 
states.71
In many ways it is a litany of woes. The tone throughout the late 1980’s and early 
J990’s was one of overwhelming weakness for micro-states on all fronts. In addition to 
the military and criminal threats which micro-states face from drug dealers, to Mafia
Paul Sutton and Anthony Payne, “Lilliput under Threat: the Security Problems of Small Island and 
Enclave Developing States,” Political Studies, XLI (1993), 579-580.
68 A. J. Dolman, “Paradise Lost? The Past Performance and Future Prospects of Small Island Developing 
Countries, in E. C. Dommen and P. L. Hein (eds.), States, Microstates and Islands (London: Croom 
Helm, 1985), pp. 40-69.
69C.E. Diggines, “The Problems of Small States,” The Round Table no. 295, July, 1985, 191-205.
70 Jake Jacobs, “The Economic Development of Small Countries,” in John Kaminarides, Lino Briguglio, 
Henk N. Hoogendonk (eds.), The Economic Development o f Small Countries: Problems, Strategies and 
Policies (Delft, Eburon, 1989), pp. 84-88.
71 John Kamanarides, “The Small Developing Countries: An Introduction,” ibid.,xii-xiv.
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incursions, resource pirates and long distance trawlers in their newly awarded Exclusive 
Economic Zones, they are also burdened with the familiar constraints of very small 
economies: limited resources; often monocultural export sectors vulnerable to external 
price fluctuations and other shocks; diseconomies of scale in most areas of economic 
activity thus limiting prospects for diversification; chronic balance of payments problems 
resulting from an excessive dependence on imports and unfavourable terms of trade for 
their exports; high degrees of both commodity and geographic concentration in their 
export trade; remoteness and high transport costs; an inadequate pool of domestic skills 
and expertise the consequence of limited local educational opportunities; an excessive 
dependence on official development assistance often linked to problems of gaining access 
to appropriate types of technical assistance; a serious bargaining disadvantage in highly 
asymmetrical relations with external sources of investment, banks and multinational 
corporations and dependence on uncontrollable overseas consumption patterns and 
foreign government policies which lend insecurity even in those sectors which may offer 
prospects for diversification: tourism, and off-shore finance for example.
To these economic constraints are added social and political weaknesses which 
undermine the micro-state’s capacity to ensure its interests most effectively in the 
international system; the intimate face to face social relations of very small societies and 
the ubiquitousness of government; the difficulties of achieving a merit system in a society 
given to personalism, clientism and bossism; the temptations for excessive political 
interference in administrative decision-making; limited career opportunities thus 
encouraging outward migration and a brain drain. Further, micro-states, particularly
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island micro-states, are geologically fragile and prone to a variety of natural catastrophes 
which can have grotesquely disproportionate effect? on a micro-state’s economy and 
inffasructure whether it is a hurricane in St. Lucia or a volcano in Iceland or global 
warming in the Maldives.
There is also what Fawzi Mellah has termed “the smallness syndrome,” a handicap 
which has been particularly recurring in the experience of his native Kuwait: a sense of 
abiding danger and weakness which is itself inhibiting and enervating for political leaders 
in very small societies.72
Perhaps this exploration of micro-state vulnerability reached its apex with the 
publication of Lino Briguglio’s UNCTAD commissioned “Vulnerability Index.” 73 As 
with so many of these studies, the focus is principally on island micro-states and thus, the 
problem of distinguishing islandness from smallness remains. Moreover, the exercise is still 
incomplete both for island micro-states and for their continental counterparts which are 
included for comparative purposes. Tuvalu, Nauru, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, 
Palau, Sao Tome and Principe, Qatar, Brunei, Djibouti, Luxembourg and and the other 
continental European micro-states are not included in the current index. However, the 
index represents a valuable contribution to a more rigorous and perhaps less 
impressionistic assessment of the nature of micro-state vulnerability. But by its very nature
72 Fawzi Mellah, “Is Kuwait a ‘Small State?” Reflections on the Notion of ‘Viability’ of Small States,” 
ibid., 113-122,
73 Lino Briguglio, “Small Island Developing States and Their Economic Vulnerabilities,” World 
Development XX in  (No. 9, 1995, 1615-1632.
in  some respects this exercise is a mirror image of those efforts to find hard indices of viability'. Note 
particularly
Francois Doumenge, “Basic Criteria for Estimating the Viability of Small Island States,” in 
Kaminarides, Briguglio and Hoogendonk (eds.), op. cit. pp. 39-56.
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and focu5, it cannot in itself indicate the other side of the picture, that is a more positive 
assessment of micro-state prospects in a changing global environment.
To be sure, the advantages of small size are not entirely overlooked even among 
those scholars somewhat numbed by the experience of Grenada, Much emphasis has been 
given, for example, to the presumed cohesion of small societies which tends to promote a 
strong sense of national solidarity, an asset which makes “subversion by stealth” less 
likely.74 Such solidarity also contributes to early levels of consensus.75 The potential harm 
of certain courses of action for the community as a whole is more readily recognised. 
This gives the small society the advantage of resilience in the face of common dangers.76 It 
is of particular value if very small societies must confront, as many of them have, painful 
demands for adjustment. Changes in the bases of the Icelandic and Maltese economies, for 
example, have depended on just such resilience among the citizenry. Paul Streeten has 
suggested that these factors of resilience, which could be a skilled and an adaptable labour 
force, attractive conditions of political stability and the absence of red tape, can go a long 
way to giving many small economies a competitive advantage in the search for 
investment.77 Others have stressed the relative invisibility of small players which
74 Robert C. Kiste and R. A. Herr, The Potential for Soviet Penetration o f the South Pacific Islands: An 
Assessment (Washington, D.Q.: U.S. Department of State, 1984), p. 6.
75 Jeff Richards, “Micro-states: A Specific Form of Polity?,” Politics X (No. 1, 1990), 44-45.
Dag Anckar takes exception these assumptions of small state homogeneity. In a comparative study he 
identifies a sufficient number of cases where homogeneity is low that one is bound to question the 
generalisation.
Dag Anckar, “Small is Homogeneous: Myth or Reality,” paper presented to the 29th Annual Meeting 
of the Finnish Political Science Association, Helsinki, 9-10 January, 1997.
76 A. Elek, H. Hill and S. R. Tabor, “Liberalisation and Diversification in a Small Island Economy: Fiji 
since the 1987 Coup,” World Development XXI (No. 5, 1993), 749-769.
77 Streeten, op. cit., 201.
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effectively puts them beyond the urgent concerns of major powers, even perhaps beyond 
view. This can allow for policy initiatives that would not be as easily tolerated in more 
visible settings.78 Very small states, because their interests are not so dispersed, can focus 
all of their energies on particular target players and here the clever and manipulative use 
of their diplomatic skills may compensate for structural weaknesses.79
Moreover, there is a growing tendency to assess this litany of woes, the misery index 
of vulnerability, against the underlying premises of the analysis. Many of these arguments 
£re rooted in theories and models of development based on the experience of large, 
developed states. For Godfrey Baldacchino, for example, the willingness of small state 
leaders and scholars to accept these models without question reflects a tragic gullibility on 
their part. It has also discouraged the development of home grown analysis.80 Perhaps 
most dramatic is the work of Geoffrey Bertram who has virtually turned conventional 
orthodoxies upside down. In assessing the rentier economies of the South Pacific, for 
example, Bertram argues that such sources of income as the remittances from migrants, 
the exploitation of global markets in philately, tourism and off-shore banking are not 
necessarily indices of deepening weakness and vulnerability. They are the foundations of 
the modem economy in these societies. And they are entirely in keeping with the 
objectives of sustainable development!81
78 Robert O. Keohane, “Economic Dependence and the Self-Directed Small State,” Jerusalem Journal o f 
International Relations Vf(No. 2, 1982),56-59.
79 Dommen, op. cit., 117.
80 Godfrey Baldacchino, “Between Scylla and Carybdis: The Track Record for Very Small, Insular 
Economies,” in David Milne (ed.), Constitutional Status and Economic Space in Very Small Jurisdictions 
forthcoming.
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In recent years, the literature on micro-states has reflected this more optimistic reading 
of their circumstances. Surely, they continue to face many of the problems alluded to thus 
far. But they also enjoy the supports, both at the regional and global levels, of ap 
international system marked by unprecedented levels of institutional co-operation. Indeed, 
as both Scottish and Quebecois nationalists have argued, their respective regional suppotl 
systems have actually strengthened their arguments for separate independence. There is 
no doubt that many of the world’s smallest states rely on a remarkable array of 
programmes for information, technical assistance and international access. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that separate independence would indeed have been unlikely were 
it not for the existence of such supports. Clearly, for the micro-states of the 
Commonwealth the fact that so many Commonwealth programmes are highly sensitive to 
the needs of the smallest members gives those states incalculable resources in engaging the 
international economy.
Globalisation too is recently being viewed not just as a new set of dangers with 
threats of marginalisation but also as a set of opportunities for very small jurisdictions to 
exploit niches. And only tiny niches are necessary, in an increasingly complex global 
economy. The recent work of Harvey Armstrong and Robert Read, for example, with 
their rigorous comparative economic analysis of small jurisdictions, suggests that many 
micro-states, particularly in Europe, are enjoying higher economic performances and 
greater levels of prosperity than those contiguous small regions which lack jurisdictional
81 Geoffrey Bertram, “Sustainable Development in Pacific Micro-economies,” World Development XIV 
(1986), 809-822.
Geoffrey Bertram, “Sustainability, Aid, and Material Welfare in Small South Pacific Island 
Economies, 1900-1990,” World Development XXL (No. 2, 1993), 247-258.
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identity and competence.82 Recent emphasis in the literature then reflects a greater 
disposition to opportunity and a willingness to challenge conventional assumptions of 
development, security and diplomatic practice which animate the arguments for small state 
vulnerability ,83
The Direction and Structure of this Study
This study is as much directed to the scope of opportunity for micro-states in the post­
war world as it is sensitive to the constraints which continue to hamper their international 
relations. Indeed, the course of the research has unsurfaced often surprising evidence of 
the continuing successful integration of these states into the global system. For a 
significant number, post-independence developments have not borne out the deep 
anxieties of many serious and conscientious observers in the early stages of decolonisation. 
The thrust of our argument, then, is that an evolving international system offers a range of 
supports and opportunities for micro-states which increasingly give substance to the 
capacities and prerogatives presumed in their sovereignty. Indeed, sovereignty itself is in 
many respects the currency by which they can augment their autonomy and enhance their 
economic well-being.
82 Harvey Armstrong and Robert Read, “Western European Micro-States and EU Autonomous Regions: 
The Advantages of Size and Sovereignty,” World Development XXIII (No. 7, 1995), 1229-1245.
83 In some cases the enthusiastic tone for very small jurisdictions is reminiscent of the work of Leopold 
Kohr.
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Small is Beautiful and Efficient: The Case for Secession,” Telos CVII 
(Spring, 1996), 93-101.
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The dissertation attempts to present a comprehensive picture of micro-state 
development in the post-war world over three main issue-areas: questions of legitimacy 
and status reinforcement; problems of engagement, representation and participation in the 
mainstream of international diplomacy and challenges of diversification and dependence 
management in the international economic relations of micro-states. The study represents 
a different approach than most of the existing literature in its emphasis on development 
patterns of micro-state participation over the broad period of the post-war years. Not 
only did the unexpected proliferation of micro-states in the 1960’s and 1970’s alter the 
international landscape, it also gradually overturned conventional prejudices concerning 
the nature of statehood, as conditions for participation themselves changed. It is useful to 
consider this broad time frame, to reflect upon an earlier climate which gave rise to 
scepticism, anxiety and even despair if we are to appreciate fully the opportunities which 
are open to micro-states in the closing years of the 1990’s. Much of the literature is as 
limited in time frame as it is in geographic scope. It is not surprising then that in the 
immediate aftermath of the Grenada crisis, it was difficult to see beyond the overwhelming 
asymmetries of power that seemed to frustrate the expectations and aspirations of very 
small states at every turn. But there has been a profound change in the international 
climate over the last forty years, a change which now presents new conditions for micro- 
states, even the smallest European micro-states, to be integrated more fully into the 
international system, often with unexpected opportunities for promoting their interests. 
These changes have affected all three areas under consideration in this study: status 
reinforcement, diplomatic engagement and economic diversification. Our focus throughout
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is to explore the value of status itself, jurisdiction as a resource for very small states, in 
their efforts to take advantage of global changes which favour their long term interests. 
By viewing our material against the broad tapestry of post-war history, we should be 
better placed to assess the consequences of very small size and the opportunities for 
ameliorating those constraints in a continually changing global milieu.
A second departure from almost all the literature thus far is our determination to adopt 
a universal basis for comparative analysis. Much of the literature is, of course, case-based. 
And a significant body of the comparative literature is region-focused. Both have yielded 
valuable insights into the particular inhibitions and limitations of very small size. Indeed, 
those insights may be all the more vivid for their close examination of unique settings 
within fairly intimate parameters of analysis. But, as we have already noted, the global 
comparative literature has been weaker for a lack of inclusiveness and universality. We 
have, throughout this study, included the experiences of the developed European micro­
states along with the very small states of the developing world. There is no demographic 
reason to exclude these states any longer, since there are a significant number of micro­
states with populations of less than 100,000. Moreover, since most of these states have 
experienced industrialisation and diversification only in recent years, there is the 
opportunity to seek parallels especially in terms of public policy initiatives and 
development strategies. The European states now engage the international system as fully 
as their Third World counterparts, particularly in targeted issue areas. Any comparative 
analysis of micro-state diplomacy should include all of the states within this group if we
are to have a fuller understanding of the impact of very small size on their international 
relations.
In short, the study offers a broad context of analysis, comprehensive both in its time 
frame and in the parameters of the micro-state class. Within that context we make use of a 
wide variety of examples and case studies, particularly in the chapters relating to perennial 
problems of status reinforcement, and a broad and detailed use of cross-comparative data 
for all 45 micro-states in both the sections on micro-state diplomacy and micro-state 
international economic relations. In both the diplomatic and economic sections of the 
study we have used exhaustive comparative data for some 40 states in the next population 
class, that is states between one and six million. This provides a perspective on the 
relative impact of small size between the very small and the small, a perspective which 
thus far is not available in the existing literature.
The dissertation is structured around the following three sections.
(a) The System Dependence o f Micro-States: Problems o f Status and Legitimacy
The first argument is a familiar one in any discussion of small states: Because of the 
vulnerabilities inherent in very small size, micro-states will stress those values and 
practices at the international level which reinforce their status as sovereign and equal 
members of the international community.
The indisputability of a state's legal status may be seen as a front line of defence. 
Typically lacking even rudimentary military forces, micro-states rely largely on tacit, and 
occasionally explicit agreements with friendly powers, the restraints of international law 
and the inhibitions which potential adversaries are likely to face in international
organisations. A state with a strong case for its own existence will be better positioned to 
exploit the norms of the international system to prevent its demise than a state where 
separate independence has always been viewed sceptically, even among sympathetic 
powers. Of course, in the face of a determined adversary and the counter-interests of 
major powers, even an appeal to conscience and law could mean little. However, to the 
extent that status itself can be a source of security, then a state's reserve of legitimacy is a 
critical issue. The survival of micro-states depends far more on systemic factors than on 
their own capacities and most important among those are the rules and diplomatic 
practices which support the separate independence of small and very small states. 
Consequently, these states give priority to those international bodies, particularly the 
United Nations system, the Commonwealth and major regional organisations, which serve 
as constant acknowledgements of their sovereignty and equality in international law.
At first glance the status of micro-states would now seem to be secure. Universal 
acceptance of the doctrine of self-determination for all colonial peoples would appear to 
have established the rights of the very small beyond doubt. The process of decolonisation 
itself has undermined prejudices of viability and traditional views of statehood which have 
so regularly dominated any discussion of micro-states. Still, the status of very small states 
in the international system has been typically fraught with controversy. Until very 
recently the very notion of separate independence for most of these states was seen as 
absurd. Their full participation in international organisations was certainly problematic. 
And for many micro-states, confidence in their eventual survival is undermined by an 
anxious recognition of the interests, and sometimes long-standing claims, of larger
neighbouring states. Indeed, as we have already noted, the experiences of Kuwait and 
Grenada, recent as they are, have served as sobering reminders of the continuing 
vulnerability of very small states even when international norms and organisations serve to 
support their sovereignty.
We have approached these problems of status in the first section of this study as 
questions of international legitimacy. A problem of legitimacy arises when there are 
discrepancies between formal status and real status. As Lagos pointed out in his analysis 
of international stratification, real status is determined by both objective and subjective 
evaluations.84 A state's legitimacy is questionable if the reality of its position does not 
appear to be in accord with existing assumptions of sovereignty. Legitimacy is also 
undermined if the legal sovereignty of a state is seen to be inimical to prevailing norms in 
the international system.
The first chapter is an analysis of the concept of legitimacy within the context of the 
historical development and contemporary usage of the principle of sovereignty. If 
sovereignty is understood as a legal acknowledgement of actual independence, micro­
states can appear as anomalies whose real status should be understood to be something 
different from, if not less than, normal states. Similarly, when sovereignty is viewed as the 
culmination of self-determination, micro-states may be seen as remnants of larger states in 
transition rather than as nations deserving the equality which sovereignty accords.
Chapter Two examines the questions of status which attend the issue of micro-state 
participation in international organisations in the twentieth century. Resistance to
84Gustavo Lagos, International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1963), pp. 22-29.
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unconditional universal membership involved both aspects of the legitimacy question, 
Whatever their formal status, micro-states were not seen to possess the capabilities which 
would make their membership a practical option for international organisations. 
Moreover, stretching the equality of states doctrine to this extent appeared as unfair as it 
was impractical. This chapter is a review of the historical experience of very small states 
in confronting these reservations and in winning acceptance for their status in the 
assemblies of the international community.
The third chapter examines the legitimacy question within the context of the principle 
of national self-determination. It is focused on the problems of applying the principle to 
extremely small and fragmentary dependencies when there is a contest of claims. While 
those challenging separate independence in these cases are also likely to question the lack 
of resources and capabilities commensurate with statehood, their major attack is directed 
to the historical and geographic credentials of these communities as national peoples. We 
look at the experience of three very small dependent territories-East Timor, Western 
Sahara, and Belize-where separate independence, while fully meeting the provisions of 
latter day United Nations doctrine and practice, was, nonetheless, challenged as a violation 
of larger principles of territorial integrity. In all three cases we see how crucial the 
consolidation of legitimacy is for controversial small territories seeking a separate future 
in the international system.
The fourth and final chapter in this section examines how very small size underscores 
Other sources of the legitimacy problem; territorial and geopolitical liabilities, the 
questionable historical and social foundations of statehood and ambiguous and unequal
treaty relationships. In particular we review the problems of status and legitimacy in 
Kuwait, The Gambia and Bhutan. The argument is not that micro-states alone confront 
problems of legitimacy or that the credentials of all micro-states are open to question and 
challenge. Rather, there are particular aspects of the legitimacy issue which are directly 
related to the very small size of states, and these compound other sources of status 
weakness. Because some micro-states may be seen as states in name only, the 
consolidation of their legal status is a primary objective in their relations with other 
members of the international system. It is this formal status in international law which 
justifies their continued sovereignty just as it allows opportunities for carving out areas of 
actual independence, however modest they might be.
(b)The Limitations o f Very Small Size in the Scale and Direction o f Micro-state
Diplomacy
The ability of micro-states to cope with problems of status, and the potential for 
achieving some measure of real autonomy in both domestic and external policies, will 
depend largely on their diplomatic resources. International lawyers have emphasised the 
importance of the capacity to engage in international relations as an essential mark of 
sovereignty. The absence of a diplomatic service or the delegation of diplomatic powers 
to another state have usually meant a compromise of status. Similarly, some measure of 
diplomatic authority has allowed governments in dependent territories a degree of 
international personality, and even access to inter-governmental organisations,
approximating the privileges accorded sovereign states.
Among micro-states the question of diplomatic capability is not only important for 
' those controversial states which may face some challenge to their sovereignty. The 
capacity to diversify relations through active bi-lateral and multi-lateral diplomacy is 
crucial for governments which seek to reduce their large, or in some instances 
overwhelming, dependence on mentor powers. As most micro-states are developing 
economies, there are also high stakes in terms of development assistance and capital 
investment which largely depend on the ability to mount an effective diplomatic presence 
in foreign capitals and international organisations.
In the second section of the study, we turn to this aspect of micro-state international 
relations. Much more than other small states, micro-states engage in very few international 
relationships and are concerned with a narrow range of issue-areas. A micro-state 
typically concentrates its limited diplomatic resources on the relationship with its mentor 
power.
Not surprisingly, the very limited diplomatic capabilities of micro-states have led 
some observers to conclude that these states do not really engage in foreign policy at all. 
Chapter Five begins by examining the influence of the 'political realist' school in foreign 
policy theory, which accounts for these initial impressions. It also reviews those empirical 
studies which have attempted to validate theoretical assumptions about the impact of size: 
specifically typologies of foreign policy behaviour based on diplomatic exchange date and 
events-data research. At this early stage of the subject, diplomatic exchange date provides 
a more reliable profile of micro-state behaviour than events-data sources. The first section 
of this chapter concludes with an overview of the total volume of micro-state and small
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state relations based on patterns of diplomatic accreditation and membership in 
international organisations. Though it would be rash to argue that micro-states are unable 
to engage in foreign policy, there is, even in this initial and broad survey, clear evidence of 
a progressive correlation between small size and the scale of diplomatic activity. In the 
second part of this chapter we compare the level of micro-state diplomatic representation 
abroad to that of small states in the next population group. There are also great disparities 
between micro-states and other small states in their capacities to establish overseas 
missions and to maintain direct relations with other states and international organisations. 
There are also significant differences within the micro-state class itself. We assess the 
relevance of such factors as the size of the economy, the duration of independence and the 
geographical location of the state. We also examine the opportunities for expanding the 
base of micro-state relations with the outside world through such alternative diplomatic 
practices as multiple accreditation, co-operative arrangements with other states, and the 
qse of the consular system.
This chapter also considers the other side of micro-state diplomacy: the importance of 
resident accreditation in micro-state capitals. The diplomatic attention which a micro­
state receives is not only a measure of its international status. It also serves as a vital link 
to the outside world, supplementing the micro-state's own meagre diplomatic resources. 
Most micro-states host very few 'missions and som ereceive # o  jg^ent.aPSredit& tlon at 
all. This low level of diplomatic attention, particularly in sharp contrast to other small 
states, would seem to support the notion that micro-states are as peripheral and 
^consequential as they are weak and inactive. Though the overall pattern is one of
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neglect, there are still important distinctions within the micro-state class, such as the 
economic and strategic interests of other states, cultural and historical links, and the 
political leadership and ideological orientation of micro-state governments,
The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the direction of micro-state diplomacy 
and the relative importance of bi-lateral and multi-lateral commitments as evident in our 
comparative analysis of the data. Given the very limited diplomatic resources of micro­
states, total diplomatic interaction is confined to a few critical relationships. International 
organisations, particularly the United Nations and the Commonwealth, are a primary focus 
of attention. Both are important not only for status reinforcement but for development 
assistance, information resources, and access to the regional economic commissions 
Regional relationships are increasingly important, particularly in conference diplomacy, 
though there are great variations among the cluster areas of the micro-states group. Most 
critical, however, is the micro-state's relationship with its mentor power. Fox's argument 
that small state diplomacy is narrow or local in focus is particularly evident among micro­
states. The 'local' power may be a neighbouring state but more often it is the former 
.metropolitan power which still dominates the micro-state's economic interests and political 
orientation. In some instances, as in the Commonwealth Caribbean, the South Pacific, or 
in southern Africa, this relationship is shared with a dominant regional power or powers. 
The initial evidence clearly confirms assumptions that micro-state diplomacy is primarily 
focused on inter-governmental organisations and on bi-lateral relationships with mentor 
powers.
(c) The Economic Dependence o f Micro-states in the International System
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The final section of the study is directed to the proposition which may seem to be the 
most critical: Because of their very small size and limited resources, the international 
economic relations of micro-states are characterised by patterns of extreme dependence, 
with little opportunity for diversification and bleak prospects for genuine autonomy. 
Chapter Six is a review of the concept of dependence, particularly in the literature of 
dependency theory, and an examination of small size and problems of independent 
economic development. The central issue in this discussion is the extent to which the 
limitations of very small size are fundamental and structural, thus precluding strategies for 
the self-determination of national economic priorities.
Chapter Seven begins with a comparative assessment of micro-state trading patterns 
with that of other small states. It examines the overall importance of trade in micro-state 
economies and, more particularly, the levels of commodity concentration in micro-state 
export trade. One of the most striking indices of dependence is a narrow base of primary 
production for export and the consequent vulnerability of the very small economy to price 
fluctuation, product substitution and market change. These patterns of dependence for 
micro-states are extreme; in many cases dependence is underlined further by the low value 
of their few products and their marginal share of world production.
The depth of dependence is even clearer in the geographic concentration of micro­
state trade and sources of aid and investment. Micro-states are typically dependent on a 
single source of supply and a single market. Using the Hirschmann index of geographic 
concentration, we see the extent of micro-state trade dependence in comparison with other 
small states which are themselves largely dependent on a few trading partners. For micro­
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states* trade dependence is typically centred on the mentor power confirming patterns 
already apparent in the previous section. However, the data also suggests recent 
encouraging trends to diversification in both the commodity and geographic indices of 
micro-state export trade.
When we turn to patterns of capital investment and development assistance the initial 
impression is again one of extreme dependence among the developing economies of the 
micro-state group. In the final section of this chapter we consider the problems which 
micro-states face in the competition for investment and aid* the relative significance of bi­
lateral and multilateral assistance, and the opportunities for diversification. And we 
consider whether the character of micro-state trade and capital flows support the 
scepticism of those who view small size as imposing chronic and permanent obstacles to 
self-reliant development.
The conclusion reviews our general hypotheses on the impact of very small size in 
the international relations of micro-states and those particular propositions which served 
as the focus for research in this study. Much more than other small states, there is a want 
p f  confidence and a still contingent status which micro-states bring to international 
politics, an early ceiling on the extent of their participation, and limited opportunities for 
diversification and independence. However, it is by no means clear that these disabilities 
doom micro-states to a palsied existence on the margins of an indulgent international 
system. On the contrary, the new international climate and the new global economy 
present as many opportunities for very small states as they do constraints. The conclusion 
is an appropriate time to review the balance of options facing micro-states, particularly
the advantages rooted in their newly won status. Our assessment will be within the context 
of themes developed in the literature thus far. But we also want to consider the prospects 
for micro-states against the backdrop of changes in the global milieu and within th^ 
context of our findings across the chapters of this study.
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TABLE I
MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO POPULATION
MICRO-STATES POPULATION
1 Mauritius 1,056,660a
2 Gambia 1,025,867b
3 Gabon 1,011,710b
4 Guinea-Bissau 943,000c
5 Guyana 739,553d
6 Cyprus 725,000e
7 Fiji 715,375f
8 Swaziland 681,059f
9 Djibouti 519,900g
10 Bahrain 508,037h
11 Qatar 486,000g
12 Comoros 446,817h
13 Suriname 404,31 Od
14 Luxembourg 384,400h
15 Solomon Islands 359,000
16 Equatorial Guinea 356,000d
17 Malta 345,0001
18 Cape Verde 341,991a
19 Iceland 262,193e
20 Brunei 260,482h
21 Barbados 257,082j
22 Bahamas 255,055a
23 Maldives 213,215a
24 Belize 189,774h
25 Vanuatu 175,000
26 Western Samoa 159,862h
27 St. Lucia 133,308h
28 S§o Tom6 and Principe 116,998h
29 St. Vincent and Grenadines 106,499h
30 Micronesia 100,749k
31 Grenada 94,806h
32 Tonga 94,649f
33 Kiribati 72,335a
34 Dominica 71,183h
35 Seychelles 68,5981
36 Antigua and Barbuda 62,992h
37 Andorra 54,507a
38 St. Kitts and Nevis 44,000m
39 Marshall Islands 43,380n
40 Monaco 29,876a
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TABLE I
MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO POPULATION
MICRO-STATES POPULATION
41 Liechtenstein 29,8680
42 San Marino 23,719e
43 Palau 15,122a
44 Naum 9,500d
45 Tuvalu 9,043h
46 Vatican City 1,000
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TABLE II
MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO 
~SIZE OF TERRITORY1
(square kilometres)
MICRO-STATES SIZE
1 Gabon 267,667
2 Guyana 214,969
3 Suriname 163,820
4 Iceland 103,000
5 Guinea-Bissau 38,125
6 Solomon Islands 28,370
7 Equatorial Guinea 28,051
8 Djibouti 23,963
9 Belize 22,963
10 Fiji 18,333
11 Swaziland 17,400
12 Bahamas 13,864
13 Vanuatu 12,190
14 Qatar 11,437
15 Gambia 11,295
16 Cyprus 9,251
17 Brunei 5,765
18 Cape Verde 4,033
19 Western Samoa 2,831
20 Luxembourg 2,586
21 Mauritius 2,040
22 Comoros 1,862
23 Palau 1,632
24 S3o Tom6 and Principe 1,001
25 Dominica 751
26 Tonga 748
27 Kiribati 717
28 Micronesia 701
29 Bahrain 688
30 St. Lucia 617
31 Antigua and Barbuda 482
32 Seychelles 455
33 Andorra 453
34 Barbados 430
35 St. Vincent and Grenadines 388
1 Statistical Yearbook 1993 (New York: United Nations, Department for 
Social Information and Policy Analysis, Statistical Division, 1995)
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TABLE II
MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO 
SIZE OF TERRITORY
(square kilometres)
MICRO-STATES SIZE
36 Grenada 345
37 Maldives 298
38 St. Kitts and Nevis 262
39 Malta 246
40 Marshall Islands 181
41 Liechtenstein 160
42 San Marino 61
43 Tuvalu 24
44 Nauru 21
45 Monaco 195ha
46 Vatican City 44ha
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TABLE III
MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO 
SIZE OF G.D.P.1
(in $US millions, 1992)
I MICRO-STATES $
1 Luxembourg 11,848
2 Qatar 7,473
3 Cyprus 6,639
4 Iceland 6,613
5 Gabon 4,864
6 Bahrain 4,364
7 Brunei 3,919
8 Bahamas 3,059
9 Mauritius 3,036
10 Suriname 2,807
11 Malta 2,705
12 Liechtenstein 1,529
13 Barbados 1,574
14 Fiji 1,407
15 Swaziland 955
16 Andorra 836
17 Monaco 64618 Djibouti 578
19 San Marino 485
20 Belize 468
21 Antigua and Barbuda 439
22 Seychelles 409
23 Cape Verde 385
24 Gambia 339
25 St. Lucia 302
26 Comoros 273
27 Guyana 239
28 Grenada 217
29 Solomon Islands 207
30 St. Vincent and Grenadines 193
31 Dominica 187
32 Equatorial Guinea 185
33 Vanuatu 180
34 Maldives 178
35 Nauru 163
1 Statistical Yearbook 1993 (New York: United Nations, Department for Social Information 
and Policy Analysis, Statistical Division, 1995) pp. 35-46.
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TABLE III
MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO 
SIZE OF G.D.P.
(in $US millions, 1992)
| MICRO-STATES $
36 Guinea-Bissau 134
37 St. Kitts and Nevis 131
38 Tonga 124
39 Western Samoa 123
40 Marshall Islands 79
41 Kiribati 39
42 Palau 31.5
43 S3o Tom§ and Principe 27
44 Tuvalu 9
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TABLE IV
MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO LEVELS OF 
PER CAPITA INCOME^
(in $US thousands, 1992)
IMICRO-STATES $
■
1 Liechtenstein 54,607
2 Luxembourg 31,343
3 Iceland 25,436
4 Monaco 23,082
5 San Marino 21,099
6 Nauru 18,111
7 Andorra 17,781
8 Qatar 16,497
9 Brunei 14,516
10 Bahamas 11,587
11 Cyprus 9,273
12 Bahrain 8,188
13 Malta 7,536
14 Suriname 6,408
15 Antigua and Barbuda 6,646
16 Barbados 6,078
17 Seychelles 5,684
18 Gabon 3,938
19 St. Kitts and Nevis 3,114
20 Mauritius 2,756
21 Dominica 2,594
22 Micronesia 2,484
23 Grenada 2,384
24 Belize 2,364
25 Palau 2,286
26 St. Lucia 2,206
27 Fiji 1,904
28 St. Vincent and Grenadines 1,771
29 Marshall Islands 1,618
30 Tonga 1,280
31 Djibouti 1,238
32 Swaziland 1,205
33 Vanuatu 1,149
34 Guinea-Bissau 1,071
35 Cape Verde 1,002
1 Statistical Yearbook 1993 (New York: United Nations, Department for Social 
Information and Policy Analysis, Statistical Division, 1995), pp. 35-46
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TABLE IV
MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO LEVELS OF 
PER CAPITA INCOME
(in $US thousands, 1992)
MICRO-STATES $
37 Tuvalu 713
38 Solomon Islands 606
39 Kiribati 528
4° Equatorial Guinea 502
41 Comoros 466
42 Gambia 374
43 Guyana 296
44 S3o Tom6 and Principe 218
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CHAPTER ONE
Sovereignty and the Question of Legitimacy:
Problems of Status for Micro-States in the 
International System
The initial and usually recurring theme which characterises any discussion of 
micro-states is the problematic nature of their sovereignty; the discrepancies between legal 
status and the limitations of very small size. Typically, micro-states have been described 
as 'ceremonial states',1 'statelets’ or ‘quasi-states'2 with formal credentials that bear little 
relationship to those powers normally associated with sovereign authority. Against 
traditional models of statehood they appear as caricatures. More often than not this is a 
perfunctory and instinctive response. It seems self-evident that these tiny states could 
hardly be 'genuinely' sovereign: No support beyond an appeal to common sense is thought 
to be necessary.3 In one of the earliest studies of micro-states Roger Fisher noted that 
"there is inevitably an attempt on the part of lawyers and others who look at the micro­
state problem to adopt the solution of Procustes, . . .  we tend to insist that a small entity 
fit the bed that we have constructed. If it is not big enough to be a traditional state, 'a 
viable international unit', then it should go back where it came from."4
]Ronald P. Barston (ed.), The Other Powers (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1973), p. 21.
2Harold and Margaret Sprout, Foundations o f International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand 
Co., Inc., 1962), p. 81.
3For example: "To speak of San Marino as a 'sovereign state' when its total area is only 38 square miles 
seems to strain the imagination."
Charles G. Fenwick, International Law (New York: Appleton-Centuiy-Crofts, Inc., 1948, 3rd ed. rev.), 
p. 114. In the closing days of decolonisation such candid incredulity gave way to more polite and 
circumspect language, though a sense of disbelief remained. Joseph Frankel, International Politics: 
Conflict and Harmony (London: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 37-38.
4Roger Fisher, "The Participation of Microstates in International Affairs," The American Society o f 
International Law-Proceedings, Washington, D.C. (April 25-27,1968), 166.
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This abiding scepticism about the reality of micro-state sovereignty is reflected not 
only in academic literature and popular journalism but in the practices of the international 
system. The traditional European micro-states have long confronted doubts which 
inhibited and limited their participation in international diplomacy. Much of their 
diplomatic activity was given to asserting the historical basis of and legal justification for 
their own international status.5 With the onset of decolonisation and the unexpected 
appearance of so many new micro-states, official and explicit doubts were muffled in the 
clamour for self-determination. But the long-term viability of statehood on a miniscule 
scale is still open to question.
The problematic nature of statehood in so many cases is a dominant characteristic 
of the contemporary international system. New states, but particularly new micro-states, 
appear as "more hope than actuality."6 Many exist within the shadow of opposing 
interests and with few military or economic capabilities, even in relation to other small 
states. The case for separate independence is often questionable in both practical and 
moral terms. For many of these tiny states, then, the consolidation of their legal status 
and the acceptance of their credentials of statehood are recurring and urgent issues. In 
these conditions, the durability of the state may be seen, as John Herz suggests, as a 
question of its legitimacy.7
We begin our examination of micro-states by considering those questions which 
might undermine their status in the international system and determine their survival as
5C. D'Olivier Farran, "The Position of Diminutive States in International Law," in Erik Briiel (and others, 
eds.), Intemationalrechtliche und Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen-Fetschrift fur Walter Schdtzel zu 
Seinem Geburtstag (Dusseldorf: Hermes, 1960), pp. 131-147.
Robert C. Good, "State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States," in 
Laurence W. Martin (ed.) Neutralism and Non-Alignment (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 3.
7John Herz, "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State," in 
James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, rev. ed., 
1969), p. 82.
71
separate entities. It is the concept of legitimacy as a dimension of statehood which is our 
central concern in this and the following three chapters. Initially, we explore the use of 
legitimacy as an analytical concept in international relations. More particularly, we focus 
on the problems of legitimacy for micro-states against the backdrop of the historical 
development and contemporary understanding of statehood and the principle of 
sovereignty in the international system. In the next chapter we assess the experience of 
tiny communities in asserting their case for separate existence and rooting their 
sovereignty in the international community of states.
The Legitimacy of States
When we speak of the legitimacy of a state in international relations we are 
referring to the justification for its existence in both practical and moral terms;8 the 
credentials of statehood. In the first sense legitimacy refers to an assessment of the state's 
capabilities. Can the state (or would-be state) act in the capacities normally understood to 
be the functions of a state? Here the emphasis is on viability: that is, "surviving and 
functioning in a changing environment."9 The capacity to fulfill the functions of statehood 
can be seen as a measure of a state's "survivability." A state with intrinsic disabilities may 
be viewed by other members of the international system (and even by its own subjects) as 
an aberration likely to succumb eventually to a more rational and capable political system. 
Legitimacy is withheld to the extent permanence is doubted.
8In discussing the legitimacy of governments, David Apter chose to see legitimacy as the composition of 
two sets of values: those which can be described as "consumatoiy," that is normative, and those which he 
calls "instrumental," that is utilitarian.
David Apter, The Politics o f Modernization (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965) pp. 83-87.
Patrick Emmanuel, "Independence and Viability: Elements of Analysis," in Vaughan A. Lewis (ed.), 
Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean (Kingston: Institute of Social and 
Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1976), p.3.
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But the legitimacy of a state is not only a reflection of its power and capacity. It is 
also a consideration of moral justification, of its ‘right’ to a separate destiny. The 
justification for a state's existence is a question of both domestic and international support. 
The internal basis of legitimacy reflects the extent to which the state is identified with 
primary community loyalties. Legitimacy is present if the state is believed to be " . . . the 
basis of which a particular group organizes its separate and distinct existence . . . "10 The 
international judgement of a state's legitimacy is based, in part, on an assessment of this 
evidence. It is also the belief that these majority sentiments can be accommodated within 
the framework of other principles, particularly commitments to the territorial integrity and 
historical claims of other peoples and states. It is the conviction that a particular 
community has a right to be constituted as a state and to enjoy the privileges of 
sovereignty and membership in the international system.
Legitimacy, then, is most evident if the separateness of the state as a sovereign 
community is seen to be in accord with prevailing norms of self-determination. This 
aspect of the legitimacy of the state is also an issue of viability. Clear domestic consensus 
in support of the state's separate independence, buttressed by a favourable international 
climate is particularly important in times of crisis when a state's survival is threatened by 
larger interests and alternative versions of a just settlement.
The legitimacy of the state in international relations refers, then, to the extent to 
which there is positive commitment to the state's right to exist and confidence in its ability 
to survive. The legitimate state is the state which is accepted as authentic, credible and, 
perhaps most important, durable. In this sense, the concept of legitimacy conveys more 
than the acceptance derived from legal recognition, though recognition and admission to
10Herz, op. cit.
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international organisations do invest even the most improbable states with at least some 
measure of legitimacy.
Every state jealously protects the rituals, symbols and privileges of its sovereign 
status. For some, the legal prerogatives of sovereignty may contribute in time to 
legitimacy where it is not yet confidently established. No state, then, is wholly illegitimate. 
However, when there are misgivings about a state's right to exist and about its likelihood 
of survival, a state can be said to suffer 'a crisis of legitimacy.' In such cases, self­
justification becomes a foreign policy priority, reflecting both the lack of confidence felt in 
the state itself and the perceived scepticism or indifference in the outside world.11 Behind 
the weakness of a state's credentials is the fear that the identity of the state will be 
surrendered to more persuasive claims or to more expedient interests. Legitimacy is a 
bulwark against expendability and for the smallest and weakest of states the appeal to the 
legitimacy of their independence is often their only defence in periods of challenge.
Sovereignty as the Basis of Statehood
We have suggested that legitimacy is a qualitative assessment of a state's status in 
international relations and is thus a notion distinct from that of the legal principle of 
sovereignty. Nonetheless, this usage of legitimacy only accentuates the complex web of 
assumptions and tenets which lie at the core of sovereignty itself. Sovereignty is 
traditionally and widely understood to be the most indispensable attribute of the state, but 
there has been little agreement as to its essence. A consideration of these shifts in 
emphasis and interpretation in the usage of sovereignty is central to assessing the initial 
problems of status for micro-states and the long-term issues of diplomatic and economic 
competence examined in the later chapters of this paper.
11 Good, op. cit., p. 8
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There are two prevailing themes in the historical development of sovereignty 
which are directly related to the international status of micro-states. First, sovereignty has 
been seen as the legal prerogatives derived from the possession of supreme power in the 
political system. Second, sovereignty has been viewed as the legal authority expressing 
the will or self-determination of the community. For micro-states, both interpretations of 
sovereignty pose difficult problems of legitimacy. The sovereignty of these tiny states has 
appeared questionable because the capabilities crucial to the exercise of this power are 
seen to be wanting. Moreover, micro-states are typically fragments of territory, small 
islands and enclaves whose separate sovereignty may seem absurd and pernicious when set 
aside larger claims to national self-determination. Diminuitive size is not reconciled easily 
with either the powers ascribed to the sovereign state or with claims for genuine 
nationhood. We will examine some of these particular cases in the next chapter.
(a) Sovereignty as Independent Power
Whatever the differences in the understanding of sovereignty and the assessment of 
its implications, the concept has always conveyed supremacy and finality of authority. 
"Sovereignty," noted one publicist, "is the power finally to divide and dispose."12 The 
notion that such a power exists within the state has been complemented by its corollary; 
sovereignty is the assertion of that authority's independence in relation to other organised 
political communities. As a theory of obligation within the state, sovereignty is fraught 
with controversy. It has been attacked as morally unacceptable,13 as irrelevant in 
practice,14 as impossibly indeterminate,15 and as logically inadequate.16 Nonetheless, the
12W.R. Bisschop, "Sovereignty,” British Year Book o f International Law, II (1921-22), 122.
13Jacques Maritain, Man and State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 28-53.
14The pluralists argued that the interdependence and complexity of modem social life preclude the concept 
of sovereignty as an exclusive attribute of state authority. "It is a matter of degree and not of kind that 
the State should find for its decrees more usual acceptance than those of any other association."
Harold J. Laski, Studies in the Problem o f Sovereignty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917), 
p. 17.
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development of sovereignty as a theory of obligation within the state has fundamentally 
influenced its understanding and usage as a principle of international relations.
The term sovereignty was first used for feudal chieftains and bore the connotation 
of excellent or highest.17 During the Middle Ages it referred to a variety of final 
authorities but it meant only superiority or appelate finality and not supremacy.18 It was 
not until 1557 that a coherent theory of sovereignty was woven in response to the 
establishment of separate and independent political authority in states. Bodin defined 
sovereignty as ". . . the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and
See also: E R .G . Greaves, The Foundations o f Political Theory (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltds.,
1966, 2nd ed.) pp. 11-30.
Hymen Ezra Cohen, Recent Theories o f Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937) 
pp. 38-56.
15"Is it (sovereignty) some organ of government, or the government in general, or the consitutional 
convention of the electorate, or the nation or State organically conceived, or the whole mass of the 
State's population organically regarded public opinion, sentiment, or will? Where is this ultimately 
controlling power, and how shall we communicate with it?"
C. E. Merriam, History o f the Theory o f Sovereignty Since Rousseau (New York: The Columbia 
University Press, 1900), pp. 17-21.
See also:
K. W. B. Middleton, "Sovereignty in Theory and Practice," in W. J. Stankiewicz, In Defense o f 
Sovereignty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 135.
16Sovereignty as a command theory fails because it must rely on the sanction of coercion that can not 
fully explain obligation.
The state can bring force to bear at need, only because it uses force exceptionally because normally it 
rests on something which is not force, and because the society, which alone can furnish it with force to 
use, approves of it being used in such cases.
J. L. Brierly, The Basis o f Obligation in International Law, ed. by Sir Hersh Lauterpacht and 
C. H. M. Waldock (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958), pp. 25-26.
17Johannes Mattem, Concepts o f State, Sovereignty and International Law, (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1928), p. 1.
The earliest definition of sovereignty, as distinct from common usage, can be traced to the Roman jurist 
Proculus who spoke of it as "that which is subject to the power of no other people." Proculus used this 
term in relation to "a foreign power." His influence on later Renaissance writings on political authority 
was not inconsiderable.
E. N. Van Kleffens, "Sovereignty in International Law," Recueil Des Cours, LXXXXII (1953), 16,
27-28.
18Georg Schwarzenberger, Power Politics (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1951,2nd ed.), p. 84.
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subjects in a Commonwealth."19 It was not to be confused with proprietal rights. 
Sovereignty was a quality which could only be held and exercised by the prince and his 
magistrates. It was a political authority, different in kind from any other claim to 
authority, for it was comprehensive and it was ultimate. It was the presence of such a 
power which constituted a political community.
The essential feature of this sovereign power was its exercise free of any consent.20 
Yet, while Bodin used both "absolute" and "supreme" to describe the powers of his 
sovereign, his understanding of this authority should be interpreted more modestly. The 
sovereign was bound to the laws of nature and God, and subject also to the Salic laws 
which constituted the customary laws of the kingdom and kingship.21 Given Bodin's 
understanding of these limitations, sovereign power could be described more accurately as 
superiority.
It was Hobbes who pursued the route from superiority to supremacy with such 
ruthless logic. Sovereignty was the means by which people could be saved from their own 
egocentricity.22 There could be no middle ground between complete anarchy and absolute
19Jean Bodin, The Six Books o f a Commonweale trans. by Richard Knolles (1606), ed. and intro, by 
Kenneth Douglas McRae (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1962), I, 8, p. 84.
20 Ibid., I  10, p. 159 '
2'lbid., I., 8, pp. 92, 95.
Positivist critics have viewed such limits as simply decisions of conscience, ethical imperatives but not 
legal limitations. Yet, as Max Adams Shepard noted, this argument denies the legality of medieval law 
because it was not issued as command backed by coerceive sanction. For Bodin, the dictates of natural 
law were legal imperatives. Moreover, Bodin subjected his sovereign to specific obligations derived 
from natural law including the inviolability of private property, the legality of contractual obligations 
and the proscription of arbitrary murder. Though sovereignty was supreme, it was not absolute. A 
sovereign was subject to certain restraints if not to other princes.
Max Adams Shepard, "Sovereignty at the Crossroads: A Study of Bodin," Political Science Quarterly, 
(December, 1930, No. 4), 587-588, 591.
Bodin, op. cit., I, 8, p. 95.
22Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ed. by Michael Oakeshott, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), I, 
pp. 13-14, 80-92.
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sovereignty and no limitation or incumbrance on the sovereign as Bodin had allowed. 
Law was the exercise of sovereign will and upon that will there could be no restraint save 
that of the discretion and interest of the sovereign.23 The covenant by which men 
surrendered their rights issued no obligation upon the sovereign. The only release was 
failure.24
Hobbes' brutal reasoning had a permanent impact on theories of sovereignty. "If a 
determinate human superior," wrote John Austin, "not in the habit of obedience to a like 
superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate 
superior is sovereign in that society."25 With his doctrine of a legally omnicompetent 
sovereign and his notion that law was ultimately personal command, Austin reduced all 
relations of law to a de facto basis. The supreme power had neither legal rights nor legal 
duties. Law could only be the command of the sovereign. The sovereign must be 
definable, recognisable, final and absolute.26 The attributes of sovereignty- inalienability, 
indivisibility, and even irresponsibility- were the logical conclusions of the demand for 
finality. Sovereignty as absolute command supported by coercive sanction incorporates 
the supremacy of political power and the finality of legal authority, and it is this which is 
often seen as the fundamental attribute of the modem state.27 The rights and prerogatives 
of states are due to their "fundamentally unlimited and absolute authority."28
™Ibid.t H, pp. 18, 93-120.
24/&/</., 11,21, pp. 144-145.
25W. Jethro Brown (ed.), TheAustinian Theory o f Law (London: J. Murray, 1906), p.35.
2<sIt is the "definiteness" and the "determinateness" of the sovereign which is its most characteristic 
feature. On the issue of "determinateness" in sovereignty see: Ivor Wilks, "A Note on Sovereignty," in 
Stankiewicz, op. cit., pp. 195-205.
27"Austin's theory represents the completion of a movement of thought which paralleled the gradual 
increase, on the practical political side of the power, of the modem nation-state,. . .  Now the doctrine of 
sovereignty offered the national kind the most convenient theoretical weapon with which to combat the
claims of rival feudal or ecclesiastical authorities, refractory estates or competing systems of law. The 
idea of one unified legal scheme affording order, consistency and certainty in the governing of all social
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The development of sovereignty as a theory of obligation, then, has stressed the 
finality of authority based on the supremacy of political power. Sovereignty in its 
international sense and external usage is a statement of those powers and prerogatives in 
terms of others beyond the boundaries of its jurisdiction. It is sometimes referred to as 
sovereignty in its negative sense, for now the stress is on independence rather than 
overlordship. It is the declaration of the scope of a state's jurisdiction, a formulation of 
deterrence, a claim that " . . .  the State may not receive orders from anyone."29 
Sovereignty conceived as supreme authority within the state implied absolute 
independence outside and this could mean, if necessary, the unlimited exercise of the 
state's authority in securing its objectives.30
relations within a given national area, overriding all contradictory rules and injunctions, and flexible 
enough to be modified at the command of a single sovereign will, made a strong appeal."
Shepard, op. cit., 581-582.
^D. M. Kooijmans, The Doctrine o f the Legal Equality o f States (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1964 ), p. 128.
29Marek Stanislaw Korowicz, "Some Present Aspects of Sovereignty in International Law," Recueil Des 
Cours, CD (1962), 12.
For Georg Schwarzenberger, negative sovereignty meant" .. .  non-recognition of any superior authority. 
On the level of legal relations, this situation may be expressed in terms of a right, or freedom, not to 
have to recognise any superior." Schwarzenberger, in Stankiewicz, op. cit., p. 167.
^"External sovereignty, as one manifestation of it came to be called, was assimilated to internal 
sovereignty, so that the state was regarded as possessing the same legal right to exercise its will a 
Vexterieur. . .  that it has over subjects in its own territory."
J. W. Garner, "Limitations on National Sovereignty in International Relations," American Political 
Science Review XIX (February, 1925), 5.
Such absolutist inteipretations of the sovereign rights of states were particularly troublesome in German 
political philosophy and jurisprudence. The grand notions of the Hegelian state were as embarrassing 
logically as they were exhilarating sentimentally. Jellinek, for instance, argued that sovereignty did, 
indeed, mean the unlimited and absolute exercise of the state's will, but that will could bind itself. For 
Jellinek, this auto-limitation (selbstversplichtung) was the very essence of sovereignty. The uniqueness 
of sovereign authority was that it could be bound by no other will than its own. Every will has the self- 
imposed limitation of its own definition. To be consistent, free will must be allowed to pursue every 
option including that of obligation. To deny it such a course would be a limitation in itself.
Kooijmans, op. cit., pp. 131-135.
Cohen, op. cit., pp. 38-56.
Merriam, op. cit., pp. 193-196.
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Sovereignty not only meant the legal right to pursue any course of action 
deemed vital to a state's interests. It also implied the capacity to effect those decisions. 
The problem in this view of sovereignty has always been one of identifying those 
capabilities which justify the recognition of sovereignty in law. Which powers and to what 
extent must they be possessed before sovereignty is clearly established or eroded? 
Responses to this question have been typically as vague as they are confident. In the most 
fundamental sense it meant the capabilities for armed conflict to ensure the continued 
independence of the state. It was widely felt that if a state lost its power to make war, it 
lost its sovereignty. For Treitschke, for instance sovereignty finally meant "drawing the 
sword when (the state) sees fit."31 "A defenceless State may still be termed a Kingdom for 
conventional or courtly reasons," he said, "but . . .  in point of fact such a country can no 
longer rank as a State."32 Self-help was the fundamental "mark of sovereignty"33 and often 
used as a criterion for distinguishing states as sovereign and non-sovereign. The notions 
of the state as fortress and the capacity to use force as the principal feature of sovereign 
power have been persistent themes in international relations. "The key consideration,"
31Heinrich von Treitschke from Politics I  in H. Cox (ed.) The State in International Relations 
(San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1965, pp. 53-54.
nIbid.
Bisschop, op. cit., 123.
"States, however, usually have many other powers, and in practice a state is not regarded as fully 
sovereign unless it has substantially all of the powers of normal states at the time. . . . Among the 
powers commonly possessed by states is that to convert a state of peace into a state of war, to defend 
itself . . .  to occupy res nullius, to perform wrongful acts rendering itself responsible . . . "  Quincy 
Wright, Mandates Under the League o f Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), pp. 292- 
293.
"While every sovereign state continued to hold as of right whatever it possessed, every sovereign state 
continued to be entitled to challenge the existing order by invoking an unlimited jus ad bellum. 
Changes to that order might be the outcome of unilateral resort to force and duress, but they were also 
the outcome of this right, and they were legitimised by virtue of its universal recognition."
F. H. Hinsley, Nationalism and the International System (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973),
p. 110.
33Fenwick, op. cit., p. 106.
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noted Andrew Scott, "is whether a group of persons desiring to proclaim themselves a 
"nation" have the capacity to assert their independence and act on that basis."34 Scott 
concluded that, given the vulnerability of their security conditions, most contemporary 
states " . . .  are not sovereign in the meaningful sense of the t erm. . .  "35
In this sense, then, sovereignty as independence is not simply a passive 
notification of frontiers, a statement of legal identity. Sovereignty is seen as the legal 
rights derived from the possession of specific conditions of state power. In addition to 
capabilities for self defence, this notion of sovereign power implies actual or potential 
capacity for economic independence and certainly the freedom to pursue independent 
relations with other states. Until very recently, independent competence in areas of 
economic and fiscal management were seen as critical indicators of sovereignty. States 
which were largely or wholly dependent upon other states (or latterly upon other 
international actors) in areas of economic policy were questionable. Both in the 
Mandates system36 and in the earlier stages of decolonisation, the Great Powers 
consistently justified delays in granting sovereignty to their dependent territories on the 
grounds that they lacked the resources and capacities for the economic independence 
expected of a sovereign state. The importance of economic independence to the 
continued relevance of the principle of sovereignty was also emphasised by the first 
generation of integration theorists who anticipated the demise of the territorial state and
34 Andrew M. Scott, The Functioning o f the International System (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1967), 
p. 235.
35Ibid.
"A country is independent only insofar as it has the power to enforce its freedom of decision-making, 
regardless of which other countries want to influence it."
Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World o f Powers (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 38.
36 For a useful discussion of the expected standards of statehood both in the Mandates system and in the 
League see, Walter Holmes Ritsher, Criteria o f Capacity for Independence (Jerusalem: Syrian 
Orphanage Press, 1934), pp. 1-14, also Chapter Six.
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the obsolesence of the principle of sovereignty. As competences in areas of economic and 
social policy were transferred to other actors, so the state's sovereignty would be drained. 
Eventually the concessions are so cumulative that even the core areas of sovereign power 
are eroded and the state is eclipsed by a new political system. For some, economic 
interdependence, particularly in post-war Europe, had become so advanced that 
sovereignty seemed to be "more a state of mind or an aspiration rather than a 
condition..."37
In the traditional view, then, the validity or reality of sovereignty in law depends 
on the extent to which it reflects independence in fact. Sovereignty as independence 
means the possession of powers sufficient to ensure that the state can enjoy those rights in 
practice which it is acknowledged to possess in law. For some, the glaring disparities 
between the impotence and dependence of states on one hand and the exaggerations of 
their legal prerogatives on the other only serves to confirm doubts about the continued 
relevance of sovereignty and the contemporary understanding of statehood. Since 
"sovereignty claims its birthright of overriding competence,"38 it should at least 
approximate its own logic if it can not fulfill it.39 "At the root of the perplexities which 
attend the problem of the loss of sovereignty," complained Hans Morgenthau, "there is the
37Paul Taylor, International Co-operation Today (London: Elek Books, Ltd., 1971), p. 39.
Disenchantment with the relevance of sovereignty in an increasingly interdependent world was typical 
of the integration literature of the late fifties and sixties.
Karl Loewenstein, "Sovereignty and International Co-operation," American Journal o f International 
Law, XLVin (1954), 225.
“(Sovereignty) has little application or use in a world in which nations continually interact and 
interpenetrate and in which there are international organizations such as the United Nations, broad 
alliances such as N.A.T.O., and supranational organizations such as the European Economic 
Community."
Andrew M. Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 162.
38Rosalyn Higgins, The Development o f International Law Through the Political Organs o f theUnited 
Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 55.
39Frederick M. Watkins, The State as a Concept o f Political Science (New York: Harper and Bros., 
1934), pp. 42-62.
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divorce in contemporary legal and political theory, of the concept of sovereignty from the 
political reality to which the concept is supposed to give legal expression.”40 If 
sovereignty is so casually reduced to legal fiction, both the tenets of international law and 
the practices of international organisation could be undermined. Nowhere does this seem 
more apparent than with the corollary of sovereignty, the doctrine of the equality of states. 
From the time of The Hague Conferences, and certainly with the apparent recognition of 
small state rights in the League of Nations, the doctrine of equality has been attacked as a 
dangerous fiction. As one publicist put it, ”. . .  the doctrine of equality has served 
heretofore to divorce the theoretical system of international law set forth in text books 
from the facts of international life.”41 He went on to warn that such a discrepancy has 
become "a positive political danger” with the establishment of international institutions. If 
equality was clearly and universally understood in a limited forensic sense then there 
would be less reason for concern. The anxiety stems from claims for comprehensive 
participation in the name of equality of rights.42
40Morgenthau's reassessment of sovereignty was written in the early days of the new post-war 
international order. Most of the existing states were weak and dependent, with far less influence than 
they now enjoy. While Morgenthau emphasised that sovereignty did not mean "actual independence," 
he also maintained that sovereignty was lost when a state could no longer ensure the "impenetrability" 
of its territoiy and when it no longer possessed the capacity" to make "fundamental decisions."
Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Problem of Sovereignty Reconsidered," Columbia Law Review, XLVIII 
(1948), 349.
41P. J. Baker, "The Doctrine of the Legal Equality of States," British Year Book o f International Law, IV 
(1923-24), 4.
Baker was clearly relieved that the architects of the Covenant did not wholly embrace the doctrine of 
equality. "To allow a State of one million inhabitants to hold the same constitutional position as a State 
of one hundred million inhabitants, is not only theoretically but practically indefensible. To have done 
so in the League would have been undemocratic in the true sense of the word; it would have led to the 
establishment of institutions that could not have exercised real influence or authority for the reason that 
they would not have represented the political forces of the human race."
Ibid., 19.
42Edwin DeWitt Dickinson, The Equality o f States in International Law (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1920), p.4.
In some cases this has been interpreted as the possession of equal natural rights (Pufendorf, 
Burlamaqui, Wolff, deVattel) or as the equal potential or aptitude for acquiring rights (Pradier-Fodere, 
Amari).
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In her study of statehood in United Nations practice Rosalyn Higgins argued it is 
essential for the future of international organisations that some attempt be made, however 
difficult, to assess the sovereignty of an entity on the basis of its conformity to objective 
criteria:
What is important is that policy questions will have to be decided during 
the years to come; and in the future- even if this were not so in the past- 
the definition of independence will have real relevance. There would seem 
to be very good grounds for insisting upon the importance of actual 
independence; not only will such a policy keep more firm the marriage 
between law and fact, but it will also prevent certain abuses of the right of 
popular self-determination which might otherwise occur.43
For Higgins, the obvious discrepancies between law and fact can only be 
accommodated if we acknowledge the relativity of sovereignty and the variable nature of 
statehood. An entity may be a state for some purposes, (which would allow them 
admission to specific functional organisations, for example), but not for all.44 Presumably, 
the fully sovereign state is the state whose credentials and capacities would allow it to
See also: Arnold D. McNair, "Equality in International Law," Michigan Law Review, XXVI 
(December, 1927), 136-137.
Considered as the corollary of sovereignty, the equality of states has involved such rules as the 
unanimity principle and equal voting. It is true that in certain international organisations and regional 
associations both unanimity and equal voting have given way to a majority vote and/or weighted voting. 
However, the general practice has been to maintain the traditional rules of equality. Small states 
particularly have resisted attempts to undermine these privileges.
C. Wilfred Jenks, "Unanimity, The Veto, Weighted Voting, Special and Simple Majorities and 
Consensus as Modes of Decision in International Organizations," in R. Y. Jennings, (ed.), Cambridge 
Essays in International Law-Essays in Honour o f Lord McNair (London: Stevens and Sons, 1965), 
pp. 48-63.
43Higgins, op. cit.
44Ibid., p. 44.
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enjoy comprehensive participation in international society.45 In this view, then, the 
dilemmas of the sovereignty-as-power view are resolved if we admit varying degrees of 
sovereign status (and the rights and prerogatives therein) to reflect the varying conditions 
of power and independence of states in the real world. "Sovereignty in international law is 
. . . a relative term," wrote Quincy Wright. "Each international person differs to some 
extent in its capacity in law or fact to establish normal legal relations with others. The line 
between a fully sovereign and a partly sovereign state is not precise and is continually 
changing with the development of international relations."46
While the notion that states can be "more or less" sovereign has been a recurring 
theme among political scientists and publicists in international law, it has been fiercely 
resisted by the huge lobby of new states insisting on the full rights and prerogatives which 
are theirs as equal members in law of the international community. Nor have they 
abandoned the assumptions and aspirations to power traditionally associated with 
sovereignty. However, the new states have shifted the basis of sovereignty from the 
elements of power and actual independence to the criteria for national self-determination 
and particularly the rights of colonial peoples.
b) Sovereignty as the Self-Determination of a Political Community
The notion that sovereignty is not so much a set of particular powers as it is the 
expression of societal will belongs to Rousseau. It has come to be the prevailing sense of 
sovereignty in the post-war period of decolonisation. With Rousseau, as with Hobbes, it 
is the absolutist character of sovereignty which is central: "II est de l'essence de las 
puissance souveraine de ne pouvoir etre limitee: elle peut tout, ou elle n'est rien."47
4SIbid., p. 35.
^Wright, op. cit., p. 294.
47Jean-Jacques Rousseau, from Lettres de la Montagne quoted in Alfred Cobban, Rousseau and the 
Modem State (London: Archon Books, rev. ed., 1964), p. 71.
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Supremacy derives from ultimacy: The source of law can not at the same time be subject 
to it. Yet Rousseau, unlike Hobbes, attempted to separate sovereignty from the officers 
of government by equating the state with the body politic.48 The base of sovereign 
authority is the populace itself. It is the General Will of the people which is the essence of 
the state.49 Ultimate and supreme authority is vested in them and this can not be alienated 
whatever functions may be delegated to government.50 It is this inalienability which is the 
essential feature of the sovereignty of the General Will. As the state has been absorbed by 
the government in Hobbes, so the government has been absorbed by the society in 
Rousseau.51 The illimitable and plebiscitarian nature of Rousseau's sovereignty has 
endured both in the celebration of sovereignty in new states, and in the analysis of the 
essence of sovereignty in political theory.52
^Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses trans. and intro, by G. D. H. Cole 
(London: Everyman's Library, 1966), Social Contract, n , chaps. 1 and 2, pp. 20-22.
49The notion of popular sovereignty had already been expressed by Althusius, who contended that 
sovereignty was the permanent authority of the people conceded to governments for administrative 
convenience. It was inalienable. Frederick S. Gamey (trans. and ed.) The Politics o f Johannes 
Althusius (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1965).
Locke's version of popular sovereignty was based on the distinction between state and government. 
Political society retained a passive sovereignty with its ultimate power to dissolve government, which 
was the active sovereign. The distinction between Althusius and Locke on the nature of delegation is 
interesting in any discussion of political integration. For Althusius, sovereignty itself was not conceded, 
only administrative competence. For Locke, sovereignty in its active dimension was, in fact, granted. 
While the government endured it was sovereign, subject only to the final test of dissolution.
John Locke, Two Treatises o f Government, intro, by Peter Laslett (Toronto: Mentor Books, 1965), n , 
chap. 13, p. 413. Also, chapters 2, 9, and 12.
50Rousseau, Social Contract, op. cit., n, 1, p. 20.
sxIbid., n , 4, p. 24.
52For Rousseau's influence on the development of nationalism see: Cobban, op. cit., pp. 99-125.
Kenneth Minogue, Nationalism (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1967), pp. 39-42.
86
This view of sovereignty is from a sociological rather than a juridical vantage. The 
power of the state is ultimate and indivisible, but it is power based on national will and not 
on the government's command of particular capabilities and sanctions. As Francis 
Rosentiel put it in his attack on the pretensions of the European Community: "The vigour 
of a state lacking jurisdictions remains more formidable than an ensemble of jurisdictions 
in search of a state."53 As in the power view of sovereignty, this is a sense of authority 
which allows for arguments of both divisibility and indivisibility. Some writers, Karl 
Deutsch for instance, have maintained that in the process of integration the sovereignty of 
the state is dissipated as loyalties shift to institutions beyond those of the state. When 
cross-national interaction at the popular level intensifies, a new socio-psychological 
community is established, and with it, the substance of sovereignty.54 Others insist that 
identification with the state is deeply rooted. States may concede an enormous range of 
competences before they allow outsiders to determine the character of their political 
culture, or even the agenda of their domestic priorities. And substantial shifts of
53Frances Rosentiel, "Reflections on the Notion of 'Supranationality'," Journal o f Common Market 
Studies, H (1963), 135.
Rosentiel’s observations may seem almost poignant in the current debate over the terms of Quebec’s 
potential secession from Canada. Prime Minister Jean Chr&ien and the Federal Government insist that 
any ‘Yes” vote in a referendum is but a consultative exercise, the results of which must be taken into 
account by Ottawa in determining whether or not to engage the process of separation. Premier Lucien 
Bouchard and the Parti Quebe^ois Government in Quebec City, on the other hand, see such a 
referendum result as a definitive act of self-determination in itself by the people of Quebec, with no 
need for approval from the Government of Canada. Sovereignty is vested in the will of the Quebe^ois. 
As for the Federal Government, in this view it is indeed seen as an “ensemble of jurisdictions in search 
of a state.” The thrusts and counter-thrusts of this debate were covered thoroughly in The Globe and 
Mail (Toronto), May 13-20, 1996.
54Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1957), pp. 27-69.
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competence to external institutions can occur before the popular base of the state is 
weakened.55
This view of sovereignty, which clearly minimises the importance of power, has 
been particularly emphasised in the doctrine of national self-determination. For 
nationalists, the essence of sovereignty lies in the historical experience and national self- 
consciousness of the people. In some cases accession to independence was seen not so 
much as the birth of a new nation, but as the restoration of original rights.56 In the absence 
of national popular support, the sovereignty of imperial governments was hollow, however 
great the advantages of power. Similarly, there should be no reason to delay sovereignty 
for dependent peoples on the grounds their governments would lack the capabilities 
requisite to statehood. Once again, we see a distinction between formal sovereignty and 
real sovereignty.
The crux of this approach to sovereignty is the definition of a nation deserving 
recognition of separate status in the international system. Rupert Emerson put the 
question succinctly: " . . .  who are the people of what country?. . . With whom does the 
prerogative rest to delimit the relevant 'self and, once this determination has been made, 
who within the designated community has the authority to speak for it, binding the 
whole?"57
55For instance, Stanley Hoffmann was one of the earliest critics of the view that the sovereign state would 
give way to new political systems as competences were transferred to regional bodies. "As for what it 
can no longer provide. . .  by itself," he said, "the state can still provide . . .  without committing suicide, 
through cooperation."
Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western 
Europe," Daedalus, XCV (Summer, 1965), 893.
56Rupert Emerson, "Self-Determination," American Journal o f International Law, LXV (July, 1971, 
no. 3), 469.
57Rnpert Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era o f Decolonization (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 9, 
December, 1964), p. 36.
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Prior to the end of the Second World War we acknowledged, with few exceptions, 
only European peoples with long established and identifiable national cultures. We looked 
to the familiar attributes of nationhood: language, religion, distinctive customs and rituals. 
These were visible and viable national communities with justifiable claims to equality and 
independence in the international community. The apparent absence of these familiar 
attributes among most non-European peoples precluded any serious consideration of a 
transfer of sovereignty, even for those liberals most committed to the principles of national 
self-determination. Similarly, while regional and sub-cultural groups deserved some 
measure of autonomy and a guarantee of protection within the constitutional framework 
of larger states, sovereignty was neither the most appropriate nor the most equitable 
solution to meet their interests.58 Initially, then, sovereignty was seen as the deserved 
status for a people whose credentials as a national community were clear and whose rights 
in the international community had long been denied.
By 1960, however, the movement for self-determination had changed radically. 
The definition of a people was no longer based on ethnic or cultural properties. Those to 
benefit from self-determination were colonial peoples whose national credentials were 
formed in their common subjection to imperial rule. As decolonisation proceeded, the 
new states, particularly in Africa, insisted upon an absolute commitment to the colonial 
territory as the only basis for statehood. No residual rights to sovereignty would be 
recognised for distinct peoples within the boundaries of colonial territories or existing 
states. Moreover, all colonial peoples, whatever their material limitations, were nations 
whose rights to self-determination were beyond question.59 And, solutions short of
58Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination (London: Collins, The Fontana 
Library, rev. ed. 1969), Ch. 6.
59Perhaps the most outstanding example of the uncompromising tone of the new majority's commitment to 
self-determination as sovereignty was the United Nations debate on the future of Nauru. With a 
population of only 5000, it must surely have seemed at the time leading up to its independence in 1968 
as the most improbable candidate for separate statehood. However, the Nauruan demand for nothing
89
sovereignty were seen by the new majority in the international community as incompatible 
with the logic of self-determination. With few exceptions such proposals were regarded 
with suspicion and contrary to the national interests of the people concerned.60
However, as we shall explore in the next chapter, this apparently simple 
interpretation of the rights to national self-determination and the basis of sovereignty has 
not gone unchallenged. In some cases, the definition of the nation, and claims to separate 
independence, have been fiercely contested. For others, counter-claims are less explicit, 
but the threat of controversy undermines the security of their international status. In such 
a contest, it is the credibility of national identity and the justice of historical claims which 
are finally crucial.
Once again sovereignty is seen as the legal expression of political reality; if not the 
conditions of power, then the collective will of a credible national community.
c) Sovereignty and International Recognition
For some, these attempts to explain sovereignty are beside the point. Sovereignty 
exists whether or not particular powers are evident and whether or not there is a confident 
and integrated national community coincident with the territorial boundaries of the state. 
Sovereignty is not primarily a question of capacity, actual or potential; nor is it the 
independent exercise of national will in history. More modestly, sovereignty expresses the 
international identity of a territorial community as a state. It affirms the constitutional 
self-containment of the state and therefore its equality in international law. The supremacy
less than independence was readily supported by a sympathetic General Assembly. United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 226 (XXI), 20 December, 1966.
60In the Cook Islands, for example, association with New Zealand was defended on the grounds that the 
Islanders had determined this course for themselves in an election observed by United Nations 
representatives. However, the vigilant Committee of Twenty-Four accepted the results somewhat 
reluctantly, mollified only by the provision that the Cook Islanders could opt for separate sovereignty if 
they so wished at any time in the future.
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and finality of a state's authority are derived from its separateness from other states. "A 
state which is separate from all others is, by virtue of that fact, in sole control of its 
domain;” wrote Alan James. "It cannot but be supreme. Supremacy and separateness are 
therefore inextricably intertwined, each of them expressing, with a different emphasis, that 
constitutional self-containment which is the core and condition of sovereignty."61 Whether 
a state chooses to exercise certain powers; whether it has the capabilities to invoke those 
powers; whether its writ genuinely reflects the will of the populace; these are questions 
which unnecessarily confuse the simple usage of sovereignty in relations among states. 
Sovereignty is that authority which entitles a state to invoke final and supreme powers 
within its territorial jurisdiction. It is the right to undertake certain competences, not the 
competences themselves, which is the essence of sovereignty.62 And it can be said to be 
present if those rights are recognised by other members of the international system.63 In 
this view, then, sovereignty is seen as the possession of those legal rights which accord the 
state its international status and privileges and it is enjoyed by those societies which are
recognised in law to possess it.
This view of sovereignty does seem to command more support in what John
Burton has called "the altered political environment"64 characterised by both wide
61 Alan James, "The Contemporary Relevance of National Sovereignty," in Michael Leifer (ed.), 
Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreign Policy (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 972), 
p. 18.
Professor James is determined to retrieve the notion of sovereignty from the confusion which has 
bedevilled the concept in much of the literature of international relations. Alan James, Sovereign 
Statehood: The Basis o f International Society (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986).
62Taylor, op. cit., pp. 34-36.
63There are, of course, dangers in the constitutive theory of recognition. The legal status of the former 
Bantustans seemed to be clear in the absence of any recognition apart from the Republic of South 
Africa. However, the position of the Western Sahara, a member of the Organization of African Unity, 
recognised by nearly 100 members of international community, is more difficult to determine. In spite 
of widespread recognition, it would be premature to argue that the Western Sahara enjoys sovereignty 
when its territory is occupied and its people confined to refugee camps in a neighbouring state.
64J. W. Burton, International Relations-A General Theory (Cambridge: The University Press, 1967), 
pp. 108-127.
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disparities among states and by the emergence of influential and autonomous non-state 
actors. Many states are neither independent powers nor confident and integrated national 
communities. The emphasis on legal rights should support the separate independence of 
micro-states when even the smallest and most destitute state is wholly sovereign if its legal 
right to act finally and independently within its own territory is recognised by other 
members of the system.65
But there is neither consensus nor consistency about sovereignty, even among 
spokesmen for small and weak states. Sovereignty as power, sovereignty as the exercise 
of national self-determination and sovereignty as legal prerogatives are often expressed at 
the same time. For micro-states these varying emphases in the explanations of sovereignty 
have been central to their status in the international system. Until very recently micro­
state participation in the international system was limited and frequently controversial 
because the sovereignty of these states, and the rights and obligations which that entails, 
seemed more formal than real, given their exceptionally small size and obviously limited 
capabilities. Micro-states have been seen as too small to command sovereign powers and 
often too diminutive and too fragmentary to claim acceptance as distinct and viable 
national communities. This is particularly pressing if neighbouring states view the 
independence of these 'local' peoples as an insult to their own national history and an 
impediment to their aspirations for national integration.
In summary, we have argued that the status of these tiny states in the international 
system has been problematic and controversial. This does not mean that all micro-states 
are subject to question or that only micro-states are burdened with problems of self­
justification. It does mean, however, that legitimacy has been a recurrent problem in this 
class of states. In the next chapter we examine the experience of micro-states in both 
aspects of the problem of legitimacy.
65Middleton, op. cit., 153-154.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Legitimacy of Micro-States in the International System: 
The Practice of International Organisations
Doubts about the long term status of micro-states are rarely evident in the protocol 
and open diplomacy of everyday international relations. Larger states are careful to 
respect the sensibilities of the smallest and weakest members of the international 
community. However, there have been two areas where doubts and questions about the 
international status of micro-states have surfaced.
The first is that of micro-state participation in international organisations. This has 
always been a difficult issue and it constitutes the bulk of the early literature on micro- 
states.1 Reservations about micro-state membership reflect both the normative and the 
practical dimensions of the question of the legitimacy of statehood. First, there is concern 
about the capacity of these states to undertake the responsibilities and obligations of 
normal states in the organisation of the international system.
•For example:
Urban Whitaker, "Mini-Membership for Mini-States," War/Peace Report, VII (April, 1967), 3-5.
P.C. Rao, "Micro-States and the United Nations," Indian and Foreign Review, V (November 15, 1967), 
17, 21.
Jacques G. Rapoport, "The Participation of Ministates in International Affairs," Proceedings, American 
Society o f International Law, April 25-27,1968,155-163.
Roger Fisher, "The Participation of Microstates in International Affairs," Ibid., 164-188. Comments, 
179-186.
William L. Harris, "Microstates in the United Nations: A Broader Purpose," Columbia Journal o f 
Transnational Law, (No. 1, 1970), 23-53.
M. H. Mendelson, "Diminutive States in the United Nations," International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, XXI (October, 1972), 609-630.
James S. Bowman, "Participation in the United Nations: Mini-States," Polity, (Winter, 1972), 191-208. 
Michael M. Gunter, "The Problem of Ministate Membership in the United Nations System: Recent 
Attempts Towards a Solution," Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law, (No. 3, 1973), 464-486. 
Joseph R  Harbert, "The Behavior of the Ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972," International 
Organization, (Winter, 1976), 109-128.
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Further, there are misgivings about the justice of a system which allots equal voice in the 
determination of international issues to states which would be little more than small cities 
in most countries. These doubts were clearly evident in the early membership debates in 
the League of Nations and persisted with the United Nations system until the late 1960s. 
It has continued to be a recurring theme in the domestic debate in the United States about 
the future of American participation in the United Nations.2
The second period when the legitimacy issue has surfaced is in the lead-up to self- 
determination. It is always easier to raise questions about the suitability of separate 
independence for a would-be state than for a community whose sovereignty is already 
recognised in the international system. In some cases sovereignty was seen as absurdly 
inappropriate and metropolitan powers were either resigned to indefinite imperial 
administration or they looked to alternative methods of decolonisation in association with 
other territories. Once again, the controversy involved both sides of the legitimacy 
question. Much of the debate focused on the potential capacity of the new state. Was 
separate independence a reasonable means of meeting the best interests of the people? 
Could this state assume the responsibilities implicit in the accession to sovereignty?
But, in many cases, there were also misgivings about the justice of recognising 
fragments of the colonial system as separate nations. These sentiments were all the more 
compelling if there was a credible irredentist claim to challenge the legitimacy of separate 
statehood. In the next chapter we will examine this contest in the experience of three very 
small colonial territories; East Timor, Western Sahara, and Belize. The nature of the 
debate and the tentativeness of their international acceptance have implications for many 
micro-states which have successfully attained sovereignty but whose long-term survival 
must be assessed in the context of similar doubts and claims. We begin in this chapter,
2Cynicism and frustration with "rep by pop" in the United Nations is still a matter of concern in some 
quarters. Note the following leader from The Globe and Mail: "Sharing the U.N. Costs," The Globe and 
Mail, (Toronto), October 29, 1985, A6.
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however, with an examination of the issue of very small size and membership in 
international organisations.
Micro-states and the League of Nations
Initially, the League of Nations was widely seen as a confirmation of the values of 
national self-determination and small state security. The aspirations of small states at The 
Hague Conferences were now established in the provisions of the Covenant. The League 
represented the notion that the world could be made safe for the smallest and the weakest. 
And to a great extent, membership in the new organisation was itself a measure of 
international personality.3 Yet this did not mean the League should accept the universal 
suffrage of states. The diminutive sovereignties of Europe were accorded some of the 
courtesies of statehood but they were still regarded as the anomalies of a well-ordered 
international system. This was not surprising since such diminutive sovereignties had all 
but disappeared by the end of the war. Apart from the Holy See, only six very small states
3Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination (London: Collins, The Fontana 
Library, rev. ed., 1969), p. 79.
"The results of several years of work, along empirical lines, by those who made the Covenant and those 
who built up the League, enable us to assert that admission to the League is, for the post-war world, what 
recognition of a sovereign 'state' was before 1920, and that the qualifications laid down in Article One of 
the Covenant, judged as they are judged by the Committees of the Assembly, are the essential qualities of 
any independent state today. ”
Lilian M. Friedlander, "The Admission of States to the League of Nations," British YearBook o f 
International Law, IX (1928), p. 100.
See also:
Sir Hersh Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge: The University Press, 1968), 
pp. 401 f.
Quincy Wright, "Some Thoughts about Recognition," American Journal o f International Law, XLIV 
(1950), 548-559
Quincy Wright, "Recognition and Self-Determination," Proceedings, American Society o f International 
Law, (April 22-24, 1954), 32-33.
Malbone W. Graham, The League o f Nations and the Recognition o f States, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1933), pp. 33-34.
Sally Marks, "The Small States at Geneva," World Affairs CL VII (Spring, 1995), 191-196.
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retained any measure of international personality: Luxembourg, Iceland,4 Liechtenstein,. 
Monaco, San Marino and Andorra.
Liechtenstein applied for membership in the League on July 15,1920. Though the 
Fifth Committee (Admissions) acknowledged Liechtenstein's sovereignty in international 
law, it rejected the Principality's application on the grounds that Liechtenstein's treaty 
arrangements with Switzerland had so compromised her sovereignty that she could not be 
expected to fulfill her obligations under the Covenant.5 Liechtenstein's pre-war relations 
with Austria-Hungary did not promote her case and, if anything, reinforced existing 
prejudice that such ties were compelled by her exceptional smallness. In referring to the 
1912 postal agreement between Liechtenstein and Austria, Pierre Raton concludes that 
although
Trom 1918 Iceland was self-governing but in monarchical union with Denmark. Until 1920 the Danish 
High Court was still the supreme judicial body for Iceland. Denmark retained responsibility for 
Iceland's foreign affairs and security until April, 1940. This relationship was to last for 25 years at 
which time either party could abrogate the Act of Union or ask for its revision. Donald E. Neuchterlein, 
Iceland-Reluctant Ally (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 3-4.
5H1. The application of Liechtenstein is in order.
2.The Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein has been recognized de jure by many States. It 
has concluded a number of Treaties with various States, for instance in 1852 it concluded a treaty of 
extradition with Belgium, in 1863 it signed the Sanitary Convention of Dresden.
3.The Principality of Liechtenstein possesses a stable Government and fixed frontiers. The area of 
the Principality is 157 sq. km., and the population between 10,000 and 11,000.
4. and 5. There can be no doubt that juridically the Principality of Liechtenstein is a sovereign State,
but by reason of its very limited area, small population, and its geographic position, it has chosen to 
depute to others some of the attributes of its sovereignty. For instance, it has contracted with other
Powers for the control of its Customs, the administration of its Posts, Telegraphs and Telephone 
Services, for the diplomatic representation of its subjects in foreign countries, other than 
Switzerland and Austria, and for final decisions in certain cases of law. Liechtenstein has no army. 
For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the Principality of Liechtenstein could not discharge 
all the international obligations which would be imposed on it by the Covenant."
Report of the Second Sub-Committee to the Fifth Committee, League of Nations, Records o f the First
Assembly, Plenary Meetings, p. 667.
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. . .  the Principality had proved that it knew how to negotiate successfully, 
and shown the world that it was not simply another province of the 
Danubian realm (this) was not everywhere recognized...partly out of 
ignorance and partly because of a refusal to bother about the question of 
Austrian-Liechtenstein relations. Many countries were accustomed to 
regard the Principality as an Austrian province with a sort of special status, 
similar to that of Andorra in its relation with France.6
Under the treaty of 1884 Austria administered Liechtenstein's interests abroad7 with 
the result that ” . . .  the country was practically unknown in the diplomatic world,”8 and 
regarded "as merely another province of an enemy state."9 The Customs Union with 
Austria was renounced by the Principality,10 however, in 1919 after the Austrian Republic 
was established, and some of the attributes of sovereignty which the Committee claimed 
that Liechtenstein had deputed to Switzerland were not concluded until after 
Liechtenstein's application had been rejected.11
Pierre Raton, Liechtenstein: History and Institutions o f the Principality (Vaduz: Liechtenstein-Verlag, 
1970), pp. 49-50.
Liechtenstein did remain neutral officially throughout the war even though popular sentiments, 
underpinned by essential economic relations, were with the Central Powers. This changed with Allied 
victories when the Principality then opened negotiations with Switzerland. Nonetheless, even the 
official neutrality proved important when it came to the definition of Austria's frontiers in the Treaty of 
St. Germain (September 10, 1919) which had the effect of alsp recognising Liechtenstein's borders. 
Ibid., pp. 56-58.
%Ibid, p. 53.
Hbid.
10 Walter Kranz (ed.) The Principality o f Liechtenstein (Vaduz: The Government of Liechtenstein, Third 
edition, rev., 1973). p. 20.
nlbid.
The Customs Union with Switzerland was signed on March 29, 1923 and came into effect on January 
1,1924. The Postal Agreement came into effect on January 31,1921.
Raton, op. cit., pp. 76-77.
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That Liechtenstein's treaty relations should have been seen to impair the quality of 
her statehood appears all the more disputable given the provisions of Article One of the 
Covenant enabling any self-governing Dominion or Colony to achieve membership. 
Moreover, unlike such dependencies, Liechtenstein's treaty arrangements were revocable 
should the Principality have so decided.12
Whatever prejudice there was against Liechtenstein initially could only have been 
reinforced by the decision of the Liechtenstein Government to seek special concessions, 
primarily to safeguard their neutrality and to avoid a return to armed forces which they 
had not maintained since 1868.13 By so doing ” . . .  they showed that the country was not 
able to meet all the requirements of the Covenant and they thus exposed themselves to the 
criticism which was not long in coming.”14
Yet, for all of this, the real reason for Liechtenstein's rejection was her size, as 
Lord Robert Cecil (South Africa) confessed to Dr. Emil Beck, the Liechtenstein Minister 
in Berne.15 The Lilliputian dimensions of Liechtenstein served to exaggerate the alleged 
disabilities of her diplomatic and military situation in a way which might not have been so
Liechtenstein's intentions regarding a new relationship with Switzerland were apparent, however, as 
early as April 22, 1919 when Prince Karl, the Governor of the Principality, opened negotiations with 
the Head of the Swiss Political Department. The agreement on Swiss representation of Liechtenstein's 
interests abroad went into effect on October 24,1919.
Ibid., p. 73.
12Walter S. G. Kohn, "Politics in Liechtenstein," Parliamentary Affairs, XXV (No. 4, Autumn, 1972), 
326-338
Raton, op. cit., 83.
Feuille Federate Suisse, 1923, II, 406, cited in:
Pierre Vellas, "Les Etats Exigus en Droit International Public," Revue Generate de Droit International 
Public, LVffl (October-December, 1954), 559-81.
13Kranz, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
14Raton, op. cit., pp. 58-59.
15Ibid., p. 61.
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resolutely disqualifying for a larger state. In his study of the case Michael Gunter 
concluded
. . . that the League made a political decision when it turned down the 
membership of Liechtenstein and by inference, those of other ministates 
which might apply in the future. Other states also had or were to surrender 
certain sovereign attributes and yet were permitted to join. The real reason 
for the rejection of Liechtenstein was her smallness, not her deputation of 
some sovereign attributes.16
The underlying assumption throughout was that smallness must necessarily 
compromise a state's sovereignty.17 Surely, it seemed, diminutive states could not exist 
apart from a dependent relationship such as Liechtenstein's former association with 
Austria and now probable arrangement with Switzerland. The inevitable disabilities of 
very small size set these states apart from the class of normal states. That assumption was 
reinforced by Switzerland, which in spite of acting as Liechtenstein's sponsor,18 argued for
16Michael M. Gunter, "Liechtenstein and the United Nations: A Precedent for the United Nations' 
Ministate Problem," American Journal o f International Law, LXVIII (July, 1974), 499.
17This view is often taken for granted in the literature. Note, for example, the indignation of the 
following in response to just such assumptions.
Vellas, op. cit., 564-565.
A. Sottile, "L'Organisation Juridique et Politique de la Republique de St.-Marin et Sa Situation 
Internationale," Revue de Droit International de Sciences Diplomatiques, Politiques et Sociales, I (No. 
1, 1923), 26.
C. D'Olivier Farran, "The Position of Diminutive States in International Law," in Erik Bruel et. al. 
(eds.), Intemationalrechtliche und Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen: Fetschrift fur Walter Schatzel 70 
Geburtstag (Dusseldorf: Hermes, 1960), pp. 135-136.
18This decision that Switzerland should submit Liechtenstein's application was unfortunate for that in 
itself suggested dependence and the abdication of sovereign prerogatives.
Raton, op. cit., p. 66.
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establishing a special committee to examine the League's future relations with those states 
" . . .  which, because of their small size, cannot be admitted as ordinary members. "19
The rejection of Liechtenstein constituted a judgement 'by inference' for other 
micro-states. San Marino failed to respond to the Secretary-General's request for further 
information in support of her application20 and Monaco,21 though endorsed by France in 
her application, withdrew on further consideration.22
Luxembourg was admitted to the League, though the question of smallness did arise 
in the Committee.23 Luxembourg strengthened her case by applying directly and by 
abandoning her neutrality. With a standing army Luxembourg could justify her capacity to
19League of Nations, Records o f First Assembly Plenary Meetings, p. 652 
This special committee (a sub-committee of the First Committee) suggested three possible forms of 
League association for veiy small states: a) full representation but without voting rights; b) 
representation by another League member; c) limited participation, restricted to those matters of 
particular concern. These proposals provoked so much controversy, especially in relation to the 
principle of the equality of states, that the whole question was postponed pending an application from a 
particular state. This was not considered an urgent question because the issue was only relevant for a 
handful of European diminutive states.
League of Nations, "The Position of Small States," Records o f the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings 
pp. 683-688.
20Vellas, op. cit., 573.
Manley O. Hudson, "The Members of the League of Nations," British Year Book o f International 
Law, XVI (1935), 148-149.
League of Nations, Official Journal, 1924, 264.
21Georges Grinda, Les Institutions de la Principaute de Monaco (Monaco: Conseil National, 1975), 
p. 13.
Jean-Pierre Gallois, Le Statut International de la Principaute de Monaco (Paris: A. Pedone, 1964),
p. 80.
“Farran, op. cit., p. 147.
Jacques Rapaport, Ernest Muteba and Joseph J. Therattil, Small States and Territories: Status and 
Problems. A UNITAR Study (New York: Amo Press, 1971), p. 116.
23League of Nations, Records o f the First Assembly Meetings, Annex E, 610.
League of Nations, First Assembly Committee Meetings, Vol. II, 184, 225-227.
See also: Albert Whrer, "Le Statut International de Luxembourg et las Societe des Nations," Revue 
Generale de Droit International Public, XXXI (1924), 169-202
too
fulfill the obligations of the Covenant.24 Moreover, the Grand Duchy was, as the 
Rapporteur noted in the Plenary," . . .  an ancient state . . .  recognised by all civilised states 
(which) has always scrupulously carried out her international obligations."25 Neutralised in 
1867 by agreement of the Great Powers,26 Luxembourg’s foundations in the international 
system were far more certain. Long establishment and an active diplomatic tradition can 
counter the adverse effects of very small size.27
Iceland first approached the League in 1918 when the Danish ambassador in Paris 
inquired of the French government the feasibility of Icelandic membership.28 Though it 
was by then too late for Iceland to become a founding member, a further overture was 
made to the Secretary-General on July 2, 1919.29 This inquiry was not pursued and on 
October 20, 192030 the League concluded that Icelandic accession was no longer a 
consideration. Iceland's position was complicated by the fact that Denmark was still 
responsible for her foreign relations and that League membership would seem to require a 
departure from her traditional neutrality in order that she could fulfill the obligations of
Luxembourg's original application on February 23, 1920 requested that she be granted the privilege of 
maintaining her neutrality. By November 28, 1920, Luxembourg had withdrawn this request and 
agreed to alter her status of neutrality to the extent that Covenant obligations required.
Hudson, op. cit., 141.
League of Nations, Records o f the First Assembly Plenary Meetings, 585-586.
L  Oppenheim, International Law ed. by H. Lauterpacht (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 8th ed., 
1955), pp. 248-249.
27Annette Baker Fox, The Power o f Small States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 184 
The status of San Marino, however, has always been problematical in spite of the Republic's ancient 
origins and proven diplomacy.
Sottile, op. cit., pp. 20-31.
Lenedikt Gr&ndal, Iceland-Jrom Neutrality to NA.T.O. Membership (Oslo: Universitetforloget, 
1974), p. 24.
League of Nations, Official Journal, 1920, 265.
^Grfindal, op. cit.
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membership under the Covenant.31 Some Icelanders regarded League membership as an 
essential buttress to their independence and in 1930, the 1000th anniversary of the Althing, 
Jonas Jonsson, the Minister of Justice, went to Geneva to discuss the possibility of 
Iceland's accession to the Covenant.32 But Jonsson's enthusiasm for League membership 
was not widely shared among his countrymen and Iceland did not pursue the question " . .  
because of smallness, poverty and a kind of shyness."33 Smallness, then, was an inhibiting 
and compromising factor which seemed to qualify the acceptance of diminutive states in 
the international system. Only Luxembourg was able to perform a role in international 
relations comparable to that of larger states.34
Micro-states in the United Nations
Unqualified universality was no more accepted at San Francisco in 1945 than it had 
been for the League in 1920.35 Luxembourg was the only micro-state to be a founding 
member of the United Nations and only Iceland was to join subsequently until the great 
wave of decolonisation began in I960.36 It did not follow that Luxembourg and Iceland 
would serve as precedents for other micro-states.37 None of the other European micro­
31Only Switzerland had been able to reserve the privilege of neutrality. Switzerland and the United 
Nations, Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly concerning Switzerland's Relations 
with the United Nations, (Berne: 1969), 8-11,141-144,153-155.
32Gr6ndal, op. cit.
m id ., p. 25.
U nlike Iceland and Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, San Marino and Monaco were not invited to accede to 
the Treaty for the Renunciation of War (August 27, 1928) though all five states were listed as "entitled 
to appear before the Permanent Court of International Justice." Hudson, op. cit., 148-149.
35Aleksander W. Rudzinski, "Admission of New Members- The United Nations and the League of 
Nations," International Conciliation (April, 1952, No. 480), 147.
^Iceland joined the United Nations on November 19, 1946. Among the many new states admitted on 
September 20,1960 were the first of the new micro-states: the Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon and Cyprus.
37”. . .  there would be great reluctance to adopt rules that demote such old-timers as . . .  Luxembourg." 
Whitaker, op. cit., 4.
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states sought to risk the rejection which Liechtenstein incurred in 1920. Their inhibitions, 
even with the affiliated agencies of the United Nations, left no doubt that smallness was a 
consideration affecting eligibility for full participation.38 San Marino and Liechtenstein 
were both accepted as parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice but not 
without many of the same objections being raised which had prevented Liechtenstein from 
joining the League.39 And, Monaco's admission to the World Health Organization was 
qualified by the reservation that her membership would not constitute a precedent for 
other micro-states.40 These reservations were intended as a protection against the possible 
use of the estoppel doctrine in subsequent cases.41
Reservations about micro-state participation in the United Nations system were 
raised with even greater urgency once the extent of decolonisation was clear. The 
implications of this process for international organisations were not recognised 
immediately, in spite of the uncompromising tone of General Assembly Resolution 1514 
(XV). The Declaration affirmed that small size should never be an impediment to any 
colonial peoples' right to independence.42 However, at the time, it was not certain that the 
General Assembly intended this to mean independence for the "bits and pieces of 
empire."43 Passed during the same session, Resolution 1541 (XV) allowed for the
Sir Hilary Blood, The Smaller Territories: Problems and Future (London: Conservative Political 
Centre, C.P.C. No. 183, Commonwealth Series No. 4,1958), p. 7.
38Wright, Proceedings, op. cit., 26.
39Reservations about Liechtenstein's accession were expressed by the Soviet and the Ukranian 
representatives. SCOR (TV), S/PV. 432, 3.
San Marino's application four years later was accepted without controversy. SCOR (VIII), S/PV 645. 
^Rapaport, Muteba and Therattil, op. cit., pp. 138-139.
41Rosalyn Higgins, The Development o f International Law Through the Political Organs o f the United 
Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 45.
^General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) 14 December, 1960.
43Rupert Emerson, "Self-Determination,'' American Journal o f International Law, XLV (July 1971), 469.
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achievement of self-determination short of independence: a voluntary association or even 
integration with another state.44 It was hoped that these alternative provisions would be 
encouraged to effect decolonisation in the smallest territories.45
The metropolitan powers were particularly committed to the merits of Resolution 
1541. Though the British had recognised "the wind of change" sooner than any other 
colonial power, even they did not contemplate independence for their smallest colonies.46 
Several possibilities were considered: the indefinite continuation of direct British rule, 
some form of association or integration with the United Kingdom, association or 
integration with a neighbouring state, or the creation of a federation.47 Separate 
independence for small countries such as Jamaica48 or Sierra Leone49 was unlikely, let alone 
tiny colonies like the Bahamas or The Gambia.50 The existing European micro-states were 
still the exceptions to prove the rule.
The conviction that smallness would preclude separate independence was often 
shared by the political leadership in the colonial territories. In anticipation of impending 
change in the relationship with France in 1958, some African colonial elites worried about
'“General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) of 15 December, 1960.
45Rapaport, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
^"Some territories are so small that there is no prospect of their becoming effectively self governing.N 
Alan Lennox-Boyd, British Colonial Secretary 1954-1959, quoted in Blood, op. cit., p. 7.
47Ibid., pp. 10-13.
48Vaughan Lewis, Commentary on Basil Ince, "The Decolonization of Grenada in the United Nations," 
in Independence for Grenada- Myth or Reality? (Proceedings of a Conference on the Implications of 
Independence for Grenada sponsored by the Institute of International Relations and the Department of 
Government, the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, 11th - 13th January, 1974) St. 
Augustine: Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, 1974, p. 53.
49Colin Cross, The Fall o f the British Empire-1918-1968 (London: Paladin, 1968), p. 341.
^Blood, op. cit., p. 11.
104
the problem of small size and looked to independence within a larger Equatorial 
association.51 These anxieties and doubts were typical of first generation national leaders 
in very small dependencies. In the Caribbean, for instance, even Grenada's Eric Gairy, the 
first of the small island leaders to renounce the associated state relationship, at one time 
believed that Grenada's size was an obstacle to her separate independence.52
Perhaps the most dramatic example was that of James Mancham, the Chief 
Minister of the Seychelles, who argued for years that his tiny archipelago would be best 
served by the continuation of colonial rule. Mancham complained bitterly of the relentless 
pressure of the Organization of African Unity53 and the United Nations to force 
independence on all colonial territories, even it it was neither the most suitable nor the 
most preferred alternative: "Why should the Seychellois not be be allowed to pursue their 
wish to remain British?," he demanded.54 However, by March, 197455 Mancham had
51In anticipation of impending change in the relationship with France in 1958, the Abbe Fulbert Youlou of 
the Congo-Brazzaville emphasised the problem of size and the need for a larger Equatorial political 
community:" .. .  I would like to preserve the unity that has been gradually achieved between us, for I do 
not believe that any of our territories has the potential to go it alone in a world that is being drawn even 
closer together in large groups." Rene Gauze, The Politics o f Congo-Brazzaville, trans. and ed. by 
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University), p. 48. 
The critical question was: Could unity be achieved prior to independence, or was separate independence 
a regrettable but necessary first step? The major spokesman for 'union first* was the Ubangi leader 
Barthelemy Boganda who envisaged the four French Equatorial territories achieving independence as a 
single state. However personal rivalries ran deep and most other F.E.A. leaders, particularly Leon NfBa 
of Gabon, were suspicious of Boganda's proposals. Ibid., p. 59
Brian Weinstein, Gabon: Nation-Building on the Ogooue (Cambridge, Mass. : The M.I.T. Press, 1966), 
p. 215.
52In a letter to the Premiers of the Associated States, Coard Papers, June 25, 1969, quoted in Richard 
Jacobs, "The Movement Towards Grenadian Independence," in; Independence for Grenada- Myth or 
Reality?, op. cit, p.30.
53The O.A.U. had supported the Opposition Leader, France Albert Rene, and the Seychelles Peoples 
United Party, which was committed to independence. This support included a contribution of £75,000. 
The Guardian (Manchester and London), 23 May, 1974, 2.
^John M. Ostheimer, "Independence Politics in the Seychelles," in John M. Ostheimer (ed.), The Politics 
o f the Western Indian Ocean Islands (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 185.
55Africa (London), June, 1975, 23-24.
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conceded that he was resisting the inevitable. He took over the sovereignty issue 
reluctantly and led his country to independence in June, 1975.56
Though the prospects for separate independence may have been underestimated in 
the smallest colonial territories-or even viewed with some apprehension-expectations 
were altered with the very momentum of decolonisation. The General Assembly's Special 
Committee on Colonialism, reflecting the increasing influence of the new states, stressed 
the primacy of Resolution 1514 and the right to full independence whatever the 
circumstances. The independence of one micro-state, and its subsequent admission to the 
United Nations, raised expectations in even smaller territories. Vaughan Lewis has called 
this process 'independence by demonstration.'57 By 1965, with the independence of the 
Maldives, the undeclared barrier of 100,000 had been overturned, provoking the Western 
powers to urge a review of the "micro-state problem" in the United Nations.58
It was also true that the United Kingdom was not prepared to associate the Seychelles with Britain as 
Mancham had hoped.
^The Times (London), 28 June, 1976,
57Lewis, op. cit.t p.54.
^In reference to the admission of the Maldives the United States representative in the Security Council 
stated,
"Today many of the small emerging entities, however willing, probably do not have the human or 
economic resources at this stage to meet (Charter obligations). We would therefore urge that Council 
Members and other United Nations members give early and careful consideration to this problem in an 
effort to arrive at some agreed standards, some lower limits, to be applied in the case of future 
applicants, for United Nations membership. "
SCOR (XX), S/PV. 1243, 14-15.
The Secretary-General also raised the issue in his annual report for 1965:
"A different aspect of the question of the extent of participation by countries in organized international 
activities is raised by the recent phenomenon of the emergence of exceptionally small new States. Their 
limited size and resources can pose a difficult problem as to the role they should try to play in 
international life . . .  I believe that the time has come when Member States may wish to examine more 
closely the criteria for the admission of New Members in the light of the long-term implications of the 
present trends."
United Nations Document A/6001/Add. 1. (1965).
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In the Secretary-General's annual report of 1967 he urged " . . .  a thorough and 
comprehensive study of the criteria for membership in the United Nations, with a view to 
laying down the necessary limitations on full membership while also defining other forms 
of association which would benefit both the 'micro-states' and the United Nations."59 In 
response to this report the United States wrote to the Secretary-General60 suggesting the 
revival of the Committee on Membership to examine the increasingly infectious problem 
of micro-state independence. The United States renewed its concern again during the 
Security Council debate on the admission of Mauritius in 196861 and by August, 1969 the 
Americans were successful in bringing the micro-state issue to the Plenary Council.62 
Though the Council was not prepared to endorse the American proposal for the creation 
of a category of Associate Membership for micro-states, it did establish a Committee of 
Experts to investigate the whole problem.63 The United States and the United Kingdom 
each submitted proposals for associate membership.64 However, though the Committee 
finally produced a report in June, 1970 with the two Western proposals appended, no 
recommendations were made and the Committee merely pledged itself to further study.65
U nited Nations Document A/6701/Add. 1. (1967).
“United Nations Document S/8296 (1967).
61United Nations Document S/PV. 1414 (1968).
“United Nations Document S/9327 (1969).
“ United Nations Chronicle, August-September, 1969,106 f.
“For a detailed analysis of those proposals see Gunter, Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law, 
op. cit., 474-482.
Stephen M. Schwebel, "Mini-States and a More Effective United Nations," American Journal o f 
International Law LXVII (January, 1973), 110-116.
65At its tenth meeting on March 1, 1971, the Committee requested that the Legal Counsel of the United 
Nations study the proposals and inform the Committee "whether they (could) be implemented within 
the framework of the United Nations without requiring amendment thereof." The Legal Counsel 
concluded that the U.S. and U.K. proposals would require amendment of the Charter but it was possible 
to exploit further the opportunities for associate status which now exists on an ad hoc basis within the 
United Nations. Memorandum by the Legal Counsel on the proposal of the United States of America
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Underlying the concern over the micro-state problem were deep-rooted misgivings 
about the quality of statehood in such exceptionally small states. Though an attempt was 
made to distinguish 'the right to sovereignty' from 'the right to United Nations 
membership', it proved impossible to avoid the humiliating implications which the latter 
question held for the former.66 If the legitimacy of self-determination is measured by 
success67 then United Nations membership is part of that success.68 To be denied 
membership or to be accepted in less than frill and equal standing could only have the 
effect of qualifying the legitimacy of a state's sovereignty, no matter how explicit the 
assurances to the contrary. This was all the more true for micro-states, since their 
international status had always been precarious and controversial.
These intractable difficulties resulted in the eventual neglect of the micro-state 
issue, though the United States sought to raise it as late as 1970 in the context of Fiji's
(S/9836, Annex 1) and the suggestion of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(S/9836, Annex II) regarding special membership for exceptionally small states in the United Nations, 
Committee of Experts Established by the Security Council at its 1306th meeting, Conference Room 
Paper No. 8, July 23,1971. (mimeograph).
66This was emphasised by the Secretary-General in his 1967 report: "It is, of course, perfectly legitimate 
that even the smallest territories, through the exercise of their right to self-determination, should attain 
independence as a result of the effective application of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). . . 
However, it appears desirable that a distinction be made between the right to independence and the 
question of full membership in the United Nations." Op. cit.
The United States found this awkward. In spite of its expressed reservations on the micro-state 
question in general, the United States did vote for the admission of the Maldives and other very small 
dependencies.
67Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era o f Decolonization (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 9, 
December, 1964), p. 63.
68M. . . most of the ministates in the contemporary world are products of the decolonization process. 
They view membership in the United Nations as the final stamp of approval for their independence. 
Opposition to their admission would be equated by some members with a pro-colonialist stand. The 
willingness of the United Nations to admit ministates goes hand in hand with one of the principal 
values of the present international system, the dismantling of the colonial system."
Gunter, American Journal o f International Law, op. cit., 501.
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application for membership.69 Since then another 25 micro-states70 have joined the United 
Nations including Western Samoa, whose decision not to apply at independence in 1962 
was due, in part, to the fear that her application might have been rejected, particularly in 
light of the Commonwealth controversy over the admission of another micro-state, 
Cyprus.71
As more very small dependencies attained sovereignty the issue of micro-state 
participation in international organisations receded. Even the European micro-states have 
been encouraged by the precedents of the decolonisation process to pursue a more 
prominent diplomatic role. San Marino joined the World Health Organization in 1980, 
having been refused admission in 1950.72 Liechtenstein, San Marino and Monaco are all 
full parties to U.N.C.T.A.D. and, perhaps more significantly, to the Organisation of 
Security and Co-operation in Europe. Liechtenstein is now committed to a more 
independent and active diplomacy once considered inappropriate. In 1978 Liechtenstein 
joined the Council of Europe, though not without controversy. Some members expressed 
reservations reminscent of the League debate and concern for the dangers of precedent.73 
But by 1988 the climate of acceptance was such that San Marino, once again looking at
69United Nations Document S/PV. 1554 (1970) The Committee was revived to consider the applications 
of Bahrain, Bhutan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
Stephen Schwebel, "What Should the U.N. Do About the Mini-States," The Washington Post, 26 
September, 1971.
70Three of these countries (Bhutan, Oman and the United Arab Emirates) are now included in the next 
population class of states.
71R. A. Herr, "A Minor Ornament: The Diplomatic Decisions of Western Samoa at Independence," 
Australian Outlook XXIX (December, 1975), 308-309.
72Rapaport, Muteba and Therattil, op. cit., pp. 138-139.9
San Marino had joined U.N.E.S.C.O. in 1976.
nThe Times (London) 29 September, 1978,6; 17 November, 1978; p. 6.
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Alpine initiatives, was emboldened to change its status in Strasbourg. The observer 
standing of this most ancient of European states was easily converted to full membership.74
No change, however, could be more significant than Liechtenstein’s decision in 
December, 1989 to apply for full membership in the United Nations.75 The admission of 
Liechtenstein during the 45th plenary session of the General Assembly comes a full 70 
years after 'the precedent' for very small states was set. It reflects the extent of the 
victory of egalitarian norms in the organised relations of states.
The Landtag's decision was unanimous, which itself reflects the dramatic changes 
in the Principality in the last 25 years and its new-found confidence in international 
relations. Liechtenstein has been transformed from a pastoral Ruritanian community to an 
industrial economy characterised by advanced technologies and a sophisticated service 
sector. Its G.N.P. is larger than many Third World states which pursue a high-profile 
declaratory foreign policy.
Liechtenstein's diplomatic emergence was gradual and tentative. The memory of 
rejection in 1920 had been inhibiting in the early post-war years and was clearly still 
present during the Council of Europe debate in the late 1970s. Yet, in 1984, when he 
assumed his father's responsibilities, Crown Prince Hans Adam declared his country's 
intention to join the United Nations eventually and noted that Liechtenstein might very 
well take this step before Switzerland.76 The fact that the Swiss reaffirmed their intentions 
to remain outside the Organisation in the 1986 referendum77 did not affect Liechtenstein's 
commitment to a more independent and active diplomacy once considered inappropriate.
1AKeesing's Contemporary Archives (1988), 36231.
15Ibid., (1989), 37162.
16The Times (London), 27 August, 1984, 5.
The Economist (292: 25 August, 1984), 43.
77The Times (London), 17 March, 1986, 1.
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The notion that the Principality might be considered as a special Swiss canton is now 
clearly misleading.78
And, consistent with precedent, San Marino followed Liechtenstein's example by 
assuming full membership in the United Nations in February 1992 along with most of the 
former Soviet republics. Emboldened by its access to international councils, this ancient 
republic is now clearly committed to a policy of full international participation.79 With the 
precedents now firmly established, Monaco and even Andorra were emboldened to join 
the United Nations in the summer of 1993.
Micro-states can now expect to participate in international organisations without 
controversy. Any challenge to the rights of the very small would be as embarrassing as it 
would be ineffectual. To what extent does the acceptance of the universality principle 
lend support for the legitimacy of micro-states, particularly those with recurring problems 
of status and security? It is early yet to assess the depth of the international community's 
commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of many of its smallest members. 
Post-war developments have not been wholly reassuring for micro-states. In some cases 
aspirations for sovereignty have been defeated by larger claims. In others, independence is 
marred by the presumptions and ambitions of neighbouring states. It is this more critical 
aspect of the legitimacy problem that we consider next.
^In a well-known text on Swiss government, Liechtenstein is treated as virtually a Swiss canton. 
George Arthur Codding, Jr. The Federal Government o f Switzerland (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 
1961) p. 166.
Pierre Raton concedes that the Principality has been viewed as a monarchical canton in the past but 
argues that this description is oversimplified and inaccurate.
Raton, op. cit., pp. 91-98.
79Andrew Cohen, "San Marino, The Vest-Pocket Republic Has Big Ideas About Its Place in the World," 
The Globe and Mail, Destinations, (Toronto), April, 1993, 53-57.
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CHAPTER THREE
Decolonisation and the Contest for Legitimacy in 
Very Small Territories
Separate independence in very small dependencies is based on a nearly sacrosanct 
principle: The colonial state is the foundation of the nation. The people as defined in the 
imperial experience is the "self* in self-determination. So new states anxiously defend the 
validity of inherited colonial frontiers, however they might offend traditional ethnic, 
cultural, economic, and even geographical sensibilities. For dissident peoples within these 
territories there are "no residual rights of self-determination."1 General Assembly 
Resolution 1514 (XV), which allows no obstacle to the self-determination of colonial 
peoples, stresses the importance of territorial unity.2 Moreover, the inviolability of 
colonial frontiers is as sacred in the period leading up to independence as it is after the 
transfer of sovereignty. Metropolitan decolonisation policies have been monitored 
vigilantly in the United Nations to assure that the natural unity of the would-be state is 
protected against colonial dismemberment. Only on rare occasions has partition been 
accepted.3 It is this principle of the inviolability of colonial frontiers which has allowed for
!U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), I960.
Note especially Clause 6.
Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era o f Decolonization (Cambridge, Mass.: Center 
for International Affairs, Harvard University, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 9, 
December, 1964), p. 28.
“As against either internal or external challenge the established governments work to hold on to the 
'going concerns' which they now control, in evident fear that the existing frontiers, however 
unsatisfactory they may be, might give way to unforeseeable catastrophies if they were once allowed to be 
called into question. A basic reshuffling of the political map would not only endanger the power and 
prerogatives of those now in control but might also destroy much of what has so far been accomplished 
under independence, with no promise whatsoever that the next stage would not be worse than the last." 
Ibid., p. 31.
^ e  British decision to accept Anguilla's secession from the Associated State of St.Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla 
in 1967, the implementation of direct rule in 1969 and the restoration of the island's colonial status in 
1976 were met with suspicion and hostility in the region.
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the nationalisation of the colonial state and for the security of the new state's international 
identity.
The legitimacy of new states, however small or problematic, would seem, then, to 
be clearly established in the ideological commitments and the elaborate institutional 
arrangements of contemporary international relations. The United Nations system itself, in 
Stanley Hoffman's words, provides " . . .  a solemn endorsement to the nation state and . . 
(wraps) the rights and privileges of the Charter around the frail and the shivering."4
Yet colonial frontiers, particularly in very small dependencies, may be outrageous 
violations of the territorial integrity of existing states. It is not surprising that separate 
independence for tiny colonies can provoke indignation from larger contiguous states. 
Crucial to the self-esteem of any state, and especially a new state seeking to establish the 
foundations of nationhood, is the satisfaction of geographic symmetry. The map is the 
cartographic mirror-image of the nation and states are " . . . uneasy with strong 
irregularities, enclaves, detached portions, and protuberances or hollows."5
Basil A. Ince, "The Diplomacy of New States: The Commonwealth Caribbean and the Case of Anguilla," 
South Atlantic Quarterly, LXDC (Summer, 1970), 382-396.
Similarly the Comoros maintained Third World support in the United Nations for its attack on the 
French decision to retain Departmental status for Mayotte when that island voted against independence 
by a majority of 65% in the referendum of 22 December, 1974. For a useful discussion of the Mayotte 
question in the period leading up to the independence of the Comoros see:
John M. Ostheimer, "The Politics of Comorian Independence," in John M. Ostheimer, The Politics o f the 
Western Indian Ocean Islands (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 73-101.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1975), 27036A.
4Stanley Hoffmann, "Regulating the New International System," in Martin Kilson (ed.), New States in the 
Modem World (Cambridge, Mass.: and London: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 56-57.
Inis Claude pointedly addressed the importance of United Nations membership and its implications for 
rooting the international personality of new states in his thoughtful essay:
Inis L. Claude, Jr. "Collective Legitimization as Political Function of the United Nations," International 
Organization XX (Summer, 1966), 367-379.
Kenneth £. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," in Wolfram R. Hanrieder (ed.). 
Comparative Foreign Policy (New York: David McKay Co. Ltd, 1971) p. 95.
"The most striking single characteristic of the national states is the apparent naturalness of the territorial 
state."
Ibid., p. 97.
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Given this concern, those tiny colonies aspiring to independence and those micro- 
states already established, betray most strikingly the accident of their foundation. Many of 
them are continental enclaves6 or off-shore islands whose political separateness may be 
seen as an affront to the 'completeness' of a neighbouring state.
Other factors may also draw the interest of the larger state: the disproportionate 
existence of valuable resources; the strategic importance of the smaller territory; the 
irredentism of pre-colonial political or cultural ties. The relative importance of these 
interests may vary as national circumstances change but justification is always most 
satisfying if the grounds for integration are many and mutually reinforcing.
In the United Nations the interests of those states most directly concerned with the 
separate independence of very small colonial entitities has been acknowledged on various 
occasions. General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) does allow for the association or 
even integration of a colonial dependency with another state providing that such an act of 
self-determination has been exercised freely (i.e. by means of a referendum with United 
Nations participation)7 ” . . .  in full knowledge of the option available to them,”8 and, in
6 A purist definition of an enclave would apply only to Lesotho and San Marino.
"An enclave may be said to exist where territory is entirely surrounded by the territory of another state: 
Hence a piece of territory which is entirely surrounded on the landward side by the territory of another 
state, but which has direct access to the sea. . .  cannot be considered as being a true enclave.'
C. D'Olivier Farran, "International Enclaves and the Question of State Servitudes," International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, IV (April, 1955), 295.
See also: G. W. S. Robinson, "West Berlin: The Geography of an Enclave," Geographical Review XLIII 
(October, 1953), 540-547.
However, as Rigo Sureda noted, "In the context of General Assembly practice this concept is enlarged to 
mean a small sized territory entirely surrounded by a foreign country except for those parts where it is 
limited by sea."
A. Rigo Sureda, The Evolution o f the Rights o f Self-Determination: A Study o f United Nations Practice 
(Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973), p. 176.
It is this usage which is employed in this study.
^ e  United Nations supervised referenda in the Trust Territory of British Togoland (1956), which 
resulted in that territory's integration with the Gold Coast; in the Trust Territory of British Cameroons 
(1961), where separate referenda resulted in the northern part of the territory being integrated with 
Nigeria and the south united with the Republic of Cameroon; the Belgian Trust Territory of Ruanda-
cases of free association, with the option of choosing full independence in the future.9 
Moreover, the United Nations has even been willing to accept the principle of retrocession 
and the recognition that a state has a right to round off its borders. In certain cases, 
where a small territory has been claimed as an integral part of the contiguous state, the 
claim has been acknowledged. The United Nations has consistently urged that the future 
of these territories be determined by the colonial power in consultation with the interested 
state. United Nations resolutions on Ifni,10 Gibraltar,11 the Falkland Islands,12 and until
Urundi (1961), which confirmed the desire for separate independence for each part of the territory; the 
Trust Territory of French Togoland (1958), and the New Zealand Trust Territory of Western Samoa 
(1961), both resulting in independence. In the case of the Cook Islands, the administering power, New 
Zealand, invited the United Nations to oversee the elections to the Legislative Assembly and the 
subsequent debate on the future of the territory. The 1964 Cook Islands Constitution Bill providing for 
full internal self-government in association with New Zealand was the major issue of the election. The 
Constitution was not to come into effect until the new Assembly had passed it. The election resulted in 
the massive victory (70% of the vote and 14 of the 23 Assembly seats) of the Cook Islands Party, the 
major proponents of the Constitution. The General Assembly did accept the Mission's recommendations 
and passed a resolution recognising this act of self-determination and releasing New Zealand from any 
fiirther obligations to transmit information on the Cook Islands as required under Article 73(e) of the 
Charter. However, significant reservations were expressed because the decision had been made 
indirectly and not by means of a United Nations administered referendum. The fact that the association 
with New Zealand could be abrogated at any time by the Cook Islands was the most persuasive factor for 
its eventual acceptance. For the Cook Islands debate in the "Committee of Twenty-Four" see United 
Nations Document A/Ac 109/PV244,15 April, 1964.
Government of New Zealand: An Act to Make Provision for Self-Government by the People o f the Cook 
Islands and to Provide a Constitution for those Islands Wellington: (17 November, 1964).
Arnold H  Leibowitz, Colonial Emancipation in the Pacific and the Caribbean: A Legal and Political 
Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 132-196.
David Stone, "Self-Government in the Cook Islands, 1965," Journal o f Pacific History, No. 2, (1967), 
168-178.
David Stone, "Self-Determination in the Cook Islands-A Reply," Journal o f Polynesian Society LXXTV 
(1965), 80-111.
®United Nations Document A/6300 Rev. 1,769,770.(1966).
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), Principle VII.
10The doctrine of retrocession or reversion recognises the importance of contiguity but in United Nations 
practice it has applied only to very small enclaves such as Ifni.
A. Rigo Sureda, The Evolution o f the Right o f Self-Determination: A Study o f United Nations Practice 
(Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973), pp. 176-177, 197-198.
"United Nations General Assembly Resolutions:
2072 (XX), 16 December, 1965.
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1972, Spanish Sahara,13 have recognised the interests of the claimants. The colonial 
powers were urged to negotiate the future of those territories with the states concerned.14
The inviolability of colonial frontiers as the basis for self determination has been 
challenged most directly then in the smallest territories. In this chapter, we shall examine 
some of those cases where aspirations for separate independence have been frustrated by 
the assertion of larger claims. East Timor, the Western Sahara and Belize are all 
territories where the demand for separate independence was challenged by powerful 
neighbouring states arguing the cause of national integration and territorial integrity. 
Though all three territories are exceedingly small, underdeveloped and peripheral, their 
aspirations to independence were consistent with the post-war understanding of self- 
determination and the precedents established in the decolonisation process.
The definition of a colonial people with rights to self-determination is based on the 
recognition of a separate colonial experience. In the United Nations the prerequisite of a 
distinctive colonial history was recognised in all three cases. In spite of this, the course of
2229 (XXI), 20 December, 1966.
2354 (XXII) 19 December, 1967.
2428 (XXIII) 18 December, 1968.
12United Nations General Assembly Resolutions.
2070 (XX) 16 December, 1965.
2231 (XXI) 20 December, 1966.
2353 (XXII) 19 December, 1967.
2429 (XXffl) 18 December, 1968.
13United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 
2229 (XXI) 20 December, 1966.
2354-11 (XXn) 19 December, 1967.
2428 (XXIII) 18 December, 1968.
2711 (XXV) 14 December, 1970.
"Independence" was added to the "right to self-determination" in United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 2983 (XXVII) 14 December, 1972, though consultation with the Governments of Morocco 
and Mauritania and any other interested party was still included.
14Rigo Sureda, op. cit., pp 78-81,172-177,183-198.
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decolonisation was one of controversy and struggle. The conclusions were different in 
each case. In East Timor the campaign for self-determination ended in total defeat.
East Timor
Indonesia's interest in East Timor was stirred by the April 1974 revolution in 
Portugal, which opened the door to the rapid decolonisation of the Portuguese empire. 
Desperately poor and underdeveloped, the tiny colony of Portuguese Timor was hardly 
considered with great urgency in Lisbon; the Portuguese had intended to remain until at 
least October of 1978.15 With the end of the Salazar dictatorship, three political parties 
emerged in the colony: the Social Democratic Party, which later became Fretilin and which 
called for early independence;16 the U.D.T.,17 which favoured a continuation of Portuguese 
rule for as long as possible, and Apodeti,18 which promoted integration with Indonesia. 
Each party had its support among the Portuguese colons in Timor.
Indonesia's position on decolonisation in East Timor was ambivalent. As early as 
July, 1974 the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, put his country's public position 
very clearly: "Indonesia had no territorial ambitions over Timor."19 Yet, in private,
15Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1975), 27266A.
16The Associacao Social Democratica de Timor (ASDT) was formed immediately after the Portuguese 
coup of April 25, 1974. The movement included those Timorese nationalists (like the future Fretilin 
leader Jose Ramos Horta) who had been active in informal groups prior to the coup. In September 1974 
the A.S.D.T. changed its name to Frente Revolucionaria de Timor L*Este Independente (Revolutionary 
Front for Independent East Timor) or Fretilin in order" . . .  to broaden the representation of the Party to 
include independence forces rather than confining the movement to those who accepted social 
democratic politics."
The Struggle for East Timor (London: Europe-Third World Research Centre, 1976), pp. 5-6.
17Unao Democratica Timorese (U.D.T.), established largely by more moderate dissidents in the A.S.D.T.
18Associacao Popular Democratica Timorese (APODETI).
19Australian Financial Review, 16 July, 1974, as quoted in Nancy Viviani, "Australia and the Timor 
Issue," Australian Outlook XXX  (No. 2, August, 1976), 198.
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Indonesian authorities were certain decolonisation could only mean integration with 
Indonesia.20 This conviction was shared by the Australian Labour Party prime minister, 
Gough Whitlam, who feared "an independent Timor would be an unviable state and a 
potential threat to the stability of the area."21 This was also the view of the Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs22 and the Australian ambassador in Djkarta who regarded 
the stability of the Australian-Indonesian relationship as a major priority of Australian 
foreign policy.23
Indonesia's A.S.E.A.N.24 partners also accepted Indonesia's arguments for 
integration. The annexation of such a small and insignificant territory would hardly arouse
20Ibid., 200.
21 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs briefing, Canberra Times, 9 September, 1974, quoted ibid., 
199.
See also The Sunday Times (London), 24 November, 1974,12.
22Peter Hastings, "The Timor Problem," Australian Outlook XXIX (No. 1, April, 1975), 19.
23"The Department of Foreign Affairs has consistently and persistently put forward the view . . . that 
Indonesia is the linchpin of Southeast Asian security . . . thus the maintenance of the bilateral 
relationship is the paramount consideration in policy even when Australian and Indonesian interests are 
in direct conflict as they were over the West Irian issue. Because of Indonesia's capacity to disturb or 
enhance the regional balance of power, because Indonesia can facilitate or check Australia's entrde . . .  
to regional political institutions and because of great power interests in Indonesia, Australian diplomats 
have been loath to offend Indonesia by too forceful a statement of their views on particular issues, and 
are extremely wary of the often capricious sensitivities of Indonesian politicians."
Viviani, op. cit., 200-201.
The opposition view came not from the anti-Communist Liberal-Country benches but from within the 
ranks of the Australian Labour Party.
24The Association of Southeast Asian Nations includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and, since 1985, Brunei. Each of these states was concerned with Communist backed 
insurgencies. For Malaysia, particularly, the strengthening of the relationship with Indonesia became a 
primary objective of her foreign policy.
Sevinc Carlson, Malaysia: Search for National Unity and Economic Growth (Beverly Hills and 
London: The Washington Papers, Volume HI, No. 25, The Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., Sage Publications, 1975), pp. 54-57.
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand supported Indonesia on General Assembly Resolution 3485 
(XXX), which condemned the Indonesian invasion. Singapore and Papua-New Guinea abstained. The 
Philippines and Malaysia also joined the Security Council debate on East Timor, in order to support the 
Indonesian case.
See particularly SCOR, (XXI), 1915th meeting, 22 April, 1976.
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anxieties over Indonesian expansion. On the contrary, it was a positive step for regional 
security, especially given the alleged Soviet and Chinese links to the major party of 
independence, Fretilin.25 In any case, the A.S.E.A.N. states saw Indonesian annexation as 
”. . .inevitable-now or 50 years hence . . ,"26 and were not prepared to stand in her way.
Unlike West Irian,27 East Timor was truly a colonial remnant. The Portuguese 
colony occupied only a part of one of the smaller islands of the archipelago and, even at 
that, it was geographically bifurcated, with the enclave of Ocussi-Ambeno separated from 
the main colony. Concern over the potential hazards of superpower intervention in the 
region through an independent government in Dili and the obvious geographical 
eccentricity of the colony within the Indonesisan archipelago were only reinforced by the
Papua-New Guinea achieved independence at the very time of East Timor's own bid for sovereignty. 
From the outset Papua-New Guinea sought close relations with the A.S.E.A.N. states. Moreover, facing 
the dangers of a secessionist movement in Bougainville, Papua-New Guinea had reason to be concerned 
about the precedent for fragmentation in the region implicit in the independence of East Timor. 
However, "the Indonesian threat" was of equal concern given the fate of fellow Papuans in West Irian. 
One PNG minister condemned the Indonesian invasion as "imperialist intervention."
Robert Lawless, "The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor," Asian Survey XIV(No. 10, October, 1976), 
962.
25International Herald Tribune, 17 March, 1975, 7.
26Patrice de Beer, "Timor: Obsession for Indonesia," Le Monde, 5 November, 1975, translation in The 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, 16 November, 1975, 13.
27This was not the only difference in the two situations. In East Timor, Indonesia could not summon the 
same arguments which had served her well in West Irian. In her long-standing dispute with the 
Netherlands over this western part of New Guinea, Indonesia had consistently maintained that West 
Irian was an integral part of pre-colonial Indonesia to which the Republic was the successor state. 
Indonesia "could only be the boundaries of the former Netherlands East Indies with whose freedom the 
national movement had been concerned."
Rigo Sureda, op. cit., p. 143.
The Dutch case for self-determination in West Irian was regarded as a "perversion" and an 
"amputation" of Indonesian territory designed to prevent the completion of her independence.
Ibid., p. 145.
Racial, ethnic and cultural considerations had no bearing on the definition of a colony for the purposes 
of self-determination. It was the colonial administrative unit, in this case the whole of the Netherlands 
East Indies "from Sabang to Merauke," which was the exclusive basis for national self-determination. 
Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 125.
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smallness of the projected state of East Timor. Prime Minister Whitlam had already 
proposed schemes for limiting micro-state proliferation in the Pacific.28 And for Djkarta, 
the emergence of an independent state within the corpus of Indonesia could only 
encourage the secessionist aspirations of the South Moluccans and others. A Fretilin 
republic could well be an asylum for self-defined exiles and nationalists in this huge, 
diverse archipelagic state.29 It is not surprising that the prejudice against an independent 
East Timor state was well-established within the region and among extra-regional allies.
Prospects for an easy transition to independence were further undermined with the 
deterioration of civil order in the colony. The fragile Fretilin-U.D.T. coalition, which, by 
its formation, had isolated Apodeti and given considerable impetus to the independence 
alternative, finally came apart amidst mutual recriminiation. Indonesia had successfully 
exploited the anti-Communist fears of the U.D.T. and encouraged them to leave the 
coalition.30 On August 6, 1975, after a series of top-level meetings with the Indonesians in 
Kupang (capital of Indonesian Timor) and Djkarta, the U.D.T. leader, Francesco Xavier 
Lopes da Cruz, announced that U.D.T. would move soon against Fretilin: "We are 
nationalists. If we want to be independent we must follow the Indonesian political line. 
Otherwise, it is independence for a week or a month."31 Five days later the U.D.T. seized 
the key installations in Dili.32 This provoked a Fretilin counterattack which plunged the 
colony into full-scale civil war. The U.D.T. was now in coalition with the pro-
28For example, his proposal for a union between the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides.
Viviani, op. cit., 203.
29Ibid, 214.
xKeesings Contemporary Archives, (1976), 27533
3lIbid.
nIbid.
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integrationist Apodeti, though that party had had very little support hitherto.33 By 
September 1, 1975 Fretilin was in full control of Dili and Fretilin forces dominated most of 
East Timor except for the borderlands.34
On September 8 Fretilin dropped their original demand for immediate 
independence, calling instead for a provisional government and the election of a 
constituent assembly leading to independence within a few years.35 Though Fretilin 
expected the de facto writ of their authority would force the Portuguese into a settlement, 
they also recognised the need for the blessing of the colonial power to give their 
independence legitimacy. This was all the more difficult because the Portuguese were 
preoccupied with their own domestic situation and because the Portuguese governor, 
discredited for his collaboration in the U.D.T. coup, had retreated to the island of 
Atauro.36
Though apparently strong on the ground, Fretilin's position was one of isolation. 
Any possibility of coming to terms with the other parties in the colony had been precluded 
by Fretilin's "fatal error"37 of boycotting, in protest at the presence of Apodeti, the Macao 
talks of May 1975, which were designed to find a consensus. The civil war which ensued
33Viviani, op. cit.
MThe Guardian (Manchester and London), 1 September, 1975, 3.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, op. cit.
*Ibid.
Viviani, op. cit.
Moreover, the Portuguese, in negotiations with the Indonesians in London in March, 1975, had agreed 
to support East Timor's integration with Indonesia and to allow Indonesia to strengthen Apodeti's 
position prior to the elections anticipated in 1976.
Michael Richardson, Age, 9 September, 1975, quoted in Viviani, op. cit., 213.
^Viviani, op. cit.
37By October 30, 1975 the Australian Foreign Minister, Donald Willesee, told Parliament that Australia 
could not accept the claim of Fretilin or any other single party to solely represent East Timor.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1976), 27534.
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only confirmed the allegations of those who contended that Fretilin did not represent the 
majority opinion in Timor and that the integrationist forces commanded genuine and 
substantial support.
The Indonesians were determined there would be no Fretilin-led independent 
Timor. Indonesian support for the anti-Fretilin parties continued to intensify during 
October, to the extent that Indonesian forces were "responsible for virtually all the fighting 
presented to the world as a 'counter-attack' by Timorese freedom fighters."38
Portugal's position became more intractable. Whatever earlier sympathies the 
Portuguese may have had for the integrationist solution, they were not now anxious to 
sanction an outright Indonesian annexation: They refused Djkarta's proposal made at the 
time of the Fretilin counter-coup for Indonesia to restore order in the colony.39 Yet, 
clearly, Indonesia was prepared to countenance no other solution than that of integration, 
having been encouraged earlier by both Portugal and Australia. Portugal, lacking the 
means to support any initiative in defiance of Indonesian determination, could only stand 
by. Unable to faciliate integration tantamount to annexation or to grant independence to 
the Fretilin Government, Portugal was now of little consequence in the course of events.
Faced with mounting Indonesian military pressure and anticipating an invasion, 
Fretilin could only hope to be saved by achieving immediate sovereignty. The 
international censure which would follow the invasion of a sovereign state might be
^The Guardian (Manchester and London), 13 November, 1975, 3.
Fretilin claimed that they were battling Indonesian forces which had air and naval support. Indonesia 
rejected this charge and claimed, as in the October 8 capture of Butugade, that only U.D.T.-Apodeti 
forces were involved. On October 23 Malik acknowledged that Indonesia trained "the refugees" but 
insisted that Indonesia did not" . . .  send soldiers or supply weapons, but (they did) teach them to steal 
weapons from Fretilin."
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, op. cit.
*9The Guardian (Manchester and London), 1 September, 1975, 3.
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sufficient to dissuade the Indonesian generals." Unable to secure sovereignty legitimately 
from Portugal, Fretilin declared independence unilaterally in the hope it would bring 
sufficient international recognition to inhibit the Indonesians and stave off invasion.41 
However, a unilateral declaration of independence (U.D.I.) was unlikely to elicit 
immediate or extensive recognition except from the lobby of "progressive” states, and 
even that measure of success required more time and greater diplomatic resources than 
Fretilin possessed.42 Moreover, U.D.I. was directed not at a discredited European colonial 
power, as was the case in Guinea-Bissau, for Portugal was no longer the obstacle to 
Timorese independence. It was aimed at Indonesia, a Third World state with considerable
"It was reported that President Suharto himself had consistently resisted the hawkish pressures of his 
generals. He was particularly sensitive to the diplomatic repercussions of an overt invasion that could 
revive anxieties of Sukamo-style expansionism, 
de Beer, op. cit.
41The Democratic Republic of East Timor was proclaimed on November 26,1975. The new President was 
Francesco Xavier do Amaral. A Government was sworn in on 1 December, 1975, with Nicolau dos 
Reis Lobato as Prime Minister and Jose Ramos-Horta as Foreign Minister.
The Guardian (Manchester and London), 29 November, 1975, 2, and 2 December, 1975, 2 
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1976), 27534-27535.
"Mozambique recognised the new state on 1 December, 1975 and was followed soon after by the other 
former Portuguese territories: Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Sdo Tom£ and Principe, and by 
China, North Korea, Vietnam and Benin.
East Timor Information Bulletin, No. 2, February 1976, London: British Campaign for an Independent 
East Timor.
Guinea-Bissau declared its independence from Portugal on 24 September, 1973 " . . .  at a meeting place 
within the region of B o . . .".  Within a month 66 states had recognised Guinea-Bissau's U.D.I., though 
the Western powers withheld recognition and opposed the admission of Guinea-Bissau to the United 
Nations on the grounds that the Portuguese authorities were still in Bissau.
Basil Davidson, Growing from the Grass Roots: The State o f Guinea-Bissau (London: Committee for 
Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, 1973), pp. 3,11.
The Comoros declared independence from France on 6 July, 1975. France did not attempt to defeat 
U.D.I., except to reserve sovereignty over the island of Mayotte. The new state was recognised 
immediately by the O.A.U., which on 10 July urged all African states to recognise the independence of 
the Comoros. On 22 July France withdrew from Grand Comoro but maintained its presence on 
Mayotte.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1975), 27282.
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diplomatic support of its own among the very ranks which an independent Timor had to 
win over.
Though it was a desperate attempt to secure the new state, U.D.I. was a fatal 
decision. Even the possible shelter of Portuguese jurisdiction had been abandoned. The 
anti-Fretilin coalition announced that U.D.I. had "removed the last remains of Portuguese 
sovereignty in Timor"43 and that "liberated towns" had now been integrated with 
Indonesia. On December 7, 1975 Indonesia, in what was described as "the biggest single 
military operation in the country's history,"44 invaded the new republic and established a 
provisional government, which would eventually lead to East Timor's incorporation as 
Indonesia's 27th province.45
The likelihood that East Timor could have become an independent micro-state was 
probably doomed from the beginning.46 Though Adam Malik had stated as late as August
43Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976), 27535.
^The Manhester Guardian Weekly, 25 July, 1976, 7.
The Indonesian force was estmimated to be between 10,000 and 20,000.
A5The Guardian (Manchester and London), 2 July, 1976,1.
The Peoples Republican Council in East Timor voted for integration on 31 May, 1976. The territory 
became a province of Indonesia on 17 August, 1976, the anniversary of Indonesia's independence.
The Guardian (Manchester and London), 2 July, 1976,4.
The resistance in East Timor had been determined and widespread, with ten percent of the population 
estimated as killed in the ensuing struggle.
Ibid.
Indeed, the severity of Indonesian policy in East Timor had resulted in defections among some U.D.T. 
and Apodeti supporters who had abetted the Indonesian invasion.
The Manchester Guardian Weekly, 25 July, 1976,7.
^Referring to the Portuguese territories of Timor and Magao in 1964, David Wainhouse noted that" .  . . 
those colonies exist more or less at the sufferance of large neighboring Asian powers, as Goa did. 
Portuguese Timor has surely been marked as one of the targets for Indonesian 'liberation' now that the 
Dutch have been crowded out of Dutch New Guinea . . . For some time Indonesia has had designs on 
Portuguese Timor. . .  it would appear to be a matter of time before Indonesia takes over this Portuguese 
territory."
David Wainhouse, Remnants o f Empire: The United Nations and the End o f Colonialism (New York: 
The Council on Foreign Relations, Harper and Row, 1964), p. 38.
124
14, 1975 that "Indonesia did not wish to make Portuguese Timor another Goa"47 there 
were reliable reports of an Indonesian military build-up in Timor as early as February 
1975 48 xhe helplessness and vacillation of the Portuguese and the instransigence of 
Fretilin meant that there never was the necessary understanding between the nationalists 
and the colonial authorities to conclude a common presentation to the outside world. The 
remoteness of East Timor made any external assistance impractical. Those states which 
did pledge their support, the former Portuguese colonies, were not in a position to offer 
anything material. The states of the region had already acquiesced in the logic of 
integration.49 Even the Soviet Union and China, though sympathetic to Fretilin, were 
discouraged from offering material aid, given the bleak prospects for East Timor's 
survival.50 East Timor was small enough, insignificant enough and anomalous enough to 
be dispensable.
The United Nations was thwarted in its efforts to see that self-determination was 
not dismissed entirely. Indonesia had prevented the United Nations Special Mission from 
ever reaching East Timor.51 Faced with a fa it accompli, the United Nations possessed
41Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976), 27533.
**The Guardian (Manchester and London), 26 February, 1976,4.
The original report was made by Peter Hastings, Sydney Morning Herald, 21 February, 1975, quoted in 
Viviani, op. cit.t 207.
^Ibid.
^deBeer, op. cit.
5lThe United Nations Special Representative had spent three weeks in an abortive attempt to reach the 
Fretilin leaders in East Timor.
The Guardian (Manchester and London), 30 January, 1976,4 and 9 February, 1976.
The envoy, Sr. Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, Under Secretary-General and Director-General of the 
United Nations in Geneva, was appointed by the Secretary-General on 29 December, 1975 in 
accordance with Security Council Resolution 384 (XXX), 22 December, 1975.:
The Special Representative's Report, United Nations Document S/12011,12 March, 1976.
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neither the means nor the will to ensure national self-determination in this tiny colony.52 
Resolutions in the Trusteeship Council, the General Assembly, and the Security Council 
called for the withdrawal of Indonesian forces. Indonesia rejected these resolutions; the 
only Indonesian forces in Timor were volunteers; the invasion was that of patriotic forces 
led by the U.D.T. and Apodeti.53
In spite of the United Nations stand, the inevitability of the Indonesian case was 
widely accepted. On September 1, 1975 General Ali Murtupo, the Indonesian Deputy 
Chief of Intelligence, claimed that " . . .  world opinion is beginning to accept that the final 
solution to the Timor problem is integration with Indonesia."54 A sense of inevitability and 
the unspoken conviction that the inevitable may well be the best for such territories is the 
most ominous source of insecurity for many new states.
Since 1975 the issue of independence for East Timor has been met with muted 
indignation in the international community. The campaign to consolidate Indonesian 
authority in the face of sporadic but determined guerilla resistance has resulted in 
deportation, famine and widespread deprivation.55 In the United Nations there is clearly
i2The Guardian (Manchester and London), 2 December, 1976,4.
53For example, S.C.O.R (XXX), 18 December, 1975, 1868th meeting.
54Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976), 27535.
55Reports of human rights abuses in East Timor surfaced repeatedly in the early years of Indonesian 
occupation. Concern was not confined to the various public-interest groups which were promoting the 
Fretilin case in Australia, Britain and the United States. A United Nations General Assembly resolution 
in 1982 called upon the concerned parties to renew their efforts for a comprehensive settlement because 
of the international community's concern for "humanitarian conditions" in the territory. However, even 
at that, the Timor lobby was not strong: 50 votes in favour, 41 against and 50 abstentions; the portent of 
intertia to come.
United Nations General Assembly (XXXVI) Resolution 37/30. 23 November, 1982.
An Amnesty International Report on human rights abuses in 1985 estimated that 500,000 Timorese had 
been killed or "resettled." Amnesty cited Indonesian military manuals setting out the guidelines for 
torture.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1988), 34236.
In spite of these initial concerns, there was little will to pressure Indonesia for long. For example, in 
1985 the United Nations Human Rights Commission cancelled its review of human rights abuses in
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concern for the plight of the people of East Timor and every year there are appeals to the 
unnamed administering power to withdraw so that "the inalienable rights of the people of 
East Timor to self-determination and independence” might be realised.56 But this is a 
hopeless cause. Those in favour are themselves the weak and the peripheral. The "no" 
vote on the East Timor resolutions, reinforced by the abstentions, is finally prevailing for it 
is based on a coalition of regional and major powers.57 The case for an independent East 
Timor has never carried any sense of legitimacy in the face of more rational and powerful 
interests.
Western Sahara
The inviolability of colonial frontiers as the basis for national self-determination 
was also compromised in the former Spanish territory of Sahara. "The Western Sahara
East Timor. Even more damaging to the cause of an independent Timor state is the apparent consensus 
of weary, and perhaps embarrassed, resignation in the General Assembly. Since 1984 the General 
Assembly has deferred debate on East Timor, leaving it to the Decolonisation Committee, on the 
grounds that there were "delicate negotiations" between Indonesia and Portugal.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1986), 34236; (1984), 33281.
By December, 1988, Indonesia, following President Suharto's visit to the territory in November, felt 
sufficiently confident to declare East Timor open territory in the hope that this would invite investment, 
tourism and, above all, international acceptance for a return to normalcy. Various observer teams 
including members of the European Parliament and British M.P.s, along with vigilant organisations 
such as Asia Watch, still noted human rights violations by Indonesian authorities, but the tone was 
muted. The British, for example, accepted the evidence that abuses had ended in late 1987.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1989), 36934.
The New York Times, 21 November, 1988,1: 13.
As late as March 1986 Fretilin and the apparently now-aligned U.D.T. were announcing military 
initiatives. Any confirmation of continued hostilities in East Timor is hampered by lack of access and 
intermittent and unreliable sources. However, we do know that pro-independence demonstrators braved 
Indonesian security forces to appeal to the Pope during his visit to the territory in October, 1989. 
Amnesty International expressed concern over reports that these Fretilin sympathizers were tortured by 
Indonesian authorities.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1987), 35329.
The New York Times, 13 October, 1989,1:3; 19 October, 1989,1:17.
^In 1979 a resolution calling for the self-determination and independence of the people of East Timor was 
passed with 62 votes in favour, 31 against, and 45 abstentions. Now it is no longer on the agenda.
57The A.S.E.A.N. states and the Western powers.
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could have the unhappy distinction of being the only country to be decolonised out of 
existence," wrote John Gretton,58 though clearly other small entitities, like East Timor and 
West Irian, have met the same fate.
Morocco's claim to the Western Sahara was part of an irredentist policy which also 
included the whole of Mauritania and the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta, Melilla59 and Ifni. 
King Mohammed V had proclaimed Mauritania to be an integral part of "le Grand Maroc" 
in February, 195760 and unsuccessfully invaded Spanish Sahara in November of that year in 
the hope of preventing France from granting independence to Mauritania. Ironically, 
Morocco's failure to prevent the independence of Mauritania was due largely to her 
geographical separation from Mauritania by the Spanish Sahara, though the latter 
constituted part of her claim "from Tangier to Saint-Louis-du-Senegal."61 The Spanish 
presence in Sahara gave considerable credence to the French argument that Mauritania
“John Gretton, Western Sahara: The Fight for Determination (London: Anti-Slaveiy Society and the 
Committee for Indigenous Peoples, Research Report, No. 1, 1976), p. 9.
“ Ceuta, (pop. 70, 864) and the offshore island of Athucemas were captured in 1415, the first European 
colony in Africa. Melilla (pop. 58,458), along with the offshore Chaforinas islands, was colonised in 
1497. Both towns have large Spanish populations, though the Moroccan population has been steadily 
increasing. An entire Spanish division is maintained in each town and Spain has consistently rejected 
or deflected Moroccan overtures for their retrocession.
The Guardian (Manchester and London), 17 November, 1975, 2.
International Herald Tribune, 24 February, 1975,6;17 March, 1975,4.
Ceuta (March, 1981 census) and Melilla (1986 estimate); The Statesman's Yearbook: 1987
60Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1958), 16223A.
61 The White Book (Rabat, 1958) sets out Morocco's claims. Morocco also tried to suggest that the real 
feelings of the Mauritanians were for .'reunion' by co-opting traditional leaders, a tactic that was 
attempted later in Western Sahara and one which was also used by Sukarno in West Irian.
See also United Nations Document A/445. Item proposed by Morocco: The Problem of Mauritania 
(XV). Letter dated 20 August, 1960 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Morocco addressed to the 
Secretary-General, 22 August, 1960.
United Nations Document A/4594. The Problem of Mauritania. Agenda item 79 (XV). Report of the 
First Committee, 26 November, 1960. S.C.O.R. S/PV 911, 910th meetings, 17 November, 1960.
In 1960 the independence of Mauritania, a vast poverty-stricken desert tract with a very small 
population, then 620,000, would have seemed less sensible if there had been geographical contiguity 
with Morocco.
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and Morocco had never had a common frontier.62 Morocco charged that France was 
creating an "artificial state like Katanga"63 for the purpose of maintaining a military 
presence in north-west Africa.
For a time, Morocco was able to sustain a cloud of controversy over Mauritania's 
legitimacy as a sovereign state. The Moroccan case was received with some sympathy by 
other new states, particularly in the Arab world. This uncertainty, along with the charge 
of French neo-colonialism, allowed the U.S.S.R.64 to veto Mauritania's application for 
membership in the United Nations. However, with widespread recognition from 
francophone states65 and Western support, Morocco's objections were defeated by 
Mauritania's very existence and Mauritania was admitted to the United Nations at the next 
session (as the fifth micro-state). Morocco was more fortunate in pursuing the doctrine of 
retrocession over Ifni. With a population of only 50,000 and completely surrounded by 
Morocco, Ifiii was an obvious candidate for absorption. Spain quietly conceded the logic 
of the Moroccan case and Ifni was integrated with Morocco in January, 1969.
King Hassan had hoped for a similar settlement over Spanish Sahara.66 In the 
summer of 1974, Spain, which had already been under considerable pressure in the United
62The boundaries of Western Sahara were drawn by France and Spain between 1884 and 1912.
63Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1960), 17800.
There was some irony in Morocco's reference to Katanga, since Tshombe had based his claim on the 
artificiality of colonial boundaries, the veiy argument that Morocco now used to restore national unity. 
However, the artificiality of Mauritania was striking with the French construction of a capital city for 
the new state on the site of a desert village.
64At first Khruschev had sent congratulations to Mauritania.
Ibid., 17799.
65This included Tunisia, Mauritania's sponsor.
“ In November 1975 he offered to allow Spain to retain sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla in return for 
Spanish Sahara. This was a proposal which had been made once before in regard to Ifni.
The Guardian (Manchester and London) 17 November, 1975,2.
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Nations to expedite the process of self-determination, announced that a referendum would 
be held in the Sahara to determine its future status. In partial response to this pressure 
Spain had established in May 1967 the Yema'a, an assembly of elected representatives of 
tribal chiefs.67 Though Spain extended the authority of the Yema'a, the United Nations 
persisted on the question of Sahrawi independence, and in December 1972 the General 
Assembly passed a resolution, which inter-alia, called for Spain "to determine in 
consultation with the governments of Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested 
party, the procedures for the holding of a referendum under United Nations auspices to 
enable the indigenous people of the Sahara to exercise freely its right to self-determination 
and independence."68 In February of 1973 the Yema'a had also declared "the population's 
desire to determine their own future through a referendum."69
In response to this declaration, and to increased nationalist agitation, Spain 
announced in August 1974 that a referendum for self-determination would be held in the 
Sahara under U.N. auspices in early 1975.70 Morocco was determined that any act of self- 
determination would not include the possibility of independence. "If the question of 
independence is raised," the King warned on August 20, 1974, "Morocco will 
categorically say no to a referendum."71 The choice would be confined to remaining 
Spanish or "being taken back into the bosom of the motherland."72
67Gretton, op. cit., p. 26.
“ Gretton, op. cit., p. 26.
“ Gretton, op. cit., p. 27.
70Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1974), 27614.
71Paul Botha, "Spanish Sahara- A Highly Coveted Prize," Le Monde, 27, 28 November, 1975, translated
in The Manchester Guardian Weekly, 7 December, 1975, 13,14.
m id.
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At first glance, the possibility of an independent Sahrawi state looked promising in 
spite of the Moroccans' determined irredentism. The International Court of Justice, ruling 
on a reference which Morocco herself had initiated in the hope of stalling a referendum, 
acknowledged the existence of " . . . legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of 
Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara . . . "  and " . . .  the 
existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties 
with the Mauritanian entity, and the territory of Western Sahara . . . "  but concluded, 
nonetheless, that this did no t " . . .  establish any ties of territorial sovereignty between the 
territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity."73 
Thus the Court had not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of 
Resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonisation of Western Sahara and " . . .  the principle of 
self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the 
territory."74 There was insufficient reason, then, to abandon the colonial territorial unit as 
the basis for an act of self-determination. Moreover, there was less ambiguity about 
Sahrawi sentiment than could have been argued in East Timor. Though the Moroccans 
had created an integrationist party, the F.L.U. (Front pour la Liberation et lTJnite)," . . .  
it appeared mostly to have consisted of members of the Moroccan army."75 The major 
Sahrawi nationalist party, Polisario,76 commanded nearly unanimous support throughout
^International Court of Justice, Reports o f Judgements, advisory opinions and orders. Western Sahara; 
(Request for advisory opinion), Order of 3, January 1975. October, 1975.
mid.
73Gretton, op. cit., p. 31.
76Popular Front for the Liberation of Sequiet el-Hamra and Rio de Oro. In addition to Polisario and the 
F.L.U., there was also a Spanish sponsored movement, the Saharan National Unity Party (PUNS). 
However, when Spain vacillated in search of a settlement PUNS soon disintegrated. The secretary of 
the party, Henna ould-Er Rach'd, defected to Morocco with the party's funds.
"The Polisario Front," Africa, No. 55, March 1976,23-25.
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the territory and this was recognised in the October 1975 report of the United Nations 
Mission which visited the Sahara the previous May.
Within the territory, the Mission noted that the population, or at 
least almost all those persons encountered by the Mission, was 
categorically for independence and against the territorial claims of 
Morocco and Mauritania. . . . The population showed, by its 
demonstrations and statements, that it supported ...the independence of the 
Territory . . . The Frente Polisario, although considered a clandestine 
movement before the Mission’s arrival, appeared as the dominant political 
force in the Territory.77
Nor did the Moroccan case seem unassailable. Though many of the states in the 
immediate region supported Morocco, the Sahrawis had at least one powerful ally: 
Algeria.78 Unlike Fretilin, Polisario was not entirely isolated. Algeria provided the 
advantages of geographical contiguity, considerable resources, the diplomatic prestige of a 
distinguished Third World state and a well-defined interest of her own which would 
sustain her support.79
77United Nations Document (XXX), A/10428.
Polisario was supported initially by Mauritania until President ould-Daddah shifted Mauritania's policy 
to an arrangement with Morocco.
"Algeria's huge iron ore deposits near Tindouf serve to explain Algeria's position. Morocco's 
"expansionist" ambitions concern Algeria particularly since Moroccan claims have included this 
wealthy area of south-western Algeria. Moreover, to export the iron ore profitably Algeria needs a 
reliable corridor to the Atlantic, which an independent (and presumably grateful) Western Sahara could 
provide.
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Yet within weeks of the I.C.J. judgement and the United Nations Mission's report, 
the possibility of an independent Sahara had been lost. King Hassan's "Green March" into 
the Sahara on November 6, 197580 was followed only eight days later by the Tripartite 
Agreement which ended Spanish sovereignty in the area and divided the territory between 
Morocco and Mauritania.81 Polisario, their Algerian supporters, and the United Nations 
were simply out-manoeuvered by the sheer pace of events. The agreement allowed the 
Moroccans and the Mauritanians to gain full control of the territory prior to the official 
withdrawal of Spain on Febrauary 28, 1976, thereby exploiting the remaining period of 
Spanish sovereignty to cover the consolidation of their authority and to prevent any 
interregnum which could allow the establishment of a Sahrawi state. Polisario was forced 
to mount a diplomatic offensive at the same time as it was trying to cope with the 
Moroccan military occupation and the critical refugee problem which that created.82
The Polisario decision to delay a unilateral declaration of independence was 
understandable but fatal. Spain was still the legal sovereign power in the Sahara. Any 
independence which did not involve the colonial power would be illegitimate and hold 
little promise of support. As long as Spain was still the sovereign authority there might 
yet be a way of reversing the Tripartite Agreement and winning from Spain at least the
80The "Green March," a peaceful invasion of the Sahara by thousands of Moroccan citizens and supporters 
from other Arab states, was announced on October 16, 1975 and began on November 6 despite 
negotiations, warnings, and the indefatigable travels of the United Nations Secretary-General. The 
Moroccans did not advance beyond Spain's defence lines and withdrew on November 9, following 
negotiations at Agadir the day before. At first the withdrawal appeared to be a defeat for King Hassan 
but the "understanding" between Spain and Morocco was the basis for the Madrid Agreement.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976), 27576.
81United Nations S.C.O.R. (XXX), Supplement for Oct Nov. Dec., 1976, S/11880, Annex ED.
The text of the Madrid Agreement has also been translated by John Gretton, op. cit., Appendix 4, 
pp. 52-53.
“ "Independence- Polisario's Answer to Moroccans," Le Monde, 29 February, 1 March, 1976 translated in 
The Manchester Guardian Weekly, March 7,1976,11.
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referendum which had been promised. This decision to take advantage of the Spanish 
legal presence as long as possible depended on the success of (a) wooing the Mauritanians 
out of the agreement and (b) mounting a diplomatic offensive which would allow the 
United Nations to intervene.
Mauritania had been the principal supporter of Polisario until the October 1974 
agreement with Morocco at the Rabat Summit which divided the Sahara between the two 
states. The ethnic and cultural links between the Sahrawis and the Mauritanians were 
recognised by both parties.83 In August 1975 the Polisario had even suggested the 
possibility of a Mauritanian-Sahrawi confederated state, with Mauritanian president Ould 
Daddah at its head.84 Colonel Gaddafy also encouraged the Sahrawis to unite with 
Mauritania. Though " . . .  bowled over with enthusiasm for the young (Polisario) 
nationalists . . .',85 and anxious to thwart the expansion of the conservative monarchy in 
Morocco, he was, nevertheless, opposed to any further fragmentation of the Arab world.
There were several practical reasons for Daddah's decision to collaborate with the 
Moroccans. Mauritania's own historical links to the Sahrawi people were as valid as those 
of Morocco; the possible economic benefits to be derived from any mineral wealth in the 
Sahara would be of considerable relief, given the country's desperate poverty, and 
Mauritania's communications for its iron ore fields in the east to the coast would be eased 
greatly by the alteration of the borders.86 However, the most important consideration was
83One uncomfortable problem for ould-Daddah was the widespread popular support for Polisario in
Mauritania. Africa, No. 57, May 1976, 78.
uThe Times (London), 19 August, 1975, 4.
s5The Manchester Guardian Weekly, 7 December, 1975,14.
“Africa, No. 38, October, 1974, 31.
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Daddah's assessment of Hassan's determination and the likelihood that his resolution was 
indomitable. Daddah stood to lose altogether.87
Mauritania was more receptive to an acceptable solution than was Morocco.88 
Daddah recognised that his country could not sustain a long anti-guerilla struggle and, 
whatever the rewards the Sahara might bring, they could be more than offset by the cost 
of a long and unpopular war89 of attrition against Algerian-backed guerillas.90 Daddah 
admitted that he was subjected to considerable pressure from the Algerian president, 
Houari Boumoudienne, in the weeks following the Tripartite Agreement. Boumoudienne 
reminded Daddah that the Sahara and Mauritania were part of the same Moroccan claim,91 
and the successful absorption of the former could allow Morocco to "recover" the latter at 
any time.92 Mauritania's resistance to these pressures was reinforced by Morocco's own 
diplomatic advantages.
^The Manchester Guardian Weekly, op. cit., 13.
Daddah also resented Algeria's domination in Mauritanian foreign policy, the price which had been 
exacted for Algeria's support for Polisario.
Gretton, op. cit., p. 36.
D aniel Junqua, "Sahara Occidentee: la Mauritanie recherche l'apaisement," Le Monde, 3 December, 
1976, 1.
89Africa, No. 57, May 1976, 78.
90These fears were borne out by the subsequent success of Polisario attacks on Mauritania. The guerillas 
moved with such ease that they could bring their war into Noukachott itself.
The New York Times, 5 July, 1977, 5.
The Times (London), 5 July, 1977,6.
91Gretton, op. cit.
Boumoudienne's frustration had provoked him to leak the Rabat agreement between Morocco and 
Mauritania.
The Observer (London), 1 February, 1976, 9. 
nThe Manchester Guardian Weekly, 12 December, 1975,13.
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The majority of Arab states supported the Moroccan position. Many of them had 
sent delegations to the Green March.93 Even Syria, whose ideological position was more 
in line with Algeria, was sympathetic to King Hassan, remembering the Moroccan 
sacrifices on the Golan Heights.94 Presidents Bourguiba of Tunisia and Senghor of 
Senegal had also advised Morocco and Mauritania to divide the Sahara as the most 
sensible solution to the problem. And French President Giscard DEstaing was entirely 
supportive of Hassan's claim in spite of the obvious contradictions, given French 
determination to create an independent state in Djibouti.95
At the United Nations, the General Assembly had passed two resolutions on 
December 20, 1975. The "Algerian Resolution" did not mention the Tripartite Agreement 
and called for Spain to take immediate steps to enable " . . .  all Saharans originating in the 
territory to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination under United Nations 
supervision."96 The "Moroccan resolution" called for similar action b u t " . . .  through free 
consultation organised with the help of a United Nations representative."97 On January 31, 
1976 the Secretary-General announced that a special mediator, Hr. Olof Rydbeck, the 
Swedish permanent representative at the United Nations, would be sent to arrange for "an 
act of self-determination" to take place in the Sahara.98 After the first of two missions to 
Western Sahara in February 1976 Rydbeck reported to the press that " . . .  the military
m id.
m id.
95"Sahara repercussions," Le Monde, 8 January, 1976, translated in The Manchester Guardian Weekly, 18 
January, 1976, 13.
^United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3458 (XXX), 10 December, 1975, Resolution A.
91 Ibid., Resolution B.
^Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1976), 27746.
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situation as it stands makes a meaningful consultation of the Saharans very difficult if not 
impossible."99
This candid disclosure of Moroccan attempts to frustrate his mission did not augur 
well for a positive United Nations role. An even more frank criticism of Morocco was 
made by United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim when he refused an invitation 
by the Moroccan foreign minister to send a United Nations observer to the February 26 
meeting of the Yema'a which was expected to ratify the Madrid agreement.100 Waldheim 
replied that neither Spain nor the interim Tripartite Administration had taken the necessary 
measures to assure the exercise of "the right of self-determination" of the Sahrawis and 
therefore " . . .  under these conditions the presence of an observer would not satisfy the 
demands of the General Assembly."101 The final assault on United Nations efforts came in 
March, 1976, when Rydbeck, in his second mission, attempted to circumvent Moroccan 
obstruction by visiting Polisario leaders in Algiers and Sahrawi settlements in Tindouf.102 
Morocco and Mauritania claimed Rydbeck's Tindouf venture had constituted a "violation 
of the mandate entrusted to him,"103 and declared they would no longer co-operate with the 
Mission.
The failure to extract Mauritania from the agreement and the bleak prospects for a 
successful United Nations intervention made the course of U.D.I. inevitable. The Sahrawis
"Ibid.
100At least one third of the Yema’a's members had joined Polisario. Spain's derision to withdraw by 
February 26, two days earlier than announced in the Madrid Agreement, was due in part to Spain's 
reluctance to collaborate with Morocco's attempts to gain international legitimacy for Moroccan 
annexation at the meeting of the Yema'a.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1976), 27747.
l0iIbid.
102By March 1976 virtually the whole Sahrawi population was at Tindouf.
Ibid., 27748.
mIbid.
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knew that a declaration of independence would require some physical presence in the 
territory if it was to possess any legitimacy and any chance of quick and widespread 
recognition. The Moroccans were already occupying El Aiaun and Smara. Polisario 
hoped, then, to take the southern coastal town of Villa Cisneros (later Dakhla) when Spain 
pulled out on January 18.104 The opportunity for taking Villa Cisneros seemed most 
optimistic when the Spanish departure was advanced to January 12.105 However, 
anticipating Polisario strategy, Morocco sent troops into Villa Cisneros on January 11. 
Realising they now risked losing the town which had been allotted to them, the 
Mauritanians moved north. Their advance was forestalled by a Polisario attack and the 
Moroccans consolidated their presence in Villa Cisneros.106 Polisario's position could not 
have been worse. They were now compelled to wait until the official Spanish withdrawal 
before proclaiming their Saharan Democratic Arab Republic on February 28 at the Birhelu 
oasis near the Algerian border.107 The failure to secure Dakhla was fatal to the chance of a 
Sahrawi state being established. Had they been able to proclaim the new republic in 
Dakhla their diplomatic position would have been far stronger.108
104There was even a suggestion that Mauritania had been persuaded by Colonel Gaddafy to allow Polisario 
to take the town first.
The Times (London), 1, March, 1977, 14.
mKeesing's Contemporary Archives (1976), 27578.
106Gretton, The Times, op. cit.
101Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976), 27747.
mIbid.
“ . . .  the Polisario were not able to announce the creation of the S.A.D.R until the end of Februaiy, by 
which time the Mauritanians had driven them out of the southern part of the Sahara and they had no 
territory they could call their own except for Gulta-Zeniour and a tiny comer up near Tindouf; all they 
could claim to govern, in fact, were the refugees on Algerian soil. The difference between that and 
the effect that would have been produced by a proclamation coming from Dakhla in the middle of 
January is not hard to imagine.”
Gretton, The Times, op. cit.
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Morocco and Mauritania had threatened to leave the Organization of African Unity 
if that body recognised the S.A.D.R. Seventeen members of the O.A.U. did vote in favour 
of recognition in spite of this ultimatum.109 Several states joined Algeria in recognising the 
S.A.D.R. and both Fidel Castro and General Giap pledged their support for the Sahrawi 
cause.110 Algeria was also successful in constructing a coalition consisting of Libya, Niger, 
and Mali to support the Sahrawis as a counter to the otherwise formidable regional 
support for Morocco.111 Yet initial diplomatic recognition was limited because the 
republic existed as a refugee camp under Algerian auspices and the Western Sahara was 
now effectively under Moroccan and Mauritanian control.112 The major Western powers 
were anxious to maintain their friendly relations with Morocco113 and the U.S.S.R., though 
pro-Algerian, was not prepared to be isolated from the majority of states in the region.114 
The Soviets at no time offered any criticism of Morocco even though they supported the 
Algerian resolution in the United Nations. And, during the Soviet Communist Party 
Congress in Moscow, Chairman Brezhnev's support for national liberation movements did 
not include mention of Polisario at a time when it would have been most timely.115 On the
109Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Libya, Malagasy, Niger, Sdo Tomd and Principe, Somalia, Tanzania.
u:>Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976), 27579, 27748.
mJbid., 27748.
112Early recognition was granted by Angola, Benin, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, North Korea, the Malagasy 
Republic, Mozambique, Togo.
Ibid.
113Africa, No. 57, May, 1976, 78.
U4The Guardian (Manchester and London), 9 March, 1976, 3.
n5Ibid.
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whole, the Soviets were reluctant to support movements for new tiny states when a 
desirable alternative was possible.116
The failure of the Sahrawis was not only the result of being out-manoeuvered by 
the overlap plan of the Tripartite Agreement and by the pace of events. In spite of the 
findings of the United Nations Mission and the I.C.J., there was considerable concern in 
many countries as to the wisdom of creating yet another micro-state with dubious 
prospects.117 Even if it could be assumed that the Sahrawis could sustain the infrastructure 
of a modem state with a population base of a few thousand nomads, would that state be 
competent to manage its enormous phosphate reserves? And, should that be possible, is 
there justice in allocating these resources to the exclusive benefit of a tiny population 
merely on the basis of arbitrary colonial frontiers? The Tripartite Agreement suggested 
these resources would now benefit the region as a whole. Mauritania's participation 
seemed deserved and gave the agreement the appearance of justice which an exclusively 
Moroccan annexation might not have done.
These doubts as to the legitimacy of a separate Sahrawi state were largely 
responsible for the widespread diplomatic acceptance of the fa it accompli of the Tripartite 
Agreement, even though the execution of that agreement was clearly not in keeping with 
U.N. and I.C.J. findings. Though Morocco's annexation of the Western Sahara was an 
embarrassment, given the sanctitity of the self-determination principle, the strength of the 
unspoken arguments (the Sahrawis were not legitimate candidates for separate
116This was also true of their attitudes at the time on the future of Djibouti.
The Manchester Guardian Weekly, 21 March, 1976,16.
117This view was expressed even in Qatar, itself in the ranks of the smallest micro-states. 
The Guardian (Manchester and London), 9 February, 1976,12.
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statehood)118 ultimately prevailed in the early period of the dispute and protected Morocco 
from serious diplomatic retaliation and international censure.
With Spain's departure, the Moroccans and the Mauritanians soon controlled every 
settlement in the territory. However, their fixed positions were subject to constant and 
devastating lightning attacks by highly mobile Polisario units. Dashing across the desert in 
Land rovers, Polisario forces were able to attack enemy positions not only throughout the 
Sahara but also deep inside Morocco and Mauritania. Moroccan counterattacks from 
fortified bases were extremely vulnerable to ambush, and even air strikes were rarely 
effective. Polisario forces consistently exploited their understanding of the desert to their 
tactical advantage, even to the extreme of burying themselves in the sand and breathing 
through straws to escape detection.119
Polisario's strategy was not only one of sapping the resources and undermining the 
morale of their adversaries militarily. The international image of Polisario resistance was 
an important component in the diplomatic offensive which they have waged since 1975. 
Typically, Polisario leaders would use every opportunity to let journalists see for 
themselves the evidence of their victories before returning to their bases. Visits to the 
refugee camps were encouraged, demonstrating the progressive character of the Polisario 
social programme and the extent of Sahrawi solidarity for the nationalist struggle. The 
image of Polisario was increasingly romantic and heroic; a deeply committed and fiercely 
determined people who were proving the Sahara belonged to them. The tenacity of their
118"The chief restraint on relatively sympathetic nations is their belief that a nation of only 70,000 is non- 
viable."
Africa, No. 57, May, 1976, 73.
It is significant that many African states, particularly conservative pro-Western governments, were 
initially persuaded by these pragmatic concerns despite their commitments to the sanctity of colonial 
frontiers.
119For instance, note John Andrews' report in The Manchester Guardian, 8 June, 1978, 7.
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resistance clearly confirmed a sense of Sahrawi national identity and strengthened the 
claim for self-determination.
In the first years of the war the Polisario guerillas intensified their attacks on 
Mauritanian positions, even in Noukachott itself, and this strategy was finally successful in 
forcing Mauritania's withdrawal from the conflict. The war had never been supported by 
southern Mauritanians, who regarded the issue as a "Moorish affair." The Berber-Arabs 
of the North were unenthusiastic for a war against a people with whom they had long- 
established ties of kinship. And, there was growing hostility to the overbearing presence 
of the Moroccans in the Mauritanain sector of the Sahara and in Mauritania itself.120
The enormous costs for Mauritania, a small and poor country, were soon glaringly 
evident. Ould Daddah was overthrown in a military coup in July 1978 and Polisario 
responded by declaring a cease-fire, releasing Mauritanian prisoners and calling for 
negotiations with the new Mauritanian leadership.121 Sympathy for Polisario in the new 
military government and the obvious hopelessness of continuing the war led to the formal 
withdrawal of the Mauritanians from their allotted sector of the Sahara in 1979 and the 
eventual alignment of Mauritanian policy with that of Algeria and Libya.122 The former 
Mauritanian sector was immediately incorporated into Morocco and representatives for
mKeesing’s Contemporary Archives (1979), 29674.
mThe Times (London), 11 July, 1978, 1, 6; 12 July, 1978, 8.
Colin Legum (cd.) Africa Contemporary Record 1978-79 (London: Africana Publishing Co., 1979), 
B699-B708.
mThe New York Times, 6 August, 1979, 5.
Mauritania's withdrawal was expected given the catastrophic costs of the war. The country's 14,000 
man army was absorbing 65 percent of the Government's budget.
The New York Times, 18 October, 1978, 74.
With the withdrawal of Mauritania, King Hassan once again alluded to earlier Moroccan irredentist 
claims in his reference to Mauritania as an artificial creation of colonial powers.
The New York Times, 22 August, 1979, 6.
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the "restored" province of Ould Eddahad were elected to the Moroccan parliament in May
1981.123
The Mauritanian withdrawal from the war and the emergence of pro-S.A.D.R. 
factions in the Mauritanian military government124 also served to strengthen the Polisario 
cause. The participation of Mauritania had lent some justification to the Tripartite 
Agreement and blurred the reality of Moroccan ambitions. African states are particularly 
sensitive to the inviolability of colonial frontiers as the basis for self-determination. The 
legitimacy of the Sahrawi case became all the more persuasive, then, as the elemental 
irredentism of the Moroccan policy was exposed.
The ferocity of the war intensified as Morocco launched huge expeditionary 
operations and Polisario adopted conventional tactics. Instead of hit-and-run encounters 
there were long, drawn-out pitched battles. By late 1981 the Polisario units were 
deploying sophisticated tanks and missiles in increasingly frequent clashes with Moroccan 
forces. Morocco's response to the emboldened tactics of Polisario was to build a massive 
Maginot Line of sand walls across the territory. These extraordinary fortifications extend 
from Zag in south-eastern Morocco to the Atlantic coast south of El Aioun-the so-called 
"Useful Triangle."125 The effect has been the consolidation of Moroccan control and the 
denial of access for Polisario to the territory of the S.A.D.R. Polisario has still mounted 
major attacks within Morocco itself but they have not been able to weaken the Moroccan
n3The New York Times, 16 August, 1979, 5.
124Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (1981), 31001-31004.
125The construction of the wall by Moroccan military forces was an eight year enterprise over six stages of 
construction. The final section of the wall to the Atlantic coast at Guegurat was completed in April
1987. Of the territoiy's 260,000 square kilometers, 200,000 were enclosed within the wall.
The Times (London), 20 April, 1987, 5.
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hold on the Western Sahara. The military position is one of stalemate and the prospects 
for either side achieving a decisive military victory are remote.126
While Polisario's guerrilla war has failed to force the Moroccans out of the Sahara, 
their diplomatic efforts have been remarkably successful. The principal targets of the 
S.A.D.R.-Algerian political campaign have been the African states. As early as July 1976 
the Organization of African Unity, meeting in Mauritius, supported the “just struggle" of 
the Sahrawi people and called for the withdrawal of "foreign occupying forces."127 Sub­
committees were established to study the issue and to explore opportunities for mediation. 
These proposals were accepted by more conservative states for advantages of delay and in 
the expectation that the Moroccan military position would improve.128
Any assumption, however, that Algeria's particular interest could be met within the 
framework of an exclusively Moroccan-Algerian settlement proved to be mistaken. Nor 
did the death of Houari Boumoudienne offer any prospect of a softening in the Algerian 
position. Algeria's material and diplomatic commitments to the S.A.D.R. have been so 
extensive that any future agreement to a "Kurdish deal" would be extremely difficult.
126Sporadic but intense fighting has continued in spite of the wall and in spite of regular mediation 
attempts by both the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. Direct talks between King 
Hassan and Polisario officials in January 1989, and a subsequent unilateral Polisario ceasefire 
declaration, did not alter the course of the war. Exchanges between Moroccan and Polisario forces are 
represented very differently by each side, of course, but both versions agree that such incidents involve 
heavy fighting and major casualties.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1987) 35216-35218; (1989), 36409, 36748, 36988, 37014; (1990), 
37220-37221.
127At the O.A.U. meeting in Mauritius in July 1976, Benin led a number of states in a call to support "the 
just struggle of the Sahrawi people" and to demand the withdrawal of all foreign troops. Benin's 
efforts were deflected by a promise to hold a special session on the Western Sahara in the future. Still, 
there was already a significant measure of support for the Sahrawis among "progressive" African 
states. A pro-Sahrawi resolution at the February, 1976 meeting of the O.A.U. resulted in 17 votes in 
favour, 9 against and 21 abstentions.
Zdenek Cervenka, "The Organization of African Unity in 1976," in Colin Legum (ed.) Africa 
Contemporary Record 1976-1977 (London: Africana Publishing Co., 1977), A77.
™Ibid.
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Algerian influence was particularly evident in the immediate region. Though Senegal and 
Tunisia were favourable to the Moroccan position, Libya, Mali, Niger, Chad and 
eventually Mauritania supported Algeria and the S.A.D.R. At a summit meeting in 
Bamako in March 1980 the leaders of these Saharan states together with Algeria declared 
their commitment to the rights of the Sahrawi people to self-determination in accord with 
United Nations and O.A.U. resolutions.129
By 1981 there was widespread support in the O.A.U. for a ceasefire and a 
referendum under the auspices of the United Nations and the O.A.U. At the O.A.U. 
summit meeting in Nairobi in June 1981 King Hassan responded to these concerns by 
proposing, himself, a referendum, confident that the people of "the recovered province" 
would demonstrate their loyalty to Morocco.130 However, Hassan was not prepared to 
negotiate a cease-fire with Polisario or to withdraw Moroccan forces from the Sahara 
prior to the referendum.
The stalemate in the Western Sahara was reflected in the immobilism of the 
O.A.U. At one point division within the Organization on the Saharan issue brought it to 
the brink of collapse. The S.A.D.R. was admitted to the O.A.U. as the fifty-first member 
in February, 1982 and as a result twenty African states joined Morocco in boycotting the 
Tripoli summit in August.131 Without a quorum the summit was doomed. The admission
119Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1981), 30714.
mThe Times (London), 28 November, 1981, 5.
Hassan originally saw little need for a referendum since the people of the Sahara had already expressed 
their loyalty and wished "to be integrated with Morocco in the traditional manner," as his prime 
minister put it. The King eventually gave in to the pressure of the O.A.U. ad hoc Committee on 
Western Sahara at the Nairobi summit in June, 1981. However, he viewed the exercise of the 
referendum in a very constricted sense as "an act of confirmation" of union.
Tony Hodges, "Western Sahara: The Mahgreb Under the Shadow of War," in Colin Legum (ed.), 
African Contemporary Record 1980-1981 (London: African Publishing Co., 1981), A69-A70.
The Times (London), 27 June, 1981,1.
mThe Times, 23 February, 1982,6; 24 February, 1982, 7; 25 February, 1982, 6; 1 March, 1982, 4.
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of the S.A.D.R. in the face of such entrenched opposition, and clearly at the risk of the 
Organization's future, was a measure of the S.A.D.R.'s diplomatic gains and of the 
constancy of their support. The most important successes were with such major Third 
World states as India and Nigeria, the latter especially critical for their victory in the 
O.A.U.132 However, the subsequent paralysis of the O.A.U. demonstrated equally the 
determination of Morocco and her allies. Clearly, S.A.D.R. leaders were persuaded by 
consideration of the Pyrrhic nature of their victory when they agreed to withdraw 
"temporarily" from the O.A.U. in October.133
The cause of the S.A.D.R. has been promoted successfully at every level of the 
international system. In contrast to U.N. inertia on the East Timor issue, General 
Assembly resolutions in support of the "inalienable rights of the people of Western Sahara 
to self-determination and independence" are endorsed by the great majority with only a 
handful of states in opposition.134 In 1979 the S.A.D.R. was recognised by 19 states (14 of 
which were African). But by late 1981 45 states representing every region of the 
international system had granted formal recognition, received S.A.D.R. ambassadors or
Zdenek Cervenka and Colin Legum, "The Organization of African Unity in 1982: A Severe Setback to 
African Unity," in Colin Legum (ed.) Africa Contemporary Record 1982-1983 (London: Africana 
Publishing, Co., 1983), A44-50.
132Nigeria recognised the S.A.D.R. in November 1984. Lagos was exasperated at Hassan's continued 
procrastination both in terms of the proposed referendum and in respect to direct negotiations with 
Polisario. Nigeria's support was instrumental in the O.A.U.'s decision to seat the S.A.D.R delegation 
at the Council of Ministers meeting later that month.
The Times (London), 7 November, 1984,12; 12 November, 1984,4.
mThe Guardian (Manchester and London), 31 October, 1982.
134On 22 November, 1989, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution (XLIV) 43/4 which, 
inter alia, called for the Secretary-General to appoint a special United Nations representative for 
Western Sahara and urged negotiations to implement a United Nations-supervised referendum to effect 
the "self-determination of the people of Western Sahara." The vote was 88-0 in favour with 56 
abstentions. Morocco did not participate.
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exchanged notes of accreditation.135 The success of the diplomatic campaign is particularly 
evident in Spain's eventual acceptance of the Sahrawi case for self-determination and the 
necessity o f ”. . . allowing the conclusion of the process of decolonisation in line with the 
just and legitimate aspirations of the Sahrawi people."136
The future of the Western Sahara is still in doubt. However, unlike East Timor, 
the case for self-determination and separate independence has survived the threats of 
military annihilation and international indifference. Polisario's two-track strategy of 
guerilla resistance and diplomatic offensive has meant that the Sahrawi cause is still on the 
international agenda. Yet mere survival after 21 years offers cold comfort to Sahrawis 
looking beyond Morocco's formidable irredentism so tenaciously defended by the sand 
walls of the Zag line. United Nations resolutions, Third World recognition and O.A.U. 
membership have not weakened Morocco's determination. Morocco has not been isolated 
diplomatically. Nor has she had reason to fear the consequences of her resolve among 
friendly powers. Indeed, those powers, particularly the United States and France, have
135Within four years of the proclamation of its independence the S.A.D.R. was recognised by some 40 
states, including the Arab "resistance*' front of Syria, South Yemen and the P.L.O., along with Algeria 
and Libya. Polisario had ambassadors in eight capitals. By February 1982 a bare majority of 26 
African states had recognized the S.A.D.R., thus paving the way for its admission to the O.A.U. 
Council of Ministers. The S.A.D.R. is currently recognised by nearly 100 states, including such 
relatively pro-Western countries as Guatemala and Venezuela, which might be expected to be 
particularly sensitive to the Moroccan case.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1981), 30714; (1984), 33307; (1985), 33325; (1987),
35218; (1988), 35996.
136Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1981), 30716.
Spain's recognition, as Portugal's, was motivated in part by the plight of some of her fishermen held by 
Polisario forces. It was also a response to Algeria's successful manipulation of a campaign for the 
independence of the Canary Islands. Moreover, as in France, the Socialist government was more 
predisposed to the Polisario case than its predecessors had been. The S.A.D.R. opened an official 
bureau in Paris in 1982 and a diplomatic mission in Madrid in 1984. Though relations with Spain 
were broken in 1985 following the death of two Spaniards in an exchange at sea, Polisario 
representatives were invited as observers to the Congress of the Spanish Socialist Party in January
1988.
Ibid. (1982), 31489; (1984), 33306; (1988), 35596.
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been constant in their support. In most of the Arab world, as in the West and even in the 
former Soviet bloc, Moroccan determination has been embarrassing at most. Though the 
case for separate independence in Western Sahara was clearly established in the practice of 
United Nations decolonisation and in the judgements of the International Court of Justice 
and the United Nations Special Mission, both principle and precedent gave way to the 
determination of a powerful regional state and to the indifference and inertia of major 
powers. The legitimacy of a difficult case for separate independence depends as much on 
the judgement of the major powers as on the support of the weak and poor majority. That 
lesson was clear in both East Timor and the Western Sahara. The principled case for a 
separate Sahrawi state hardly justified the political and strategic costs of offending a 
formidable power. Even Algeria's support was not finally weighty enough to sway major 
powers to support the cause of a very small nomadic people whose aspirations to self- 
determination could be readily seen as both questionable and expendable.
Belize
As in the Western Sahara, the case for self-determination in Belize was challenged 
by arguments for the restoration of territorial integrity. Guatemala's case was that of state 
succession. Belize lies within the historic frontiers of Spanish sovereignty, once subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Captaincy-General of Guatemala.137
The first British settlements in the coastal areas adjacent to the Belize River were 
established as early as 1650, though British Honduras did not become a Crown colony 
until 1862. The British regarded the terms of the Anglo-Guatemalan Treaty of 1859 as a 
recognition of British sovereignty. Guatemala argued that the treaty did not provide for
137For a review of the Belize dispute see C. H. Grant, The Making o f Modem Belize (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976).
148
delimitations of sovereignty but only for a Guatemalan "cession of territory"138 in return for 
a British commitment to develop communications links between Guatemala and Belize. 
As Britain had failed to honour these commitments the treaty was no longer valid.
Since 1859, Guatemala pursued its irredentist claim, relying on Latin American 
solidarity and on the support of the United States. The American predicament on the 
Belize issue was not unlike their dilemma in the Falklands crisis. Though they were 
responsive to Britain's overtures as an ally, they were also concerned for the sensibilities of 
the Latin American republics and for the security of their role as mentor and protector, 
particularly on an issue of "external threat" to the region.139 Against these considerations, 
separate independence for a few thousand English-speaking people in Central America 
could be seen as residual British colonialism. In the post-war years the United States was 
principally concerned with the threat of Communism and the potential for Soviet 
penetration in the region. The Americans feared Belize would follow the course of other 
left-leaning governments in the Commonwealth Caribbean and that an independent Belize 
would become a toehold for Cuba in Central America.140
The British, anxious to divest themselves of imperial responsibilities, faced the 
problem of implementing independence in one of their smallest territories in the face of a 
serious irredentist threat, regional isolation, and the suspicion of the most powerful state in 
the world. Though the British were prepared to make territorial concessions in their
138J. Ann Zammit, The Belize Issue (London: The Latin American Bureau, 1976), pp. 9-19.
139Prior to 1981 the United States had abstained whenever the issue of the Falklands was raised. 
Keesings Contemporary Archives, (1981), 30935.
l40The Guardian (Manchester and London), 26 April, 1976, 3.
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negotiations with the Guatemalans,141 a complete "sell-out" would have been indefensible 
in Parliament, in other Commonwealth Caribbean countries and in Belize itself.
In contrast to the acquiescence of Portugal and Spain to events in East Timor and 
Western Sahara, Britain worked to establish the international legitimacy of Belize and to 
prepare the case for independence long before the transfer of sovereignty. While the 
British were resolute in their defence of Belize against a Guatemalan threat prior to an 
independence settlement,142 no British government before Mrs. Thatcher's was prepared to 
guarantee the security of Belize in the post-independence period. The protection of the 
new state had to be vested in international acceptance. This meant that Britain would 
have to root and cultivate a separate Belize in the international community well before the 
transfer of sovereignty.
The international identity of Belize was established with the introduction of 
ministerial government in 1964. The prime minister of Belize was empowered with 
responsibilities in foreign affairs, which allowed him to promote his country's case in the 
international system,143 particularly in the United Nations, where support for the separate 
independence of Belize increased every year.144
141During a six month period in 1977 the British had discussed three different "territorial adjustments" 
with Guatemala. The initial and most generous proposal was a concession of 2,000 square miles of 
land south of the Monkey River, nearly one quarter of Belize's total area.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1980), 30349.
142The British military reinforcements of November 1975 were just such a demonstration.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976), 27573-27574.
143Grant, op. cit., pp. 233-235.
144United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3512 (XXXV), 11 November, 1980.
The tone of the resolution was unequivocal. "The differences that exist between the United Kingdom 
and Guatemala do not in any way derogate from the inalienable right of the people of Belize to self- 
determination, independence and territorial integrity and that the continuing inability of the parties to 
resolve such differences should no longer delay early and secure exercise of that right." The resolution 
called for independence by the end of 1981.
There were 139 votes in favour, seven against (Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, 
Paraguay, Uruguay) and three absent.
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The most important asset in the diplomatic campaign for an independent Belize 
was the active role played by the states of the Commonwealth Caribbean. Belize joined 
CARICOM in May 1974.145 The CARICOM states sponsored Belize's case at the 
Organization of American States, at the Conference of Non-Aligned States and at the 
United Nations. CARICOM support for Belize is consistent with Commonwealth concern 
for Guyana, the only other mainland English-speaking state in Latin America and itself 
subject to irredentist claims.146 With the Commonwealth Caribbean initiative, the Belize 
debate in the United Nations147 went far beyond the predictable exchanges between the 
Guatemalan and British delegations. Resolution 3432 (XXX) calling for the independence 
of Belize was passed in the General Assembly by 110 votes to nine.148 By 1978 there were 
no votes at all cast in opposition to the resolution calling for self-determination and 
independence, and by 1980 even the United States, which had previously abstained, voted 
in support of the resolution.149
usKeesing’s Contemporary Archives (1975), 27208.
146The following is typical of Guyana's determined support:
“For over ten years the people of Belize have seen their yearnings for independence frustrated because 
of the spurious and absurd territorial claims of a neighbour whose friendship they seek but whose over­
lordship they emphatically reject. Guyana calls on the international community to set aside 
indifference and to identity itself, uncompromisingly and unequivocally, with the people of Belize 
struggling for independence, and the preservation of their territorial integrity.”
Statement by Frederick R  Wills, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Justice of Guyana at the Thirtieth 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, October 1, 1975. Georgetown: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 1975, 9. (mimeo).
Guyana also supported Fretilin in East Timor.
See also: R  Stephen Milne, "Impulses and Obstacles to Caribbean Integration," International Studies 
Quarterly XVIII (No. 3, September, 1974), 308-309.
147For a record of the Belize issue in the United Nations see: West Indies Chronicle, December, 1975, 
January 1976.
148Guatemala had the support of the Central American republics and Indonesia. United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 3432 (XXX), 8 December, 1975.
149Prior to 1980 the United States had abstained.
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The diplomatic efforts of the Commonwealth Caribbean states had succeeded in 
breaking up Guatemala's solid Latin American support. The earlier strength of Guatemala 
in the O.A.S. was due, in large part, to increasing concern among the Latin American 
states over the implications of micro-state proliferation in the Caribbean and particularly 
for the consequences which that held for the Spanish/English balance in the region.130 
However, the Commonwealth states persisted in an aggressive campaign on behalf of 
Belize within the region. In 1975 Barbados even threatened to leave the O.A.S. over the 
Belize issue.131
Eventually, Guatemala's position was one of international isolation. The case for 
the independence of Belize was supported at the 1975 Commonwealth Heads of State 
Conference in Jamaica,132 and more important, in the same year, at the Lima Conference on 
Non-Aligned States, where a motion calling for Belize's independence was passed while 
Guatemala's bid for observer status was refused.153 In this forum, as in the United Nations, 
Cuba was a principal advocate of Belizian independence, a policy consistent with Cuba's 
efforts to establish friendly relations in the Commonwealth Caribbean. And, in spite of a 
similar territorial dispute with Guyana, Venezuela too was anxious to cultivate her 
relations with the English-speaking states.154 Mexican support was due, in part, to her own
130Roy Preiswerk, "The Relevance of Latin America in the Foreign Policy of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean States," Journal o f Inter-American Studies XI (No. 2, April 1969), 258-260.
The Foreign Minister of Guyana suggested this was a primary motivation in the support of the Spanish 
speaking states for Guatemala.
Frederick R. Wills, The Test o f Sincerity (Georgetown: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975).
mThe Guardian (Manchester and London), 17 November, 1975,2.
Barbados' support for Belize was consistently unequivocal. See, for instance:
Barbados Ministry o f External Affairs Bulletin I (No. 2, September, 1975), 25.
l52Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1975), 27208.
™Ibid.
l54The Guardian (Manchester and London), 17 November, 1975, 2.
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self-view as a progressive Latin American state, sensitive to the prominent role of Cuba in 
the Belize lobby. Moreover, Mexico was not prepared to concede the justice of the 
Guatemalan case, having withdrawn her own claims to Belize.155
When Belize finally achieved independence in September 1981, the credentials of 
statehood were well-established in the international system even though British attempts 
to reach a settlement with Guatemala had failed. The long-standing issue of post­
independence security was not resolved in the first decade of Belize's independence. Mrs. 
Thatcher's government was prepared to concede the issue and to guarantee the defense of 
Belize as long as both countries wished to maintain the agreement.156 And the very 
presence of the British defence force demonstrated the concern still felt in Belize and in 
Whitehall.157
There is no doubt that Britain's role in protecting and guaranteeing the territorial 
integrity of Belize was pivotal and stands in stark contrast to the impotence of Portugal 
and Spain. Britain was the most important of the Commonwealth mid-wives that attended 
the birth of Belize. As long as British forces were stationed there, supported by the 
impressive Harriers, there was a formidable deterrent to sober even the most reckless of 
Guatemalan generals. And, though Britain was prepared to consider territorial 
concessions, she was not willing to accept a cosmetic settlement that would lead to
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976), 27574.
156Thatcher’s willingness to stand by Belize was crucial to ensuring lull U.S. support for independence. 
The British committed themselves to stay in Belize for an "appropriate time" after independence.
The Times (London), 27 July, 1981,6; 25 September, 1981, 6.
157Since independence U.K. militaiy aid to Belize has increased substantially. The British and the 
Guatemalans resumed negotiations in 1987, only to have them fail once again within weeks. However 
new efforts in 1988 and 1989 have brought the parties somewhat closer.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1989, 36998.
Alma H. Young, "The Central American Crisis and Its Impact on Belize," in Alma H. Young and 
Dion E. Phillips (eds.) Militarization in the Non-Hispanic Caribbean (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 
1986), pp. 147-149.
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integration with Guatemala. Had Britain been less conscientious, the people of Belize may 
have eventually faced the fate of another British imperial outpost on the isthmus, the 
Nicaraguan Mosquitos.
Nonetheless, this was never an open-ended commitment.138 Guatemalan leaders 
might have been encouraged by the reluctance of British governments to guarantee 
Belize's post-independence security. Guatemala had, after all, been pressing the claim for 
more than a century. Had they been able to maintain the loyalty of other Latin American 
states and the passive support of the United States they might well have expected to stare 
down the British military presence in the long run. It was not the Harriers or even the 
fortitude of Mrs Thatcher's government in the end which saved Belize. It was the success 
of Commonwealth diplomacy. Britain and other Commonwealth states, particularly those 
in the region, undercut the Guatemalan claim for territorial integrity by marshalling the 
arguments for Belize's national self-determination in the very capitals and international 
organisations where Guatemala had to make her case. Britain's military presence bought 
time for this effort, certainly. Britain's policy of giving the elected government of Belize a 
long rein to make its own case was also critical. And Britain's obvious search for a 
respectable withdrawal undermined arguments of vestigial imperialism. But, Britain's 
military presence, her commitment to an orderly transition to independence, and the case 
for the rights to self-determination of a minority anglophone community in Central 
America, could determine the fate of Belize only to the extent that Britain and Belize won 
support in the region and among those powers in a position to tilt the balance. The 
determination to support Belize in compatriot anglophone communities in the
,58Indeed by May, 1993 Britain was confident enough that Belize’s security was now sufficiently well- 
rooted that she could announce the withdrawal of all but 100 British training troops by October 1994. 
Responsibility for the nation’s security was transferred to the Belize Defence Forces in January, 1994. 
Still, Guatemala reiterated her claim to Belize in a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
in March, 1994,13 years after independence.
The Europa World Yearbook 1995, (London: Europa Publications, 1995), p. 548.
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Commonwealth Caribbean that were already established as states gave access to leading 
Latin republics- Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico- whose own international aspirations stretched 
beyond regional prestige to positions of influence on a larger global agenda. That agenda 
included decolonisation and the rights to self-determination of colonial peoples.
Britain's reluctant steadfastness made this possible, to be sure. But the successful 
independence of Belize was secured when the people and the government of Belize, 
supported by the regional powers and Commonwealth friends, made their case in the 
international community. It was this success which isolated Guatemala and cauterised its 
irredentism.
The efforts of Belize's patrons and the duration of independence itself augurs well 
for the future security of this small anglophone outpost in Latin America. Until recently 
O.A.S. membership was closed to those states involved in territorial disputes with original 
member states. This meant that both Belize and Guyana were unable to benefit from 
existing regional security arrangements. Now both states are members of the Organization 
and are thus able to claim the principles of the Charter for themselves.159 If nothing else, 
such changes, with United States approval, will be sobering and inhibiting for irredentist 
forces in neighbouring states. The international identity of these states, at least, is more 
secure.
Sovereignty and the inviolability of colonial frontiers may not in the end protect 
Belize from a determined irredentist government in Guatemala, however well its 
independence may seem to be anchored in the structure and the power centres of the 
international system. But the lesson of the experience in Belize is clear. The case for 
separate independence in Belize was well-established in the principles and the practice of
159Both countries finally joined the OAS on Januaiy 8,1991, in the middle of the United Nations effort to 
rescue Kuwait!
Keesings Contemporary Archives, (1991), 37957.
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the decolonisation process in the United Nations, as it was in East Timor and the Western 
Sahara. But the efforts of Belize's supporters to secure recognition of the rights to 
sovereignty prior to the withdrawal of colonial authority, particularly in important capitals, 
is itself an acknowledgement that some measure of international legitimacy may save a 
state when all other defences are lacking.
Conclusions
Questions of justification, credibility, and durability mar the international relations 
of many new small states. For some, helplessness in the face of economic pressures may 
force concessions to a larger and perhaps more rational political system, federalism, for 
example, rather than separate independence. For others, the identity of the state may not 
correspond to the priorities of internal loyalties. And for others still, they exist in the 
shadow of irredentist claims which are never entirely laid to rest. In this chapter we have 
begun to explore the question of legitimacy by examining the contest of claims in small 
and problematic territories during the difficult period of decolonisation. In each case, 
aspirations to separate independence were consistent with the principle that self- 
determination should be exercised within established colonial frontiers. But in all three 
cases this understanding of self-determination was challenged by more powerful actors in 
an appeal to the equally honoured principle of territorial integrity. From this perspective, 
self-determination for these ‘colonial peoples’ would be tantamount to endorsing the 
secession of an undeserving minority at the expense of the natural and historical unity of 
the larger state.
In all cases, the process of decolonisation was painful; finally defeated in East Timor; 
yet uncertain in Western Sahara, and eventually successful in Belize. The experience of 
these territories exposes the misgivings which underlie the uncompromising official tone of
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the principle of self-determination. In the face of a larger state's claims these doubts may 
be reflected in the inertia of diplomatic response. Even indignation and outrage can be 
expressed safely, given the assurances of a fait accompli. The components of vulnerability 
have varied in each case. East Timor, with its tiny population, was an eccentric colonial 
remnant within the confines of a powerful new state. The abdication of the colonial 
power's responsibility and the lack of support in the region proved fatal. And the pace of 
events allowed no time to mobilise international support based on United Nations 
resolutions. Unlike the Western Sahara, the Indonesian annexation was not based on 
deeply-rooted irredentist passions. It was a decision to ensure their long-term security by 
correcting territorial anomalies. The logic of integration was apparent from the outset and 
the Indonesion decision to annex East Timor was encouraged by widespread evidence that 
integration was seen as a legitimate solution.
In the Western Sahara too, the weakness of the colonial power, combined with the 
pace of developments in the colony, prevented any attempt to stall the implementation of 
the Tripartite Agreement. However, unlike East Timor, the case for an independent 
Sahrawi state was a prominent issue in the international system, particularly given the 
findings of the I.C.J. and the conspicuous role of the United Nations Special Mission. 
Moreover, Moroccan annexation was in clear defiance of African states' commitments to 
the inviolability of colonial frontiers as the basis for self-determination. And the Sahrawis, 
unlike the Timorese, enjoyed the support of a powerful patron, which has been a critical 
factor in the ability to sustain both their military and diplomatic campaigns. Yet Morocco 
is not without powerful allies to counter Algeria's influence. The case for an independent 
Sahrawi state is not supported among Western states and, Algeria herself, could have been 
isolated for sponsoring a hopeless and dubious cause. Nonetheless, the dogged resistance 
of the Sahrawis, and especially their aggressive diplomacy within the region, has resulted
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in a measure of international support that might yet shift the burden of the argument to 
King Hassan and his efforts to defend his Grand Maroc.
The problems of achieving independence for Belize as a tiny anglophone 
community in a fragment of Central America were recognised from the earliest days of 
decolonisation. Initial Latin American solidarity with Guatemala and the ambivalence of 
the United States were principal obstacles in the course of self-determination. In the case 
of Belize, however, the colonial power, along with Commonwealth Caribbean states, 
themselves essentially a micro-state community, aggressively promoted the cause of 
separate independence. It was a very long gestation period, but by 1981 the credentials of 
Belizian statehood were established sufficiently to allow for the transfer of sovereignty.
Does the equivocation and helplessness in the cases of East Timor and Western 
Sahara or the painstakingly cautious approach to sovereignty in Belize have any bearing 
on the future of controversial and vulnerable states which are recognised members of the 
international system? The successful independence of so many diminutive colonial 
territories and the comparatively few cases of failure do not settle the question beyond 
doubt. The renunciation of colonial frontiers has occurred only in the smallest territories 
and with those peoples whose case for separate independence raises the most doubts and 
whose future, from the vantage of the major powers at least, is expendable. In the next 
and final chapter of this section we will assess these problems of status for established 
micro-states and summarise our conclusions on the relevance of the legitimacy question as 
a salient feature of the international relations of very small states.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Very Small Size And Other Sources 
Of Status Weakness
For some micro-states, long-term security may be threatened by the same issues 
which have frustrated aspirations to self-determination in East Timor and the Western Sa­
hara. Though sovereignty has been granted and recognised, these states exist uneasily, 
facing a possible revival of past claims and unspoken doubts. Of course, the components 
of vulnerability vary with each case. The extent to which a micro-state can stave off its 
own demise depends on factors which compensate for the disabilities of very small size, 
particularly economic resources and geopolitical situation.
Resource rich micro-states are most vulnerably positioned to face challenges to 
their status and security. Kuwait is the most dramatic of examples. The recurring night­
mare of invasion and occupation finally befell the Kuwaitis in August, 1990 when Iraqi 
forces simply overwhelmed the sophisticated but hugely outnumbered Kuwaiti defences. 
Though Iraq had been considered a dangerous and predatory neighbour from the time of 
Kuwait's independence in 1961, and though that danger had surfaced on various occasions 
since the initial threat, Kuwait's leaders, and indeed her allies in both the Gulf Co­
operation Council and the West,1 were caught unsuspecting even in the face of Iraqi mobi­
lisation. There was a determined effort to see Iraqi troop movements as pressure tactics 
to force Kuwait to comply with Iraq's demands for a forgiveness of loans incurred during 
the war against Iran and, more importantly, for a reduction in Kuwait's oil production 
which had the effect of depressing world oil prices thereby denying Iraq the scale of prof­
‘Yet, there is also persuasive evidence that the United States, at least, was aware that Iraq would use force 
but that its actions would be "pragmatic" and limited to a legitimate settlement of the border dispute 
with Kuwait. In this view, American "nods and winks," particularly in the now infamous July inter­
view with the hapless American ambassador, April Glaspie, encouraged Saddam in the conviction that 
military action against Kuwait would not meet with opposition in Washington.
Christopher Hitchens, "Realpolitik in the Gulf," New Left Review (186, March-April, 1991), 89-101.
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its it needed if it was ever to recover the staggering costs of its war of attrition against 
Iran.
Since the invasion a debate has raged among Middle Eastern scholars as to the mo­
tives for Saddam Hussein's attack against Iraq and, more particularly, whether there was 
sufficient evidence of his intent to warrant a more engaged and prepared stance on the part 
of Kuwait and her friends. While much of the conventional wisdom at the time explained 
the invasion as the opportunism of an impetuous despot,2 others were to view a triumphal 
march of Iraqi armies into Kuwait City as the culmination of a long-held strategy.3 In this 
view, Saddam's objectives were to secure control of Middle East oil production and to 
establish Iraq as the leader of the Arab world, a just reward for its sacrifices against a 
common Persian enemy. The "recovery" of Kuwait was essential in both respects. It 
would surely give Iraq huge leverage over the remaining Gulf oil-producers. And it would 
support the oft-cited claim that recovery of Kuwait was a major step towards Arab unity 
and the assertion of popular Arab democratic forces against the corrupt and collaboration­
ist feudal regimes which both fragmented and betrayed the Arab world.
What is of interest to us in this discussion is not the strategic considerations which 
both Iraqi and Coalition forces entertained. Nor is the conduct of the war itself particu­
larly relevant. What is central, however, is the nature of Saddam's irredentist claim against 
Kuwait, the assumptions which he must have held about the strength and persuasiveness 
of those claims in the Arab, Muslim and international communities, and the implications of 
his defeat for other similarly vulnerable micro-states.
2Laurie Mylroie, "Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait," Orb is (Winter, 1993), 123-124.
3Ibid., 124-134.
Another, and perhaps more persuasive view, is that this was a window of opportunity wherein long 
standing ambitions might be achieved.
Fred Halliday, "The Gulf War and its Aftermath: First Reflections, "International Affairs (LXVII: Num­
ber 2, April, 1991), 225-227.
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Perhaps what is most striking in reviewing this episode is the sheer confidence, in­
deed the brazeness of Saddam Hussein,4 in challenging the most central commitments of 
the Charter: the respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of member 
states. While those assumptions have been violated time and again, they have been done 
so discreetly, that it is with a determined effort to respect the international legal personal­
ity of the victimised state. One might argue that that means little if your state is occupied 
and administered by hostile external forces. But, as long as there is international legal per­
sonality, there remains a chance of political recovery. States and territories which are an­
nexed soon find themselves locked in solitary confinement, beyond reach of outside help. 
They are now victims to the rules which protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the absorbing states. That was clearly the case with the Baltic states, even though most 
Western powers never recognised the legal annexation of these republics. The move to 
annex Kuwait, and to incorporate it as a recovered province of Iraq, was particularly 
grave. But it was also brazen in the extreme. No member state of the United Nations has 
forcibly lost its international legal personality since 1945. Many have been humiliated and 
compromised but they live on to fight another day. Witness the Czechs and Slovaks in 
1993 compared to the bowed heads of 1968. Witness too Afghanistan and scores of other 
countries which have been able to recover some measure of independence implicit in their 
long-standing formal status as sovereign states. Had Iraq's annexation stood, Kuwait's 
future would surely have been doomed, and indeed, the prospects for other micro-states in 
the eyes of avaricious predators would have been far less secure.
Had Saddam arranged for a "populist" and "democratic" overthrow of the regime 
without the blatant dependence on Iraqi troops; had that regime called for "fraternal" and
4As Christopher Greenwood noted, H . . . Iraq's violation of the law is so blatant and extreme. Unlike 
previous cases, there was no confusion over the facts, no provocation or menace emanating from the in­
vaded state, no real attempt to justify the invasion in terms of contemporary international law." 
Christopher Greenwood, "Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait: Some Legal Issues," The World Today (XLVII, 
Number 3, March, 1991), 40.
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even "confederal" relations with their Iraqi brethren, then it might have been much more 
difficult to pull together an international coalition to rescue Kuwait. It was not an easy 
task given public misgivings about such a commitment over the autumn months, particu­
larly in the United States. But Saddam provided no face-saving way out for the nervous 
and the timid who preferred any solution but direct engagement. The annexation of a 
member state of the United Nations allowed no cover for the tremulous. It was the blatant 
defiance of the most central United Nations principles which turned opponents into 
abstainers and reluctant bystanders into supporters.
Saddam's gamble was that the age old claims to Kuwait would find resonance in 
both the Arab world and in the West. To some extent he was right.3 Popular demonstra­
tions in the Arab world from Morocco to Jordan clearly demonstrated the power of Sad­
dam's Arab solidarity message in the streets. And in the Congressional debate in the 
United States, as in other Western countries, there were grave misgivings about defending 
a tiny feudal city state where democratic values were lost in a sea of wealth and privilege. 
Stout-hearted Americans found their democratic and republican values irrelevant as the 
Sabah sheikhs engaged White House protocol.
Yet the foundations of Kuwait's statehood were not exceptionally questionable in 
the contemporary international system and certainly not in the Arab world. Saddam reck­
lessly underestimated the resistance of Arab states to a direct attack on one of their own 
by their own. Nor could even the most reluctant states in the United Nations finally de­
fend the indomitable defiance of the Iraqi regime down to the eleventh hour.
Saddam clearly expected that Iraq's claims to Kuwait would speak to the anti­
colonial and anti-Western constituency in the United Nations. It was a gamble as ill-
Touad Ajami, "The Summer of Arab Discontent," Foreign Affairs (LXIX, No. 5, Winter, 199/91), es­
pecially 1-7.
162
conceived as that of General Galtieri in his mission to recover the 'Malvinas' islands in 
1982.
To be sure, Iraq's claim's to Kuwait have not been entirely defeated, in spite of the 
Coalition victory and the United Nations demarcation of the border, which Iraq still re­
fuses to accept. Irredentist wounds fester long after peace treaties and agreed settlements 
are thought to put them to rest. Kuwait had been similarly convinced on other occasions, 
particularly when Iraq sponsored Kuwait's membership in various inter-governmental or­
ganisations only two years after the initial challenge to Kuwait's independence. The now 
obvious dependence of Kuwait on the United States and the expulsion of much of the sus­
pected collaborationist Palestinian community in Kuwait only serves to underscore again 
the problems of legitimacy which bedevil this little state and so many others whose demo­
graphic, political and geopolitical situations are equally vulnerable.
The arguments against separate sovereignty in Kuwait presented to the Arab world 
and the international community in 1990 were a reiteration of those claims made by 
Karim Kassem at the time of Kuwait's independence from Great Britain in 1961; that is 
that the shaikhdom was "an integral part of Iraq."6 Baghdad charged Britain with taking a 
few oil wells and calling it a state.7 Independence for this "overgrown village"8 was a bla-
6Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1961), 18187. Iraq condemned "the spuriousness of the independence 
granted to Kuwait," and reiterated Iraqi "determination to uphold its right and . . .  restore Kuwait to the 
motherland."
The Government of Iraq, The Truth About Kuwait (Baghdad: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1966), 5.
TJnited Nations General Assembly Resolution (XVI)A/PV 1028, 6 October, 1961. Iraq claimed that the 
(secret) agreement of 1899 between the Kuwaiti ruler and the British Government, itself the basis for the 
new agreement of June 19,1961, was invalid. “If Kuwait was not legally a British protectorate, then in­
dependence was not something which Britain could confer. What is beyond dispute is that the definition 
of protection does not apply in any sense to Kuwait, since Kuwait has never been a state by any stretch of 
the definition of statehood; never possessed the qualifications for statehood which are required by inter­
national law; or ever was a member of the family of states, having been, in fact, a part of the Ottoman 
State or more precisely an administrative unit (Qaimmaqamiyah) attached to the Governor of Basrah, 
which is part of Iraq. It had no territoiy with an internationally clear frontier. Its inhabitants were a 
section of the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, and enjoying Ottoman nationality and linked to the 
Ottoman Empire by a permanent legal and political tie. There was no such thing as Kuwaiti nationality, 
and the Shaikh of Kuwait was an Ottoman subject and an Ottoman official collecting rates and taxes in
tant example of imperialist efforts to balkanise the Arab world.9 A British rescue mission 
forced the League of Arab States to intervene and ultimately ensure Kuwait's sover­
eignty.10 However, neither the support of the League nor the fall of Kassem and the sub­
sequent Iraqi recognition of Kuwait has removed the danger completely. "Built into
the name of the Ottoman Government to which he was subject. There was in Kuwait an Ottoman garri­
son and the Ottoman flag flew over the town of Kuwait”.
The Truth About Kuwait, op. cit., 17.8
Having concluded that Kuwait was part of the Ottoman province of Basrah and that Iraq was the suc­
cessor state to the Ottoman Empire in Basrah, Iraq then claimed Kuwait as a part of Basrah which had 
been detached from the province (and Iraq) by imperialist perfidy. A Mandatory Power was obliged to 
safeguard the territorial integrity of the mandated territory. By detaching Kuwait for its own purposes, 
Britain had contemptuously disregarded her responsibilities to the League.
Ibid., 18.
8 United Nations S.C.O.R. (XVI), S/PV 984,30 November, 1961.
9 The conspiratorial role played by the Western powers in the fragmentation of a natural Arab unity is a 
recurrent theme in Arabist literature. See, for example: Albert Hourani, "The Decline of the West in 
the Middle East-I," International Affairs, XXIX (January, 1953), 29-30.
Kuwait countered by claiming that the shaikhdom was never part of Ottoman Basrah but of the Arabian 
peninsula "with which she has strong bonds of kinship, character and customs." The title "qaimmaqam" 
was not an administrative designation subject to the Governor of Basrah bu t " . . .  an honourary title 
similar to Effendi, Bey, or Pasha, which Ottoman authorities often bestowed on Ottoman subjects and 
close friends." The Kuwaitis insisted that this Turkish title was invested with no significance in 
Kuwait; nor did it affect "the independence or sovereignty of Kuwait." However, even if it could be 
argued that Kuwait was an Ottoman territory, it did not follow that Iraq was the successor state to 
Ottoman administrative divisions. If this were so, then Jordan should be a Syrian province " . . .  with 
Dara, a Syrian town today, as its administrative center." But, the most important Kuwaiti counter­
argument was that the Iraqis themselves had consistently recognised Kuwaiti statehood. Official corre­
spondence from Iraq, including letters from General Kassem, had always been addressed to Kuwait as 
an independent state. Iraq had helped Kuwait to join a number of international organisations.
The Government of Kuwait, The Truth About the Crisis Between Kuwait and Iraq (Kuwait: Printing 
and Publishing Department, 1961), p. 4.
Hussain al-Barhana suggests that Kuwait's disavowal of the Ottoman link was not entirely justified. 
Hussain M. al-Barhana, The Legal Status o f the Arab Gulf States- A Study o f Their Treaty Relations 
and International Relations (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968), p. 253.
See also: Naseer H. Aruri, "Kuwait- A Political Study," Muslim World LX (October, 1970), 323-324.
10The fact that Kuwait called upon the British only corroborated Kassem's claim that the shaikhdom was 
in reality a British dependency. The Soviet Union concurred with Iraq's position. They vetoed a 
British resolution in the Security Council calling for recognition of Kuwait's independence. For a full 
account of the Arab League's role in the dispute see: Benjamin Shwadran, "The Kuwait Incident,"
Middle Eastern Affairs (January, 1962-Part I),) 2-13; (February, 1962- Part II), 43-53.
Hussein A. Hassouna, The League o f Arab States and Regional Disputes- A Study o f Middle East 
Conflicts (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc. and Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1975), Chapter Six
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Kuwait's psyche is the trauma of 1961. . ,"n and the realisation that the Iraqi danger could 
materialise at any time. Still, the enormous wealth of this little country allowed it in part 
to compensate for the misfortune of its geopolitical situation. Prior to the war it was the 
world's sixth largest oil producer, with the third largest known reserves, and was able, 
therefore, to achieve an economic importance far out of proportion to its size. The 
shaikhdom's foreign aid programme was long regarded as the means by which " . . it buys 
its right to exist."12 The generosity of aid disbursements was thought to shield the 
Kuwaitis against the envy of their bonanza, but the programme had "its base in apprehen­
sion and nervousness."13 The questions haunting Kuwait's future also affect other micro­
states clustered in the Gulf and the oil rich sultanate of Brunei.14 Though the bounty of oil 
may allow these states some prominence in the international community, it also exposes 
them to other dangers, particularly as tiny feudal remnants in a rapidly changing social and 
political environment.
The population of oil-based micro-state economies is simply not large enough to 
support the infrastructure of an integrated developed economy. The management of the 
petroleum industry, from extraction to the marketing of refined products, demands a huge 
influx of both skilled and unskilled labour. It is an invitation to caste politics. Prior to the 
War, Kuwait functioned as a large corporation with management and working classes in­
tegrated into the corporate/national enterprise. Still, there was the worrying constituency
nThe Financial Times (London), 28 March, 1973, 9. 
nThe Times (London), 4 November, 1976, VIII. 
nThe Financial Times (London), 25 February, 1976,15.
14Brunei's vulnerability to irredentist claims and subversion explains the Sultan's longtime resistance to 
independence. For many years Southeast Asia was an Oriental Balkans with all states as claimants and 
targets. Brunei's position as a tiny feudal and colonial remnant was particularly sensitive. According 
to Michael Leifer, Brunei was viewed similarly to East Timor.
Michael Leifer, "South-east Asia," in Christopher Clapham (ed.), Foreign Policy Making in Developing 
States (Famborough, Hants.: Saxon House, 1977), p. 37.
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of non-Kuwaitis; 46% of the population sulking beyond the fence of nationality. Kuwaitis 
meet only 26% of the country's manpower needs.15 From the outset they have feared that 
their city state could easily be overwhelmed by the strangers within their suburbs, and the 
evidence during the occupation for some Kuwaitis confirmed these fears though many of 
the Palestinian and other foreign communities were themselves victims of the occupation. 
At present, restrictive nationality laws ensure that only a fraction of non-Kuwaitis are 
admitted into full citizenship each year.16 Any relaxation of these restrictions are still seen 
as a risk to the future of the Sabah dynasty and the fragile control which Kuwaitis hold in 
their own shaikhdom.17 But a restrictive policy remains dangerous, disaffecting as it 
surely must the majority population from any identification with the Kuwaiti state.
Legal distinctions between Kuwaiti citizens and immigrants underlie a comprehen­
sive pattern of discrimination that leaves the non-Kuwaiti majority with little basis for na­
tional loyalty.18 The disaffected are susceptible to an alternative orientation for political
15The Guardian (Manchester and London), 29 April, 1975,4.
The increasing ratio of the non-Kuwaiti population also poses a dilemma for the state's economic devel­
opment. Labour-intensive schemes to diversify Kuwait's economic base must be regarded warily, since 
they can exacerbate the balance. These anxieties have resulted in a policy of extreme caution towards 
industrialisation and even to the abandonment of certain projects.
The Times (London), 4 November, 1976,1.
Kuwait's population increased from 206,473 in 1957 to 1,697,301 in 1985. Between 1963 and 1970 
the average annual increase was ten percent, the highest of any state in the world. Between 1957 and 
1983 the non-Kuwaiti population rose from 93,000 (45%) to 870,000 (57.4%).
The Middle East and North Africa 1987 (London: Europa Publications, 1988), 532.
Naturalised citizenship can be obtained only after ten years residence for Arabs and fifteen years for 
non-Arabs. Only fifty persons can be naturalised in any one year. Moreover, naturalised citizens do 
not acquire voting rights unless naturalisation occurred at least ten years prior to the date of promulga­
tion.
Aruri, op. cit., 328.
17Ibid., 333-339.
18The pattern of discrimination is particularly apparent in the social services. Immigrant Arabs are not 
allowed to own property. For the wealthy, who can afford exorbitant rents, it is a manageable restric­
tion. For the large population of menial labourers, however, it means a shanty-town existence. Only 
ten percent of immigrants are admitted to the state school system. For the remainder it is a choice be­
tween expensive private schools or no education at all. Immigrants are not protected under the Kuwaiti
identification particularly if it is exploited by a contiguous state with irredentist claims to 
further weaken the state's credentials.19 The advantages of wealth, then, only compensate 
in part for the disabilities of very small size in questions of status and security.
In some cases, as in Djibouti, where an irredentist claim might have been advanced, 
the local complex of interests has proven favourable to the separate independence of the 
small territory.20 In these situations, unlike East Timor, the regional balance is clearly 
threatened by the territorial expansion of one local power over another. Geopolitical con­
siderations of this kind were also important in the case of Kuwait as long as such a balance 
was in place. Both Iran and Saudi-Arabia would find Iraqi absorption of Kuwait as intol­
erable, just as Iraq and Saudi-Arabia could be expected to thwart any attempt by Iran to 
annex the island micro-state of Bahrain.21 The disabilities of very small size for vulnerable
health programme and must use private medicine. Citizens enjoy a range of privileges and sinecures in 
Kuwait which are not open to the majority of the population.
Ibid., 329.
The Times (London), 4 November, 1976, 11.
The Guardian (Manchester and London), 29 April, 1975,4.
Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans (London: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 431-440.
Hassan Ali Al-Ebraheem, Kuwait and the Gulf-Small States and the International System (Washington: 
Center for Arab Studies; London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 70-74.
19India, for example, was able to tap the disaffection of the non-Sikkimese majority to build a constituency 
for the integration of Sikkim into India. The British had encouraged Nepalese immigration into 
Sikkim from the middle of the nineteenth century in order to counter Tibetan influence among the 
Bhutias. The Chogyal relied on the support of the Bhutias and the Buddhist-Lepchas, but they ac­
counted for less than 25 percent of the population. His consistent refusal to respond to Nepalese aspira­
tions, fearing that this would lead to the constitutional diminution of his own powers and an end to the 
traditional exclusive privileges of the Bhutia-Lepcha constituency, ensured that the Nepalese majority 
would look to India.
Ranjan Gupta, "Sikkim: The Merger with India,"Asian Survey XV (No. 9, September, 1975), 788.
20For nationalists committed to the cause of a greater Somalia, Djibouti was one of "the five parts" of the 
Somali nation.
Lee C. Buchheit, Secession- The Legitimacy o f Self-Determination (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1978), p. 176.
21For a review of the Iranian claim to Bahrain see H. al-Bahama, "The Fact-Finding Mission of the United 
Nations Secretaiy-General and the Settlement of the Bahrain-Iran Dispute, May 1970," International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly XXII (July, 1973, No. 3), 541-552.
Edward Gordon, "Resolution of the Bahrain Dispute," American Journal o f International Law LXV 
(July, 1971), 560-568.
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and insecure micro-states may be compensated in part, then, by the skilful exploitation of 
regional diplomacy and local power interests.
Yet the security and the territorial integrity of a micro-state may depend on the 
blatant sufferance of the larger, and possibly dangerous, neighbour. This is particularly 
evident in Bhutan's agonizingly slow emergence into the international system and the very 
strict limitations placed on her participation in international affairs by India's interpretation 
of the 1949 treaty between the two states.22 The treaty provides that Bhutan will be 
"guided by the advice of India in its external relations."23 For Bhutan the phrase merely
Hooshang Moghtader, "The Settlement of the Bahrain Question: A Study in Anglo-Iranian-United 
Nations Diplomacy," Pakistan Horizon XXVI (No. 2,1973), 16-29.
The case of Bahrain is a disturbing example of the potential danger of irredentist revival. The 'settle­
ment' with the Shah had little effect on the Khomeini regime's determination to brandish old arguments 
in 1980. The Times (London), 18 July, 1980, 8.
The Daily Telegraph (London), 21 September, 1980,47
The Bahrainis charged Iran with backing an attempted coup in the island in 1982.
The Times (London), 5 January, 1982, 5; 29 March, 1982, 1; 24 May, 1982, p. 4.
Saudi-Arabia's commitment to the causeway linking the mainland to Bahrain was partially in response 
to a perceived Iranian threat.
The New York Times, 3 December, 1979, IV, 1.
22At the time of its accession to the United Nations in 1971, Bhutan had a population of approximately 
800,000. The kingdom's international status had always been ambiguous. The United Nations did not 
regard Bhutan as a candidate for decolonisation since it could not be described accurately as a 'non self- 
governing territory.' Yet, its sovereignty was not fully established either. Bhutan was regarded gener­
ally as a protectorate of India. Protectorate status was likened to that of suzerainty.
L. Oppenheim, International Law, ed. by H. Lauterpacht (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955, 
8th ed.), p. 192.
It was long argued that the protectorate relationship involved a "definite diminution (if not a total 
deprivation) of sovereignty" when applied to the peoples of Asia and Africa.
T. Baty, "Protectorates and Mandates," British Year Book o f International Law n  (1921-22), 112.
23The text of the Treaty of Friendship Between India and Bhutan, 8 August, 1949 (Darjeeling) is repro­
duced in L. S. Rathore, The Changing Bhutan (New Delhi: Jain Bros., 1974), Appendix VIII, 
pp. 144-149.
The treaty does not include the term 'protectorate' but it does maintain the essential features of the 1910 
treaty between Britain and Bhutan. India inherited the British policy of containing Chinese influence 
across the Himalayas.
The text of the Treaty Between the British Government and the Government of Bhutan 1865, and of the 
Treaty Between Great Britain and Bhutan 1910 (Punakha), are also reproduced in Rathore, ibid., Ap­
pendix V, pp. 134-139; Appendix VII, pp. 142-143.
Though the wording of the 1949 and 1910 treaties is identical, it has been argued that the former does 
not constitute a protectorate relationship given the explicit commitments to Bhutanese sovereignty by
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suggested consultation, not obligation.24 For India, however, the phrase meant that 
"Bhutan (had) given India the right to formulate its foreign policy."25 At the very least, 
India insisted that Bhutan could not initiate any relations with a third state except through 
New Delhi.26 Though this overbearance has provoked "an obsession with status con­
sciousness"27 in Bhutan, any alternative to the relationship with India has been impractica­
ble and potentially ruinous. There has been little enthusiasm in Bhutan for the Nepali 
model of defiant independence.28 For Bhutan such presumption is too precarious. Not
the Indian Government and the international personality which Bhutan has assumed. Since the condi­
tions of the 1910 relationship were so different, then, that treaty must be regarded as one of protection. 
Kapileshwar Labh, India and Bhutan (New Delhi:Sendha Publications, Ltd., 1974), 
pp. 187-207; 220-230.
24By 1959, irritation with the constrictions of India's patronage was beginning to surface in Bhutan. In 
his report to the Bhutanese government on the relationship with India, D. K. Sen, the constitutional 
advisor to the Government of Bhutan, argued that the phrase "to be guided" merely suggested consulta­
tion and not obligation. He stressed that Bhutan was a fully sovereign state which had not surrendered 
its final control over external relations. Indeed, the treaty itself was a voluntary act of a sovereign state. 
Though Indian advice would be sought as outlined in the treaty, Bhutan was not bound by that advice; 
nor did the treaty preclude diplomatic initiative. Accordingly, Sen announced to the press that Bhutan 
was about to open direct relations with major powers. Prime Minister Nehru promptly wrote to the 
young Maharajah to state the inadvisability of pursuing such a course.
Asian Recorder (1959), 2903.
Nagendra Singh, Bhutan-A Kingdom in the Himalayas (New Delhi: The Thomson Press, 1972), 
p. 133.
K. Krishna Moorthy, "Bhutan: Thoughts of Sovereignty," Far Eastern Economic Review 
(February 16,1961), 297.
25Pradyumna P. Karan, "The Geopolitical Structure of Bhutan," India Quarterly XIX (No. 3, 
July-September, 1963), 207.
26Leo E. Rose, "Bhutan's External Relations," Pacific Affairs XLVII (Summer, 1974), 197.
27T.T. Poulouse, "Bhutan's External Relations and India," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
XX (No. 2, April, 1971), 204.
28Leo E. Rose, "Sino-Indian Rivalry and the Himalayan Border States," Orb is V (No. 2, Summer, 1961), 
206-208.
Nepal's choice was dictated by a fear of India as great as that of China.
George N. Patterson, "Recent Chinese Policies in Tibet and towards the Himalayan Border States," The 
China Quarterly (October-December, 1962), 196.
Nonetheless, it was a policy which left Nepal, unlike its diminutive neighbours, as "an arena for big- 
power competition."
Rose, Pacific Affairs, op. cit., 199.
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only is Bhutan's status more ambiguous than that of Nepal but her very smallness made 
any disciplinary measures less problematical than with Nepal.
It was precisely the example of Nepal which perturbed India.29 In its attempts to bal­
ance its relations with India and China, Nepal was considered as an unreliable buffer. 
There was no guarantee that Bhutan and Sikkim would not act similarly if given the op­
portunity. From the perspective of New Delhi, any independence on the part of the Hima­
layan states was bound to result in some Chinese penetration. India was determined to 
prevent any further breach in its defence cordon. When the Chogyal of Sikkim sought to 
establish separate international personality, he lost his usefulness to India. New Delhi then 
supported the Chogyal's opponents, an intervention which led to the complete absorption 
of Sikkim into India.30
To avoid a similar fate, the Bhutanese attempted to push India's understanding of 
the treaty as far as possible while constantly reassuring New Delhi of their loyalty. Their 
sensitivity to India's security interests was realistic. It meant that they would have to en­
hance their international status gradually and within the scope of the 1949 treaty. In the 
first two decades of independence these attempts to conduct external relations were met 
with determined Indian resistance, particularly on the sensitive issue of contacts with 
China.31 When several Western powers were approached by Bhutanese agents on the
*Ibid.
30The Chogyal of Sikkim believed that the post-war climate was favourable to the rights of small states 
and that this in itself was conducive to a change in Sikkim's treaty relations with India. Eventually 
Sikkim's sovereignty would be recognised in the international system.
Gupta, op. cit., 788.
During Prime Minister Ghandi's visit to Sikkim in 1968, the Chogyal spoke of Sikkim's "rightful place 
in the comity of nations." This lack of loyalty was bewildering in New Delhi and meant that the 
Chogyal and an independent Sikkim were no longer useful.
Leo E. Rose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationship," Pacific Affairs XLII (No. 1,1969), 34.
31India's anxieties were clear in accusations of Chinese "cartographic aggression against Bhutan," the oc­
cupation of Bhutanese territory, and the violation of Bhutanese air space.
Note Given by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India,
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possibility of direct relations, India quietly intervened to prevent any response.32 Eventu­
ally, however, Bhutan’s resolve, underscored by constant and friendly reassurance, elicited 
a more flexible stance in New Delhi. As early as 1962 India sponsored Bhutan's accession 
to the Colombo Plan.33 Formal diplomatic relations between the two states were estab­
lished in 1968.34 The stage was set for United Nations membership when the kingdom 
joined the Universal Postal Union in 1969.33
30 June, 1962. Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged Between the Governments o f India and 
China , November, 1961-July, 1962, White Paper No. VI, New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 
1962, 105.
India consistently claimed that Chinese maps included some 300 square miles of Bhutanese territory as 
part of Tibet, though these lands were not occupied by the Chinese. China treated these charges as 
spurious attempts to disguise India's own designs.
Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged Between the Governments o f India and China and A Note on 
the Historical Background o f the Himalayan Frontier o f India, September-November, 1959, White 
Paper No. II, New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1959,41.
In the face of the Sino-Indian conflict Bhutan sought to retain formal neutrality, fearing that too explicit 
an alignment with India would increase its vulnerability. Though he welcomed Nehru's assurance that 
"an attack on Bhutan was an attack on India," the Bhutanese prime minister still refused to allow the 
positioning of Indian troops on Bhutan's soil 
Asian Recorder (1959), 2587, 2903.
K. N. Agrawal, "Indo-Bhutanese Relations," Political Scientist IV (Part Two, Januaiy-June, 1968), 
44-45.
32Moorthy, op cit., 297.
India's determination to quarantine the kingdom from all contacts and influences save those of India 
went so far as to deny Bhutan's request for the channeling of PL480 funds to Bhutan on the grounds 
that Indian aid was sufficient unto itself.
Karan, op cit., 212.
For a review of India's aid programme for Bhutan during this period see:
Valentine J. Belfiglio, "Indian Economic Aid to Bhutan and Sikkim,” International Studies Xm 
(No. 1, Januaiy, 1974), 94-104.
33" . . .  admission has its own bearing on the legal status of Bhutan and registers Bhutan's first entiy into 
a regional group of states.. . H 
Nagendra Singh, op. cit., p. 147.
Participation in the Columbo Plan gave Bhutan its only contact with the outside world.
Daniel Wolfstone and M. P. Gopolan, "The Road to Bhutan," Far Eastern Economic Review 
(April 9,1964), 85-86.
34The heads of the Missions were called 'Special Officers.' The function of the Bhutanese Special Officer 
in New Delhi was " . . .  to co-ordinate, expedite and facilitate the implementation of various Indian 
aided projects in Bhutan and to also act as the Liaison Officer of the Government of India with the Gov­
ernment of Bhutan on all other matters of mutual interest."
Nagendra Singh, op. cit., p. 139.42
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For Bhutan, United Nations membership was viewed as the ultimate security for its 
separate international identity.36 But in India there was concern that this would allow 
Bhutan free rein to pursue a Nepali-style foreign policy.37 However, to oppose such a 
popular issue in Bhutan and to be seen as obstructing a legitimate case of self- 
determination as well as flouting the principle of universal membership was clearly unac- 
ceptably embarrassing.
Though Bhutan finally joined the United Nations in 1971, Indian sponsorship was 
based on the understanding that membership would not alter the treaty relationship be­
tween the two countries. Barring a major threat to India's northern frontiers, United Na­
tions membership has probably relieved the danger of the kingdom slipping into the fate of 
Sikkim.38 It would be much more difficult to absorb a member state of the United Nations, 
even if that state's treaty commitments are tantamount to protectorate status. Moreover, 
Bhutan has gradually succeeded in persuading India to relax its tight rein. The kingdom
These representatives were given full ambassadorial status in April, 1971. Bhutan had referred to its 
Mission as an embassy from the outset.
Ibid., 140.
Bhutan had accepted an Indian Advisor in 1963 as a " . . .  consultant to the Prime Minister on political 
matters and as a channel of communication between the two governments,N but a successor was not ap­
pointed in 1966 because the advisor had been accused of interference in Bhutanese affairs. Similarly, 
an Indian suggestion to appoint an officer of the External Affairs Ministry to Bhutan on a full-time ba­
sis raised suspicions in Bhutan and led instead to the exchange of special officials.
Rose, Pacific A flairs, (1974), 201.
35" . . .  it furnishes proof of Bhutan's sovereignty... "
Nagendra Singh, op. cit., p. 148.
36The leader of the Bhutanese delegation to the United Nations, Prince Namgyal Wangchuck, saw mem­
bership as the culmination of Bhutan's quest for full international status.
United Nations Document, (XXVI) A/PV/1934, p. 21 September, 1971, pp. 67-68.
37Rose, Pacific Affairs, op. cit., 202.
38The Bhutanese were not alone in regarding United Nations membership as relevant to the kingdom's 
status. The French ambassador to the United Nations observed that membership allowed Bhutan ".. . . 
to improve its independence,. . .  maintain its originality and. . .  achieve its legitimate aspirations." 
Unitai Nations Document, (XXVI) S/PV 1566,10 October, 1971,16-18.
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now enjoys direct relations with Bangladesh. It joined the Conference of the Non- 
Aligned. And, more significantly, it was allowed to negotiate directly with China on the 
settlement of outstanding border issues.39 This does not mean that the legitimacy of Bhu­
tan's statehood is fully established. Bhutan remains a ward of India, "a regional unit within 
India's defense perimeter."40 Bhutan's aspirations for its international personality have to 
be considered within the context of India's traditional claims of guardianship. For micro- 
states whose identity is forged from sufferance, such claims may prove, in more critical 
times, to be the more persuasive for being the more historically justified.
In some cases the sufferance of the larger and dangerous neighbouring state may 
depend on the extent to which that state is concerned for its own prestige and international 
image. Venezuela's threat to Guyana is "clear and present," as the failure to renew the 
Port of Spain Protocol demonstrates.41 And, during the Falklands Crisis in 1982 Guyana 
protested Venezuelan frontier violations to the Security Council.42 Though Venezuela had
39The first set of negotiations was held in Thimphu in April 1984. Both sides have repeatedly stated their 
commitment to a "peaceful friendly border."
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (1986), 34175; (1987), 35384; (1990), 37356.
Bhutan joined the F.A.O., the I.D.A., the I.M.F. and the World Bank in 1981 and U.N.E.S.C.O. in 
1982. In 1983 the Kingdom was one of the founding members of the South Asian Association for Re­
gional Cooperation. This gives Bhutan direct relations, through cross-creditation, in New Delhi, with 
Pakistan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka in addition to the exchange of missions with Bangladesh 
and more recently Kuwait.
See also S. D. Munt, "Bhutan Steps Out," The World Today XL (December, 1984), 514-520.
40Karan, op. cit., 212.
41The Protocol between Venezuela, Guyana and the United Kingdom was signed in Port-of-Spain on June 
17, 1970. It was to replace an earlier 1966 agreement between Venezuela and the United Kingdom 
which had left the resolution of the dispute to a mixed commission. The work of that commission was 
frustrated by regular Guyanese complaints of Venezuelan border incursions. The Port-of-Spain Protocol 
imposed a 12 year moratorium on the issue, with each side agreeing not to press any territorial claims 
on the other during this period. It allowed for either an automatic 12 year extension, a negotiated five- 
to-12 year extension, or unilateral termination with six months notice. In protest against Guyana's in­
transigence and her determination to proceed with a hydro-electric project in the disputed Essequibo 
region, Venezuela announced that she would not renew the Protocol. In response Guyana launched a 
major diplomatic campaign for support, particularly in Brazil and Colombia.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1970), 24286; (1981), 31066.
A2The Times (London), 29 April, 1982, 6; 3 May, 1982, 3; 13 May, 1982, 6.
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adopted a hard line on the territorial dispute, she has also been anxious to cultivate rela­
tions within the immediate region, including those Commonwealth Caribbean micro-states 
which would be most outraged by any Venezuelan decision to realise her long-standing 
claim to three eighths of Guyana.43 To some extent the dispute has already proven to be 
an embarrassing obstacle in Venezuela's attempts to assume a larger role in the interna­
tional system. The forced withdrawal of her application to join the Non-Aligned move­
ment is dramatic evidence of the cost of her policy towards Guyana.44 Even Guatemala, in 
the absence of the British Harrier force, might hesitate to endure the opprobrium which 
the annexation of Belize would risk.
However, there is little comfort in this kind of calculation. It is still existence on 
sufferance and it is never certain, even with prestige-conscious states like Venezuela, that 
domestic considerations will not finally force the resolution of a long-standing irritant. 
Argentina's campaign for liberation of the 'Malvinas' is a sobering example for micro-states 
living on the good will or self-restraint of powerful neighbours.
The New York Times 9 May, 1982, 18.
Guyana made it clear that it was ready to accept aid from any friendly state in the event of a Venezuelan 
invasion. In October, 1982 Brazil granted Guyana a $50 million credit for the purchase of aircraft, ar­
moured vehicles and munitions.
The Times (London), 2 October, 1982,6.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1984), 32966.
43John D. Martz, "Venezuelan Foreign Policy Towards Latin America," in Robert D. Bond (ed.) Contem­
porary Venezuela and its Role in International Affairs (New York: New York University Press, 1977), 
pp. 175-178.
Cedric L. Joseph, "The Venezuela-Guyana Boundary Arbitration of 1899: An Appraisal, Part One" 
Caribbean Studies X (No. 2, July 1970), 56-89; Part Two, (No. 4, January 1971), 35-75.
^Venezuela applied to join the Non-Aligned Movement in mid-1982. However, in the face of Guyana's 
objections, Caracas withdrew its application in February 1983 but maintained its observer status. 
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1983), 32350-32351.
Though the issue remains unresolved, relations between the two countries have improved considerably 
since 1985, Various economic co-operation agreements have been signed during these years. In Febru­
ary, 1990 both sides agreed to the appointment of a United Nations mediator.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1985), 33978; (1986), 34478; (1987), 34935; (1988), 36209; (1990), 
37492.
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In some cases, the larger state, while holding acquisitive designs, might have con­
cluded that separate independence would not preclude union eventually. In the case of 
The Gambia, for instance, Senegal had every reason to believe in the eventual union of the 
two countries and the creation of Senegambia. The British were reluctant to accept the 
notion of separate independence for their tiny enclave.45 The territory was considered "too 
small to carry the burden of sovereignty"46 and British efforts were directed to encouraging 
integration with Senegal.47 The Gambians themselves did not accept the likelihood of in­
dependence until the criteria of size and economic viability became demonstrably less 
formidable.48 A United Nations mission49 established to explore the opportunities for as-
following the river Gambia for 92 miles, the country sticks".. .into Senegal like a crooked forefinger." 
Africa, May, 1977,61.
Only 15 miles in width for most of its length, The Gambia's borders do not extend even to the natural 
limits of the river basin on either side. At certain points the frontier is so unnatural that only a rock is 
placed to mark its supposed existence. The border also interrupts traditional patterns of settlement. In 
some cases farmers lived in Gambian villages but tended their crops in Senegal.
R. Harrington, "Gambia-Afiica's Smallest Country," Canadian Geographical Journal LXXVT (January 
1968), 34-39.
Africa, October, 1974, 38.
Africa, March, 1976, 51.
f i r  Hilary Blood, The Smaller Territories: Problems and Future (London: Conservative Political Centre, 
C.P.C. No. 183, Commonwealth Series No. 4,1958), p. 11.
Sir Edwin Windley, former Governor of The Gambia, said: "The Accident of history created Gambia 
too small and too ill-endowed to develop economically in isolation." quoted in: Berkeley Rice, Enter 
Gambia- The Birth o f an Improbable Nation (London: Angus and Robertson, 1968), p. 292.
47The British had attempted to sell the colony to France in 1875 in exchange for territory elsewhere, par­
ticularly the Ivory Coast and Gabon. It was agreed that The Gambia was a useless expense to maintain 
and that the original reasons for its separation from Senegal were no longer relevant. However, disa­
greement over the terms of an exchange and determined resistance in The Gambia meant that the pro­
posals came to naught.
48Though the British had not foreseen independence for The Gambia, the example of Sierra Leone and 
other small countries encouraged expectations of independence in the colony. The United Party ex­
ploited these precedents to refute arguments that The Gambia was too small to be a viable state in its 
own right.
"The question whether the Gambia can be viable is not relevant since she should be able to manage in­
dependence on her own as other small countries are doing."
United Party statement quoted in Claude E. Welch, Jr., "Unlikely Gambia," Africa Report X  
(February, 1965), 7.
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sociation with Senegal outlined three alternatives: the incorporation of The Gambia as the 
eighth province of Senegal; the establishment of a Senegambian federation, the alternative 
most favoured by the Mission; or a Senegambian "entente" encouraging ventures which 
would lead to federation. The report regarded this alternative only as "a means to an 
end."50 However, the Gambians' sense of their own separateness was more formidable 
than any party had anticipated. A separate colonial history had produced different educa­
tional, legal, political and economic institutions.51
The Gambian prime minister, D. K. Jawara, procrastinated, offering proposals 
based on the United Nations Mission's third alternative.52 The Senegalese, however, were 
totally committed to the logic of integration. Jawara's "confederation" offered only the 
veneer of integration. In light of the ill-fated Mali Federation, such experiments seemed 
unworkable. If there was to be union at all, it had to be substantial.53 Moreover, President 
Senghor wanted a federation which would reflect the reality of the size discrepancy. The 
Gambia could not expect an exaggeration of Gambian representation in order to create the
49United Nations, Report on the Alternatives o f Association between the Gambia and Senegal (New York: 
The United Nations, 1964).
xIbid.
51Three hundred years of British colonial rule, albeit in benign neglect, had left, nevertheless, a sense of 
separate interest and distinctive identity. Though many of the people in the interior would not speak 
English, the Anglicized leadership was jealous of the British educational, political, and legal institu­
tions and the open-door economy which distinguished life in The Gambia from Senegal. Indeed, the 
differences of colonial history were all the more pronounced for the particularly emphatic French way of 
life in Senegal. The Gambia was the most peaceful of British colonies. The was no need for a military 
force to uphold the colonial authority. Its excessive Britishness led Queen Victoria to call it "that dear, 
loyal little place.”
Rice, op. cit., p. 2. See also p. 317
52Jawara sought a confederation which would integrate foreign policy, overseas representation, and de­
fence in a seven-person "Council of the Alliance." In all other spheres each government would retain 
exclusive jurisdiction. Even The Gambia's membership in the Commonwealth would not be affected.
J. H. Proctor, "The Gambia's Relations with Senegal: The Search for Partnership," Journal o f 
Commonwealth Studies V (No. 2, July, 1967), 151.
53"The Gambia Goes It Alone: Part Four," West Africa, 6 February, 1965,145.
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appearance of an equal partnership. Finally, the responsibility of the federal government in 
the crucial areas assigned to it had to be clearly established beyond doubt.
From Dakar, The Gambia was clearly seen as an artifice; its eventual union with 
Senegal was inevitable. For Senghor, history possessed its own common sense. The 
Gambia and Senegal were "one country and one people."54 Given such assumptions, 
Senegal was not willing to countenance anything other than organic union. Were they to 
agree to a superficial arrangement they might only delay the inevitability of complete un­
ion. Senegal could afford to wait: " . . .  the Gambians can taste independence if they want 
to, but sooner or later they will realize the advantages of a wider grouping."55 Though this 
uncompromising and patronising posture was to reinforce independence sentiments in The 
Gambia, the Senegalese were assured that the very shock treatment of independence 
would soon turn the Gambians to Senegal. Indeed, if the illusions of separate independ­
ence were shattered early by the realities of experience, the issue was unlikely to surface 
again.
Given the certainty of his convictions, Senghor finally did accept the separate inde­
pendence of The Gambia, with agreements for co-operation in foreign affairs, including 
Senegalese representation of The Gambia's interests abroad where directed, and in matters 
of "external security and defence against any form of threat;"56 and development of the 
Gambia river basin.57 Further co-operation towards Senegambia was established in a series
^Leopold Senghor quoted in W. A. E. Skumik, The Foreign Policy o f Senegal (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1972), p. 145.
55 West Africa, op. cit.
56 West Africa, 11 July, 1964.
57The Convention for the Establishment and Organization of an Inter-State Committee for the Integrated 
Development of the Gambia River Basin, 18 February, 1965.
This convention was in accord with the recommendations of an earlier F. A.O. report.
Food and Agriculture Organization, Integrated Agricultural Development in the Gambia River Basin: 
A Report to the Governments o f Gambia and Senegal (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 
1964).
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of agreements including the Senegalo-Gambia Interstate Ministerial Committee to oversee 
the process of cooperation.58 Jawara, however, was anxious to resist "the logic of integra­
tion" and to salvage as much international personality for The Gambia as possible. This 
was often difficult and compromising given Senegal's commitment to the inevitability of 
union. For Senegal The Gambia's existence has been described as "an arrow pointing at 
our heart"59 and "a knife plunging into Senegal's side."60 The extent of the Gambia's vul­
nerability and the justification for Senegal's confidence was clearly demonstrated in the 
events following the attempted coup in The Gambia in July, 1981. Jawara, who was in 
London at the time, was compelled to invoke the Security Agreement requesting Senegal 
to send troops into The Gambia to deal with the rebels. Senegalese intervention and the 
restoration of Jawara to the presidency immediately forced a serious and determined effort 
to move toward the logic of Senegambia.61 Protocol agreements establishing the union of
58The Committee was to meet annually, alternately in Dakar and Banjul (formerly Bathurst). The Com­
mittee was to be assisted by a Permanent Secretariat based in Banjul but with a Senegalese Executive 
Secretary nominated by both governments.
The Treaty o f Association, 19 April, 1967. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 640, no. 9156,
101-109.
Subsequent agreements were reached on the recognition of equal fishing and shipping rights within 
Senegambian waters, the construction of Senegambian schools and cultural centers in both countries, 
the exchange of sports and cultural events and the rationalisation of transportation.
Peter Schwab, "Melanges- The Gambia's Relationship to the Senegambia Association," Geneve Afrique 
IX (No. 2,1970), 101-103.
»Le Monde, 7 July, 1976.
“Rice, op. cit., 3.
The Gambia cuts off the southern province of Casamance from the rest of the country. Recurring 
secessionist sentiments in Casamance only reinforces the fear in Dakar that The Gambia could be used 
as a base of subversion. Moreover, the extensive and uncontrollable practice of smuggling and The 
Gambia's role as a virtual free port within Senegal, have proven to be costly irritants.
Skumik, op. cit., pp. 145-47.
Peter Robson, "The Problems of Senegambia," Journal o f Modem African Studies III (No. 3,
October, 1965), 398.
61 Arnold Hughes, "The attempted Gambian coup d'etat of 30 July 1981," in Arnold Hughes (ed.) The 
Gambia: Studies in Society and Politics (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 1991), pp. 92-106.
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the two countries as Senegambia were signed by both presidents in December 1981 and 
the Confederation came into effect on February 1, 1982. Though the protocols provided 
that" . . .  each of the Confederal States shall maintain its independence and sovereignty,”62 
and thus for the time being its separate status in international law, it established 
Senegambian institutions much more advanced than anything Jawara had previously con­
sidered. The central institutions of the new Confederation were a Confederal Council of 
Ministers headed by a President and Vice-President (the presidents of Senegal and The 
Gambia respectively), and a Confederal Parliament nominated by members of the two na­
tional legislatures. With these institutions in place the two countries committed them­
selves to policy co-ordination and joint policy formulation. Yet this logic of integration, 
which for a time seriously threatened the continued separate international personality of 
The Gambia, finally gave way to inertia, self-interest and those forces rooted in different 
colonial experiences which justified separate independence in the first place. Even more 
important was the fact that the experiment in Confederation failed to meet the very differ­
ent expectations of both parties and was ultimately unable to reconcile the consequences 
of such profound disparities between the two partners.63 Though the Confederation was 
dissolved quickly in 1989, both states continue to recognise the need for co-operation and 
closer economic ties, for the immediate future at least. The Gambia may have emerged 
from this coaxed marriage with greater confidence.
The Gambia in its early period of independence was an extreme case of micro-state 
vulnerability. Had President Senghor been more determined in the period prior to inde­
pendence, and less confident in the ultimate historical outcome, it is possible that separate
^Official Gazette o f the Senegambia Confederation
63Amold Hughes, "The Collapse of the Senegambian Confederation," Journal o f Commonwealth and
Comparative Politics (XXX, No. 2, July, 1992), 216-217.
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independence would not have been an alternative at all for The Gambia.* The very small 
size of The Gambia and its fragmentary geographical character are mutually-reinforcing 
problems which undermine the case for separate independence.
The problems of micro-state legitimacy are particularly evident in continental mi­
cro-states. They are more exposed to the larger interests of their neighbours, whether 
those be territorial completeness, security and defence or economic rationalisation. 
Stanley de Smith has argued that an island, being a more "visibly separate geographic 
area"65 is, therefore, more legitimate as a separate state than a comparable mainland entity. 
Geographical isolation establishes a clear sense of separate identity which supports the 
legitimacy of the claim for separate independence.66 In taking issue with de Smith, John 
Osthemier cites the international acceptance of independence for The Gambia and 
Equatorial Guinea to support his contention that diminutive continental entities possess 
the same credentials for separate statehood as small islands.67 The sense of separate iden­
tity can be as compelling for continental communities as for island peoples. Of this there 
is ample evidence, though a distinction must be made between a sense of separate identity 
and the recognition of a distinctive interest sufficient to win acceptance for a separate des­
tiny.
“The Gambians have been the first to acknowledge their precarious status. Note the following statement 
in a Government publication:
"Considering that a total merger with her bigger neighbour has always been on the cards actively en­
couraged by both Britain and France and untiringly advocated by Senegal to the point of coercion, it is 
surprising that The Gambia still survives as a sovereign independent nation."
The Gambia Forges Ahead (Banjul: Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1977), p. 6.
“ Stanley A. de Smith, Microstates and Micronesia (New York: New York University Press, 1970), 
p. 57.
“Ibid.
67John M. Ostheimer, "Are Islanders Different? A survey of Theoretical Ideas," in John M. Ostheimer 
(ed.) The Politics o f the Western Indian Ocean Islands (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 
pp. 13-27
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As we have argued already, The Gambia's "acceptance" is not without qualification. 
Moreover, Equatorial Guinea too has faced claims from larger states.68 At the 1962 
meeting of the U.D.E.A.C.69 it was suggested that Fernando Po be transferred to 
Cameroun70 and Rio Muni attached to Gabon.71 After Spain granted internal autonomy to 
the colony in 1963, its progress towards separate independence was supported by the 
states of the region.72 However, the continued independence of Equatorial Guinea has 
been questioned since, particularly in Nigeria, where trade unions demanded the annexa­
tion of Equatorial Guinea in light of the maltreatment of Nigerian migrant workers during 
the brutal regime of Macias Nguema.73
68These claims have been related to the traditional ties among the Fang of Cameroun, Gabon and Equato­
rial Guinea. In the 1930's, Fang nationalists aspired to a single Fang state in the region. The French 
regarded Fang nationalism as a threat to the security of their own frontiers in the area.
Brian Weinstein, Gabon: Nation-Building on the Ogooue (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), 
pp. 58-62.
President Ahidjo of Cameroun justified his acceptance of refugees from Equatorial Guinea on the 
grounds t h a t . .  the people of that territory who have sought refuge are of the same parentage as our 
people."
Jeune AJrique, 2 January, 1976 quoted in: Suzanne Cronj6, Equatorial Guinea: The Forgotten Dicta­
torship (London: Anti-Slavery Society, 1976), p. 26.
69Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale
70Paul Soppo Prison, former president of the Cameroun legislature, argued in 1962 that the creation of 
micro-states which were unviable and susceptible to neo-colonialism was a senseless course. Since 
parts of Cameroun had been given to Gabon, Qubangi-Chiari, Congo and Chad, the leaders of those 
states could recognise at least Cameroun's claim to Equatorial Guinea since it is " . . .  the natural and 
ethnic prolongation of Cameroun, the continuation of the southern zone of the Fang Ntoumou people of 
the low region of Amban, a zone which, by the way, used to include Wdeu-Ntem, a former 
Camerounese region today included in the national territory of Gabon."
Paul Soppo Prison, "Face a l'harmonisation de l'Afrique: le Cameroun et la Guinee Espagnole," Com- 
munaute France-Eurafrique (September, 1962), 7, quoted in: Weinstein, op. cit., p. 230.
71The Fang in Gabon wanted Equatorial Guinea annexed to Gabon in order to increase the Fang percent­
age of the population.
Ibid., p. 231.
^Support was particularly forthcoming from Gabon. However, relations deteriorated in 1972 when Gabon 
occupied the islands of Mbanie and Cocotiers which, though they had been part of Equatorial Guinea, 
were claimed when Gabon extended its territorial waters.
Cronj£, op. cit., pp. 8, 10, 26.
^The Guardian (Manchester and London), 27 January, 1976,4.
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Ostheimer's examples, then, do not necessarily refute de Smith’s argument that the 
legitimacy of diminutive states is more readily realised in island states. Territorial contigu­
ity has posed difficult problems for most mainland micro-states, while geographical isola­
tion has favoured island states with axiomatic independence. The alternatives to separate 
statehood are also more difficult to effect with island peoples because "the maritime nature 
of their separation" can so exacerbate separateness as to encourage the fragmentation of 
island groupings.74 Given these problems the decolonisation of small islands is often inde­
pendence by default. However, this is not to say that geographical self-containment itself 
ensures long-term security. Some island micro-states have also faced explicit irredentist 
pressures.75 And, for others, the durability of continued separate independence may de­
pend on the willingness of donor states to continue the budgetary support which makes 
sovereignty even on a minimal subsistence basis possible.
The issue of legitimacy is inseparable from that of security. The prospects for ex- 
pendability are greater if the reserve of international acceptance remains limited and quali­
fied. Nor is this necessarily relevant only for the newest micro-states. What is San Mar-
West Africa, 6 Februaiy, 1965, 155.
Africa, March, 1976, 57.
74Separatist movements in Anguilla, Nevis, Barbuda, Addu, Aruba, Tobago, Bougainville, Tuvalu and 
Mayotte are cases in point. In spite of constitutional provisions for reunion with Guinea-Bissau, the 
"temporaiy" independence of Cape Verde proved to be more rooted in sentiments of separateness than 
P.A.I.G.C. ambitions would have suggested.
75We have already mentioned the case of Bahrain.
In 1957 Prime Minister R. D. Bandaranaike suggested a Ceylonese claim to the Maldive Islands, argu­
ing that the archipelago had once been a dependency of Ceylon.
The Times (London), 25 March, 1957.
Though that claim was not pursued, the proximity to Sri Lanka and the exclusivity of the relationship 
has resulted in sufficient apprehension in the Maldives to encourage a diversification of its external re­
lations.
Dilip Mukeijee, "Maldives Diversifies Contacts with Big Neighbours," Pacific Community VI (No. 4, 
July, 1975), 602-603.
M. Adeney and W. K. Carr, "The Maldives 'Republic," in Ostheimer, op. cit., p. 158.
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ino's reserve of international acceptance, should Italy ever decide to complete its 
"territorial integrity?" While this seems unthinkable, particularly given the long- 
established understanding between the two countries, San Marino has, nonetheless, ex­
ploited every opportunity to assert its separate independence and to confirm the recogni­
tion of its status in the international system. Faced with the responsibility of proving 
themselves as states to be respected and defended, micro-states, in the tradition of small 
state diplomacy, stress the primacy of international norms to secure the permanence of 
their sovereignty. Even the most controversial micro-state can argue that its own survival 
is crucial to the credibility of the fundamental principles of international law. The process 
of legitimisation is itself a foreign policy objective. And prospects for the smallest and 
weakest states are more propitious than for their counterparts in earlier international sys­
tems. The norms and institutions of contemporary international relations have increasingly 
been those most relevant to the security of small states and particularly micro-states. The 
inviolability of colonial frontiers as the basis for national self-determination allowed for 
their separate independence in the first place.
However, this only underscores the argument that security is first an issue of juridi­
cal survival and this, in turn, means participating in the organised relations of the interna­
tional system. This participation is crucial to meeting whatever problems of status they 
face. Status is rooted and legitimacy is enhanced by exploiting the formal network of in­
ter-state relations. With time the commitments of international diplomacy become pledge 
cards against future neglect or complacency. For some micro-states, an international 
profile may be the only basis for security. However, this is often a daunting and impossi­
ble task. While it is important to register their presence and to project their statehood in 
foreign capitals and international organisations, the human and economic resources are 
often beyond reach. We examine this aspect of the micro-state problem in the next sec­
tion of this essay.
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In summary, we have argued that micro-states are particularly vulnerable to what. 
we have called questions of legitimacy. The issue of legitimacy is not directly relevant in 
the case of every micro-state, but it is always relevant in any discussion of very small size 
and sovereign statehood. Very small size imposes particular burdens while it exacerbates 
familiar problems. Lingering doubts about capacity are often reinforced by misgivings 
about rights to self-determination. While the problems of status vary with particular 
conditions, legitimacy as a dimension of international personality is a familiar concomitant 
of micro-statehood.
The concept of legitimacy embraces both the legal and political dimensions of 
status. We have noted that in spite of the recognition of micro-states' sovereignty in inter­
national law, there may yet be serious misgivings about their political status. These reser­
vations may compromise and finally erode even the legal status which they now possess. 
Conversely, the prerogatives which accompany the legal status of micro-states as equal 
members of the international system can be exploited to enhance their political status. An 
adroit use of the formalities of the international system can allow even the most improb­
able and dubious state to root its statehood eventually in the diplomatic commitments of 
other states and inter-state organisations. The concept of legitimacy allows us, then, to 
bridge the difficult terrain between the legal provisions of sovereignty and the political ex­
pectations of independence. International status can be viewed from both perspectives 
and it is this grey area which has always been the recurring theme in the international rela­
tions of micro-states.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Sovereignty and the Challenge of Diplomacy 
The Relevance of Size in the External Relations of Micro-States
If there are doubts about the reality of micro-state sovereignty, it is because such 
states appear incapable of external relations. International relations may be seen as the 
raison d'etre of statehood1 and the capacity to protect and project national interests the 
essential mark of sovereignty.
We have already discussed the importance of diplomacy for those micro-states 
whose claims for separate independence are in question. The ability to cope with 
controversies of status depends on exploiting the legal norms and institutions of the global 
system and this, in turn, requires some degree of international presence. This may be a 
minimal foreign policy of sovereignty-maintenance, but it is fundamental to the long term 
security of the state.
But even for micro-states where status is not in question, the issue of diplomatic 
capability is still urgent. Most micro-states are developing economies, competing for 
foreign capital and development assistance. Even the smallest and weakest micro-states, 
by virtue of their sovereign status, have direct access to foreign governments and 
international agencies. The extent to which they can take advantage of these opportunities 
is dependent on the diplomatic capabilities which they can muster to promote their 
interests. There are few micro-states, then, whose international presence could be 
confidently left to philatelic commissions.
In this section of the discussion we explore that question which seems most central 
to the issue of viability: How do these tiny states manage their external relations? We
1F. S. Northedge, The International Political System (London: Faber and Faber, 1976), p. 177.
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begin in this chapter by reviewing those conclusions about very small states which are 
commonly assumed in theoretical studies in foreign policy. We also consider the principal 
methodological approaches to empirical research in the relationship of size and foreign 
policy behaviour, namely events data analysis and diplomatic exchange studies. We 
conclude this section by reviewing the scale of micro-state bilateral and multilateral 
relations, using diplomatic exchange data as our basis for analysis. In the following 
several sections of this chapter, we examine both the intensity and the direction of micro­
state participation in the international system. Our principal interest is the assessment of 
delineations between the very small and the small. Throughout this section, and in the 
following chapters on the international economic relations of micro-states, we draw upon 
comparative data for micro-states and other small states: those countries with populations 
between one and six million. We begin now with the general question of micro-states as 
actors in international politics.
Micro-states and the Study of Foreign Policy:
Theoretical Assumptions and Methodological Problems.
Scepticism about the capacity of micro-states to engage in the international system 
is common enough. This reflects the influence of "political realism" and the 
preponderance of Western models based on high politics. In this view, the external 
relations of micro-states may be described as "ceremonial" or "administrative"2 but they 
do not constitute foreign policy and foreign policy is the activity of a normal state in 
international relations.
Foreign policy is widely understood as initiative and output. Modelski, for 
example, views foreign policy as that activity by which states influence and alter
2R. P. Barston (ed.), The Other Powers-Studies in the Foreign Policies o f Small States 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1973), pp. 21-22.
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conditions in their external environment. Though he allows for foreign policy as reaction, 
whereby states "adjust their own activities to the external environment,"3 he emphasises 
the generative nature of foreign policy as an activity "for changing the behavior of other 
states."4 This is finally a question of power. "All measures directed to the outside world 
and aimed at changing the foreign policies of other states involve power"5 and, for 
Modelski, the "power-assets" which make foreign policy possible are directly related to 
the size of the state.6
Like Modelski, Rosenau accepts that foreign policy can be adaptive behaviour- the 
state's accommodation with its environment. However, he too stresses that this adaptation 
is essentially purposeful and directed to effecting change or preservation in the 
environment of the state:
By foreign policy is meant the authoritative actions which governments take- 
or are committed to take- in order either to preserve the desirable aspects of 
the international environment or to alter its undesirable effects . . .  In other 
words, some image of how the environment should be structured necessarily 
underlies every external activity undertaken by governments, and it is in this 
sense that foreign policy is a distinctive form of adaptive behaviour.7
3George Modelski, A Theory o f Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 6-7.
AIbid., p. 6.
5Ibid.
6Ibid., p. 49.
7James N. Rosenau, "Comparing Foreign Policies: Why, What, How," in James N. Rosenau (ed.) 
Comparing Foreign Policies (New York: Sage Publications, Halsted Press Division, 1974), pp. 3-22. 
Some students of the subject have attempted to move away from the active-centered model. Frenkel's 
definition, for example, is broad and perhaps vague: "Foreign policy consists of decisions and actions 
which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others."
Joseph Frenkel, The Making o f Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 1.
For Frenkel foreign policy is essentially reactive:
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The notion that foreign policy is a projection of a state's image of the external 
environment was particularly emphasised in Holsti's analysis of national role perceptions. 
Holsti suggested that states with credible foreign policies are those which play a "role” in 
the international system. Foreign policy is seen as "national role performance" derived 
from the policy makers' role conception or their "image of the appropriate orientation or 
unctions of their state toward, or in the external environment."8 In his typology of 
national role perceptions Holsti structured a continuum of activity/passivity. He allows for 
four passive roles: independent, internal development, protectee and isolate.9 Yet, even 
these passive categories involve such notions as self-reliance and self-determination. The 
role perception which encourages aloofness is a choice for all of that; an image of the state 
as primarily self-absorbed. Beyond this however, Holsti suggests a degree of passivity 
lacking even the clear self-view of the isolate:
" . . .  foreign policy is generally pursued without any clear purpose. Most policies are reactive, following 
real or imagined stimuli from the environment; active foreign policy which positively pursues objectives 
based upon firmly held values, is much rarer."
Joseph Frankel, National Interest (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1970), p. 26.
8K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly 
XIV (No. 3, September, 1970), 246.
^dependent: " . . .  the government will make policy decisions according to the state's own interests 
rather than in support of the objectives of other states. The themes in the role conception of the 
independent all emphasise this element of policy self-determination; otherwise they do not imply any 
particular continuing task or function in the system."
Ibid., 268.
Internal Development: "This concept has little reference to any particular task or function within the 
international system. The emphasis, on the contrary, is that most efforts of the government should be 
directed towards problems of internal development."
Ibid., 269.8
Isolate: "The national role of the isolate demands . . .  a minimum of external contacts of whatever 
variety."
Ibid., 2708
Protectee: "Some governments allude to the responsibility of other states to defend them but otherwise 
do not indicate any particular orientation, tasks or functions toward the external environment."
Ibid.
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(There are states which). . . have no real foreign policy if by that term we 
mean a coherent set of objectives guiding day to day diplomatic actions, 
expectations about how changes in the external environment could 
influence the state in question, or a well thought out image of a desirable 
future state for the external environment. These states appear to be 
objects, but not actors, in international relationships. Except for 
commercial matters, they do not try to change external conditions in their 
favour, and they see no continuing external tasks for themselves.10
If the projection of self-image is seen as the essence of foreign policy, then micro- 
states might appear to lack the confidence of role perception as surely as they lack the 
means of role performance.11 These assumptions are axiomatic and pervasive in both 
general analyses of foreign policy and in small state studies, particularly during the early 
years of decolonisation, when any future international role for micro-states seemed 
unlikely.12 Though the issue of micro-state diplomacy may have appeared too obvious to 
pursue, there was a growing effort to assess the impact of size, among other variables, on 
the behaviour of states in the international system. James Rosenau's early model for 
analysing the influence of size, modernisation and political accountablity13 has spawned
l0Ibid„ 281.
"Holsti's own samplings excluded many micro-states simply because his sources of role-perception, 
newspapers and journals of the Western world, carried few references to these states. It may be tempting 
to conclude that lack of information is itself evidence of lack of role.
12The excesses of decolonisation, noted one student, have resulted in " . . .  the birth of new small states 
which . . .  do not seem to reach the minimum size below which no meaningful, constructive part in 
international affairs is possible."
Jean Luc Vellut, "Smaller States and the Problems of War and Peace: Some Consequences of the 
Emergence of Smaller States in Africa," Journal o f Peace Research III (1966), 266.
13Using these three basic variables, Rosenau developed a typology of "eight genotypic national societies."
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further research to test the relationship of these variables to differing patterns of foreign 
policy behaviour. Subsequent efforts were centred on the following aspects of the foreign 
policy process: a) the degree of international participation14; b) the focus of international 
involvement;15 and c) the degrees of conflictual and co-operative behaviour.16
Most of this literature is classification analysis. How do these states differ in terms 
of the frequency, scope and nature of their interactions in the international system? The 
findings in this body of work suggest that size is the most salient variable in any 
differentiation of foreign policy behaviour.17 There are two hypotheses concerning the 
impact of size which are of concern to us in this section. They may be summarised as 
follows:
James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches 
to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 48.
In a further elaboration Roseanu and Hoggard added three 'external' or 'systemic' variables to 
complement the three national or subsystemic variables of the original model.
James N. Roseanu and Gary D. Hoggard, "Foreign Policy Behavior in Dyadic Relationships: Testing a 
Pre-Theoretical Extension," in Rosenau (ed.), Comparing Foreign Policies, op. cit., 117-150.
14R. J. Rummel, "Some Empirical Findings on Nations and their Behavior," World Politics XXI (January,
1969), 226-241.
Maurice A. East and Charles F. Hermann, "Do Nation-Types Account for Foreign Policy Behavior?," in 
Rosenau (ed.), Comparing Foreign Policies, op. cit., pp. 269-302.
15James G. Kean and Patrick J. McGowan, "National Attributes and Foreign Policy Participation; a PATH 
Analysis," Sage International Yearbook o f Foreign Policy Studies I (1973), 219-251.
16Stephen A. Slamore and Charles F. Hermann, "The Effects of Size, Development and Accountability on 
Foreign Policy," Peace Research Society (Intemational)Papers XIV (Ann Arbor Conference, 1969), 
15-30.
James H. Harf, "Inter-Nation Conflict Resolution and National Attributes," in Rosenau (ed.), Comparing 
Foreign Policies, op. cit., pp. 305-328.
Maurice A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models," World Politics XXV (July, 
1973), 556-576.
17Patrick A. McGowan and H. B. Shapiro, The Comparative Study o f Foreign Policy (London: Sage 
Publications, 1973).
Kean and McGowan, op. cit.
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a) Size is the major national attribute determining the extent of a state's 
international involvement. The smaller the state, the fewer external reactions it will have.18
b) As size determines the degree and frequency of international involvement, so it 
also delimits its geographical and functional scope. A small state is likely to be limited to 
regional and local levels of interaction. Global involvement will be primarily through inter­
governmental organisations.19
Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour: Problems of Data Compilation
What empirical research supports these conclusions? Thus far, empirical studies 
have centred on two bases of information: events-data analysis and diplomatic exchange 
data. Events-data research20 analyses the volume of a state's international interactions; the 
patterns of its bilateral and multilateral relations; its response to particular issues and its 
degree of conflictual or co-operative behaviour. An event is defined as "an occasion when 
one actor directs an action toward one or more others" and is regarded as "the basic unit 
through which the pattern of international relations can be discerned, contrasted and
18East and Hermann, op. cit., 291.
East, op. cit., 564.
Kean and McGowan, op. cit., 221.
Salmore and Hermann, op. cit., 23.
19Annette Baker Fox, The Power o f Small States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 3. 
George L. Reid, The Impact o f Very Small Size on the International Behavior o f Micro-States (London: 
Sage Professional Papers in International Studies, No. 402-027, Sage Publications, Inc., 1974), 
pp. 30-31.
20Edward A. Azar, "The Analysis of International Events," Peace Research Reviews IV (No. 1,1970), 
1- 10.
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assessed."21 The basis of the research is the computation and analysis of a state's events as 
recorded in major newpapers, global chronologies and regional sources.22
There are certain problems which arise when using events-data research in the 
analysis of micro-state behaviour. The first is that of newsworthiness.23 The major 
sources for events-data collection are likely to provide only occasional mention of micro­
states. This reflects, in part, the conviction that these tiny states are as ineffectual and 
unimportant from the domestic perspective of the source as they are to the international 
system as a whole. Moreover, with a few notable exceptions, these states are not liable to 
engage in the kind of dramatic conflictual behaviour which would draw attention to their 
international relations.24 The neglect of micro-state events on the basis of the peripheral 
and passive characteristics of micro-state international relations has meant that micro- 
states have not been included in events-data studies. In their analysis of the W.E.I.S. data, 
for example, Salmore and Hermann excluded all states for which there had been less than 
15 events computed in a two-year period.25 This problem could have been met, in part, 
by adding regional and local sources to the major Western newspapers and global
21 James N. Rosenau and George H. Ramsey, Jr., "External and Internal Typologies of Foreign Policy 
Behavior: Testing the Stability of an Intriguing Set of Findings," Sage International Yearbook o f 
Foreign Policy Studies HI (1975), 245-262.
22The W.E.I.S. (World Event/Interaction System: Charles McClelland) used The New York Times Index. 
The C.RE.O.N. (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations) Project used Deadline Data on World 
Affairs. Events data sources are compared in Robert Burrowes, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . .  A 
Comparison of Event Data Sources," in Rosenau (ed.), Comparing Foreign Policies, op. cit., 
pp. 383-406
“ J. Galtung and M. Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News," Journal o f Peace Research II (1965),
64-91.
Gaiy Hoggard, "Differential Source Coverage in Foreign Policy Analysis," in Rosenau (ed.), Comparing 
Foreign Policies, op. cit., pp. 353-377.
24 And when these tiny jurisdictions do make the evening news, as in Grenada, Kuwait or the Falklands, it 
is as objects or targets of larger state strategy rather than as actors in their own right.
25Salmore and Hermann, op. cit., 19.
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compilations. However, there is the difficulty of differential coverage which could leave 
some states overlooked in areas where compilations are not available or where micro- 
states are judged as peripheral even within their own regions.
An even greater limitation is the fact that some micro-states have no daily 
newspaper at all. A weekly or bi-weekly government bulletin may be the only source of 
information. Regular access to these sources could be as frustrating for the regional 
chronologer as for the individual researcher.
This is not to rule out the value of events-data research for the future study of 
micro-state international relations. It is possible that news-gathering agencies and data­
base centres will become more attentive to micro-state interests. Technological advances 
in information collection suggest some support for this view. So too do the ever- 
expanding concerns of the United Nations system, which draw even the most peripheral 
states into a network of international information.
There are, however, other measures of external behaviour which are more readily 
accessible with less risk of neglect at the source: indicators of diplomatic exchange; 
representation and voting behaviour in international organisations and international 
conferences; patterns of trade exchange, aid and investment; and treaties, conventions, and 
military alignments. All of these can serve as reliable indicators of a state's involvement in 
the international system. Ideally, exhaustive data from these sources could be correlated 
with that of events-data compilation to present a comprehensive and thorough picture of 
micro-states in international politics.
Diplomatic exchange data can be useful in at least four respects. In the first place 
it is an index of the extent of a state's participation in the international system. States 
interact in international society in widely varying degrees of range and intensity. The 
number of capitals with which a state enjoys some form of accreditation, the number of 
inter-govemmental organisations to which it subscribes, and the size of those
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commitments provide reliable indicators of the level of that state's involvement in the 
international system.
Second, diplomatic exchange data provides an important indication of a state's 
orientation in international politics. Since the establishment of a mission abroad is a 
significant commitment of scarce resources, the decision is a reflection of those 
relationships judged as crucial to the state's interests. Even the near-universal 
commitments of the Great Powers reveal differentials of accreditation and thus a hierarchy 
of relationships. For small and weak states with limited resources, these commitments are 
particularly indicative of that state's most important associations. What are the ideological 
and geographical boundaries of a state's international relations? To what extent is it 
involved in system-wide issues?
Third, just as diplomatic exchange data indicates those relationships considered 
important to the sending state, so it attests to the standing of a state in the international 
system.26 Since the decision to establish accreditation is one of cost on the part of the 
sending state it can only reflect the importance of the host state in the judgement of the 
sender. The status of a state in the international system is indicated both by the number of 
missions received and by the identity of those missions. The commitment of "key 
legitimizers"27-  the Great Powers or regional leaders-enhances the status of the receiving 
state. The analysis of status as reflected in the accreditation which a state receives allows 
us to understand the extent to which a state- or a class of states- can be viewed on a
26J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The Composition And Status Ordering of the International System: 
1815-1940,H World Politics XVIII (January, 1966), 237-242
Melvin Small and J. David Singer, -The Diplomatic Importance of States, 1816-1970; An Extension 
and Refinement of the Indicator," World Politics XXV (July, 1973), 580-583.
27Singer and Small, op. cit., 245-246.
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central/peripheral continuum.28 We will explore this aspect of micro-state international 
relations later in this chapter.
Unfortunately, micro-states have rarely been included in these studies and we have 
little sense of the distinctions between the small and the very small. In their excellent 
study, Singer and Small used a population limit of 500,000, League or United Nations 
membership and/or recognition by France or Britain as "key legitimizes" so as to exclude 
"the ephemeral and politically insignificant principalities."29 The World Handbook of 
Political and Social Indicators includes all United Nations members but only those other 
independent states with populations over one million, which would exclude a dozen 
micro-states.30 Only five micro-states were included in the Alger and Brams study.31 Even 
Plishke's survey of micro-states excludes the old European states.32
^Dominguez identified centrality with international influence: “The center includes the major powers- 
France, the People's Republic of China, the U.S.S.R., The United Kingdom and the United States- those 
countries whose behavior and power influence all other countries in the international system . . . also ..  
those countries whose behavior must be taken into account by the major powers in their key policy 
decisions.
The peripheral state is one which may be penetrated regularly by the center but is only intermittently 
capable itself of center penetration.
A country in the peripheries of the international system is one whose behavior and power are marginal 
to the center of the international system and to all other countries in the peripheries- except when 
policies for the subsystem to which that peripheral country belongs are formulated.”
Jorge I. Dominguez, "Mice that Do Not Roar: Some Aspects of International Politics in the World's 
Peripheries,'1 International Organization XXV (Spring, 1971), 175-176.
29Singer and Small, op. cit., 245.
Small and Singer, op. cit., 590-591.
30Bruce Russett, Hayward R. Alker, Karl W. Deutsch, and Harold D. Lasswell, World Handbook o f 
Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).
That approach would exclude Tonga, Nauru, Kiribati and Tuvalu. At the time it would have excluded 
Western Samoa, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco and Andorra.
31 Chadwick F. Alger and Steven J. Brams, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Inter- 
Govemmental Organizations," World Politics XIX (July, 1967), 646-663.
Russett, and Singer and Small attempted to include even the European micro-states by setting their 
population limit at 10, 000, which at the same time ". . . avoided the impossible task of identifying the 
scores of island kingdoms and chieftains. . . as well as a number of politically esoteric enclaves." 
However, even by this criterion, Nauru, independent in 1968, would have been excluded. Since then 
Tuvalu achieved sovereignty and there are other such diminutive territories where independence might 
be expected in the forseeable future.
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In these earlier studies the problems of using this kind of data for micro-states 
were formidable. Most micro-states had achieved independence only recently. Their 
foreign ministries were small and not yet well-established, with diplomatic lists unavailable 
in some cases. Moreover, micro-states often rely on consular levels of exchange which 
are not included in international compilations. These problems have not been entirely 
overcome. Nonetheless, diplomatic exchange data still provides the most reliable index of 
micro-state international relations, particularly in comparison to other small states.
A comparative assessment of diplomatic-exchange data reveals two patterns which 
micro-states share to some extent with other small states. First, micro-states are indeed 
"local powers," in the sense that they have few ongoing bilateral relationships. Formal 
accreditation, particularly an exchange of permanent missions, is limited to a very small 
community of states. The most important of these are patron states, which may be the 
former metropole, a neighbouring state or both. The micro-state's regular "diplomatic 
community" is modest even in comparison to the weakest and poorest states in the next 
population class. Even when micro-states do aspire to a larger network of bilateral 
contacts, the limitations of very small size impose an early ceiling on formal diplomatic 
exchange, including non-resident forms of accreditation. We explore this aspect of micro- 
state diplomacy in detail in the next section of this chapter.
Bruce M. Russett, J. David Singer, Melvin Small, "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A 
Standardized List," American Political Science Review LXII (September, 1968), 933.
32Elmer Plishke, Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options (Washington, D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), p. 12.
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Yet the modest scale of micro-state diplomacy does not suggest that these very 
small states are indifferent to issues beyond local and pragmatic concern.33 In keeping 
with widely held assumptions about the international orientation of small states in general, 
micro-states give priority to multilateral diplomacy at both the regional and international 
levels. Typically, micro-states will direct most of their limited diplomatic resources to 
these commitments. Even the handful of micro-states which are not members of the 
United Nations participate in those U.N. functional bodies which are most relevant to their 
interests. For all small states the virtues of multilateral diplomacy are as symbolic as they 
are practical. Critics argue that multilateral forums, particularly the international 
conference, are very long on rhetoric and short on substance.34 Yet even the declaratory 
diplomacy of multilateralism is supportive and satisfying for small and weak states. Small 
states value multilateral diplomacy for the same reasons that they promoted The Hague 
Conferences a century ago. The exercise itself constantly reaffirms the dignity and the 
legal equality of all participants at the table.
33It is not an uncommon assumption that the dimensions of national interest are determined by the size of 
the state. Hence, small states would be expected to have fewer interests and thus less need for extensive 
international involvement.
Frankel, National Interest, op. cit., pp. 62-72.
East and Hermann, op. cit., 275.
However, the number of interests may be less important than the character of interests. All states can be 
said to share the same core interests relating to their international identity, their security and their 
economic well-being. The important distinctions between small states and large states relate more to 
their respective abilities to promote their national interests. Thus, the distinction between interests and 
objectives or between "operational interests" and "aspirational interests" is more appropriate to the issue 
of the impact of size on the international involvement of states.
Modelski, op. cit., pp. 118-119.
Frankel, ibid., pp. 31-38.
34A. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations- Principles and Issues (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice 
Hall, 4’thed., 1988), p. 343.
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This is not to understate the importance of international and regional bodies in 
addressing the central interests of micro-states. Clearly, there are issues, such as nuclear- 
testing in the South Pacific, for example, which must be pursued in a multilateral context 
in both regional and global bodies. The material benefits of international regulation, co­
ordination of regional policies, access to development assistance programmes, and the 
potential for dependence relief through diversification justify the priority which micro- 
states give to multilateralism and inter-governmental organisations. In some cases, 
particularly regional bodies, an inter-govemmental organisation may serve as the primary 
focus of bilateral diplomacy mitigating the need for an exchange of missions. Moreover, 
the cultivation of particular expertise and a concentration of resources and effort can allow 
a micro-state to have significant influence in the determination of multilateral policies. 
Malta's contribution in the Law of the Sea Conferences can be seen as an example of 
effective micro-state diplomacy beyond immediate and parochial interests.
Though the proliferation of inter-govemmental organisations has extended the 
resources and policy options of most small states, effective participation remains a 
formidable challenge given the limitations of small budgets and over-extended staff. Once 
again the gap between ambition and capability distinguishes micro-states from other small 
states. The disabilities of very small size are evident in the comparative participation of 
micro-states and other small states in inter-govemmental organisations.35 These
3STable III at the end of this chapter lists small-state and micro-state membership in regional and global 
inter-govemmental organisations. Micro-states belong to an average of 26 organisations; small states in 
the next population class subscribe to an average of 46 organisations. These differences are confirmed 
in Table IV and Table V, which outline the participation of both groups of states in the full range of the 
United Nations system.
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differences would not support the notion that very small states have only "bare minimum" 
interests in the international system. It is true that within this class there are states whose 
self-view and external regard place them on the peripheries of the international system. 
But there are others whose security and economic interests would justify a greater 
diplomatic presence than their resources allow. We now examine the diplomatic practices 
of micro-states in light of the constraints of very small size. We consider too the extent to 
which these constraints are mitigated by economic advantages, geopolitical assets and 
leadership styles.
Patterns of Diplomatic Relations for Micro-states 
and Other Small States
Whatever the frustrations, all micro-states participate in regional and global 
multilateral diplomacy. Very small size usually means that their participation pales in 
comparison even to that of other small states. Still, multilateralism offers a relatively 
profitable return on investment. Apart from symbolic and material advantages, it hugely 
supplements their modest efforts to maintain normal practices of bilateral diplomatic 
representation. It is this level of international involvement which most clearly reflects the 
limitations of very small size. Even for relatively prosperous micro-states, it is difficult to 
establish regular channels of diplomatic exchange with more than a handful of partners. 
In these prerogatives of sovereignty, micro-states are disadvantaged among small states.
We begin with a comparative review of micro-state and small state representation 
in foreign capitals.36 Particular attention is given to avenues other than the overseas 
mission: non-resident accreditation, joint representation, and the use of consuls. The 
second section considers micro-states and small states as recipients of diplomatic attention
36The permanent mission to the United Nations is also included since it often serves to represent a state's 
interests in the United States and Canada.
199
from other states, particularly major powers. For states with modest services of their 
own, the resident diplomatic corps can provide welcome supplemental links to the outside 
world.
The Overseas Mission in Micro-state Diplomacy
The size and scope of a state's diplomatic service is a reflection of both its capacity 
as an international actor and the hierarchy of its external interests. By analysing the 
particulars of micro-state diplomatic representation we soon appreciate the burdens of 
very small size and the essentially recipient nature of micro-state relations with the outside 
world. Only 14 micro-states have established more than ten missions abroad. In contrast, 
all but 12 of the small states in the next population class (Bhutan, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia and the newly independent states of Armenia, Eritrea, Georgia, Kyrgystan, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) send more than ten missions. Three 
micro-states have only one overseas mission; two others have none at all. The average 
number of resident overseas missions for micro-states is only eight compared with 27 for 
the next population class of small states.37 Clearly, micro-state diplomatic representation 
is the lowest of any class of states.
There is a correlation between the size of the economy and the scale of diplomatic 
representation. Of the 24 micro-states with fewer than seven overseas missions, all but 
one (the Bahamas) have a Gross National Product of less than $500 million.
Gabon and Qatar, both O.P.E.C. members, stand apart from other micro-states. 
Both countries were able to establish a relatively large diplomatic service in the early days 
of independence. Gabon's enviable resource base and comparatively high per capita 
income levels have allowed a scale of international representation far beyond that of most
37 If we do not include Eritrea and the 13 former Soviet and Yugoslav republics which are just beginning 
to establish a diplomatic service, the average number of resident overseas missions for small states is 
31.
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African states. Gabon maintains more missions abroad than all but two of the sub-Saharan 
African states in this study. It remains an anomaly, even among other rich micro-states.
Qatar, with a population of 110,000, became independent in 1970. By 1975 the 
shaikhdom had established 26 missions abroad, accredited to a further 21 states. 
Similarly, Brunei achieved sovereignty in 1984 and is already represented in 18 capitals. 
This was the pattern for all the oil-rich micro-states with very small populations at the time 
of independence. Though there were problems of staffing, given a small pool of skilled 
personnel, capital costs were relatively insignificant. But wealth was not the only factor in 
explaining the large scale of Gulf state diplomacy. These are feudal regimes in a highly 
volatile region which benefit from the legitimacy insurance of high profile diplomacy.
The correlation of diplomatic representation with levels of per capita income is less 
consistent. Some of the states with the most skeletal diplomatic services are among the 
world's most prosperous societies. But, since micro-states have such limited total 
resources, absolute costs tend to be more decisive than questions of allocation. Even if a 
particularly ambitious micro-state should assign a grossly disproportionate share of its 
budget to overseas representation, the still-small size of its total wherewithal would 
preclude the kind of representation undertaken by larger states, however poorer the living 
standards.
The length of time that a state has been independent might seem to be as important 
as its economic resources. States expand their services with experience and with the 
development of bilateral relations.38 Most of the larger small states in this study are long- 
established members of the international community. The newest among them, Papua- 
New Guinea, independent in 1975, and Namibia, independent in 1990, Eritrea and, of
38A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, "Diplomacy and Diplomats: The Formation of the Foreign Service Cadres in 
Black Africa," in K. Ingham (ed.) Foreign Relations o f African States, Proceedings of the 25th 
Symposium of the Colston Research Society, University of Bristol, 4-7 April, 1973, (London: The 
Colston Papers, Colston Research Society, Butterworths, 1974), esp. pp. 288-289.
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course, most of the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics, are among the lowest-ranked 
states in this class. These considerations are less relevant for micro-states because of the 
early ceiling in the potential expansion of a micro-state's diplomatic service. Of the 31 
micro-states which send fewer than ten missions, nine had achieved sovereignty prior to 
1970.39 This longer period of sovereignty has not resulted in a marked expansion of the 
diplomatic service in these states comparable to that of states in the next population group 
during a similar period. For the newest micro-states there is little reason to expect that 
time will allow any significant change in the pattern of their diplomatic practice. These are 
the most diminutive states in the international system. The very recency of their 
decolonisation is the result of long-held reservations about their prospects for 
independence. Short of an oil bonanza, these newest and smallest micro-states seem 
destined to pursue their international relations through means other than the overseas 
mission.
Except for Gabon and Qatar, the most active micro-states maintain a scale of 
overseas representation comparable to the poorest and weakest states in the next 
population class: that is between ten and 20 missions. These few "active" micro-states 
rank similarly in other indices of international involvement, such as membership in inter­
governmental organisations. Four of them (Cyprus, Iceland, Luxembourg and Malta) 
participate in the multiple linkages of the Western European state system. Indeed, Cyprus 
and Malta have both applied for membership in the European Union.40 The uncertain 
future of a united Cypriot state would justify the most high profile diplomacy possible 
from the Greek Cypriot government in Nicosia. And, similarly, Guyana's commitment to 
an active and prominent foreign policy reflects an abiding concern for unresolved disputes
39 Though an ancient principality, Andorrra’s international status was not clear until 1993.
mThe Economist, 21-27 July, 1990, 50-51.
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which threaten her territorial integrity and perhaps her international personality. 
Moreover, Guyana has pursued an significant role within her own region and a vigorous 
identification with a broader alignment of Third World states. Bahrain's relatively high 
rank within the micro-state class (12 missions) may obscure the fact that the shaikhdom 
has the smallest diplomatic service in the Arab world. Bahrain's level of diplomatic 
representation, confined largely to Arab capitals, is truly modest in comparison with other 
small but oil-rich Gulf states.
Of all the channels for international participation open to micro-states, the 
establishment of the overseas mission is obviously the most difficult. It is certainly the 
most expensive: the cost of the embassy space itself; accommodation for the ambassador 
and staff; the recruitment of secretarial and clerical personnel; local transportation and 
leave expenses; cypher links and telex connections; and entertainment costs. All of these 
are prohibitively expensive for very small states. It is particularly difficult when, like all 
states, they are sensitive to maintaining minimal standards appropriate to the dignity of the 
state. Costs are particularly high in the most important centres: New York, London, 
Brussels, Paris and Washington. Tonga’s High Commission in London accounts for 70% 
of the foreign relations budget.41 It is not surprising that it is the kingdom's only overseas 
mission.
How do most micro-states allocate these scarce resources? The United Nations 
mission in New York is certainly a major priority. As we have stressed in earlier chapters, 
the flag in the plaza and the seat in the General Assembly are acknowledgements of the 
very small state's international personality. This may be "woolly minded"42 and for
41 Commonwealth Report on Diplomatic Services (London: The Commonwealth Secretariat, 1970).
42 Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis o f International Society (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 
pp. 114-115.
Alan James properly insists that participation in the international system has no bearing on the rights 
and prerogatives of statehood: "International activity is not a condition of sovereignty. What sovereignty
203
confident and long-established states like Switzerland it is irrelevant. But for fledgling 
states seeking reassurance and self-esteem, participation in the life of the United Nations is 
an acknowledgement and reinforcement of their sovereignty. More important, permanent 
representation in New York gives access to most states in the international community, 
often at a very high level. The mission in New York is plugged into the day-to-day 
agenda of the global town meeting, often impossible to reach from a remote micro-state 
capital. Vast sources of information in every policy area are available to micro-state 
representatives while their colleagues at home base rely largely on periodic and 
intermittent press reports. Moreover, the United Nations mission is often a bilateral 
posting in that it may be accredited to the United States, Canada and other Western 
Hemispheric states.
Though the New York mission is important and resourceful, it is still beyond the 
means of some micro-states. The Gambia and the Maldives joined the United Nations at 
independence, but they did not establish permanent missions until much later. Western 
Samoa delayed her own membership for 14 years largely because of the projected costs. 
For the Solomon Islands the permanent delegation to the United Nations is its only 
overseas mission. Even then, it is housed in offices shared with Western Samoa. At one 
time, the respective ambassadors of the two countries were husband and wife.43 Four 
other South Pacific micro-states have still not applied for membership.44
does is to give a state an international capacity, to make it eligible for international life. It is not 
necessaiy that that capacity should be used, that a state should take advantage of its eligibility." 
Sovereignty then, relates neither to a guarantee of international participation (United Nations 
membership, for instance) nor the necessity for active diplomacy.
Ibid., pp. 25-26.
43An unusual but happy situation discussed by both ambassadors with the author on a visit to the United 
Nations in 1985.
^ o n g a , Kiribati, Tuvalu and Nauru
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Typically the micro-state mission in New York is a bare-bones operation. Only six 
micro-states have more than five officers.45 Most are staffed by two or three people. In 
these conditions it is impossible for the mission to cover the full range of issues and 
meetings in New York. In their frenetic schedules, micro-state delegates must choose 
those committees which seem most central to the country's interests. This often means 
relying on advice from a trusted neighbour or patron state in difficult and unfamiliar issue 
areas.
Such a friend is usually a major regional power or, more discreetly, the former 
metropole. With few exceptions the latter constitutes the principal overseas mission. 
Most micro-states still depend on the former colonial power as a trading partner, aid 
donor, and a source of investment. Typically, the former metropole is the preferred choice 
for higher education. In many cases there are large communities of emigres resident there. 
Moreover, the European capitals are themselves major centres of diplomatic activity. 
They are important too as access points to E.U. institutions.
There are also important regional capitals which require the presence of a 
permanent mission. And, as noted, in some cases, the role of the former metropole has 
been eclipsed by regional powers: the United States and Canada in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean, for instance; and Australia and New Zealand in the South Pacific. Apart from 
allocations for these "great neighbours," regional diplomacy is active and intense, but 
conducted from home base. Typically, the ambassadors to neighbouring states of similar 
circumstance will be senior officers resident in the foreign ministry.
Some micro-states reach beyond the contacts established in New York, the former 
metropole capital and the major regional power. These are the micro-states which come 
closest to the pattern of diplomatic representation characteristic of the next group of small
45See Table VHI
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states. The most active establish missions in other capitals of the First World, some 
presence in the former Second World, and thereafter an extensive network of missions in 
their own region or their own ideological community.
Multiple Accreditation
There are alternatives to the overseas mission which allow tiny and poor states to 
extend their international contacts. One of the most familiar expedients is the practice of 
multiple accreditation, whereby an envoy in one capital is simultaneously accredited to one 
or more others. Home-based officers are also accredited as ambassadors to various 
capitals. Of course, many states are content to conduct their relations with most other 
states without formal channels of accreditation. For the more ambitious state, however, 
multiple accreditation allows for an international profile otherwise beyond its means.
Non-resident accreditation is primarily a gesture of particular regard, a 
commitment beyond the minimal courtesies in the exchange of diplomatic relations. Non­
resident envoys are responsible for assuming the same functions in representing their 
state's interests as if they were stationed there permanently. Whether they can meet these 
extra responsibilities in practice is usually doubtful. At best, non-resident envoys' visits to 
their other postings can only be periodic and the receiving state's access accordingly 
limited. This seems even more likely where there is no apparent geographic rationale to 
the distribution of assignments. Iceland's ambassador to Denmark, for example, is also 
ambassador to Turkey and Japan.
However wanting in practice, multiple accreditation is a necessary expedient in an 
international system of 192 states. Not even the most powerful states establish missions in 
every other state. The value of non-resident accreditation will depend as much on the 
intensity of relations between the states concerned as on the abilities and resources of the 
base mission. There are many relationships which are neither consistent enough nor
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significant enough to require the outlay of a permanent mission but which warrant the 
courtesy of accreditation and the attention of part-time responsibility. Diplomatic 
relations at this level may be adequate enough to meet the mutual needs of the two states. 
Unhappily for many micro-states, non-resident accreditation must suffice even when 
interests would be better served by more permanent representation.
Multiple accreditation accounts for a more significant proportion of "targets" in 
the diplomatic practice of other small states than it does for the micro-states. All but four 
of these small states accredit half again as many non-resident targets as resident. Though 
multiple accreditation is practised by all but six of the least active micro-states, there is 
much less consistency in its use than with small states in the next population group. More 
than half of all micro-states have more non-resident targets than resident, but this includes 
five states with fewer than five established missions. With so few missions, any use at all 
of multiple accreditation is bound to result in a higher proportion of non-resident missions. 
For these states, multiple accreditation can not markedly improve the range of diplomatic 
contacts. There is an early limit to the potential extensibility of two or three missions. For 
the few oil rich micro-states multiple accreditation is less significant because they can 
afford to establish resident missions in most of the states with which they have diplomatic 
relations.
It is among those micro-states where foreign policy aspirations are frustrated by 
limitations of size that multiple accreditation is practiced so extensively: Cyprus, Iceland, 
Guyana, Luxembourg and Malta. Within their population class these states rank 
consistently high in other indices of international involvement. Multiple accreditation 
allows them to raise their total diplomatic network to levels comparable to that of other 
small states, achieving an international presence in keeping with their own aspirations. 
Even some of the micro-states with ten or fewer missions have supplemented their 
diplomatic network with non-resident posts. Mauritius, The Gambia, Swaziland, Fiji, and
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Barbados all pursue more active international roles than their few missions would suggest. 
All have more than doubled their targets by means of multiple accreditation.
THE USE OF MULTIPLE ACCREDITATION 
THE CASE OF ICELAND
RESIDENT
MISSIONS
ALSO ACCREDITED TO:
1 COPENHAGEN Italy, Turkey, Israel, Lithuania, Japan, the Vatican
2 OSLO Poland, Croatia, Cyprus, Slovakia, Macedonia, 
Republic of Korea
3 STOCKHOLM Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Albania, Namibia
4 LONDON Ireland, Greece, Netherlands, India, Nigeria
5 PARIS Spain, Portugal, Cape Verde, UNESCO, Council 
of Europe, OECD
6 MOSCOW Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, 
Kazakhstan, Romania, Bulgaria
7 BONN Austria, Switzerland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Serbia-Montenegro, OSCE
8 BRUSSELS Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, EU, NATO, WEU
9 WASHINGTON Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Chile, Colombia, 
Uruguay, Venezuela
10 GENEVA (UN) Egypt, EFT A, GATT, WHO, ILO and all other UN 
specialised agencies
11 NEW YORK (UN)
12 REYKJAVIK China
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Co-operation with Another State
The disabilities of size may encourage some form of co-operation with another 
state to ensure a more extensive representation of interests. This may involve a treaty 
with a larger state whereby the latter undertakes representation of the smaller state's 
interests either wholly or supplementary to the small state's own diplomatic service. It can 
also mean arrangements for establishing joint missions with neighbouring states of similar 
circumstances. Co-operation with a larger power is more common, even if it presents 
greater potential problems.
Luxembourg has diplomatic relations with 108 states but maintains only ten 
missions abroad which are accredited to a further 23 capitals. However, by agreement 
with her Benelux partners, Luxembourg's commercial and economic interests are tended 
by Belgium and her political and diplomatic interests represented by the Netherlands in 
those many states where there is no direct Luxembourg accreditation.46 Liechtenstein now 
has missions in New York, Brussels and Vienna in addition to its embassy in Berne. 
Elsewhere, its limited and periodic overseas interests are represented by Switzerland. This 
does not imply an abandonment of Liechtenstein's right of legation or treaty power. It is, 
as the Swiss have insisted, an arrangement of convenience for Liechtenstein with 
Switzerland acting in response to instructions from the government in Vaduz.47
For new states, however, these arrangements are less attractive. Luxembourg's 
relations with Belgium and the Netherlands are intimate and confident. Similarly, 
Liechtenstein has enjoyed a secure relationship with its much larger neighbour 
characterised by Switzerland's sensitivity to the principality's sovereignty and its role as
46Guide du Ministere des Affaires Etrangerset du Commerce Exterieur (Luxembourg, December, 1977).
47The Agreement of 24 October, 1919.
Pierre Raton, Liechtenstein: History and Institutions o f the Principality (Vaduz: Liechtenstein-Verlag,
1970), pp. 72-76.
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principal advocate whenever Liechtenstein's credentials were open to question. But for 
new states, where a confident self-view is lacking, independent diplomacy is the badge of 
newly-won sovereignty and essential to a sense of dignity.48 The projection of a distinctive 
international image is indispensable in the process of nation-building and it is particularly 
well-served by the formalities of diplomacy. It is not surprising that new states are 
reluctant to risk confusing their international identity by relinquishing exclusive 
responsibility for a prerogative so invested with symbolic significance.
Yet some micro-states have concluded agreements with larger neighbours to 
supplement their own meagre representation.49 Western Samoa's agreement with New 
Zealand is similar to Liechtenstein's arrangement with Switzerland. New Zealand 
represents Western Samoa's interests whenever necessary and as directed by the 
government in Apia.50 The Gambia's accord with Senegal allows Gambian interests to be 
represented by Senegalese envoys and for Sengalese missions to serve Gambians abroad in 
those states where The Gambia is not represented.51 The case of The Gambia is 
particularly interesting. After the abortive coup d'etat attempt on 5 July, 1981, which 
forced President Jawara to rely on Senegalese troops to restore order, there was a 
renewed commitment on both sides to extend and supplement existing agreements to a 
further stage of co-operation. When the Senegambian Confederation came into effect on
^Wilson Carey McWilliams, "Political Development," in R. Butwell (ed.), Foreign Policy and the 
Developing Nations (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), p. 19.
49India's representation of Bhutan's overseas interests is not just a question of administrative convenience. 
As noted earlier, Bhutan has sought to expand its international relations within the context of the 1949 
treaty with India. The development of a Bhutanese diplomatic service will depend as much on Indian 
sensibilities as on Bhutanese resources. Though Bhutan enjoys diplomatic relations with many states, 
she maintains only three embassies abroad; New Delhi, Dacca and Kuwait..
^The Treaty o f Friendship between the Government o f New Zealand and the Government o f Western 
Samoa, Apia. 1 August, 1962; Western Samoa, Prime Minister's Department, Treaty Series, No. 1,1967.
51 The Agreement of Co-operation in Foreign Policy, 11 July, 1964.
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February 1, 1982 it included, inter alia, a new protocol calling for "co-ordination of 
foreign policies" and the appointment of two foreign ministers in the Confederation 
Council of Ministers.52 As with many of the other protocols of the Confederation, it did 
not substantially change The Gambia's diplomatic status. The terms of the Confederation 
recognised the sovereignty and the independence of each state. The Gambia continued to 
pursue an active diplomacy and now maintains nine missions abroad accredited to a 
further 26 states. This has been augmented by active summit and conference diplomacy to 
forge an independent image for The Gambia in the world.53 This suggests that the 
provisions of the Senegambian treaties for Senegalese representation of Gambian interests 
abroad may have been more to serve the spirit of a necessary but precarious relationship 
than to supplement The Gambia's own diplomacy.
Even in Samoa, which long spumed the temptations of international politics, the 
same trend is apparent. The Samoan-New Zealand relationship has been noted frequently 
as a model for micro-states in coping with the burdens of diplomatic representation. 
Eventually, however, the Samoans moved slowly out from under the patronage of New 
Zealand. This was particularly demonstrated in their decision to reverse their isolation 
from the United Nations and to establish a permanent mission in New York. The 
Government has also modified its initial policy of discouraging foreign representation in 
Apia. Once content to receive accreditation through Wellington, Western Samoa signalled
52The New York Times, 1 February, 1982.7 
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1982), 31548, 31834.
53In the early years of independence The Gambia embarked on a policy which extended its links to Libya 
and the Arab world, China, and the more radical governments in Africa. Often this was a stance at 
variance with President Senghor's own policies.
The Times (London), 12 February, 1975, 16.
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its new sense of international confidence in 1976 when China opened an embassy in 
Apia.54
There are also instances where no explicit agreement exists but where the micro­
state's diplomatic resources are so limited and its relationship with a mentor power so 
intimate that international representation on behalf of the micro-state by the mentor could 
be expected as the situation demanded. In the early years of independence the former 
metropole can act as a vital link for the new micro-state to the international community. 
While such an understanding is valuable, it must of necessity be discreet. Even among 
those states determined to maintain close ties with the former metropole, it is still 
important to cultivate at least the appearance of independence and a distinctive diplomatic 
image.
If co-operative diplomatic arrangements with a larger power hold the danger of 
compromising self-respect and obscuring national identity, what of joint representation 
with other micro-states? This has been often advocated as an acceptable solution to the 
micro-state dilemma of inadequate representation.55 Many micro-states are located in 
cluster areas with a common colonial experience and similar interests.
Micro-states have been no less sensitive in their dealings with neighbouring micro- 
states than with larger states. Acute sensibilities of independence, emphasised by 
constitutional and ideological differences and daunting problems of communication, have 
resulted in a weaker sense of commonality than might be expected. Closer examination 
usually reveals deeply-rooted differences to account for intense feelings of separate 
identity. Among island micro-states, particularly, maritime separateness has perpetuated
54R. A. Herr, HA Minor Ornament: The Diplomatic Decisions of Western Samoa at Independence," P. J. 
Boyce, Foreign Affairs for New States (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977), p. 247.
55Elmer Plishke, Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options (Washington, D.C.: 
American Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), pp. 53-54.
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traditional rivalries and mutual suspicion.56 Moreover, though neighbouring micro-states 
may benefit economically from diplomatic collaboration in the long run, in the short run 
they are competitors better served by separate representatives in those capitals crucial as 
markets and as sources of aid and investment.
Even among micro-states the issue of relative size is not unimportant. Fiji, for 
example, with 715,375 people, stands alone as a "giant" among South Pacific states. Fiji 
has acted on behalf of the other South Pacific states at certain international forums and at 
the United Nations.57 But this did not develop into a shared South Pacific diplomatic 
service based in Suva. The other states prefer to entrust their representation to their own 
envoys in those capitals of most importance to them; Canberra, Wellington, London, 
Tokyo.
Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde established joint missions in Algeria. Since both 
states were ruled by the same party and pledged to eventual unification, it was not a 
surprising arrangement. What may be more significant, however, is the fact that separate 
missions account for most of the overseas representation of both states.
Only among the Commonwealth micro-states of the Eastern Caribbean is joint 
representation an accepted arrangement. Even among these states it is a variable practice. 
Dominica, for example, shares office space at the United Nations with St. Lucia and is 
represented jointly with four other Eastern Caribbean states in Ottawa. But it maintains 
separate missions in London and Washington. Similarly, Antigua and Barbuda is 
represented in Ottawa by the High Commissioner for the Eastern Caribbean; shares
56John M. Ostheimer, "Are Islanders Different? A Survey of Theoretical Ideas," in John M. Ostheimer 
(ed.) The Politics o f the Western Indian Ocean Islands (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 13-27.
57In his address to the general Assembly in 1970, the Prime Minister of Fiji, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, 
emphasised the importance of a Pacific voice at the United Nations: "As far as we are authorised by our 
friends and neighbours, and we do not arrogate to ourselves any role of leadership, we would hope to act 
as representative and interpreter of that voice."
Parliament of Fiji, Report on Foreign Affairs, Parliamentary Paper No. lof 1974, Appendix HI (a).
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offices, though not the same High Commissioner, in London with Belize; and maintains 
separate missions in Washington and at the United Nations.
The representation of a state's interests and the projection of its identity before the 
world are the very core of sovereign privileges. The decision to co-operate with other 
states requires not only a realistic assessment of needs and confidence that co-operation 
will best serve the state's interests without compromising its sovereignty. It also means 
some measure of indifference to the allurements of international protocol. What may 
appear as sensible to sympathetic students of micro-states is usually fraught with 
controversy in practice.
The Use of Consular Representatives
Consular representation can be an expedient means of extending a micro-state's 
international relations in lieu of a costly diplomatic service. However, the extent to which 
consuls can substitute for diplomats is limited. There are important distinctions of 
accreditation and function and therefore of privileges and immunities. The diplomatic 
representative is the official spokesman of his state, accredited to the Head of state, and 
authorised to enter secret negotiations on behalf of his state.58 The consul's functions have 
been confined traditionally to actes de gestiorr, the protection of commercial interests and 
the promotion of trade, the provision of advice and assistance for resident nationals and a 
panoply of administrative and notarial responsibilities.59
SiThe Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, Article 3 (1).
59B. Sen, A Diplomat's Handbook o f International Law and Practice (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1965), pp. 202-203.
Luke T. Lee, Consular Law and Practice (London: Institute of World Affairs, Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 
1961), pp. 59-62
Accordingly, his privileges and immunities are limited, particularly as he remains subject to local 
jurisdiction.
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These distinctions of function between diplomatic and consular representatives are 
subject to some degree of overlap and the variable practice of states.60 Most states have 
amalgamated their consular and diplomatic services with a resultant increase in the number 
of dual appointments. It is convenient to have diplomatic officers empowered to perform 
consular functions.61 Moreover, it is often difficult to separate the purely commercial 
interests of a state from political or even strategic considerations.62 The consul's 
responsibility for promoting friendly relations between the peoples of the two states 
through various cultural activities also bears certain political implications since the consul 
is acting as spokesman and interpreter for his state’s point of view.63 These political and 
diplomatic dimensions of consular representation can be all the more important if there is 
no resident diplomatic mission and the consul is the lone representative for his state.64 In 
some cases, this larger responsibility has been recognised and consuls with the rank of 
consul-general are allowed to be established in the capital itself and accepted as ministers 
for purposes of precedence.65
For the European micro-states consular representation is vested with diplomatic 
significance. Some micro-states rely almost entirely on consular representation for their 
links to the outside world. In most cases, the micro-state consulate is that country's only
^The Yearbook o f the International Law Commission (1959,1), pp. 170-178.
61Lee, op. tit., pp. 20-22.
Sen, op. cit., pp. 219-220.
62As Luke Lee noted, "A generally accepted rule of international law illustrates this point tellingly: a state 
(political) may be injured through the injury of its citizens (economic or otherwise)."
Lee, op. cit., p. 188.
63Sen, op. cit., p. 243.
“Ibid., p. 228.
Lee, op. cit., pp. 186-189
65Sen, op. cit., pp. 224-225.
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representative and as such he bears the sole responsibility for promoting friendly relations, 
interpreting his country's point of view and making any and all representations as 
necessary. The importance of the micro-state consul can not be exaggerated. The 
consular service gives visibility to the international identity of micro-states which would be 
lacking otherwise. Often that may be the only function, since the European micro-states 
would not have many resident nationals or significant commercial interests in many of the 
more esoteric capitals where their consular missions are established.66 The consulate, 
then, is a confirmation of the micro-state's sovereignty and international identity.67
Micro-state consular relations are based wholly on the services of the non­
professional or honourary consul. The practice of appointing honourary consuls is well- 
established among Western European and Latin American states.68 It was not accepted 
among Communist states and it is practised variably elsewhere.69 The United States, for 
example, appoints only career consuls or consular agents but accepts honourary consuls
^ o r  instance, Monaco has consulates in Haiti, Paraguay, and Costa Rica.
67This is a principal argument for those defending the sovereignty of the smallest European micro-states.
C. D'Olivier Farran, "The Position of Diminutive States in International Law," in Erik Bruel et. al. 
(eds.) Intemationalrechtliche und Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen: Fetschrift fur Walter Schagel zu 
seinem 70 Geburtstag (Dusseldorf: Hermes, 1960), pp. 131-147.
Having said that, it is possible for consulates to be established without the recognition of sovereignty 
attendant upon the establishment of a diplomatic mission. A state may have consular missions in 
dependent territories or a state may allow the establishment of a consular mission but refuse to interpret 
that acceptance as recognition of the sender as a sovereign state. For example, the then United Arab 
Republic did not regard the establishment of an East German consul in Cairo to imply recognition of 
the German Democratic Republic. However, the issuance of an exequatur, the commission from the 
receiving state which authorises the status and the duties of the consul, does constitute recognition of 
the sending state. Moreover, the request for an exequatur is regarded as an act of recognition by the 
sending state of the receiving state. Farran's case is based on the exchanges of exequatur.
Lee, op. cit., pp. 34-35 
Sen, op. cit., pp. 135-136.
^Lee, op. cit., p. 305.
69Ibid., pp. 15-20.
Sen, op. cit., pp. 217-218.
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from other states.70 Unlike career consuls, honourary consuls are appointed locally and 
need not be citizens of the state which they represent. Their postings are not dependent 
on special training or examination and they usually receive little or no remuneration. Most 
important, honourary consuls can engage in private professional or commercial activities. 
Since they are often citizens of the host state and employed privately there, they are 
usually accorded fewer immunities.71
It is also likely that the honourary consul's functions will be more restricted than 
those of the career consul, though this depends on the established practice of the sending 
state. For micro-states these possible distinctions of function are less relevant when the 
consular service is constituted wholly of honourary consuls. In spite of these differences, 
honourary consuls can hold any consular rank within the functions assigned by the state 
which they represent and those accepted by the receiving state.72
Without specific training or fixed remuneration there is always the risk that 
honourary consuls will benefit more from the arrangement than the state which they 
represent. The prestige afforded by consular designation can be an advantage in private 
business. And, it is possible that the honourary consul will be too preoccupied with his or 
her own activities to devote much attention to consular functions. On the other hand, 
honourary consuls are often "good friends" of the state which they represent and noted for 
their long and conscientious service. With little or no capital expenditure, the honourary 
consul system is an economical means of achieving representation on a scale otherwise 
unlikely. It is also a resourceful arrangement, for it brings to the service of the state those 
whose familiarity with local conditions and personalities can be invaluable.
70Lee, op. cit., p. 17.
Ibid., p. 20.
72Precedence is established by rank rather than class. Thus, an honourary consul who heads a post takes 
precedence over a career consul who does not.
Sen, op. cit., p. 223.
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For the European micro-states,73 the honourary-consul system constitutes the 
major share o f their overseas representation. It has allowed these states to have a direct 
presence throughout the world. Only the Communist states were inaccessible.
State No. of Diplomatic 
Missions
No. of Consular 
Missions
Monaco 7 43
Iceland 13 50
Cyprus 20 56
Luxembourg 20 35
San Marino 8 47
Malta 15 82
Consular missions also constitute whatever representation is resident in or 
accredited to Liechtenstein, San Marino, and Monaco. Liechtenstein has not established 
any consular missions itself but all 25 of the states accredited to the Principality are 
represented at the consular level. Three states have honourary consuls resident in 
Liechtenstein. Of the 32 states accredited to San Marino, 30 are consular missions 
resident in Italy. There are 38 consulates resident in Monaco.
The honourary consular system would seem to be ideally suited to the 
requirements of many new micro-states. Apart from the advantage of having some kind of 
visible official presence in important capitals, the honourary consul could prove to be a
73Though until 1993 Andorra was not a party to the normal channels of diplomacy, it established 
"delegations" in a number of states. The delegate was usually an Andorran citizen engaged in private 
business in the host state or a local citizen with some ties to Andorra. In that sense, the "delegation" is 
similar to the honourary consul. The primary function of these offices was to promote tourism in 
Andorra since they were official representatives of the Sindicat D'Iniciative de Le Vails D'Andorra.
Now Andorra is in the process of establishing regular diplomatic missions, at the United Nations, the 
Council of Europe, Paris, and Madrid and the Holy See.
A number of states have accredited consuls to Andorra. They are based in nearby French or Spanish 
centres. The British Consul-General in Barcelona is accredited to Andorra. However, as his exequatur 
was granted by the two co-princes and not by the Council of the Valleys, it did not necessarily constitute 
recognition of Andorra's sovereignty since one of the co-princes, the President of the French Republic, 
claimed that Andorra's relations with other states were the responsibility of France. There are now 
French and Spanish embassies in Andorra la Vella
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valuable link to much-needed services and sources of investment in the industrialised 
states. Yet, these very needs also account for the infrequent use of the honourary consul 
system among micro-states outside of Europe. Those most in need are the smallest and 
the most remote states with the least developed economies. The international contacts 
and associations of these states are limited. Discovering locals who have some interest or 
connection with the micro-state would be difficult in many cases. Successful emigres tend 
to settle in the former metropole where the micro-state is likely to be represented already. 
Only a few new micro-states have been able to overcome these difficulties.74
The Resident Diplomatic Corps in Micro-State Capitals
The representation which micro-states receive is as important to their participation 
in international relations as that which they are able to send. The diplomatic attention 
accorded to micro-states is significant not only as a reflection of international status but as 
a further dimension of their capacity to function in the international system. For some 
micro-states the resident diplomatic corps is the principal contact with the outside world. 
For almost all of them it is an important supplement to their own limited diplomatic 
services.
A comparative ranking of micro-states with other small states according to the 
number of diplomatic missions received confirms the patterns evident in our analysis thus 
far. Only four micro-states (Gabon, Cyprus, Qatar and Luxembourg) receive more than 
20 missions, while only 24 of the 56 larger small states receive less than 20. This includes 
16 Soviet and Yugoslav republics. Twenty-seven micro-states receive fewer than ten
74The following micro-states use non-diplomatic missions. They include not only consuls but commercial 
and trade representatives and government offices.
Swaziland 6; Barbados 1; Tonga 2; Nauru 7; Guyana 7; Cape Verde 5; Bahrain 2.
Nauru has consulates in Australia, Fiji, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, New Zealand, the Marianas, 
Hawaii and two in the continental United States. There is also a Government Office in London.
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missions along with two recent graduates from the micro-state class: Bhutan and
Lesotho. The average number of missions received is 28 for the small states and nine for 
the micro-states.75 Those states which rank high as senders and as participants in 
international organisations also rank high in their diplomatic importance as measured by 
the size of the resident diplomatic corps.
Are such factors as tenure of independence, geopolitical location and the size of 
the economy relevant in explaining differences in the diplomatic commitments which 
micro-states and small states receive from other members of the international system?
Duration of independence might seem to be important. States of very recent 
independence can be expected to interest other states in resident representation only as the 
development of bilateral relations warrants. For some micro-states (Guyana and Malta, 
for instance) a comparatively longer period of independence and the gradual development 
of a more prominent international role have met with an increase in the number of states 
willing to establish resident missions in their capitals. This is also evident in a few post- 
1970 micro-states: Guinea-Bissau, Fiji, Suriname. For most micro-states, however, the 
length of independence has made very little difference. Western Samoa (1962), the 
Maldives (1965), Tonga (1970) and Swaziland (1968) are still among those states with a 
resident diplomatic corps of six or less. For the new and smallest micro-states (and, most 
certainly for those smallest of dependencies yet to achieve sovereignty) the prospects for 
even six resident missions are remote. Ten of these micro-states have only one or two 
resident missions.
There is some regional differentiation in levels of resident accreditation. European, 
Middle Eastern and Western Hemispheric states are primary centres of diplomatic 
attention. Until recently, sub-Saharan African capitals ranked low in international indices 
of diplomatic exchange. In the Singer/Small study no sub-Saharan African state was
75 Once again this figure rises (to 33) if we exclude the new states of Eritrea and post-Communist Eurasia.
among those 27 states which received more than 75 missions.76 To some extent these 
regional differences are reflected in the diplomatic importance accorded to states in this 
study. Of the 24 small states in the next population class which receive fewer than 20 
resident missions, ten are in sub-Saharan Africa.77 However, levels of resident diplomatic 
accreditation are rising in most African states. This is not just the result of other states 
giving more attention to the continent. There has also been a significant expansion of 
regional diplomatic exchange. This is evident in both groups of states. Though African 
micro-states command little attention in comparison with larger states, they rank relatively 
high within their respective population groups.
The most notable regional difference is the South Pacific, where resident 
accreditation for most states is minimal. The South Pacific is primarily a region of island 
micro-states. They are small in the extreme and of little economic importance. Of course, 
the diplomatic attention given these states could change dramatically if the region became 
a principal area of strategic competition.
The influence of remoteness is evident with land-locked states as much as far-flung 
islands. Resident accreditation is lower in land-locked states than in coastal states of 
similar population size and economic advantage. Of the 16 land-locked small states in this 
study, 13 receive fewer than 20 missions. The others rank only marginally higher: 
Paraguay, Slovakia, Laos with 27, 25 and 24 resident missions respectively. Land-locked 
states are dependent on the port facilities and transit routes of neighbouring coastal
76Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The Diplomatic Importance of States, 1816-1970: An Extension and 
Refinement of the Indicator," World Politics XXV (July, 1973), 77.
Note also David H. Johns, "Diplomatic Activity, Power and Integration in Africa," Sage International 
Yearbook o f Foreign Policy Studies (1975), 85-105.
77 Most of the others are the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics.
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states.78 Often they are not easily accessible and it is more convenient for other states to 
manage their hinterland interests from missions in coastal capitals.79
Apart from the disabilities of very small size, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 
are particularly affected as land-locked states.80 Their access to the international system 
depends on transportation and communications links with the Republic of South Africa. 
Though it is the largest of the three states, and once the largest micro-state in Africa, 
Lesotho is especially vulnerable. It maintains diplomatic relations with 44 states and it has 
established missions in ten capitals accredited to another 26 states. Yet only eight states 
along with the EU have established missions in Maseru. Diplomats move to and from 
their posting on the sufferance of the South African authorities which, of course, at one 
time could be difficult. The case of Botswana is less extreme. It was one of the five front­
line states that faced South Africa, but it attracted fewer missions than the smaller coastal 
states of Guinea-Bissau and Djibouti. Initially, most of the accreditation which the former 
High Commission territories received was based in Pretoria. With new links to Zambia 
and the independence of Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique there was some scope for 
relieving their physical and political isolation in the days of the apartheid regime.81
78Robert McKinnell, "Land-locked countries and the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development," in Zdenek Cervenka (ed.) Land-Locked Countries o f Africa (Uppsala: The Scandinavian 
Institute of African Studies, 1973), pp. 300-315.
79Much of the accreditation to the land-locked states of North-eastern Africa is based in Dakar.
80Willie Henderson, "Independent Botswana: A Reappraisal of Foreign Policy Options," African Affairs
LXXin (No. 290, January, 1974), 37-44.
T. T. Thane, "Lesotho, the Realities of Land-lockedness," in Cervenka, op. cit., pp. 239-249.
Zdenek Cervenka, "Swailand's Links with the Outside World," in Cervenka, Ibid, pp. 263-272.
81 The independence of the former Portuguese colonies and improved transportation links made these 
states much more accessible to the rest of Africa. The change in the centres of non-resident 
accreditation also reflected international co-operation in reducing as much as possible the visible 
features of their dependence on South Africa.
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When remoteness is combined with very small size and paucity of resources, it 
places the state truly on the periphery of international political and economic relations. 
Among the lowest ranking micro-states in our table of resident accreditation are isolated 
and tiny states such as these; the Maldives, the Comoros, Tonga, Kiribati, Western Samoa, 
Sao Tome and Principe. Yet, while geographic isolation compounds the peripheral nature 
of the very small state, it is still size which is most directly related to the extent and 
diversity of interests held by other states. Some of the island states of the Eastern 
Caribbean, for instance, have no resident diplomatic corps at all. They are not remote and 
isolated. Central location actually discourages resident accreditation. They are all 
extremely small and the interests which other states do have can be conveniently managed 
from missions in larger states nearby.
Isolation may be as much a self-imposed condition for ideological reasons as it is a 
question of geography. A policy of introversion and withdrawal from international 
relations may be seen as crucial to the consolidation of a government's domestic power 
base. During the period of the Mafias Nguema regime in Equatorial Guinea, for example, 
that country's links to the outside world were extremely limited, confined to those states 
which were regarded as ideologically congenial or politically unavoidable. Even United 
Nations access was restricted. After the 1979 coup the new government began to restore 
links with the outside world. By 1985 Equatorial Guinea had established ten missions 
abroad compared to six in 1975. More significant, the number of states with resident 
missions in Malabo rose from four in 1975 to 12 in 1992.
There is some correlation between economic importance as measured by the size 
of the economy and the diplomatic attention which states receive. With the exception of 
Ireland and New Zealand, the larger small states with a Gross National Product over $15 
billion all host resident missions from more than 35 states. At the lower end of the small
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state table, 20 of the 24 states with fewer than 20 resident missions are also among those 
small states with the lowest G.N.P. (under $1.5 billion).
The correlation is also evident in the micro-state group. With three exceptions 
(Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, and Guyana), micro-states which receive over ten missions are 
the largest economies in their class with Gross National Products over $1 billion. In spite 
of their small economies, Guyana and Guinea-Bissau were relatively successful in winning 
commitments of resident accreditation, particularly from leftist governments which were 
prepared to acknowledge a deliberately active policy of non-alignment. The correlation 
between the size of the economy and the level of diplomatic attention is even more 
consistent at the lowest ends of the tables. Problems of geopolitical isolation and 
economic weakness are often concomitant with very small size and together they will 
restrict the potential interest which a micro-state may hope to draw. The varying influence 
of these factors is evident when analysing the differences within the micro-state group. 
Luxembourg, Guyana, Iceland, and Malta attract a respectable amount of attention in 
comparison to that accorded Sao Tome and Principe, the Maldives or Tonga. What is 
more striking, however, is the comparison of these more prominent micro-states with 
small states of the next population group.
These high-scoring micro-states have attracted resident representation only to the 
same extent as the least advantaged states of the small state group. Compared to these 
states, the most solicited micro-states are favoured in levels of economic development, 
centrality of location, political stability and leadership reputation. Often they pursue a 
more active foreign policy than the poorest states of the the next population group. Yet, 
in spite of these comparative advantages, micro-states do not attract a correspondingly 
higher level of international attention than the poorest and most peripheral of the small 
states.
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Small states are commonly viewed as "consumers" in the global system.82 In terms 
of diplomatic exchange data they may be seen as "net receivers," accepting more 
commitments than they are able to give themselves.83 Yet for micro-states this question is 
not as important as it may at first appear. Many micro-states send so few missions abroad 
that even minimal resident accreditation of two or three states will mean they are "net 
receivers." Kiribati with three resident missions and the Solomon Islands with seven have 
established no missions themselves in other capitals, though the Solomon Islands does 
maintain a permanent mission at the United Nations in New York
Among the "net receivers" are micro-states which serve as monitoring posts for 
interests other than those in the micro-state itself. Fiji is the centre of the South Pacific 
regional state system. Whatever accreditation other island states receive is usually based 
in Suva. It is the major stop-over between North America, Japan and Australasia. And 
Suva's role as an entrepot has boosted Fiji's function as a re-exporter in the Pacific region. 
Similarly, Bahrain's relatively large resident diplomatic corps reflects the extent to which 
the shaikhdom has replaced Lebanon as a service centre in the region. Djibouti is a 
curious example of this pattern. It is a very small state totally lacking in resources except 
for its geothermal areas. It is unlikely that it will ever have a diplomatic service of its own 
comparable to the attention which it receives. But, because of its strategic location and its 
importance as a port and rail centre, Djibouti has attracted the interest of the major 
powers and the dominant states of the region. Within a year of its independence there 
were 12 missions resident in Djibouti and today there are 14.
82David Vital, The Inequality o f States (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 17-20.
83In their study, Alger and Brains found no correlation between small size and a state's "world interest 
balance", that is the difference between the number of missions sent and received.
Chadwick F. Alger and Steven J. Brams, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Inter­
governmental Organizations," World Politics XIX (July, 1967), 654.
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States which are "net receivers" may also be the beneficiaries of generous policies 
of resident accreditation from those powers anxious to raise their international profile 
wherever possible; for example, status-conscious states such as Taiwan, the Republic of 
Korea and even Israel. Taiwan and Israel account for two of the five missions resident in 
Swaziland. At one time Eastern bloc governments and other "progressive" states were 
also prepared to reward an assertive policy of non-alignment, even in the smallest states. 
The Seychelles is an interesting example. The 1977 coup which brought France Albert 
Rene to power occasioned a dramatic shift in foreign policy from a comfortable 
identification with the West to a vigorous policy of non-alignment. Much of this new 
activism had to be conducted through summit and conference diplomacy. The meagre 
resources of the Seychelles had not permitted any increase in the number of its permanent 
missions beyond those in London and New York. However, the posture of the new 
government encouraged a number of friendly states to establish missions in Victoria: 
Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, North Korea and Libya.
There is a further consideration in this section of the discussion. To what extent 
do the major powers rely on non-resident accreditation to meet their commitments in 
micro-state capitals? The near-universal diplomatic commitments of the United States are 
limited only among the smallest micro-states. Though the United States maintains resident 
missions in 29 micro-state capitals, it relies on non-resident accreditation to represent 
American interests in most others. Britain maintains resident missions in 23 micro-states, 
most of them Commonwealth members. China is represented in 22 micro-state capitals, 
France in 21 and Russia in 15. There are nine micro-states with no major power 
representation at all at the ministerial level though consulates may be resident in these 
smallest micro-states. The extent to which the major powers rely on non-resident 
accreditation to manage their interests in micro-states is one of the most distinctive 
features of micro-state international relations.
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Major Power Representation in Micro States
Five: f v Cyprus, Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Qatar, 
Seychelles
Four: Barbados, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, 
The Gambia, Guyana, Suriname
Three: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Brunei, Comoros, The 
Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Vanuatu
Two: • |f | | Belize, Grenada, St. Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon 
Islands, Swaziland, Western Samoa
One: Andorra, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Palau, 
Tonga, Tuvalu,
None: Dominica, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Nauru, St. Christopher and 
Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino
Conclusions
Micro-state participation in the international system is characterised by limited 
representational capacity and minimal diplomatic importance. Their modest involvement 
in the diplomatic life of the international community sets them apart even from other 
disadvantaged small states. The limitations of very small size are most evident in the 
establishment of overseas missions and permanent delegations to international 
organisations.
The prohibitive costs of permanent representation are not the only constraint for 
micro-states. Even occasional forays in conference diplomacy and the hosting of 
visitations from other states can stand out as major commitments. Infrastructural costs 
such as communications and information-gathering services are similarly disproportion­
ately heavy for micro-states. Not only is information costly but it is random and limited. 
Typically, a micro-state's world view is based entirely on sources from the mentor. These 
problems are compounded by the lack of expertise necessary to the formulation and 
representation of foreign policy objectives. Even for those micro-states which are less
constrained by financial considerations, the recruitment of committed and qualified 
personnel is difficult in such small societies. To be sure, as David Vital emphasised, these 
are the most disturbing problems for small states in general.84 But for micro-states they 
are experienced in the extreme.
At first glance such skeletal diplomatic services would seem to confirm the notion 
that micro-states are "non-actors" incapable of conducting independent foreign relations in 
any meaningful sense. But bare-bones diplomacy does not mean that micro-states can not 
promote their interests in the international system. Clearly few micro-states have stakes in 
the full panoply of issues which constitute the global agenda. It is not important whether 
micro-states can address every international issue satisfactorily. It only matters that they 
can represent their interests in those issue areas which are of direct concern for their own 
welfare. South Pacific micro-states, for example, have little vested interest in the burning 
issues of South Africa and Palestine which have dominated much of the international 
conference agenda. A sympathetic declaratory policy can win some gratitude in those 
quarters where these issues are crucial and thus may translate into favourable lines of 
credit and aid, or even reciprocal support in issues of direct concern such as nuclear 
testing in the South Pacific. But this is the kind of diplomacy which can be done on a 
shoestring.
This is not to suggest that micro-state diplomacy can be or need be confined to 
single-resource commercial relations, local co-operative development projects, and modest 
pragmatic day to day administrative concerns. For most micro-states, many of the central 
issues of international politics, particularly those relating to development- the terms of 
trade, aid, and technical assistance, debt management- are of direct concern to their own 
welfare. Others face controversies of status and the predatory designs of covetous
84Vital, op. cit., pp. 10-38.
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neighbours. Promoting these interests requires access to major centres: at least one major 
power, the United Nations, and principal regional states and organisations.
Clearly micro-states can not engage in bilateral diplomatic exchanges on a scale 
comparable to other states. But there is scope for the imaginative use of even these 
limited links. Micro-states must allocate their very scarce resources to target those 
centres where representation will be most effective. This usually means that the most able 
individuals will be stationed in the principal delegation in the former metropole. For most 
micro-states this office will also be the principal link to the European Union. In some 
instances micro-states have even been prepared to delay a permanent mission in New York 
in order to establish an effective mission in the former metropole. Choosing priorities may 
also mean that some normally important capitals are not stationed and certain conferences 
and organisations are neglected to permit a larger travelling budget for direct periodic 
representations from a government figure or a senior diplomat as roving ambassador. 
And, typically, given the absolute costs of international representation, the resources of 
the external affairs bureaucracy at home will have lower priority.
Most micro-states can rely on advice and even representational support from larger 
states. While there are always sensitivities about state dignity in these situations, most 
micro-states do enjoy friendly relations with the former metropole or a trustworthy 
neighbour which allows them to conduct a satisfactory foreign policy. This may be 
diplomacy by proxy but if there is trust on one side and sufficient sensitivity on the other it 
can serve to meet many of the micro-state's interests in the international system.
Micro-states benefit too from the resources of regional organisations. Regional 
co-operation is unlikely to extend to collaborative diplomatic representation. But in such 
micro-state communities as the South Pacific and the Eastern Caribbean, the services of 
regional bodies have substantially supplemented micro-states' links to the outside world.
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Most micro-states are members of the Commonwealth. Given the number of 
micro-states in its membership, this post-imperial association could be described as a 
micro-state organisation. Much of its efforts in technical assistance and in research in 
development studies is directed to the special problems of very small states.
However, it is the United Nations system, and particularly the regional 
commissions, which best support micro-state relations with the outside world. Not only 
does the United Nations provide access to other members of the international system on 
both an incidental and a regular basis, it also provides a vast range of information services 
crucial to the formulation of foreign policy objectives, particularly those relating to issues 
of economic development. It is fitting that the United Nations, which often played a 
critical role in the independence and international acceptance of micro-states, should 
provide the context and support for their continuing relations with the international 
community.
Micro-state diplomacy may be limited and still largely dependent on external 
supports. But micro-states are not without interests in the global community. Nor are 
they totally incapable of representing those interests. Smallness, isolation and the very 
limited capabilities of micro-states would have surely once confined them to the margins 
of international life. But, in the contemporary international system with its universal 
institutions and egalitarian values, even the smallest state has access to the opportunities 
which this global network provides.
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TABLE I 
NUMBER OF MISSIONS ESTABLISHED ABROAD1
SMALL STATES MICRO-STATES
Finland 80 Gabon 33
Denmark 77 Qatar 30
Norway 65 Cyprus 20
Israel 64 Luxembourg 20
'Slovakia 60 Brunei 18
Libya 58 Malta 16
Lebanon 55 Iceland 13
Uruguay 50 Bahrain 12
Costa Rica 47 Guinea-Bissau 12
Panama 45 Guyana 12
Kuwait 41 Djibouti 12
Nicaragua 41 Equatorial Guinea 11
Jordan 39 Mauritius 11
Somalia 39 Cape Verde 10
New Zealand 37 The Gambia 9
Senegal 37 San Marino 8
Ireland 34 Barbados 7
Honduras 32 Fiji 7
Oman 32 Grenada 7
United Arab Emirates 32 Monaco 7
El Salvador 29 Suriname 7
Albania 28 Belize 6
Mongolia 28 S2o Tom6 and Principe 5
Mauritania 27 Swaziland 5
Haiti 26 Western Samoa 5
Paraguay 26 Seychelles 5
Croatia 24 Marshall Islands 4
Singapore 23 Andorra 4
1 This list includes only separately established permanent missions at the 
legation or embassy level. It does not include missions, like some in Brussels 
which are also accredited to the European Union, unless there is a 
completely different staff.
The World Directory o f Diplomatic Representation 
(London: Europa Publications, 1993)
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TABLE 1
NUMBER OF MISSIONS ESTABLISHED ABROAD
SMALL STATES MICRO-STATES ______ I
Congo 21 Antigua and Barbuda
—
4
Chad 20 Bahamas 4 /
Burundi 20 Dominica2 4
Central African Republic 18 Micronesia 4
Laos 18 St. Kitts and Nevis3 4
Benin 17 St. Lucia3 4
Lithuania 16 Liechtenstein 4
Slovenia 16 Maldives 3
Jamaica 16 St.Vincent and the Grenadines3 3
Latvia 14 Comoros 2
Estonia 14 Vanuatu 2
Sierra Leone 14 Palau 2
Togo 14 Solomon islands 1
Trinidad and Tobago 13 Tonga 1
Bosnia-Hercegovina 12 Tuvalu 1
Papua New Guinea 11 Kiribati 0
Namibia 10 Nauru 0
Turkmenistan 10
Armenia 10
Macedonia 10
Lesotho 10
Kyrgystan 9
Eritrea ‘ 8
Botswana 8
Georgia 7
Moidova 7
Bhutan 5
Tajikistan 5
2 Th.is includes one joint O.E.C.S. mission in Ottawa.
3 This includes two joint O.E.C.S. missions in London and Ottawa.
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TABLE II
MISSIONS RESIDENT IN SMALL STATES AND MICR6-STATES1
SMALL STATES MICRO-STATES
Libya 67 Gabon 40
Kuwait 66 Cyprus 30
Denmark 62 Qatar 28
Lebanon 61 Luxembourg 21
Senegal 59 Bahrain 18
Ireland 55 Guinea-Bissau 17
Israel 55 Guyana 17
United Arab Emirates 51 Malta 17
Jordan 48 Suriname 15
Uruguay 46 Barbados 14
Finland 44 Brunei 14
Norway 43 Djibouti 14
Singapore 42 Fiji 14
Nicaragua 41 Belize 12
Panama 39 Equatorial Guinea 12
Costa Rica 38 Iceland 11
Namibia 38 Mauritius 11
Oman 36 Seychelles 10
Honduras 33 Cape Verde 9
Somalia 33 Gambia 8
Jamaica 32 S3o Tome and Principe 8
New Zealand 31 Solomon Islands 7
Honduras 27 Comoros 7
Paraguay 27 Swaziland 6
El Salvador 26 Vanuatu 6
Slovakia 25 Grenada 5
Laos 24 Tonga 5
Congo • 24 Micronesia 5
1 This table includes only resident embassies and legations. For consular 
representation see Table IV.
The World Directory of Diplomatic Representation  (London: Europa Publications, 1993) 
Euro pa World Yearbook. 1993 Volumes i, ii. (London, Europa Publications, 1993)
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TABLE II
MISSIONS RESIDENT IN SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES
SMALL STATES MICRO-STATES
Croatia 23 Western Samoa 5
Haiti 21 Bahamas 4
Trinidad and Tobago 20 St. Lucia 4
Latvia 20 Antigua and Barbuda 4
Lithuania 20 Marshall Islands 3
Central African Republic 19 Kiribati 3
Benin 19 Maldives 3
Albania 18 Andorra 2
Mauritania 18 Dominica 2
Togo 18 Nauru 2
Slovenia 18 St. Kitts and Nevis 2
Mongolia 17 St. Vincent and Grenadines 2
Sierra Leone 17 San Marino 2
Botswana 15 Liechtenstein 1
Estonia 15 Tuvalu 1
Burundi 14 Palau 1
Chad 14 Monaco 1
Papua New Guinea 14
Georgia 12
Macedonia 11
Moldova 10
Armenia 9
Eritrea 9
Kyrgystan 9
Lesotho 8
Tajikistan 7
Bosnia-Hercegovina 6
Turkmenistan 6
Bhutan 2
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TABLE III
SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE MEMBERSHIPS IN 
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS’1
SMALL STATES MICRO-STATES I
Denmark 91 Gabon 59
Finland 89 Iceland 55
Norway 89 Luxembourg 55
Libya 63 Qatar 48
Mauritania 63 Cyprus 45
Benin 56 Gambia 44
Togo 55 Mauritius 39
Congo 53 Bahrain 38
Jordan 53 Guinea-Bissau 35
Slovakia 53 Guyana 34
Chad 51 Swaziland 34
United Arab Emirates 51 Barbados 33
Kuwait 50 Djibouti 33
Ireland 48 Equatorial Guinea 31
Sierra Leone 48 Grenada 28
Lebanon 47 Malta 28
Libya 47 St. Lucia 27
Central African Republic 46 Belize 26
Costa Rica 46 Comoros 26
Nicaragua 46 Fiji 26
Panama 45 Dominica 25
Lithuania 45 Bahamas 24
Slovenia 44 Monaco 24
Uruguay 44 St. Vincent and Grenadines 23
Oman 43 SSo Tom6 and Principe 23
Trinidad and Tobago 41 Cape Verde 22
Jamaica 40 Suriname 22
New Zealand 40 Maldives 21
Honduras 39
Burundi 38
1 Union of International Associations (ed.) Yearbook of International Organizations. 
1992/1993 Volume 2 , 10th ed. (MOncheen, New York, London, Paris: K. G. Saur, 
1992), esp. Table III, pp. 1612-1614.
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TABLE III
SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE MEMBERSHIPS IN 
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
SMALL STATES MICRO-STATES
Ei Salvador 37 Seychelles 21
Israel 37 Brunei 19
Namibia 37 St. Kitts and Nevis 18
Latvia 36 San Marino 16
Macedonia 36 Solomon Islands 16
Haiti 35 Vanuatu 16
Paraguay 35 Tonga 15
Tajikistan 34 Western Samoa 13
Lesotho 32 Liechtenstein 12
Singapore 32 Andorra 11
Armenia 31 Kiribati 9
Turkmenistan 31 Palau 8
Estonia 30 Nauru 7
Botswana 30 Marshall Islands 6
Papua New Guinea 30 Antigua and Barbuda 5
Moldova 29 Micronesia 5
Georgia 26 Tuvalu 5
Croatia 25
Kyrgystan 23
Bosnia-Hercegovina 21
Eritrea 21
Mongolia 21
Albania 19
Laos 18
Bhutan 12
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TABLE IV 
MAJOR IGO MEMBERSHIPS FOR MICRO-STATfes
MICRO-STATES MEMBERSHIPS
Andorra UN, Council of Europe
Antigua and Barbuda UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Bahamas UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Bahrain UN, Arab League, OPEC, OIC, OAPEC, GCC
Barbados UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Belize UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Brunei UN, Commonwealth, ASEAN, OIC
Cape Verde UN, OAU, ECOWAS
Comoros UN, OAU, OIC
Cyprus UN, Commonwealth, OSCE, Council of Europe
Djibouti UN, OAU, Arab League, OIC
Dominica UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Equatorial Guinea UN, OAU
Fiji UN, South Pacific Forum, CP
Gabon UN, OAU, OPEC, OIC
Gambia UN, Commonwealth, OAU, ECOWAS, OIC
Grenada UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Guinea-Bissau UN, OAU, ECOWAS, OIC
Guyana UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Iceland UN, NATO, EFTA, Council of Europe, OSCE, OECD 
NC
Kiribati Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum
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TABLE IV
MAJOR IGO M EM BERSHIPS FOR M ICRO-STATES
MICRO-STATES MEMBERSHIPS
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Maldives
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritius
Micronesia
Monaco
Nauru
Palau
Qatar
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and Grenadines 
San Marino
Sao Tom6 and Principe
Seychelles
Solomon Islands
Suriname
Swaziland
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Western Samoa
UN, EFTA, Council of Europe, OSCE
UN,EC,NATO,WEU,OECD,Council of Europe,OSCE
UN, Commonwealth, SAAEC, CP
UN, Commonwealth, OSCE, Council of Europe
UN, South Pacific Forum
UN, Commonwealth, OAU
UN, South Pacific Forum
UN, OSCE
Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum 
UN, South Pacific Forum 
UN, Arab League, OPEC, GCC, OIC, OAPEC 
UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM 
UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM 
UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM 
UN, OSCE, Council of Europe 
UN, OAU
UN, Commonwealth, OAU 
UN, Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum 
UN, OAS, CARICOM 
UN, Commonwealth, OAU, SADCC 
Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum 
Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum 
UN, Commonwealth, South Pacfrc Forum 
UN, Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum
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TABLE V*
M AJOR 1GO MEMBERSHIPS FOR SMALL STATES
SMALL STATES MEMBERSHIPS
Albania UN, Council of Euope, OSCE, P/P
Armenia UN, BSCE, CIS, Council of Europe, OSCE, P/P
Benin UN, OAU, ECOWAS, OIC
Bhutan UN, SAAEC, CP
•
Bosnia-Hercegovina UN, Council of Europe, OSCE
Botswana UN, Commonwealth, OAU, SADCC
Burundi UN, OAU,
Central African Republic UN, OAU I
Chad UN, OAU
Congo UN, OAU
Costa Rica UN, OAS, CACM, ALADI
Croatia UN, Council of Europe, OSCE I
Denmark UN. EU, NATO, Council of Europe, OSCE, OECD, 
WEU, NC
El Salvador UN, OAS, CACM
Eritrea UN, OAU
Estonia UN, Council of Europe, CBSS, OSCE, WEU* P/P, 
NC
Finland UN, EU, OSCE, OECD, Council of Europe, P/P
Georgia UN, BSEC, CIS, OSCE, Council of Europe, P/P
Haiti UN, OAS, CARICOM
Honduras UN. OAS, CACM, ALADI
Ireland UN, EC, Council of Europe, OECD, WEU* OSCE
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TABLE V
M AJOR IGO M EMBERSHIPS FOR SMALL STA TES
SMALL STATES MEM BERSHIPS
Israel UN
Jamaica UN, Commonwealth, OAS. CARICOM
Jordan UN, Arab League, OIC
Kuwait UN, Arab League, OPEC, GCC, OIC, OAPEC
Kyrgystan UN, CIS, OIC, OSCE, P/P, ECO
Laos UN, CP, ASEAN*
Latvia UN, CBSS, Council of Europe, OSCE, WEU, P/P, 
NC*
Lebanon UN, Arab League, OIC
Lesotho UN, Commonwealth, OAU, SADCC
Liberia UN, OAU, ECOWAS
Libya UN, Arab League, OAU, OPEC, OIC, OAPEC
Lithuania UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, WEU, P/P, NC*
Macedonia UN, OSCE, Council of Europe I
Mauritania UN, OAU, Arab League, ECOWAS, OIC
Moidova UN, OSCE, BSEC, Council of Europe, P/P, CIS
Mongolia UN
Namibia UN, Commonwealth, OAU, SADCC
New Zealand UN, Commonwealth, ANZUS, OECD, South Pacific 
Forum
Nicaragua UN, OAS, CACM, ALADI
Norway UN, NATO, EFTA, OSCE, OECD, Council of Europe, 
NC
Oman UN, Arab League, GCC, OIC
Panama UN, OAS, ALADI
241
TABLE V
MAJOR IGO MEMBERSHIPS FOR SMALL STATES
SMALL STATES MEMBERSHIPS
Papua New Guinea UN, Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum, CP
Paraguay UN, OAS, Merosur
Sierra Leone UN, Commonwealth, OAU, ECOWAS, OIC
Singapore UN, Commonwealth, ASEAN, CP
Slovenia UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, P/P
Slovakia UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, P/P
Somalia UN, OAU, Arab League, OIC
Tajikistan UN, CIS, ECO, P/P, OSCE
Togo UN, OAU, ECOWAS
Trinidad and Tobago UN, Commonwealth, OAS, CARICOM
Turkmenistan UN, CIS, ECO, P/P, OSCE
United Arab Emirates UN, Arab League, OPEC, GCC, OAPEC
Uruguay UN, OAS, Merosur
*Key: ALADI: Latin American Integration Association; ASEAN: Association of South- 
East Asian nations; BSEC: Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone; CACM: Central 
American Common Market; CARICOM: Caribbean Community and Common Market;
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States; Commonwealth of Nations; CP: Colombo 
Plan; CBSS: Council ofBaltic Sea States; Council ofEurope; ECO: Economic Cooperation 
Organization; ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States; EFTA: European 
Freee-Trade Association; EU: European Union; GCC: Cooperation Council for the Arab 
States of the Gulf; Merosur; NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization; NC: Nordic 
Council; OAPEC: Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries; OAS:
Organization of American States; OAU: Organization of African Unity;
OECD: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development; OPEC: Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries; OSCE: Organization For Security and Cooperation in 
Europe; SAAEC: South Asian Association for Economic Cooperation; SADCC: South 
African Development Coordination Conference; South Pacific Forum; States of the Gulf; 
UN: United Nations.
* Associate status
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TABLE VI
MICRO-STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM**
IAEA.. JBRD_ _JBA_ _JFC_ -IMF _EAQ JEAQ- _GATT JMO. JCAQ. ILO
Andorra
Antigua and Barbuda X X X X X X X X X X
Bahamas* X X X X X X X
Bahrain* X X X X X xBarbados X X X X X X X X X
Belize X X X X X X X X X X
Brunei* X X
Cape Verde* X X X X X X X X
Comoros X X X X X X X X
Cyprus X X X X X X X X X X
Djibouti X X X X X X X X
Dominica* X X X X X X X X X
Equatorial Guinea* X X X X X X X X
Fiji* X X X X X X X X
Gabon X X X X X X X X X X X
Gambia X X X X X X X X X
Grenada* X X X X X X X X
Guinea-Bissau* X X X X X X X X X
Guyana X X X X X X X X X X
Iceland I X X X X X X X X X X
Kiribati* | X X X X X
1 Europa World Year Book, 1993, Volume I (London: Europa Publications, 1993), pp. 50-52.
* "Countries to whose territories GATT has been applied, and which now, as independent states,
maintain a de facto application of the GATT pending final decisions as to their future commercial policy." Ibid.
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TABLE VI
MICRO-STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
IAEA .IBRD. IDA _1EC_ JM F . _EAQ IFAQ.. _.GATT_. IMO ICAO ILQ
Liechtenstein X
Luxembourg X X X X X X X X X X X
Maldives X X X X X X X X X
Malta X X X X X X X X
Marshall Islands X X X X
Mauritius X X X X X X X X X X X
Micronesia X
Monaco X X X
Nauru X
Palau
Qatar* X X X X X X X X
San Marino X
Sdo Tom6 and Principe* X X X X X X X X
St. Kitts and Nevis* X X X X X
St. Lucia* X X X X X X X X
St. Vincent and Grenadines* X X X X X
Seychelles* X X X X X X X X X
Solomon Islands* X X X X X X X X X
Suriname X X X X X X X X
Swaziland* X X X X X X X X X
Tonga* X X X X X
Tuvalu*
Vanuatu X X X X X
Western Samoa X X X X X X
TABLE Vi
MICRO-STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
ITU UNESCO UNIDO UPU WHO WMO WIPO UN
| Andorra X X X X
Antigua and Barbuda X X X X X X
Bahamas X X X X X X X X
Bahrain X X X X X X X
Barbados X X X X X X X X
Belize X X X X X X X X
Brunei X X X X X
Cape Verde X X X X X X X
Comoros X X X X X X X
I Cyprus X X X X X X X X
I Djibouti X X X X X X X
Dominica X X X X X
Equatorial Guinea X X X X X X
Fiji X X X X X X X X
Gabon X X X X X X X X
Gambia X X X X X X X X
Grenada X X X X X X
Guinea-Bissau X X X X X X X X
Guyana X X X X X X X
Iceland X X X X X X X
Kiribati 1 x X X X
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TABLE VI
MICRO-STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
ITU UNESCO UNIDO UPU WHO WMO WIPO UN
Liechtenstein X X X
Luxembourg X X X X X X X X
Maldives X X X X X X X X
Malta X X X X X X X X
Marshall Islands X X
Mauritius X X X X X X X
Micronesia X X
Monaco X X X X X X
Nauru X X X
Palau X
Qatar X X X X X X X X
San Marino X X X X X
Sdo Tom6 and Principe X X X X X X X
St. Kitts and Nevis X X X X X
St. Lucia X X X X X X
St. Vincent and Grenadines X X X X X X
Seychelles X X X X X X
Solomon Islands X X X X X
Suriname X X X X X X X X
Swaziland X X X X X X X X
Tonga X X X X X
Tuvalu X X
Vanuatu X X X X X X
Western Samoa X X X X X
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TABLE VII
SMALL STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM1
_IAEA_ JBRD_ IDA IFC _IME_ _FAQ_ JEAQl _£?AII IMQ JCAQ. ILQ__
Albania X X X X X X X X X
Armenia X X X X X X X X
Bhutan X X X X X
Benin X X X X X X X X X X
Bosnia-Hercegovina X X X X X
Botswana X X X X X X X X X
Burundi X X X X X X X X X
Central African Republic X X X X X X X X X
Chad X X X X X X X X
Costa Rica X X X X X X X X X X
Congo X X X X X X X X X X
Croatia X X X X X X X X X X
Denmark X X X X X X X X X X X
El Salvador X X X X X X X X X X X |
Eritrea X X X X X X X X I
Estonia X X X X X X X X I
Finland X X X X X X X X X X X I
Georgia X X X X X I
Haiti X X X X X X X X X X X I
Honduras X X X X X X X X X I
Ireland X X X X X X X X X X X I
Israel X X X X X X X X X X X |
Jamaica X X X X X X X X X X |
Jordan X X X X X X X X X X I
1 The Europa Yearbook 1993, Volume I (London: Europa Publications, 1993), pp. 50-52.
* "Countries to whose territories GATT has been applied, and which now, as independent states,
maintain a de facto application of the GATT pending final decisions as to their future commercial policy." Ibid.
TABLE VII
SMALL STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
1 IAEA JBBD_ . IDA. IF.C _IME_ EAQ_ JEACL _GAIT _IMQ_ JCAQ. ILO 1
Kuwait H____ x ___ X X X X X X X X X X
Kyrgystan X X X X X X X X
Laos X X X X X X X X
Latvia X X X X X X X X X X
Lebanon X X X X X X X X X X
Lesotho X X X X X X X X X
Liberia X X X X X X X X X X
Libya X X X X X X X X X X
Lithuania X X X X X X X
Macedonia X X X X X X X X X
Mauritania X X X X X X X X X X 1
Moldova X X X x 1
Mongolia X X X X X X X I
Namibia* X X X X X X X I
I New Zealand X X X X X X X X X X X
I Nicaragua X X X X X X X X X X X
I Norway X X X X X X X X X X X
I Oman X X X X X X X X
I  Panama X X X X X X X X X X
Papua New Guinea* X X X X X X X X X
Paraguay X X X X X X X X X
Sierra Leone X X X X X X X X X X X
Singapore X X X X X X X X
Slovenia X X X X X X X X
Slovakia X X X X X X X X
Tajikistan X X X X X X
Togo X X X X X X X X X x
Trinidad and Tobago X X X X X X X X X X I
Turkmenistan X X X X 1
United Arab Emirates* X X X X X X X X X X 1
Uruguay X X X X X X X X X x 1
TABLE VII
SMALL STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
ITU.... UNESCO JJNIDQ. . URU _WHQ_ WMO _ WIPO ...UN
Albania X X X X X X X X
Armenia X X X X X X X X
Bhutan X X X X X X
Benin X X X X X X X X
Bosnia-Hercegovina X X X X X X X X
Botswana X X X X X X X
Burundi X X X X X X X X
Central African Republic X X X X X X X X
Chad X X X X X X X X
Costa Rica X X X X X X X X
Congo X X X X X X X X
Croatia X X X X X X X X
Denmark X X X X X X X X
El Salvador X X X X X X X X
Eritrea X X X X X X
Estonia X X X X X X X
Finland X X X X X X X X
Georgia X X X X X X X X
Haiti X X X X X X X X
Honduras . X X X X X X X X
Ireland X X X X X X X X
Israel X X X X X X X X
Jamaica X X X X X X X X
Jordan X X X X X X X X
Kuwait X X X X X X X
Kyrgystan X X X X X X X
Laos X X X X X X X
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TABLE VII
SMALL STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
......................................- 1 ITU UNESCO JJNIDCL UPU _WHQ_ _WMQ_ -JA/IEQ.. UN .
Latvia X X X X X X
Lebanon X X X X X X X X
Lesotho X X X X X X X
Liberia
Libya
X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X
Lithuania X X X X X X X
Macedonia X X X X X X X X
Mauritania X X X X X X X X
Moldova X X X X X X X
Mongolia X X X X X X X X
Namibia X X X X X X X X
New Zealand X X X X X X X X
Nicaragua X X X X X X X X
Norway X X X X X X X X
Oman X X X X X X X
Panama X X X X X X X X
Papua New Guinea X X X X X X X
Paraguay X X X X X X X X
Sierra Leone X X X X X X X I
Singapore X X X X X X 1
Slovakia X X X X X X X X |
Slovenia X X X X X X X X 1
Tajikistan X X X X X X X I
Togo X X X X X X X X
Trinidad and Tobago X X X X X X X X
Turkmenistan X X X X X X 1
United Arab Emirates X X X X X X X X I
Uruquav X X X X X X X x  I
TABLE VIII
THE SIZE OF SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE MISSIONS TO 
THE UNITED NATIONS (New York)*
SMALL STATES
Costa Rica 17
MICRO-STATES
Cyprus 11
Israel 17 Gabon 9
Jamaica 13 Brunei 8
New Zealand 13 Antigua and Barbuda 7
Norway 12 Cape Verde 6
Finland 11 Gambia 6
Denmark 10 Guyana 6
Honduras 10 Swaziland 6
Libya 10 Malta 5
El Salvador 9 Suriname 5
Ireland 9 Bahamas 4
Nicaragua 9 Bahrain 4
Haiti 8 Barbados 4
Jordan 8 Fiji 4
Kuwait 8 Qatar 4
Oman 8 St. Lucia 4
Uruguay 8 San Marino 4
Benin 7 Andorra 3
Namibia 7 Maldives 3
Panama 7 Mauritius 3
Togo 7 Guinea-Bissau 3
Bosnia-Hercegovina 6 Djibouti 3
Botswana 6 Dominica 3
Estonia 6 Iceland 3
Latvia 6 Luxembourg 3
Liberia 6 Micronesia 3
Mauritania 6 St. Kitts and Nevis 3
Slovakia 6 Solomon Islands 3
Slovenia 6 Belize 2
Bhutan . 5
1 Permanent Missions to the United Nations, No. 274 (New York: United Nations, 
August, 1994).
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TABLE VIII
THE SIZE OF SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE MISSIONS TO 
THE UNITED NATIONS (N ew  York)
SMALL STATES MICRO-STATES
Croatia 5 Comoros 2
Georgia 5 Equatorial Guinea 2
Lesotho 5 Grenada 2
Lithuania 5 Marshall Islands 2
Papua New Guinea 5 Monaco 2
Paraguay 5 St. Vincent and Grenadines 2
Sierra Leone 5 SSo Tom§ and Principe 2
Singapore 5 Seychelles 2
Trinidad and Tobago 5 Western Samoa 2
Albania 4 Liechtenstein 2
Armenia 4 Palau 1
Chad 4 Vanuatu 1
Laos 4
Mongolia 4
United Arab Emirates 4
Central African Republic 3
Congo 3
Eritrea 3
Kyrgystan 3
Lebanon 3
Macedonia 3
Burundi 2
Somalia 2
Moldova 1
Tajikistan 1
Turkmenistan 1
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TABLE IX
MEMBERSHIP OF SELECTED MICRO-DEPENDENCIES IM 
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
Montserrat 11
Netherlands Antilles 7
Anguilla 6
Cook Islands 6
Aruba 5
Bermuda 5
Greenland 3
Gibraltar 3
Faroe Islands 2
Aland Islands 1
Guernsey 1
Jersey 1
Western Sahara 1
Isle of Man 0
East Timor 0
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TABLE X
MICRO-STATE AND SMALL STATE MEMBERSHIPS IN 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 1
!;SM A U .:ST A T E s!!!i! !!§|||S^^
Denmark 2369 Luxembourg 982
Finland 2143 Iceland 861
Norway 2130 Cyprus 558
Ireland 1507 Malta 433
Israel 1412 Mauritius 385
New Zealand 1178 Barbados 312
Slovakia 1132 Andorra 286
Croatia 1075 Fiji 284
Slovenia 1025 Guyana 274
Uruguay 795 Monaco 260
Estonia 789 Bahamas 251
Singapore 783 Gabon 248
Lithuania 744 Bahrain 225
Costa Rica 658 Gambia 213
Latvia 619 Swaziland 197
Panama 557 Liechtenstein 188
Namibia 508 Suriname 188
Lebanon 504 Belize 163
Jamaica 462 Seychelles 160
Jordan 458 Qatar 158
Paraguay 450 S t  Lucia 156
Kuwait 445 Antigua and Barbuda 141
Trinidad and Tobago 420 Grenada 139
Honduras 383 Brunei 134
El Salvador 378 Dominica 133
1 Yearbook o f  International Organizations, 1992-93, Volume II, 10th ed . 
(Munchen, New York, London, Paris: K. G. Saur, 1992), esp. Table ill, 
pp. 1612-1614.
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TABLE X
MICRO-STATE AND SMALL STATE MEMBERSHIPS IN 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
§1
Nicaragua 364 Western Sam oa 127
Georgia 362 Solomon Islands 119
Papua New Guinea 346 S t  Vincent and Grenadines 118
Sierra Leone 328 Djibouti 112
Togo 311 San Marino 104
Libya 292 Vanuatu 99
Benin 291 Tonga 97
Congo 279 S t  Kitts and Nevis 94
United Arab Emirates 277 Guinea-Bissau 81
Liberia 276 Cape Verde 74
Haiti 274 Comoros 72
Botswana 270 Equatorial Guinea 69
Moldova 265 Kiribati 66
Bosnia-Hercegovina 243 Maldives 48
Lesotho 234 Palau 45
Armenia 219 Tuvalu 44
Macedonia 213 Sao Tome and Principe 41
Benin 194 Nauru 34
Mauritania 192 Marshall Islands 27
Central African Republic 180 Micronesia 19
Oman 1J3
Chad 145
Kyrgystan 122
Turkmenistan 112
Mongolia 107
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TABLE X
MICRO-STATE AND SMALL STATE MEMBERSHIPS IN 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
! ! ! !
Tajikistan 98
Albania 88
Eritrea 64
Laos 61
Bhutan 48
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TABLE XI
PATTERNS OF MICRO-STATE DIPLOMACY
State
Andorra
Antigua and Barbuda 
Bahamas
Missions Sent
France 
Holy See 
Spain
United Nations
United Kingdom 
United States 
United Nations
Missions Received
France
Spain
China
United Kingdom 
United States 
Venezuela
Consulates Sent
Canada
Germany (2, Hon.) 
United States
Consulates Received
Denmark
Germany
Canada
United Kingdom 
United States 
United Nations
France
United Kingdom 
United States 
European Union
United States (2) Austria (Hon.) 
Canada (Hon.) 
Denmark 
Germany (Hon.) 
Iceland
Jamaica (Hon.) 
Sweden
Switzerland (Hon.')
State Missions Sent Missions Received
Bahrain
Barbados
Egypt Algeria
France Bangladesh
Iran Egypt
Iraq France
Jordan Germany
Kuwait India
Lebanon Iran
Saudi-Arabia Iraq
Tunisia Japan
United States Jordan
United Nations Korea, Republic of
United Nations, Geneva Kuwait
Oman
Pakistan
Saudi-Arabia
Tunisia
United Kingdom 
United States
Belgium Argentina
Canada Brazil
Trinidad and Tobago Canada
United Kingdom China
United States Colombia
Venezuela Costa Rica
United Nations France 
Holy See
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
United States Belgium
Denmark 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland
Australia (2) 
Canada 
Germany (2) 
United States (2)
Austria (Hon.) 
Belgium 
Cyprus 
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Finland
Germany (Hon.)
State Missions Sent Missions Received
Barbados cont.
Belize
Korea, Republic of 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Venezuela 
European Union
Canada Belgium
Mexico China (Taiwan)
United Arab Emirates Costa Rica
United Kingdom Honduras
United States Jordan
United Nations Mexico
Panama
Sweden
United Kingdom 
United States 
Venezuela 
European Union
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Haiti
Isreal
Italy
Jamaica (Hon.)
Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
Peru
Sweden
Canada
Germany (Hon.)
Sweden (Hon.)
United States (7, 6 Hon.)
Denmark 
Germany (Hon.) 
Jamaica
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State Missions Sent Missions Received
Brunei Australia Australia
Egypt France
France Germany
Germany Indonesia
India Japan
Indonesia Korea, Republic of
Japan Malaysia
Korea, Republic of Oman
Malaysia Pakistan
New Zealand Phillipines
Oman ' Singapore
Phillipines Thailand
Saudi-Arabia United Kingdom
Singapore United States
Thailand 
United Kingdom 
United States 
United Nations
United Nations, Geneva
Cape Verde Angola Brazil
Cuba China
Germany Cuba
Guinea-Bissau France
Netherlands Portugal
Portugal Russia
Consulates Sent Consulates Received 
Austria
Belgium (Hon.)
New Zealand 
Netherlands (Hon.) 
Sweden
Germany (4, Hon.) 
Netherlands 
United States
Denmark
Germany
Sweden
State Missions Sent Missions Received
Cape Verde cont.
Comoros
Cyprus
Russia 
Senegal 
United States 
United Nations
Senegal 
United States 
European Union
France China
United Nations France 
Mauritius 
Seychelles 
Sweden 
United States 
European Union
Australia Australia
Belgium Bulgaria
China China
Egypt Cuba
France Czech Republic
Germany Egypt
Greece France
India Germany
Italy Greece
Kenya Holy See
Libya Hungary
Mexico India
Russia Iran
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Germany (Hon.) Belgium
Italy
South Africa
Austria (Hon.)
Barbados 
Denmark (Hon.) 
Dominican Republic (H) 
Eduador (Hon.)
Finland (Hon.)
France (3, Hon.) 
Germany (5, 3 Hon.) 
Greece 
India (Hon.)
Italy (5, 4 Hon.)
Kuwait (Hon.)
Lebanon (2, Hon.)
Austria (Hon.) 
Belgium (2, Hon.) 
Brazil (2, Hon.) 
Burundi (Hon.) 
Canada (Hon.) 
Chile (Hon.) 
Colombia (Hon.) 
Cost Rica (Hon.) 
Denmark (Hon.) 
Eduador (Hon.) 
Finland
Guyana (Hon.) 
Iceland
State Missions Sent Missions Received
Cyprus, cont. Syria Israel
United Kingdom Italy
United States Lebanon
Yugoslavia Libya
United Nations Romania
United Nations (Geneva) Russia
Slovakia
Syria
United Kingdom 
United States 
Yemen 
Yugoslavia 
European Union 
FAO 
UNDP 
UNFICYP
PLO
Consulates Sent Consulates
Malta (Hon.)
Norway (Hon.)
Panama
Papua New Guinea (H.) 
Peru (Hon.)
Philippines (Hon.) 
Portugal (Hon.)
Spain (Hon.)
Sweden (Hon.)
Swizerland (2, Hon.) 
United Kingdom (5, Hon.) 
United States (15, 14 H.) 
Uruguay (Hon.)
Received 
Ireland (Hon.)
Japan (Hon.)
Jordan (Hon.) 
Liberia (Hon.) 
Luxembourg (Hon.) 
Mali (Hon.)
Malta (Hon.) 
Mexico (Hon.) 
Netherlands (Hon.) 
Norway (2, Hon.) 
Oman (Hon.) 
Panama (Hon.)
Peru (Hon.) 
Philippines (Hon.) 
Portugal (Hon.) 
Rwanda (Hon.)
San Marino (Hon.) 
Sierra Leone (Hon.) 
Spain (Hon.)
Sri Lanka (Hon.) 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Thailand (Hon.)
State Missions Sent Missions Received
Djibouti Belgium China
Egypt Egypt
Ethiopia Ethiopia
France France
Iraq Iraq
Japan Libya
Kenya Oman
Saudi-Arabia Russia
Somalia Saudi-Arabia
Tunisia Somalia
United States Sudan
United Nations United States
Yemen
European Union
Dominica Belgium China (Taiwan)
Canada (joint OECS) Venezuela
India
United Kingdom 
United Nations
Equatorial Guinea Cameroun Cameroun
China China
Ethiopia Cuba
France France
Consulates Sent
Germany (Hon.) 
Luxembourg
United States
Consulates Received
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany (Hon) 
Sweden
United Kingdom (Hon.)
Sweden
United Kingdom
State Missions Sent Missions Received
Equatorial Guinea, cont. Gabon Gabon
Morocco Korea, D P R.
Nigeria Nigeria
Poland Russia
Russia Spain
Spain Sweden
United Nations United States
European Union
Fiji Australia Australia
Belgium China
Japan France
New Zealand Japan
United Kingdom Korea, Republic of
United States Malaysia
United Nations Marshall Islands
Micronesia 
New Zealand 
Papua New Guinea 
Tuvalu
United Kingdom 
United States 
European Union
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Australia 
Canada 
United States
Canada
Denmark
Finland
Nauru
Norway
Sweden
State Missions Sent Missions Received
Gabon Algeria Algeria
Angola Angola
Argentina Argentina
Belgium Belgium
Cameroun Brazil
Canada Cameroun
Central African Republic Canada
China Central African Republic
Congo China
Egypt Congo
Equatorial Guinea Egypt
Ethiopia Equatorial Guinea
France France
Germany Germany
Iran Guinea
Italy Iran
Ivory Coast Italy
Japan Ivory Coast
Kenya Japan
Korea, P.D.R. Korea, P.D.R.
Korea, Republic of Korea, Republic of
Kuwait Lebanon
Mauritania Mauritania
Morocco Morocco
Nigeria Nigeria
Russia Philippines
Saudi-Arabia Russia
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Australia (Hon.) 
Austria (Hon.) 
Germany (3, 2 Hon.) 
Japan
Denmark 
France (2)
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State Missions Sent
Gabon, cont.
The Gambia
Senegal
Spain
Togo
United Kingdom 
United States 
Venezuela 
Yugoslavia 
Zaire
United Nations 
United Nations (Geneva) 
European Union
Belgium 
Nigeria 
Saudi-Arabia 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
United Kingdom 
United States 
United Nations
European Union
Missions Received Consulates Sent Consulates
Received
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Spain
Sweden
Togo
Tunisia
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zimbabwe
European Union
China Austria (Hon.) Denmark
Nigeria Denmark
Senegal Germany (3, Hon.)
Sierra Leone United States
Sweden
United Kingdom 
United States 
European Union
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State Missions Sent Missions Received
Grenada
Guinea-Bissau
Belgium
Canada
Cuba
United States 
Venezuela 
United Nations 
European Union
China (Taiwan) 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Venezuela 
European Union
Algeria
Belgium
China (Taiwan)
Cuba
Egypt
Guinea
Portugal
Russia
Senegal
Sweden
United States
United Nations
European Union
Algeria
Brazil
Cape Verde
China (Taiwan)
Cuba
Egypt
France
Germany
Korea, P.D.R.
Libya
Portugal
Russia
Senegal
Sweden
United States
European Union
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Canada
Germany (Hon.) 
United States
France
Guyana (Hon.) 
Netherlands (Hon.) 
Sweden
Germany (Hon.) 
United States
United Kingdom (Hon.)
State
Guyana
Iceland
Missions Sent Missions Received
Belgium Brazil
Brazil Canada
Canada China
China Colombia
Cuba Cuba
India Germany
Russia India
United Kingdom Jamaica
United States Korea, D P R.
Venezuela Libya
United Nations Russia
European Union Suriname 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Venezuela 
European Union
Belgium
China
Denmark
France
Germany
Norway
Russia
Sweden
United Kingdom
China
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Norway
Russia
Sweden
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Cyprus (Hon.) Denmark
United States (4, 3 Hon.) Finland
Germany 
Jamaica (Hon.) 
Sweden
Argentina Australia (Hon.)
Australia (3) Canada (Hon.) -
Austria (2, Hon.) Cyprus (Hon.)
Bangladesh Denmark (6)
Brazil (2) Finland (5, Hon.)
Canada (9) Germany (6, Hon.)
Chile Sweden (4)
Colombia United Kingdom (Hon.)
Cuba
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State
Iceland,
Missions Sent
cont. United States
United Nations 
United Nations (Geneva)
Missions Received
United Kingdom 
United States
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Cyprus
Denmark (15, Hon.)
Egypt
Finland (7)
France (6)
Germany (11, Hon.)
Greece
India (3)
Indonesia 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy (7)
Japan (Hon.)
Kenya
Korea, Rep. of (Hon.)
Lebanon
Luxembourg
Malaysia
Malta
Mexico
Netherlands (3)
New Zealand (Hon.)
Nigeria
Norway (10)
Pakistan (2)
Panama
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State Missions Sent Missions Received
Iceland, cont.
Kiribati Australia
New Zealand 
United Kingdom
Liechtenstein Austria
Belgium
Holy See
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Philippines 
Portugal (2) 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain (6)
Sri Lanka 
Sweden (8) 
Switzerland (3, Hon.) 
Tunisia 
Turkey (2)
United Kingdom (14) 
United States (21) 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yugoslavia
Australia (Hon.) 
Germany (Hon.)
New Zealand (Hon.) 
United Kingdom 
United States (Hon.)
34 non-resident 
consulates
State Missions Sent Missions Received
Liechtenstein, cont. Switzerland
United Nations
Luxembourg Austria Austria
Belgium Belgium
China Bulgaria
Denmark China
France Denmark
Germany France
Holy See Germany
Italy Greece
Japan Ireland
Netherlands Italy
Portugal Japan
Russia Netherlands
Spain Portugal
Switzerland Russia
United Kingdom Spain
United States Switzerland
United Nations Turkey
United Nations (Geneva) United Kingdom
European Union United States
NATO Zaire
European Union
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Australia (Hon.)
Austria (3, 2 Hon.) 
Cyprus (Hon.)
Denmark (Hon.) 
Germany (11, Hon.)
Malta (Hon.)
United States (16, 15 H.)
Burkina Faso (Hon.)
Canada (Hon.)
Djibouti
Finland
Iceland
Mali
Malta
Monaco
Sweden
Togo
State Missions Sent Missions Received
Maldives India India
Sri Lanka Pakistan
United Nations Sri Lanka
M alta Algeria Australia
Australia China
Belgium Czech Republic
China Egypt
Egypt France
France Germany
Germany Holy See
Iraq Italy
Italy Korea, D P R.
Libya Libya
Philippines Russia
Russia Slovakia
United Kingdom Spain
United States Tunisia
Uruguay United Kingdom
United Nations United States
European Union 
PLO
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Denmark
France
Sweden
Australia (5, 3 Hon ) 
Austria (3, Hon.) 
Brazil (2, Hon.) 
Cameroun (Hon.) 
Canada (2, Hon.) 
Cyprus (Hon.) 
Denmark (2, Hon.) 
Finland (Hon.)
France (Hon.)
Greece (Hon.) 
Germany (7, Hon.) 
Greece (Hon.)
India, (2, Hon.)
Iraq
Ireland (Hon.)
Israel (2, Hon.)
Italy (15, Hon.)
Japan (2, Hon.) 
Jordan (Hon.)
Korea, Rep. of (Hon.) 
Lebanon (2, Hon.)
Austria (Hon.) 
Belgium (Hon.) 
Canada (Hon.) 
Colombia (Hon.) 
Cyprus (Hon.) 
Denmark 
Finland
Honduras (Hon.) 
Iceland 
Japan (Hon.)
Liberia (Hon.) 
Luxembourg (Hon.) 
Mexico (Hon.) 
Monaco (Hon.) 
Netherlands (Hon.) 
Norway (Hon.) 
Pakistan (Hoif.) 
Philippines (Hort.) 
Poland (Hon.) 
Portugal (Hon.)
San Marino (Hon.)
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State Missions Sent Missions Received
Malta, cont.
Marshall Islands China Australia
Fiji China
United States United States
United Nations
Mauritius Australia
Belgium
Comoros
Australia
China
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Luxembourg 
Mexico (Hon.)
New Zealand (2, Hon.) 
Norway (Hon.)
Pakistan (Hon.) 
Philippines (Hon.) 
Portugal (Hon.) 
Singapore (Hon.)
Spain (Hon.)
Sweden (3, Hon.) 
Switzerland (4, Hon.) 
Syria (Hon.)
Turkey (Hon.)
United Kingdom (Hon.) 
United States (9, 8 Hon.) 
Venezuela (Hon.)
Senegal (Hon.) 
Sweden
Switzerland (Hon.) 
Thailand (Hon.) 
Turkey (Hon.) 
Yugoslavia (Hon.)
United States
Australia (3, Hon ) 
Germany (2, Hon.)
Austria (Hon.) 
Belgium
State Missions Sent Missions Received
Mauritius, cont.
Micronesia
Monaco
Egypt 
France 
India 
Kenya 
Pakistan 
United Kingdom 
United States 
United Nations
Fiji
Japan
United States 
United Nations
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Holy See 
Italy
Switzerland 
United Nations
France
India
Korea, Republic of 
Madagascar 
Pakistan 
Russia
United Kingdom 
United States 
European Union
Australia
Japan
Korea, Republic of 
Philippines 
United States
France
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Italy (Hon.)
New Zealand (Hon.) 
United States (Hon.)
Denmark
Finland
Germany (Hon.)
New Zealand (Hon.) 
South Africa (Trade Of.) 
Spain (Hon.)
Swizerland (Hon.)
United States (2)
Australia (2, Hon.) 
Austria (Hon.) 
Belgium (3) 
Denmark (Hon.) 
France (8) 
Germany (5, Hon.) 
Luxembourg 
Malta (Hon.) 
Netherlands (3)
Austria (Hon.)
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany (Hon., 
Ireland (Hon.) 
Mexico (Hon.) 
San Marino
State Missions Sent Missions Received
Monaco, cont.
Nauru Australia
China (Taiwan)
Palau Japan United States
United Nations
Q atar Algeria Algeria
Austria Bangladesh
Bangladesh China
Belgium Egypt
China France
Egypt Germany
France India
Germany Iran
India Iraq
Iran Japan
Iraq Jordan
Japan Korea, Republic of
Jordan Kuwait
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Switzerland (5)
United States (12, Hon.)
Australia (2, 1 Hon.) 
China (Taiwan)
Fiji
India
New Zealand 
Philippines 
United Kingdom
Sweden
State Missions Sent Missions Received
Q atar, cont. Kuwait Lebanon
Lebanon Mauritania
  Libya Morocco
Morocco Oman
Oman Pakistan
Pakistan Russia
Russia Saudi-Arabia
Saudi-Arabia Somalia
Somalia Sudan
Spain Syria
Sudan Tunisia
Syria Turkey
Tunisia United Kingdom
United Arab Emirates United States
United Kingdom Yemen
United States 
United Nations 
United Nations (Geneva)
St. Christopher & Nevis Canada (Joint OECS) China (Taiwan)
United Kingdom (OECS) Venezuela 
United States 
United Nations
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
United States (2, Hon.) Denmark
State Missions Sent Missions Received
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
San M arino
Canada (Joint OECS) 
United Kingdom (OECS) 
United States 
United Nations
Canada (Joint OECS) 
United Kingdom (OECS) 
United Nations
Austria 
Belgium 
France 
Holy See 
Italy
Switzerland
United Nations
United Nations (Geneva)
China (Taiwan) 
France
United Kingdom 
Venezuela
China (Taiwan) 
Venezuela
Holy See 
Italy
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Germany (Hon.) Denmark
Germany (Hon.) 
Jamaica (Hon.)
Japan (Hon.) Denmark
Germany (Hon.)
Argentina 
Australia (Hon.) 
Austria (Hon.) 
Belgium (Hon.) 
Brazil
Canada (2, Hon.)
Cyprus (Hon.)
Finland
France (5)
Greece
India
Israel
Italy (13)
Japan
Malta (Hon.)
State Missions Sent Missions Received
San M arino, cont.
Sao Tome and Principe Angola Angola
Belgium China
Gabon Cuba
Portugal Gabon
United Nations Korea, D.P.R.
Portugal
Russia
European Union
Seychelles Comoros China
Cuba Cuba
France France
United Kingdom
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Mexico
Monaco
Panama
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland (3)
Turkey
United Kingdom 
United States (3)
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
United Kingdom (Hon.) Sweden
United States (Hon.) United Kingdom (Hon.)
Australia (2, Hon.) 
Denmark (Hon.) 
France (Hon.)
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
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State Missions Sent Missions Received
Seychelles, cont.
Solomon Islands
Suriname
United Nations
United Nations
Belgium
Brazil
Mexico
Netherlands
United States
Venezuela
United Nations
India
Netherlands
Russia
Sweden
United Kingdom 
United States 
European Union
Australia 
China (Taiwan) 
Japan
New Zealand 
United Kingdom 
United States 
European Union
Belgium
Brazil
China
France
Guyana
India
Indonesia
Japan
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Germany (Hon.) Germany
Australia (2, 1 Hon.) Germany (Hon.)
United Kingdom Sweden
Germany (Hon.) Denmark
United States (2, 1 Hon.) Finland
Germany (Hon.) 
Sweden
United Kingdom (Hon.)
State Missions Sent Missions Received
Suriname, cont.
Swaziland
Tonga
Korea, Republic of 
Libya
Netherlands
Russia
United States 
Venezuela 
European Union
Belgium 
Denmark 
United Kingdom 
United States 
United Nations
China (Taiwan) 
Israel
Mozambique 
United Kingdom 
United States 
European Union
United Kingdom Australia 
China (Taiwan) 
New Zealand 
United Kingdom 
European Union
Tuvalu Fiji United Kingdom
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
Denmark (Hon.) 
Germany (Hon.)
South Africa (Trade Of.)
Australia (Hon.) 
Germany (2, Hon.) 
New Zealand 
United States
Austria (Hon.)
Denmark
South Africa (Trade Of.) 
Zaire
Germany (Hon.)
Australia (Hon.) 
Germany (Hon.)
State Missions Sent Missions Received
Tuvalu, cont.
Vanuatu
Western Samoa
Cuba Australia
United Nations China
France 
New Zealand 
United Kingdom 
European Union
Australia 
Belgium 
New Zealand 
United States 
United Nations
Australia
China
New Zealand 
United States 
European Union
Consulates Sent Consulates Received
New Zealand (Hon.)
Germany (Hon.) 
United States (Hon.)
Sweden
Germany (Hon.) 
Sweden (Hon.)
United Kingdom (Hon.)
CHAPTER SIX
Economic Dependence in the International Relations 
of Micro-States: The Structure of the Small Economy
Thus far, we have examined the position of micro-states in the international system 
in terms of legal status and diplomatic activity. Questions about the credibility of 
sovereignty and the legitimacy of claims for separate independence characterise micro- 
state international relations. And the limitations of very small size clearly set micro-states 
apart from the normal diplomatic practices of other small states. Are these initial 
impressions of weakness borne out in the international economic relations of micro-states? 
To what extent does the very small size of the micro-state economy necessitate conditions 
of extreme dependence?
The issue of dependence is a central and recurring theme in small state studies. In 
this last section of our discussion we examine the structural elements of dependence in the 
international economic relations of micro-states. In particular, we focus on the 
relationship between very small size and economic dependence as reflected in the 
commodity composition and geographical direction of trade, and in patterns of capital 
investment and budgetary support.
We begin in this chapter by briefly reviewing various approaches to the definition 
and usage of dependence. Particular attention is given to the distinctions between 
functional and structural dimensions of dependence. Very small economies reflect both 
elements. In the concluding pages of the chapter we outline the most familiar constraints 
facing micro-states in any attempt to reduce their dependence in the international system; 
those problems which arise from the highly skewed structure of their very small 
economies.
282
The Concept of Dependence
What do we mean by dependence? It has been defined simply as "a subordinate 
relation to the outside world."1 This first suggests passivity: The dependent state moves in 
an external environment which is determined primarily by other actors. It cannot 
contribute to the shape and direction of events beyond its borders, however much they 
may affect its own interests. The dependent state is "system-ineffectual." Its foreign 
policy is "adjustment to reality, not rearrangement of it."2
However, dependence not only limits the opportunities for a state to condition its 
own external environment. The dependent state is itself vulnerable to external pressures 
which determine the scope and direction of its behaviour. As dependence deepens, so the 
state's capacity to qualify and adapt external influence is weakened. The dependent state 
can lose control even over its internal affairs as these become increasingly managed within 
the terms of external interests.
Economists as well as political scientists have stressed the importance of 
vulnerability as the critical element of dependence. Michael Michaely, for example, 
argues that "An agent is ‘dependent* on some phenomenon (or position, or act), if it is 
vulnerable to its complete disappearance or to disturbances in it; and the more severe the 
vulnerability, the heavier the dependence."3 Michaely’s concerns centred on the economic
Gabriele Winai Strbm, Development and Dependence in Lesotho-the Enclave o f South Africa (Uppsala: 
The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978), p. 14.
2Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputian Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics," International 
Organization XXIII (Spring, 1969, No. 2), 296.
See also: Vaughan A. Lewis and A. W. Singham, "Integration, Domination and the Small-State System: 
The Caribbean," in S. Lewis and T. G. Matthews (eds.) Caribbean Integration (Puerto Rico: Institute of 
Caribbean Studies, University of Puerto Rico, 1967), p. 128.
3Michaely understands this vulnerability to consist of two components: " . . .  the extent o f the damage that 
would occur should the disruption of the phenomenon on which the agent is dependent take place; the 
other is the likelihood of such an event, that is, of the disruption actually occurring. Dependence is thus 
a product of a multiplicand and multiplier. The larger either of the two components is- given the other- 
the larger is the vulnerability and the higher the degree of dependence.. . "
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vulnerabilities of states in terms of foreign trade, foreign capital and income, foreign 
labour and labour income, transfers of technology and macroeconomic influences and 
events.4
It is this second aspect of dependence, that is the issue of vulnerability, which is 
most critical to the question of a state's viability. The survival of a state may be 
determined finally, as Vital argues, by its capacity to withstand stress.5 Important here is 
the concept of "penetration," with its emphasis on the linkages between the internal 
processes of decision-making and the external sources of influence.
The notion that the contemporary state is increasingly permeable and porous is 
familiar enough.6 But, for James Rosenau, there are cases where the impact of the 
external environment will have been so profound as to produce "a new type of political 
system that will account for phenomena which not even a less rigid use of the national- 
international distinction renders comprehensible."7 Rosenau identifies this as "the 
penetrated political system" and describes it as follows:
A penetrated political system is one in which non-members of a national
society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly
Michael Michaely, Trade, Income Levels and Dependence (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 
1984), pp. 7-8.
4 Michaely focuses particularly on trade dependence. Both trade and foreign capital will be examined in 
an analysis of micro-state dependence in the next chapter.
^avid  Vital, The Inequality o f States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), pp. 4, 87,120.
6John H. Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," World Politics IX (July, 1957),
473-493.
Andrew M. Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 156-176.
7James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Bariy Farrell (ed.) Approaches to 
Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 65.
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with the society’s members, in either the allocation of its values or the 
mobilization of support on behalf of its goals.8
Rosenau's interest is in distinguishing those political systems where external actors 
are directly involved from those where they are merely "influential non-participants."9 
The involvement of non-members is the consequence of a "shortage of capabilities,"10 
which is recognised in the penetrated state and exploited from the outside. States which 
are "thoroughgoing" penetrated systems are those, such as Cuba or the formerly 
independent state in South Vietnam, where external participation in domestic politics is 
pervasive and extends over a broad range of issue-areas.11
Rosenau emphasises the importance of consent in his definition. The penetrated 
system is distinguished by the legitimacy accorded to the role of non-members in the 
allocation of values and the attainment of goals.12 Occupied France, for example, is not 
considered a penetrated system in Rosenau’s view because German attempts to allocate 
their own values and to mobilise the country in support of their goals met with 
resistance.13 This emphasis on the legitimacy of external participation presents problems in 
differentiating levels of consent. Rosenau interprets legitimacy to be that which is 
considered "binding, irrespective of whether . . . (it is) . . . accepted regretfully or
%lbid.
9Ibid.
1°Ibid., p. 68
uIbid., p. 66.
12As Rosenau puts it:
"Most important, the participation of non-members of the society in value-allocative and goal-attainment 
processes is accepted by both its officialdom and its citizemy, so that the decisions to which non­
members contribute are no less authoritative and legitimate than those in which they do not participate." 
Ibid., p. 64.
uIbid., p. 66.
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willingly."14 This could imply that consent may be given sullenly; an unhappy but realistic 
assessment of ill-fated national interests.15 In this situation domestic decision-makers are 
not so much persuaded as intimidated. This further suggests, (though the thrust of 
Rosenau's argument is towards collaboration), that the relationship between the penetrated 
state and external actors could be one of constant tension and hostility.
The implications of Rosenau's emphasis on consent have been taken up in later 
studies of dependence. The truly dependent society may be viewed as one in which the 
values and priorities of external interests are seen by decision makers (and perhaps by the 
masses) to be their own. This raises the question of the extent to which Rosenau's stress 
on "face-to-face interaction"16 is necessary. Decision-makers may be sensitive to external 
pressures, both private and governmental, without those pressures being personal and 
immediate. If external interests constitute the terms of reference within which policy is 
made, compliance will be unprompted and even intuitive.
Rosenau's approach to the subject confirms the asymmetry of the dependent state's 
relations with the outside world. On the one hand, it is unable to influence those events 
and conditions which determine its external environment. On the other, it is itself 
susceptible to external penetration in the determination of its values and goals. Simply 
put, the dependent state is characterised by one-way sensitivity to the outside world.
In practice, it is difficult to identify the threshold of dependence. Rosenau himself 
readily acknowledged the problems of classifying systems as penetrated: "What one 
observer treats as direct participation another may regard as indirect influence."17 The
ulbid., p. 69.
15Roseanau cites Finland's reluctant acceptance of Soviet participation in Finnish affairs as just such an 
example.
Ibid., p. 64.
l6Ibid., p. 69.
]1Ibid., p. 66.
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decision is finally arbitrary. The concepts of independence, inter-dependence and 
dependence can only be relative and contextual descriptions. Bernard Schaffer's 
observation that dependence is not a category but a "score of asymmetry"18 is a sensible 
acknowledgement that dependence is neither necessarily static nor comprehensive.
A state's "score" is determined by the "spread" of its dependence, which can be 
distributed unevenly over the range of a state's interests, as Rosenau acknowledged in his 
distinction between "thoroughgoing" and "less thoroughgoing" penetrated systems.19 A 
state may be largely dependent in its trading relationships but retain substantial autonomy 
in its defence policy and/or its diplomatic commitments. Guyana is just such an example. 
For much of the post-independence period, the United States accounted for one fifth of 
Guyana's total trade. It was also consistently a principal source of development 
assistance.20 Yet, Guyana was still able to pursue a radical and independent policy in the 
region and even in the larger context of East-West relations as her 1977 application for 
formal association with Comecon clearly illustrated.21 Moreover, Guyana's security can
18Bemard Schaffer, "The Politics of Dependence," in Percy Selwyn, (ed.) Development Policy in Small 
Countries (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 29.
19Rosenau, op. cit., pp. 66-67.
20While the United States is neither Guyana's principal market nor its main source of imports, it does 
account for the largest percentage of total trade. In 1981, the United States was Guyana's second most 
important market after the United Kingdom. Nearly 24 per cent of Guyana's exports went to the United 
States. In the same year, the United States was the source of nearly 21 per cent of Guyana's imports, 
second only to Trinidad and Tobago.
United Nations, International Trade Statistics Yearbook Volume I (New York: United Nations, 1987). 
The United States has consistently been among the three principal sources of bilateral aid to Guyana. 
Note Appendix n, Chapter Seven, Table X.
21 At the time, Guyana's trade with Comecon states was less than one per cent in either direction. The 
Manley government in Jamaica also sought to develop trade relations with Comecon in order "to 
complete (our) policy of non-alignment."
Keesings Contemporary Archives (1977) 28219, 29367 
"Guyana-Delicate Balance," Africa (Februaiy, 1978), 58-67.
Jean-Pierre Clerc, "Guyana, The Co-operative Republic: Socialist for Development Purposes," 
(translated from Le Monde), The Manchester Guardian Weekly, April 2, 1978, 13.
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hardly be said to depend on the United States, given American commitments to 
Venezuela, the likely source of any military threat. There is, then, no necessary spillover 
from dependence in one sector to that of another.
The distribution of a state's dependence is not only measured by the range of issues 
affected but also by the concentration of relationships. The scope for alleviating 
dependence is finally determined by the diversity of a state's dependent relationships. It is 
not just a question of ''subordination to the outside world;" it is the direction of 
subordination which determines the "score" of a state's dependence.
Important also is the extent to which a state's dependence is perceived as 
permanent. Is dependence rooted in conditions which are intrinsic to the state itself or is it 
contingent on factors which are liable to change? Alister McIntyre refers to this 
distinction as that of "structural dependence" and "functional dependence". Structural 
dependence is "the dependence that arises because of the size and structure of the 
economy and cannot be helped."22 Functional dependence is "the dependence which 
arises as a result of particular policies chosen and therefore can be avoided if alternative 
policies are chosen."23
Functional dependence can be seen as primarily self-imposed; the adoption of 
policies which are counter-productive and self-defeating when measured against objectives 
for greater autonomy. Dependence in these circumstances is largely a political- 
psychological handicap. The more acute the decision-makers' perceptions of their own 
weakness, the greater their inhibition in undertaking alternatives.24
“ Alister McIntyre, "Some Issues of Trade Policy in the West Indies," in N. Girvan and P. Jefferson (eds.) 
Readings in the Political Economy o f the Caribbean (Mona, Jamaica: New World Group, 1971), 
pp. 165-183.
™Ibid.
24 Percy Selwyn, "Room for Manoeuvre?," in Selwyn, op. cit.y pp. 17-18.
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The experience of dependence can be so debilitating that it engenders an 
overwhelming sense of impotence. For nationalist critics in Canada, for example, 
particularly in the 1970’s, it is this aspect of dependence which is finally so pernicious and 
compromising:
Canada has become so deeply penetrated by the American metropolis, so 
dependent on it- economically, militarily, culturally and psychologically- 
that we are overcome by our own sense of powerlessness. The possibility 
of independence seems doubtful and the cost of it stupendous.25
Defeatism may induce policies of reluctant acquiescence, or it may lead to policies 
of active and enthusiastic collaboration. In the latter instance, the institutional elements of 
dependence are sustained largely because external penetration of the state has advanced to 
the point that domestic values and interests, particularly those of the elites, coincide with 
the priorities of dominant external interests. This analysis of dependence, as we have 
noted, is apparent already in Rosenau's notion of 'the penetrated society.' And it this 
domestic collusion which is seen as the basis of the neo-colonial relationship.
For radical strategists, dependence on alien interests can only be overcome as 
national values are recovered and genuinely bold and independent policies are adopted. 
Using a Marxist framework of analysis, dependency theorists view dependence as 
underdevelopment resulting from penetration by the international capitalist economy. 
Development in the dependent state is limited and confined to the priorities and prevailing 
interests centered in the metropolitan economies.
25C. W. Gonick, "Foreign Ownership and Political Decay," in Ian Lumsden (ed.) Close to the 
49th Parallel etc.: The Americanization o f Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 44. 
This excellent collection of essays perhaps best represents the nationalist anxieties of the early Trudeau 
years, and in some cases, the application of dependency theory models to the American-Canadian 
relationship.
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The Brazilian sociologist, Theotonio dos Santos, describes dependence as follows:
By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain 
countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another 
economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of inter­
dependence between two or more economies, and between those and 
world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the 
dominant ones) can expand and can be self-starting, while other countries 
(the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, 
which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate 
development.26
There are, of course, important areas of dispute among dependency theorists in 
emphasis and approach, particularly in relation to the primacy of class or nation in the 
framework of analysis.27 However, there are general propositions which are common to 
the literature of dependency theory:28
(a) Third-World economies proceed from undevelopment to underdevelopment 
Underdeveloped economies do not reflect conditions of pre-capitalist economies. The 
historical process was one of undevelopment to underdevelopment, since both 
development and underdevelopment are the consequences of the expansion of
26Theotonio dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," in K. T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges (eds.) 
Readings in U.S. Imperialism (Boston: Porter and Sargent, 1971), p. 226.
27Henry Veltmeyer, "Dependency and Underdevelopment: Some Questions and Answers," Canadian 
Journal o f Political and Social Theory II (No. 2, Spring-Summer, 1978), 55
“ For a review of that literature see:
Ronald H. Chilcote, "Dependency: A Critical Synthesis of the Literature," Latin American Perspectives 
(No. 1, Spring, 1974), 4-29.
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international capitalism. Thus, the historical process of capitalism in the Third World may 
be seen as "the development of underdevelopment."29
(b) The dualistic model o f the underdeveloped economy is rejected as a basis for 
development strategy. The persistence of dualism is not the consequence of the resilience 
of feudal structures and subsistence activities resistant to the modernised sector, but a 
response to capitalist penetration in which the rural and traditional sectors of the economy 
stagnate to further the process of capital accumulation. Thus, the unequal patterns of 
development inherent in the capitalist division of labour are duplicated in the domestic 
structure of the underdeveloped economy.30
(c) The underdeveloped state has little hope o f becoming developed in the international 
capitalist economy. Since the growth in the capitalist centre is dependent on the 
continued extraction of surplus value from the underdeveloped economy, the dependent 
state's own prospects for development are limited, particularly in relation to the growth of 
the internal market. The transfer of profits precludes the development of a capital and 
intermediate goods sector sufficient to sustain an integrated industrial economy.31
(d) Dependence is sustained by the collaboration o f local clientele classes, whose 
interests and consumption patterns are those o f the capitalist centre?2 The role of the 
clientele classes emphasises the importance of dependency as penetration and the essential
29Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," Monthly Review, XVIII (No. 4, 
September, 1966), 17-31.
30Theotonio dos Santos, "The Crisis of Development Theory and the Problem of Dependence in Latin 
America," in Henry Bernstein (ed.) Underdevelopment and Development (London: Penguin Books, 
1976), pp. 57-80.
Keith Griffin, Underdevelopment in Spanish America (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), 
pp. 19-30.
31dos Santos, in Fann and Hodges, op. cit.
32Celso Furtado, "The Concept of External Dependence in the Study of Underdevelopment," in Charles K. 
Wilber (ed.) The Political Economy o f Development and Underdevelopment, (New York: Random 
House, 1973), pp. 118-123.
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functional character of dependency from a Marxist perspective. For Susanne 
Bodenheimer, "the existence o f . . . clientele classes . . .  is the kingpin and sine qua non of 
dependency."33
Dependency theory is a useful analytical framework for understanding the manifold 
and often subtle patterns of domination and dependence in the "post-imperial" age. The 
insistence that dependence is a function of economic penetration beyond the political and 
military dimensions of power allows for a greater appreciation of the complexity of the 
dependent condition. And the use of class analysis provides a basis for understanding the 
functional dimension of dependence and for appreciating the extent to which it can 
facilitate and reinforce structural elements.
However, dependency theorists underestimate factors which are crucial to the 
pattern and extent of dependence; social and cultural composition, demographic structure, 
location, and, most important, the size of the state. These factors may in themselves be 
the primary determinants of dependence and may preclude any opportunity for self- 
generating development, even if all linkages to the metropolitan economies were severed. 
A state's dependent condition may be seen, then, as a mosaic of overlapping structural 
elements. Moreover, the structural and functional elements of dependence themselves 
interact. Structural dependence may induce patterns of functional dependence but the 
reverse is also true. Timid or self-defeating policies may exaggerate and deepen structural 
disabilities in the dependent state. There is no question that dependency theory provides 
insight into the patterns of dependence in underdeveloped economies arising from the 
historical process of capitalist expansion. But, it is less certain that dependency theory 
offers a framework for strategies of development in those states where the potential for
33Susanne Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Under­
development," in Fann and Hodges, op. cit., p. 164.
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actual independence and a self-generating economy is checked finally by the sheer 
limitations of small size.
We return to an assessment of these options for micro-states in the concluding 
chapter.
Defining the Small State Economy
In considering the economic consequences of smallness, we begin with the 
problems of defining a small state for the purposes of economic analysis. Can we assume 
that the small state is necessarily a small economy? Some economists have been content 
to use a simple definition based on population size. Both Simon Kuznets34 and Michael 
Michaely35 accept the I.M.F. definition of a small state as one of less than ten million 
people. Robinson36 also based his definition on population but argued that the ceiling 
figure should be fifteen million so that "moderately small" economies like Belgium and the 
Netherlands could be included. Kuznets noted that the economic consequences of small 
size are progressively more evident the smaller the state in question.37 Similarly, William 
Demas preferred a lower figure of five million and added a geographic qualification of 
10,000-20,000 square miles of arable land.38
34Simon Kuznets, "The Economic Growth of Small Nations," in E. A. G. Robinson, The Economic 
Consequences o f the Sizes o f Nations (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1963), p. 14.
35Michael Michaely, Concentration in International Trade (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 
1962).
36E. A. G. Robinson, "Introduction," in Robinson (ed.), op. cit.
37Kuznets in Robinson, Ibid., pp. 14-15.
38William G. Demas, The Economics o f Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the 
Caribbean (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965), p. 22.
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For others,39 the size of the economy is a question of national income. It is the 
size o f the market which is important and this may not always relate to population size. 
Many of the greatly populated Third World states are small countries for the purposes of 
economic analysis, particularly in comparison to the "small" but advanced economies of 
Western Europe:
1992 Population G.D.P. 
tPer Capita Income)
G.D.P. 
(millions $ U.S.)
PAKISTAN 102.5 million $350.00 $31,650
SWEDEN 8.4 million $28,291.00 $244,77440
Some economists, then, have chosen to allow for the importance of population, 
geography and income in a composite definition of the small economy.41 Michael Ward, 
for example, has argued that "an economy (or region) is small when it is unable to devise 
techniques of organisation, production or marketing free from reliance on foreign or 
metropolitan institutions."42 Thus, we have come full circle. It is the degree of 
dependence which determines the definition of small size: The small economy is the 
dependent economy.
39Peter J. Lloyd, International Trade Problems o f Small Nations (Durham, N.C. Duke University Press, 
1968), p. 11.
Sidney Dell, Trade Blocs and Common Markets (London: Constable and Co., Ltd, 1963), p. 166.
40 1987 data. The World Bank World Development Report 1989 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989).
41G. Leduc and J. Weiller, "The Size of the Economy and its Relation to Stability and Steady Progress: II," 
in Robinson, op. cit., p. 200.
G. Marcy, "How Far Can Foreign Trade Confer Upon Small Nations the Advantages of Large Nations," 
in Robinson, Ibid., p. 266.
42Michael Ward, "Dependent Development- Problems of Economic Planning in Small Developing 
Countries," in Selwyn, op. cit., p. 116.
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For our purposes, however, the use of population size does conform to other 
measurements of the small economy. The 43 small states in our list are small by every 
agreed standard. We have used a ceiling of six million, clearly below the I.M.F. figure and 
approximating the classifications used by Demas and Raynolds.43
Moreover, less than half of these states have a 1992 G.N.P. of over $4 billion 
which Barend de Vries regarded in 1967 as the market definition of a small economy.44 
Finally, our central focus, after all, is the micro-state. Our selected small states are 
included only for comparative purposes. States with a population of less than one million 
are also unquestionably small in economic terms. Only six micro-states exceed de Vries' 
ceiling G.N.P. figure of $4 billion, while most have a G.N.P. of far less than SI billion.
The Skewed Structure of the Small Economy
The economic disabilities of small size are most obvious in the highly skewed 
structure of the small state economy. The small state is typically concentrated in its 
economic activity. The explanation for this tendency is two-fold: The small state suffers 
first from problems of resource deficiency and, second, from limitations derived from 
diseconomies of scale.
Small Size and Resource Deficiency
Resource deficiency first suggests material poverty; a state which possesses little 
of marketable value. But, it also refers to the lack of diversity in a state's resource base,
43David Raynolds identified "small protean economies" as those states with populations under six million. 
David R. Raynolds, Rapid Development in Small Economies; The Example o f El Salvador (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 102.
44This figure was "a convenient dividing point," in de Vries' 1967 World Bank paper on the export 
performance of developing countries. He continued to employ this classification in later studies.
Barend A. de Vries, "Development Aid to Small Countries," in Selwyn, op. cit., p. 165.
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which can apply to rich and poor states alike. The notion that the small state commands a 
limited range of resources is based on the assumption that a state small in population is 
also likely to be small in territory.45 This in turn implies a limited distribution of mineral 
resources and less variety in topographical, soil and climatic conditions necessary for a 
broad range of agricultural production.
However, the initial assumption that there is a correlation between demographic 
and geographic size is not entirely justified with the small states in this study. Most of 
these states are more than 100,000 square miles in area. This is about the size of West 
Germany or the former Yugoslavia, comparatively large territories. Among micro-states, 
however, the correlation is justified. Only Gabon has a territory of more than 100,000 
square miles in area. Most are less than 10,000 square miles and half are less than 1,000 
square miles. There is little doubt, then, that the micro-state is as diminutive in area as it is 
in population size.
The second assumption that a small territory is likely to provide only a narrow 
resource base must also be qualified. An expansive territory does not necessarily mean 
that a country will enjoy a diversity of natural resources. Some of the largest small states 
are vast barren tracts. In some cases, the sparse population of these territories is itself a 
reflection of their material deficiencies. Similarly, a small territory does not mean that the 
potential for resource development is confined to a few products. Swaziland, though only 
6,700 square miles in area, benefits from profitable deposits of iron ore, asbestos, and coal 
in addition to a comparatively diverse range of agricultural products: sugar, citrus fruit, 
rice, maize and sorghum. Livestock, timber and cotton production are also important. 
Moreover, many small coastal and island states are looking increasingly to the sea to
45George L. Reid, A Comparative Study o f the Foreign Policies o f Very Small States with Special 
Reference to the Commonwealth Caribbean (University of Southampton, Ph.D. dissertation, 1971), 
p. 234.
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augment their resource base. The maritime dimension of a state's territory can 
significantly extend its effective geographic size.46
Yet, even if a state does possess a variety of resources, its impact on the structure 
of the state's economy will depend ultimately on the volume and value of those resources 
and, most importantly, on the ease with which they can be exploited. Peter Lloyd has 
argued that the resource base of a state should be understood to include factors other than 
mineral and agricultural products.47 The location of the state, transportation, and 
communications advantages and the skills of its people are not necessarily correlated with 
geographic size.
To what extent, then, is the narrow resource base argument useful in explaining 
the skewed structure of small state and micro-state economies? Allowing for obvious 
exceptions, it is reasonable to assume that the likelihood of a diverse mineral and 
agricultural resource base will be greater the larger the territory. This is particularly true 
of micro-states. A few micro-states enjoy a comparatively diverse range of mineral and 
agricultural resources and these are the larger territories in the micro-state group: Guyana, 
Surinam and particularly Gabon. But, even these states still have few resources in terms 
of any significant impact on the structure of the state's economy. A resource base 
sufficiently rich and varied to allow diversification of economic activity would have to be 
much more extensive than is the case with any of the micro-states and most of the small 
states included here.
The micro-state is typically a developing economy based on the export of a few 
primary commodities. The extent of this resource deficiency and the consequent 
skewnesss of the economy is reflected in the commodity concentration levels of their
^John Connell, Sovereignty and Survival: Island Microstates in the Third World (Sydney: University of 
Sydney, Department of Geography, Research Monograph No. 3,1988), pp. 46-50.
47Lloyd, op. cit., p. 5.
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exports. Only for the oil producers is the impact of a narrow resource base potentially less 
restrictive, since their huge revenues can be used to develop alternative sectors of the 
economy. For most micro-states, their products are highly vulnerable to demand elasticity 
and price fluctuation and their problems of development and eventual diversification are 
much more formidable.
Moreover, the extremes of resource deficiency are particularly evident among 
micro-states. In the Maldive Islands, for example, the economy is based solely on dried 
fish; in The Gambia, groundnuts; in Lesotho, mohair; in a number of South Pacific states, 
copra. In these cases, resource deficiency is pathetic and the prospects for real 
development are bleak.
Extreme smallness exacerbates the effects of other geographical liabilities to limit 
the potential for resource development. Kiribati, Tuvalu and other low-lying atolls, for 
example, are too small to allow any of the geological and topographical variations of the 
larger islands. With unpredictable patterns of precipitation and an early susceptibility to 
saline infiltration, there is little potential for any crop other than copra.48 Moreover, these 
economies have no resilience in the face of natural disaster. With so little space and a 
single product there is no margin for retreat or an alternative course. The whole economy 
could be devastated.49
For some micro-states the only exploitable resource is their location. Djibouti has 
no natural resources whatsoever and its economy is based primarily on its importance as a 
rail centre and port for Ethiopia and the ancillary services which that entails. Djibouti’s 
location also gives it strategic importance. The French naval base has been a major prop
^R. G. Ward, "The Consequences of Smallness in Polynesia," in Burton Benedict (ed.) Problems o f Small 
Territories (London: University of London: The Institute of Commonwealth Studies, The Athlone Press, 
1967), pp. 82-83.
A9Ibid., p. 83.
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of the country's economy and is responsible for the comparatively high level of its social 
services.50 Other micro-states, Malta and Iceland, also profited from their strategic value 
to the major powers, though in the case of Iceland this was always a marginal contribution 
to the island’s post-war prosperity. Moreover, this form of economic support is 
increasingly unacceptable. The very smallness of the micro-state makes it difficult to 
absorb a large foreign presence without social and cultural dislocation. The 
disproportionately huge American population in Iceland resulted for a time in widespread 
Icelandic opposition to the Keflavik base.51
Moreover, when the primary resource is the strategic value of the state itself, the 
economy becomes dependent on the defence policies of other powers, which are liable to 
change. The declining British interest in the Mediterranean and the accompanying cuts in 
the defence budget imposed serious problems of recession and unemployment and the 
need to restructure the Maltese economy, which had been based primarily on the defence 
sector.52 Many micro-states are in a position to exploit the strategic interests of major 
powers and some, like the Maldives, are desperately in need of the income which a foreign 
base could bring.53 Though this has been a principal concern in the subject of micro-state
50James Buxton, "Independence on a Wing and a Prayer-Djibouti Comes of Age," The Financial Times,
24 June, 1977.
Anthony Hughes, "Djibouti- France: the Reluctant Colonialist?," Africa Report (Nov.-Dec., 1975),
10-14.
51 As one observer noted, the American force of 3,000-4,000 troops is "the equivalent of stationing some 
four million alien soldiers and their families in the United States."
Thraninn Eggertsson, "Determinants of Icelandic Foreign Relations," Co-operation and Conflict X 
(No. 2,1975), 94.
52John Dowdall, "The Political Economy of Malta," The Round Table (No. 248, October, 1972),
465-473.
"Malta-Financial Times Report," The Financial Times, 6 February, 1975.
53When the British withdrew from Gan in 1976 a number of states expressed interest in the base. 
Maldivian President Ibrahim Nasir announced that he had turned down a Soviet offer of $1,000,000 to 
lease Gan- a courageous decision, given the Maldives' limited opportunities for income.
Liz Colton, "The Strategic Isles on the Oil Routes," Gemini News Service, No G66432,1978.
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decolonisation, notably in the Indian Ocean,54 it has not proven an attractive option. In 
most cases, the presence of a foreign power seems too flagrant a compromise of national 
dignity and newly-won independence.55
There are, however, other ways in which a state can exploit its location to 
compensate for a deficiency of material resources, particularly if there is potential for 
tourism. The most promising resource for many of the micro-states in this study may 
seem to be their place in the sun. With few exceptions, development policies encourage 
expansion in the tourist industry. For some island micro-states in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean and the Pacific, tourism is by far the most important component of gross 
domestic product.56 Moreover, the potential for tourism is increasingly true even for 
remote and exotic locations in the fog and wind belt of the far North.57 Yet tourism does 
not necessarily ensure economic security and the promise of significant diversification. 
Demand patterns are fickle and highly sensitive to economic conditions in industrialised 
countries. Moreover, the long term multiplier effects of tourism are doubtful, at least in 
developing economies, since the major beneficiaries tend to be foreign-owned hotel
54Robert G. Irani and William O. Staudenmaier, "Microstates and the Balance of Power in the 
Contemporary International System," Naval War College Review XXXI (No. 1, Sequence 268, 
Summer, 1978), 76-96.
55 Of course, some micro-states, like Bahrain and Qatar, have willingly offered their territory for military 
purposes. In these cases, however, the incentive has little do with possible benefits to their economies. 
Both states are sufficiently prosperous to ignore the blandishments of Great Powers. These decisions 
are simply rooted in national and regional security.
56This is particularly the case for the Commonwealth Caribbean micro-states.
Connell, op. cit., p. 62.
Inaccessibility leaves some micro-states (S3o Tom£ and Principe, the Comoros, and the most remote 
Pacific islands) far behind in the competition for tourist dollars.
57 Consider, for example, the growth of adventure tourism and convention tourism in Iceland. Pony treks 
and camping expeditions appeal to a growing German market particularly. New Years fireworks, 
dinner parties on a glacier are enticements in Iceland’s appeal in the back pages of The New Yorker 
urging public and private organisations to hold their conventions at the top of the world.
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chains, airlines and shipping companies, travel firms and overseas producers of goods for 
the tourist sector.
There is some short term benefit for the construction industry (though 
accompanied by an inflation in land values) and a longer term benefit to those engaged in 
local transportation and the production of certain foods for the tourist sector.58
However, the distribution of benefits is not to the long term benefit of the domestic 
population. 'Leakage' could be so high that the returns may not justify the social costs.59 
The more prestigious and financially rewarding positions in the industry tend to be held by 
expatriates, thus risking the possibility that in a highly tourist-dependent economy, the 
indigenous populations will become a nation of bus boys and parlour maids. For some 
critics the tourist sector offers little more than "a replication of the plantation economy."60
The "demonstration effect" of a large influx of tourists, who import lifestyles and 
consumption patterns beyond the reach but not the expectations of the local population, 
can have lasting consequences for the stability of the country, particularly if the resulting 
sense of relative deprivation is associated with class and racial differences. There is 
concern too for the cultural costs of tourism if the local culture is reduced to that of "a 
human zoo . . .  (where). . .  local people (are) encouraged to be 'interesting natives' and go 
through traditional movements for the benefit of goggling strangers."61 These problems 
are particularly evident in very small economies where the density of tourism is so high.
58S. G. Britton, "The Political Economy of Tourism in the Third World," Annals o f Tourism Research IX 
(1982), 331-358.
59John M. Biyden, Tourism and Development (Cambridge: The University Press, 1973), pp. 71-96.
60H. C. Brookfield, Colonialism, Development and Independence: The Case o f the Melanesian Islands in 
the South Pacific (Cambridge: The University Press, 1972), p. 134.
M. Salter, "The Economy of the South Pacific," Pacific Viewpoint XI (No. 1, May, 1970), 13.
61Biyden, op. cit.
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Moreover, tourism may deepen existing patterns of dependence. For most states 
with significant tourist industries, there are high indices of geographical concentration in 
the sources of the tourist population. The external base of the tourist industry is typically 
the principal trading partner and the primary source of aid and investment.62
There are also "invisible" factors of dependence; the inhibitions derived from the 
necessity of maintaining a good image. It is important that the host country pursue 
policies which reflect conditions of stability and which ensure attitudes of confidence and 
favour in the tourists' home countries. Tourism, then, may offer some measure of 
diversification for countries with a limited range of resources. But it may not offer much 
opportunity to reach beyond existing patterns of dependent relationships, unless there are 
vigorous and determined efforts to market their destination outside these familiar 
patterns.63 And that is difficult, given the enormous costs, particularly for very small 
economies, of embarking on marketing initiatives in expensive new markets against tough 
and much better endowed competition.
All that being said, tourism is still the world’s largest industry, and a growth 
industry at that. If it is pursued in tandem with other strategic diversification initiatives it 
has and can continue to offer very small economies some measure of optimism in moving 
towards self-reliance or at least a more flexible regime of dependence management. For 
those very small jurisdictions, long dependent on a single primary resource, the Faroes, for 
example on a diminishing cod fishery, tourism offers hope for relief from the utter despair 
of a society bankrupt for its monoculture.64
62Brookfield, op. cit.
63Ban It Chiu quoted in Biyden, op. cit., p. 94.
64 The Iceland Reporter, XXII (Number 241, March, 1996), 1, 15.
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Some micro-states with limited resources also exploit the economic advantages of 
their separate international identity in other areas of the service economy. The "resource 
potential" of legal status is an increasingly attractive option for micro-states. They serve as 
off-shore financial centres and tax havens, free ports, and flags-of-convenience: 
Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Malta, the Bahamas, Bahrain and Vanuatu and Nauru in the 
South Pacific.65 Others trade on their distinctive international identity in philatelic and 
numismatic markets. This has long been a lucrative practice for Tonga. In Tuvalu 
philately is the principal source of non-grant income and the second most important 
employer in the country.
In many cases service activities which exploit location and legal status are so 
important that the structure of the economy is as skewed as for those states dependent on 
particular commodities.66
All micro-states, then, are resource deficient if we understand resource sufficiency 
to mean a material endowment diverse enough to support a wide variety of economic 
activities. Though resource deficiency partially explains the narrow base of economic 
activity in micro-states, it is the manufacturing sector which is most relevant to the 
question of economic diversification. Here the limitations of very small size are evident in 
the early imposition of diseconomies of scale. It is to this aspect of the problem that we 
turn now.
Small Size and Economies o f Scale
The potential for economic diversification in the small state is ultimately limited by 
the problems of achieving economies of scale. A reduction of costs sufficient to allow
“ Caroline Doggart, Tax Havens and Their Uses (London: The Economist Publications, Special Report 
No. 1191,1990).
“ Connell, op. cit., p. 68.
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maximum efficiency and competitiveness means production at optimum size. But for the 
small state, indivisibilities of plant and productive processes in many industries are such 
that optimum size would require a level of demand far beyond that of the domestic market 
alone. Robinson estimated that a high-income market of fifty million people was 
necessary in order to achieve economies of scale in the major areas of industrial 
production,67 while Demas believes that for populations of under three million economies 
of scale are unlikely even in public administration.68 The constraints and risks of a small 
market preclude many of the activities possible in larger economies: They cannot be 
supported in states as small as those in this study.
Diseconomies of scale operate to constrict the scope for diversification in small 
economies at all stages of development. But, as market size is subject to national income, 
the small industrialised state will permit economies of scale to be achieved more readily 
than in a developing economy of similar size. Consequently, the structure of the economy 
will be more diversified the higher the state of development.
Yet, differences in the degree of diversification are even more pronounced between 
large and small industrialised economies than between small economies at different levels 
of development.69 Since the structure of demand does not become less diverse as its 
volume is reduced, the material requirements of the small economy exceed domestic 
capabilities. Aggregate limits to total productive capacity in the small economy will 
restrict the range of activities possible.70 And, in spite of high income, diseconomies of 
scale still act to prevent production of a wide range of goods required for the home
67Robinson, op. cit., p. xviii.
“ Demas, op. cit., p. 57.
69Michaely, Concentration in International Trade, op. cit., p. 16.
70Lloyd, op. cit., p. 19.
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market. The diversity of demand, then, is met through imports and this means that 
domestic production must be channelled into particular areas for export.
The small industrialised economies developed specialised areas of production 
where they had a comparative advantage either in geographical position (Belgium), natural 
resources (Sweden),71 or in the efficiency and skills of the workforce (Switzerland).72 In 
some cases, the domestic market served as a springboard for the expansion of the industry 
through exports. In the case of Switzerland, however, where 95% of the output in the 
four major areas of production is exported, the importance of the domestic market as a 
basis for development is less certain.73
Earlier explorations into the comparative success of the small industrialised 
economies in overcoming the problems of scale suggested that these cases did not serve as 
encouraging models for the development strategies of Third World states. Contemporary 
conditions are more unfavourable, it was argued, than they were when the European states 
embarked on industrialisation. As Demas pointed out, those small states were able to 
benefit from a greater elasticity of higher-income demand for manufactured goods and 
more labour intensive processes in smaller units of production, which made economies of 
scale less significant than now. Most important, however, these small states were able to 
exploit more liberalised conditions of trade and thus escape the limitations of the domestic 
market.74
For all but a few of the states in this study the problems of small size are 
exacerbated by the familiar conditions of economic underdevelopment. Deficiencies of
71I. Svennilson, "The Concept of the Nation and its Relevance to Economic Analysis," in Robinson, 
op. cit., p. 352.
72W. A. Johr and F. Kneschaurek, "Study of the Efficiency of a Small Nation," Ibid., pp. 54-77.
nIbid., pp. 63-64.
74Demas, op. cit., pp. 83-84.
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internal transportation and communications separate large sections of the population from 
the centres of economic activity.75 There may be a significant subsistence sector. And 
cultural and ethnic divisions can be reflected in demand patterns to fragment an already 
small market even further.76
The gloomy prospects derived from arguments of scale can, on the other hand, be 
exaggerated. Though large-scale heavy industry is not feasible for most small states, there 
are still opportunities in other areas of production: textiles, footwear, beverages and food 
processing.77 There may be prospects for agro-industrial projects or secondary processing 
established around an export staple. Depending on other development indicators, 
particularly the skills and potential adaptability of the work-force, there are opportunities 
even in areas of high technology. The development of the electronics industry in 
Singapore is an encouraging example.
Clearly, the impact of scale depends on the industry in question. The scope for 
industrial production may be greater than it first appears, for optimum size does not 
always determine feasibility. As Sidney Dell noted, minimum plant size can be as much as 
one-fifth of the largest efficient size.78 A comparison of five industries in the United States 
and Trinidad and Tobago indicated that comparative diseconomies of scale in Trinidad 
were only marginal.79 Moreover, many activities are best established in the domestic 
market, however small. This includes local transportation and communications systems, a
75Lloyd, op. cit., p. 8.
76Ward in Selwyn, op. cit., p. 122.
77Dell, op. cit., p. 49.
™Ibid., p. 47.
79A. D. Knox, "Some Economic Problems of Small Countries," in Burton Benedict (ed.) Problems o f 
Smaller Territories (London: University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, The Athlone 
Press, 1967), pp. 43-44.
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variety of other direct services and the construction and building materials industries, 
where considerations of transport costs allow domestic production to be practical even in 
a small market.80 These opportunities are particularly important for the island micro- 
states. Often construction, cement production and local services constitute the whole of 
the non-agricultural sector of the economy.
Still, even in these areas of potential development, small size can be an inhibiting 
and disabling factor. Cost-efficiency is weakened by the probability that industries in a 
small economy will function as monopolies.81 Moreover, aggregate size limits the 
intellectual resources necessary for product development, particularly in areas of more 
advanced technology.82 Without the support of adequate research there is always risk to 
the industry's continuing competitiveness. These conditions are exacerbated if the small 
state is cut off from the mainstream of the industrialised world with only limited and 
irregular channels of communication and information. For all but a few well placed micro­
states these particular consequences of small scale will be serious obstacles to 
development in more sophisticated areas of production.
The most important consequence of small size, however, is the early ceiling 
imposed on the development of an intermediate and capital goods sector. The domestic 
market in these states is simply too small to support the range of products necessary for 
the inter-industrial linkages and interdependence essential to a rounded structure of
80Kuznets in Robinson, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
81Demas, op. cit., p. 57.
Donald B. Keesing, "Small Population as a Political Handicap to National Development," Political 
Science Quarterly LXXXIV (No. 1, March, 1969), 52.
82David Vital, The Inequality o f States (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 44.
Demas, op. cit., p. 57.
Kuznets in Robinson, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
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production. For most of the developing states these linkages are first established around a 
particular growth industry centred on an agricultural or mineral resource.
But, as H. C. Brookfield has observed, the opportunities for establishing linkages 
even on this basis are limited both in range and volume.83 "Backward linkages" such as 
international transportation systems tend to be confined to the points of export. "Forward 
linkages" are limited to early stages of processing since more advanced stages are not 
feasible because of diseconomies of scale. The scope for "demand linkages," where 
consumer goods are produced for the export sector, are reduced for the same reasons.84
Demas has emphasised that it is this aspect of the problem of scale which is most 
discouraging for the development prospects of small states. Diseconomies of scale hit the 
small developing economy at its most vulnerable point; the growth of the manufacturing 
sector.85 For Demas, then, "small size" is the critical factor in limiting the small developing 
state's potential for achieving structural transformation of its economy. It might succeed 
in developing an important and profitable manufacturing centre based on particular export 
industries, but diseconomies of scale will preclude the establishment of the wide range of 
activities necessary for a balanced economy and self-sustained growth. As the small 
economy cannot be diverse and well-rounded so it cannot be independent and self- 
generating.86
This does not mean that diseconomies of scale are an insurmountable obstacle to 
prosperity in small states and micro-states. A state which is able to exploit a valuable
83H. C. Brookfield, "Multum in Parvo: questions about diversity and diversification in small developing 
countries," in Selwyn, op. cit., p. 54.
*AIbid.
85Demas, op. cit., p. 82.
86Demas was soon criticised by scholars in his own region for his pessimism and defeatism.
Lloyd Best, "Size and Survival," New World Quarterly II (No. 3, 1966), 58-63.
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resource or which commands large earnings from invisible exports can enjoy enviable 
living standards. Moreover, the problems of scale are not confined to small states and 
micro-states. Small market size is a characteristic feature of economic underdevelopment 
and diseconomies of scale also operate to produce a skewed economic structure in many 
larger developing states. However, for these states there is greater potential for economic 
diversification. As suggested, the resource base of the larger state is likely to be more 
varied. Resource development may be more a problem of investment and technology than 
of scarcity. More important, however, the potential size of the market in the large 
developing state is sufficient to support eventually a diversified and balanced structure of 
production.
The major limitation for the small state is the inevitable early ceiling on market 
potential. Small size limits the extent to which the economy can be diversified. And, it is 
the question of diversification which is crucial in the analysis of small state and micro-state 
dependence.
In summary, the limited range of activities possible in the small economy is due 
first to the correlation between small size and a narrow and thus deficient resource base 
and, second, to the early intervention of diseconomies of scale. The small economy is 
characteristically unbalanced, the highly skewed structure of production being unequal to 
the diversity of domestic demand. We turn now to the two most oft-cited dimensions of 
dependence in the international relations of small states and micro-states; vulnerability in 
patterns of trade and external capital flows.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Patterns of Trade and Capital Flows 
in the International Economic Relations of Micro-States
If small economies are typically viewed as structurally dependent with very little 
"room to manoeuvre,"1 it is largely because of their perceived vulnerability to external 
markets and outside sources of capital. They exist in an increasingly competitive 
international economy with limited options and few instruments to shape their economic 
milieu. Micro-states, even the most prosperous among them, are bit players in the 
international economy to be sure. Yet, some of the direst prognoses are based as much on 
intuition as on evidence. Until recently, much of the statistical data of micro-state 
international economic relations was not available, even to United Nations agencies. 
Now, however, there is sufficient data to draw a profile of micro-states and other small 
states in the international economy.
In this chapter we examine two areas of micro-state international economic 
relations which are central to any discussion of dependence; trade and capital formation. 
Of course, there are many other areas which can frustrate efforts to diversify and to 
achieve some measure of self-reliance. Still, it is the apparent vulnerability of micro-states 
and small states in general in their trade and in their sources of capital which are glaring 
and recurring themes in the literature. We begin with the trading patterns of these small 
economies.
1 Percy Selwyn, "Room to Manoeuvre," in Percy Selwyn (ed.), Development Policy in Small Countries 
(London: Croom Helm, 1975), pp. 8-24.
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Micro-State Trade in the International Economy
Thus far we have discussed the structure of the small economy as typically 
confined to a limited range of domestic production. Because of this imbalance it is highly 
dependent on external trade. As the wide range of domestic needs can only be met 
through imports, domestic production is geared primarily to the export sector. And, to 
exploit comparative advantage in world markets, the small economy must specialise. At 
the same time, only through external demand will economies of scale in the specialised 
sectors be achieved. Thus, the small state's greater dependence on trade is both "the 
consequence and complement"2 of the skewed structure of its economy.
Continuing with our use of small states between one and six million for 
comparative reference, we examine in this chapter micro-states as dependent economies in 
the international trading system.3
The first section of this chapter focuses on the most important indices of trade 
dependence; the levels of commodity concentration in export trade and the correlation
2S. Kuznets, "Economic Growth of Small Nations," in Austin Robinson (ed.), The Economic
Consequences o f the Size o f Nations (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1963), p. 21.
3The selected cases in this chapter do not include certain European micro-states: Andorra, whose 
status was not resolved until 1993 and Monaco and San Marino for which separate data is not 
available. Nor do these tables include those states which reached independence following the collection 
and compilation of this data: the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau in the micro state group, and 
Eritrea and the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics in the larger small state group. International 
trade statistics are notoriously behind the year of publication of most statistical volumes. This is 
particularly true of developing states, especially those in the micro-state class. Indeed, the most recent 
data is in some cases earlier than the 1986 base which is used in these tables. The intention of these 
tables in this chapter is not to give a definitive profile of every country’s trading patterns for every year 
since independence. That would be an enormous undertaking for some 80 states and far beyond the 
scope of this portion of what is, after all, a larger consideration of micro-state relations. By using 1975 
and 1986 bench mark figures, particularly in the critical indices of commodity and geographic 
concentration of trade, we are able to paint a picture of small state and micro-state patterns of trade 
during a decade of independence in so far as that picture relates to issues of dependence and dependence 
management in these states.
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between small size and high levels of concentration in the direction of trade. We begin by 
assessing the comparative importance of trade in the economies of micro-states and small 
states in the next population class.
Small Size and Dependence on Trade
The extent to which small economies are dependent on trade can be illustrated 
most simply by calculating the ratio of exports and imports to gross national product. In 
an early study of weak states in international politics Marshall Singer estimated that a high 
degree of trade dependence was evident if trade exceeded more than 20 percent of gross 
national product.4 However, Singer conceded that this was the case for two-thirds of the 
states in the international system and that only the continental economies of the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. had trade ratios which at that time fell below ten percent.5
Yet, among small states and micro-states the extent of trade dependence is 
particularly extreme. No state in either class falls below 20%. Even 30% is a low trade 
ratio for states of this size. No micro-state and only five of the small states listed have a 
ratio to G.N.P. of less than 30 percent. On the other hand, all but five micro-states and 
more than half the small states in the next population class exceed 50 percent.6 The 
average trade ratio for the small state groups is 62.3%; for micro-states it is 85.5%.
The level of trade dependence is not related to the size of the G.N.P. itself. If we
4Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World o f Powers (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 
p. 238.
5 Ibid.
6 Note Table II in Appendix I to this chapter.
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divide the states into three groups according to the size of the G.N.P., we see that there is 
a wide distribution in the ratios in each group.
G.N.P. Below Sib. $lb. - S 5 b | | Over $5b
Lowest Ratio 37.0 22.7 23.9
Highest Ratio 212.0 259.6 263.7
And these wide variations hold if we divide these groups further according to our 
population classification, though the variations are much greater among micro-states, 
except in the over $5 billion group which includes only Luxembourg.
G.N.P. Below Sib, $lb.>  $3b. Over $5b.
Micro States: Lowest 37.2 50.3 13.0
Highest 212.0 259.6 32.2
Other Small States: Lowest 37.0 22.7 23.9
Highest 158.4 143.1 263.7
However, the extent of trade dependence among small states is related to the level 
of per capita income. The average ratio o f total trade to G.N.P. for the poorest states 
(with a per capita income of less than $480 per annum) is 48.5 in the small state group and 
68 for micro-states. But at the highest income level (a per capita income over $6000 per 
annum) the average ratios are 82.7 and 101.3 respectively.
Average Ratios o f Trade to G.N.P. by Income Levels7
Lower 
$480 or less
Middle 
$480- $1940 
$1940 - $6000
Higher 
over $6,000
Micro-states 
Small states
(9) 68.0 
(14) 48.5
(15) 92.0 (7) 76.2 
(13) 72.5 (5) 53.9
(8) 101.3 
(8) 82.7
For the industrialised high income state, a greater trade dependence is the 
consequence of every manufactured export having a high import content. As 
manufactured products' share of exports increases, the greater the need for imported 
intermediate and capital goods. In a newly industrialised economy like Singapore, for 
example, the overall trade ratio is 263.7. The ratio of exports to G.N.P. is itself high 
(123.5) but the ratio o f imports to G.N.P. is 140.2. Ironically, then, the small economy's 
dependence on trade increases the more developed it becomes.
Moreover, as income levels rise, domestic demand for consumer goods expands. 
The greater variety o f goods required can only be met through additional imports. And 
since it is the growth of consumer demand which is important, the emphasis here is on 
levels of income rather than development. Higher trade ratios, then, can be evident in 
economies, like the oil states, where wealth is not related to extensive industrialisation.
7The World Bank Atlas 1988 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1988)
By 1994 there had been no significant changes. Micro-states fell into the same income groups that they 
had in 1986, though the monetary definitions of those groups had changed.
The World Bank Atlas 1996 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996).
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A high trade ratio can also reflect the importance of tourism in the economy, even 
for lower income states. Tourists bring with them the demand patterns of advanced 
economies and the host state must import a wide range of goods to meet the needs of the 
tourist sector. For some states, the annual tourist influx is many times their own 
population size.8 Thus, micro-states such as the Seychelles, Mauritius and the islands of 
the Commonwealth Caribbean, which rely heavily on tourism, reflect very high indices of 
trade dependence. As this suggests, trade dependence for most small states and micro- 
states is primarily a problem of import consumption.9 The average ratio of imports to 
G.N.P. for all 80 states is 45.9 compared to the average total trade ratio of 73.6.
A further examination of import ratios will reveal the marked differences between 
micro-states and other small states in the extent to which they are dependent on imports. 
Micro-states are clearly unable to provide even the most fundamental needs from then- 
own resources. The average ratio of imports to G.N.P. is 36.7 for the small states listed 
but 55.1 for micro-states and this greater dependence of micro-states on imports is evident 
at every level of per capita income.
8In 1993, St. Lucia, for example, with a population of 120,300 received 342,400 tourists which accounted 
for one half of the country’s foreign exchange earnings.
The Europa World Yearbook 1994 (London, Europa Publications, 1994), pp. 2534-2539.
Malta is an even more dramatic example. In the same year Malta received 1,063,000 visitors which 
earned the country $653 million.
^ o te  Table III in Appendix I to this chapter.
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Average Ratios o f Import Trade to G.N.P. bv Annual Per Capita Income Levels
Lower 
$480 or less
Middle •§.. 
$480$ 1940 
$1940-$6000
Higher 
Over $6000
Micro-states 
Small states
(9) 47.0 
(14) 32.8
(15) 61.3 
(7) 53.3 
(13) 44.0 
(5) 30.3
(8) 54.1 
(8) 40.0
Only six micro-states, as compared to 24 other small states, have import ratios of 
less than 30. This group includes poor and remote states with a large subsistence sector 
but it also includes wealthy oil exporting nations whose import bills are still large but small 
only in relation to a G.N.P. swollen because of huge export earnings.
Moreover, 20 micro-states as compared to only eight o f the other small states have 
import ratios of more than 50. These include those states with a large re-export trade 
(Bahrain, the Bahamas, Antigua and Barbuda); tourist havens (the Seychelles, most of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean states) and some lower income states whose own resource 
deficiency is such that practically all goods have to be imported (for example, the 
Maldives).
The difference between micro-states and other small states is also evident in the 
figures relating to export trade, though it is less pronounced.10 The average ratio of
10 See Table IV in Appendix I to this chapter.
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exports to G.N.P. is 25.6 for the small states and 36.8 for micro-states. Among high 
income states the discrepancies between micro-states and other small states is marked. In 
this group the average export ratio for small states is 42.6 but 71.1 for micro-states. 
However, in other income groups, the differences between the two size groups are not 
dramatic.
Average Ratios of Export Trade to G.N.P. by Annual Per Capita Income Levels
Lower 
$480 or less
Middle 
$480 - $1940 
$1940 - $6000
|  Higher 
Over $6000
Micro-states (9) 20.9 (15) 34.5 
(7) 22.8
(8) 71.1
Small states (14) 15.6 (13) 28.5 
(5) 23.7
(8) 42.6
A low export ratio is a reflection of a state's peripheral situation and its paucity of 
exportable resources. Most of the states with an export ratio of less than 20 are either 
acutely resource deficient and/or landlocked and situated on the periphery o f the 
international trading system with particular problems of accessibility. In some cases the 
export ratio is lower than might be expected because of civil war or the idiosyncratic and 
despotic policies of an isolationist regime which interrupt the normal patterns o f export 
trade. For example, both factors help to explain the extraordinarily low 1975 export ratios 
for Guinea-Bissau (3.4), and the Comoros (5.7). There are, however, a few higher income
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states in this group (the Seychelles, Djibouti, Uruguay, Panama and Cyprus), whose lower 
export ratio is related to the importance of non-commodity activities and invisible export 
earnings. This confirms the importance of other factors which contribute to the extent of 
a small state's trade dependence; the relative importance of commodity earnings; the 
security of established trading relationships; the specific policies of governments and, most 
important, the proximity of the state to major centres.
For over half the micro-states, however, (particularly those in the higher income 
groups) the export ratio is markedly higher than that of other small states. This includes 
the oil producers whose vast earnings are bound to constitute an enormous share of their 
G.N.P. and a few states (Bahrain, the Bahamas) whose extrordinary export performances 
are due primarily to the capacity of their transhipment terminals and refineries and their 
role as re-exporters of oil and petroleum products. Re-exports of oil account for 91 
percent of the Bahamas' staggering export total of $2.5 billion, nearly four times the size 
of the tiny state's gross domestic product. But this group also includes other primary 
producers whose economies are based on the export sector. Here size does seem to be 
important. Micro-states in this group are much more dependent on their export trade than 
other small states.
Serious trade dependence is a feature of nearly all small economies with 
populations of sue million or less. But the extent of trade dependence for micro-states is 
even greater than that of other small states. The average total trade ratio for the small 
states listed is 62.3, more than twice that of Singer's dependence figure. But for micro­
states the average ratio of total trade to G.N.P. is 85.5. Nineteen micro-states, as
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compared to only five larger small states, have total trade ratios over 85. Similarly, more 
than half the small states (27) fall below a ratio of 60 while only 11 micro-states are so 
low. Moreover, the average ratio of total trade to G.N.P. is higher at every level of 
income. Even allowing for the inflated figures of a few exceptional micro-states, there is a 
clear pattern of greater dependence for micro-states in both export and import trade. The 
importance of trade for the typical micro-state economy, then, is extreme. However, it is 
the commodity composition and geographical direction of that trade which is most 
significant in assessing the structure of dependence in the micro-state economy.
Commodity Concentration in Export Trade
The structure of trade in the small economy is believed to be typically one of 
export specialisation and import diversification.11 The smaller the economy, the greater is 
the range of basic commodities which must be imported. Thus, very small states can be 
expected to have proportionately lower commodity concentration indices of imports than 
larger states. However, differences in import indices due to size have proven to be less 
dramatic than might be expected. All states import a wide variety of commodities and 
Michaely found that variations in commodity concentration levels between large and small 
states were not as significant for imports as for exports.12 Consequently, we have not 
attempted to calculate commodity indices of import trade. Given the vast number of
11 Peter J. Lloyd, International Trade Problems o f Small Nations (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 
1968), p. 23.
12Michael Michaely, Concentration in International Trade (Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing Co., 1962), p. 12.
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separate commodities listed, the task of computing indices for 80 states would be 
enormous. As the evidence already available suggests the probability of only marginal 
variations, this task hardly seemed justified.
What is important is to indicate the extent to which micro-states and other small 
states must depend on a narrow range of exports in order to pay for the imports required. 
To do this, we have calculated the degree of export specialisation by using the Hirschmann 
index of commodity concentration.13 In all but a few cases, the index was based on 
commodities of the three digit S.I.T.C. grouping. While the three digit classification 
allows for clear distinctions, it is least likely to risk replication which could exaggerate the 
diversity of a state's export trade.14
13The index was first used by Hirschmann to measure the geographic concentration of a state’s trade but it 
also can be applied as a measure of commodity concentration.
See Michaely, op. cit.\
Lloyd, op. cit.
m f .  n=4 (Xij) 2
Z
1=1 (Xj)
Albert O. Hirschmann, National Power and the Structure o f Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of 
California, 1945), Appendix A.
The total value of a state’s (J) export trade is Xj and the value of its specific commodity exports is Xij
1 Nevertheless, the 3-digit classification is still fraught with potential distortions. As Michaely noted, 
some commodities are classified separately though they really are closely related. This tends to reduce a 
state’s index favourably. Moreover, an index of the commodity concentration of exports is not a wholly 
accurate reflection of the degree of concentration of economic activity for a given state since other 
important sectors such as services are not included.
Michaely, op. cit., p. 9.
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It has been argued that states with a high ratio of total trade to gross domestic 
product are also inclined to a narrow commodity concentration in their export trade. 
Peter Lloyd has objected to this argument on the grounds that there are far too many 
exceptions. And, for Lloyd, the fact that any correlation can be so easily disproved "alone 
destroys the foundation of the general theory of small nation trading."15
With the larger small states Lloyd's objections seem justified. Of the 22 small 
states which have a particularly high trade ratio, that is over 50% of G.N.P., there are five 
with comparatively low indices (under .350) of commodity concentration in their export 
trade: Denmark (.093), Ireland (.172), Lebanon (.219), Singapore (.229) and Norway 
(.306). The most notable exceptions are clearly the highly developed small economies. 
Conversely, of the 19 small states with a high index of commodity concentration (over 
.500) in their export trade, nine have comparatively low ratios of total trade to G.N.P. 
(less than 50%): Paraguay (22.7), Haiti (24.1), Burundi (29.8), Somalia (32.5), Benin 
(33.6), Chad (37), Laos (39.8), El Salvador (41.7), and Trinidad and Tobago (44.7). 
These exceptions, unlike those in the micro-state class, are not high income economies. 
Moreover, the 1986 calculations were particularly low for these states. They do not really 
counter Michaely's argument that small economies with a high ratio of total trade to 
G.N.P. are also likely to evidence high indices of commodity concentration in their export 
trade. Similarly, only seven micro-states of the 28 with indices of over .600 have a total 
trade ratio of less than 60 percent. As with other states, the most notable exceptions in
15Lloyd, op. cit., p.30.
Lloyd’s criticism of previous studies is that such conclusions were based on groupings of states 
which were too general to allow for the impact of other variables.
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this group are the poorest states: Cape Verde, the Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea- 
Bissau.and Sao Tome and Principe.16
Lloyd's findings suggest that the correlation between small size, a high trade ratio, 
and a high degree of commodity concentration of exports is not very convincing. Our 
review of small state trade would generally seem to support this except for micro-states. 
Here there is a clear and consistent correlation. Micro-states demonstrate both a high 
ratio of trade to gross national product and a high commodity correlation of exports.
As with comparisons of total trade dependence, it is clear that there are a number 
of factors which influence the extent to which a state's export trade is concentrated. As 
suggested already, the level of development in the economy is clearly relevant. We have 
noticed that high income economies tend to have a greater overall trade dependence. But, 
within the high income group there are important structural variations which account for 
the marked differences in the commodity compostion of export trade. As would be 
expected, the wealthy primary producers evidence a high degree of export specialisation 
while in the more developed states of the high income group, those with an important 
manufacturing sector, export trade is much more diversified. The composition of exports, 
then, is a reflection of the structure of the economy rather than its standard of prosperity.
The development factor is even more pronounced than that of size. The large 
economy based on primary production will be more specialised in its exports than the 
small economy with an industrialised sector which holds the most important share of the 
national product. For these economies, comparative advantage is determined by the
16 Note Table V in Appendix I to this chapter.
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availability o f factors (such as capital or skilled labour) which are not confined to a very 
narrow range of goods, and, therefore, they may be expected to be as diversified in their 
export as in their import trade.17
The table below indicates differences accountable to both the development and size 
factors. The average index is reduced the higher the level of per capita income. For the 
larger small states the trend is particularly apparent.
Average Small State Commodity 
Concentration Indices by Income Group
Lower Middle Higher
$480 or less $ 480-$1940 
$1940-$6000
Over $6000
(14) .589 (13) .566 
(5) .449
(8) .360
There is some deviation in the highest income group due to the inclusion of the 
United Arab Emirates, most of whose exports consist of crude oil. Without the 
exceptional UAE index (.892), the average for small states with per capita income levels 
o f over $6000 is .284 rather than .360. Furthermore, the most industrialised small 
economies have the lowest commodity concentration indices: Singapore, Denmark and 
Finland.
17Kuznets, op. cit., pp. 15-23.
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Assessing the impact of economic development on the export structure of micro­
states is more difficult. Though many micro-states enjoy high levels o f per capita income, 
only a few have significant manufacturing sectors. Apart from Cyprus, the indices of 
commodity concentration of export trade for these micro-states (which include Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Luxembourg) are notably higher than those o f other small European 
economies. A few middle-income micro-states with comparatively significant industrial 
sectors (Malta) do have indices marginally lower than that o f most other states of their 
size. But the differences in degrees of commodity concentration indices between income 
levels among micro-states are not significant. Like the United Arab Emirates in the small 
state group, Qatar's nearly exclusive (.971) oil export trade somewhat distorts the average 
index for high income micro-states. Without Qatar the average index for these states is 
.518 rather than .649.
Average Micro-State Commodity Concentration Indices by Income Group
Lower Middle Higher
$480 or less $ 480 - $1940 
$1940 - $6000
Over $6000
(9) .734 (15) .531 
(7) .517
(8) .649
As indicated in our earlier discussion of resource endowment, the location of the 
state is important to its potential for export development. As transport costs are reduced, 
and accessibility to markets is improved, so capital is easier to attract for export industries
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which could be ignored otherwise. The states with the highest levels of commodity 
concentration in their export trade are not only small and less developed but peripheral in 
the international trading system. However, the impact of location appears to be much 
more evident among the larger small states than micro-states.
Average Indices of Commodity Concentration of Export Trade by Region
Small States Micro-states
Asia and Oceania .417 .615
Sub-Saharan Africa .638 .683
Middle East and North Africa .543 .794
Caribbean and Latin America .473 .549
Europe .238 .417
Clearly, all micro-states at all income levels and in every region demonstrate a high 
degree of commodity concentration in their export trade. The micro-state average is high 
in every income group with 28 of the 38 micro-states listed having commodity 
concentration indices of over .500 for their export trade. For some, such extremes of 
export specialisation might seem to support initial assumptions that the formal provisions 
o f micro-state sovereignty belie the realities of severe dependence. This seems all the more 
persuasive since for most micro-states their share o f the world market is miniscule and the 
value of their few products is erratic and often disappointing.
Consider the example of Fiji. Compared to many other micro-states Fiji's position 
in terms of size, location, and even resource base is enviable. In addition to sugar, Fiji's
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timber, fish and mineral (gold) resources give the islands some natural advantages over 
other South Pacific micro-states. Fiji has a significant and relatively diverse manufacturing 
sector, a well-developed tourist industry and, perhaps most important, a role as entrepot 
re-exporting goods and services in the region.
Yet Fiji's export trade is still primarily dependent on sugar. Cane sugar and sugar 
products accounted for 32.6% of total export earnings in 1993.18 Given Fiji's tiny share of 
world sugar production (0.5%) she has little bargaining power in determining price. Price 
fluctuations in sugar have been savage in their consequences. In 1965, for example, world 
prices fell to 1/4 of the 1963 level, precipitating recession and sabotaging development 
planning targets. Fiji's second crop, copra, is also vulnerable to extreme price instability.
Nonetheless, though micro-states are relatively more dependent on a very narrow 
base of export goods than larger states, the general trend in the trading patterns of both 
small states and micro-states is one of export diversification. Eighteen micro-states have 
dramatically lower (more than .100) commodity concentration indices in their export trade 
than they had in 1975. In only four cases is the index higher. This trend to diversification 
is evident at every income level and in every region. In some cases it is the result of 
modest development in secondary areas of primary production: rice in Suriname, fish 
products in Guinea-Bissau, vegetables in Western Samoa. In Kiribati the now exhausted 
phosphate reserves, once the nearly exclusive source of export revenue, have been 
replaced by an expanding fishery. In others the successful establishment of industries 
based on the processing of primary products accounts for the lower index. In most cases,
18Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 1994 (Bangkok: Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific, 1994), pp. 127-129.
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particularly in the Caribbean, a skilled labour force and a local culture of entrepreneurship 
have allowed for the growth of a significant manufacturing sector in textiles, machinery 
and electrical goods. Trade dependence as measured by a narrow base of export revenue 
is still a characteristic feature of small state and micro-state vulnerability in the 
international economy though it by no means suggests hopelessness and despair for the 
future.
The Geographic Concentration of Trade
It is serious enough that the small state is so heavily dependent on its export sector 
and that its export earnings are confined to a few commodities, often of limited and 
fluctuating value and typically constituting only a tiny fraction of world production. Even 
more disturbing is the extent to which these small states must rely on one or two trading 
partners. When a state is dependent on the same partner in both its import and export 
trade it may be seen as a satellitic economy,19 particularly if those patterns are evident in 
other areas such as capital flows or tourist markets.
There is a correlation between these two aspects of trade dependence. Both 
Hirschmann and Michaely found that states which demonstrated a high level of commodity 
concentration in their export trade were also likely to evidence a high index of geographic
19A. D. Knox, "Some Economic Problems of Small Countries," in Burton Benedict (ed.) Problems o f 
Smaller Territories (London: University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, The Athlone 
Press, 1967), p. 37.
Apparently the term ‘satellite economy’ was coined by Bert Hoselitz, “Patterns of Economic Growth,” 
Canadian Journal o f Economics and Political Science XXI (1955), 420-421, quoted in William G. 
Demas, The Economics o f Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean 
(Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965), p. 32.
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concentration. Hirschmann said that he would have expected otherwise, that a country 
with only a few commodities to export would be able to spread them over a large market. 
That this does not seem to be the case is due in part to the fact that world demand (and 
thus a diverse market) is not always possible for many products. Nor can it be assumed 
that the confidence and security which might be derived from a single trading partner will 
offer an advantage in a wide range of goods. The potential for diversification is not 
necessarily related to long-established access to a market, particularly if there is a 
considerable discrepancy in the size and/or economic wealth of the two partners. This is 
certainly the case for most small states and micro-states and in both groups, Hirschmann's 
and Michaely's earlier findings of a correlation between high indices of commodity 
concentration and geographic concentration are borne out. If we examine the 19 small 
states with commodity concentration indices of over .500 in their export trade, nearly half 
(nine) are similarly high (over .500) in their indices of geographic concentration. Among 
micro-states the correlation is similarly evident. Fifteen of the 28 micro-states with 
commodity concentration indices of over .500 have geographic indices of over .500. In 
total there are twenty-two micro-states which are over .500 in the geographic 
concentration of export trade. The exceptions are those states whose limited exports are 
highly valued in the world market (the oil producers) and the European micro-states. This 
last point indicates that the extent of geographic diversification of exports is also a matter 
of how the market is defined. For many states the index of concentration would change 
dramatically if E.U. members were treated as a single market rather than separately.
Hirschmann also argued that export trade was more geographically concentrated 
than that of imports and that this was especially true of states where geographic 
concentration indices were high. For Michaely, however, this tendency did not seem 
particularly strong. Nearly half the states in his sample (19 of 43) evidenced a higher 
index of geographic concentration in their import trade than for their exports. Using a 
ratio of imports to exports, Michaely's average in the sample was 1.03, suggesting that 
geographic concentration was only marginally more evident in export trade.20 But in our 
study Hirschmann's original contention seems to be corroborated. Among the 43 selected 
small states only 14 (31%) had a higher level of geographic concentration in their import 
trade, thus demonstrating ratios of below 1.00. The average ratio for the group was 1.22. 
The same tendency is even more pronounced among micro-states. Only nine of the 38 
micro-states for which both export and import indices were calculable had higher levels of 
concentration in their import trade and thus ratios below 1.00. The average ratio for the 
micro-state group was 1.34.
A high level of concentration in the direction of a state's import trade is a reflection 
of geographical proximity and in many cases the enduring importance of former colonial 
ties. Those states which are particularly import dependent in the direction of their trade 
are the Caribbean and South Pacific islands, where the United States and Australia serve 
as the obvious primary sources of supply. The perpetuation of neo-mercantalist trading 
relations between France and her former colonies in Africa is reflected in the extent to
20Michaely, op. cit., p. 21.
See also, Michael Michaely, Trade, Income Levels and Dependence (Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing Co., 1994), p. 77.
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which these states have such high indices in the direction of their import trade. Contrast, 
for example, Gabon (.674) with the Gambia (.304) whose open door policy was well 
established in the period of British rule.
Only a few states, then, in both groups are more concentrated in the direction of 
their import trade than in their exports. Moreover, the average levels of geographic 
concentration are lower for imports than for exports. The average index for the micro- 
state group is .538 for export trade but only .438 for imports. The average figures for the 
small state group are .462 and .381 respectively.
As this indicates, micro-states are significantly less diversified in their import trade 
than other small states. Nearly half (18 of 38) of the micro-states had indices of over .400 
in the direction of their imports. This figure is a very high index for exports. But for 
imports, it indicates extreme levels of concentration. In contrast, only 13 of the 45 small 
states demonstrated indices of over .400. This discrepancy seems to be evident at all 
income levels.
Among middle income states the micro-state index is actually lower than that of 
other small states. Most of the states in both groups at this income level are Western 
Hemispheric countries. However, unlike the small Latin American republics whose 
trading relations have been confined almost exclusively to the United States, the micro- 
states in the region enjoy long-standing Commonwealth ties with both Britain and Canada, 
which serve to reduce the impact of the United States as the primary source of supply and 
the major market in the area.
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There is a slight tendency to geographic diversification of imports as income levels 
rise. This is more consistent in the small state group. It is only offset at the highest 
income level because of Ireland (.503), reflecting that country's special economic 
relationship with Britain. In the micro-state group, however, prosperity does not 
necessarily encourage diversification. Some of the most extreme examples of geographic 
concentration of imports are among higher income micro-states, indicating the importance 
of location (Luxembourg), of former colonial relationships (Gabon) or both (Nauru).
Micro-states are clearly more concentrated in the geographic direction of their 
import trade than other small states. However, a high level of geographic concentration is 
far less critical in its implications for a state's score of dependence if it is a question of 
supply rather than markets. This is not to suggest that there are not grave implications if 
most goods and services are derived from a single country. Such a relationship with 
minimal competition can certainly mean higher domestic costs. And, because such 
domination is usually that of a large, industrialised metropolitan power in a small, 
developing economy, it can also mean control of local marketing systems and financial 
institutions. In most cases this extent of import dependence is a function of a similar 
export dependence. Reciprocity is the price paid for established and secure markets for 
the weaker country's exports.
Nonetheless, the potential for diversification is greater on the import side than for 
exports, particularly if as a primary producer a state's major export commodities are not 
those which are subject to inelasticity of demand and consistently high prices. The most
serious aspect of trade dependence then is that of the direction of a state's exports. And 
this is particularly acute for micro-states.
Michaely has suggested that an index of over .400 can be regarded as a high level 
of geographic concentration of export trade.21 More than half of the larger small states in 
our study fall into this category. The average index for the small state group is .462. 
Among micro-states this measure of dependence is far more pronounced. The average 
index for micro-states is .538 and 28 of 39 micro-states exceed .400 in the geographic 
concentration of their export trade. Similarly, it might seem reasonable to assume that a 
state is extremely dependent if more than 30 percent of its exports are directed to a single 
market. Such is the case for 30 of 36 micro-states for which trade direction statistics are 
available. Most greatly exceed the 30 percent figure and only the oil producing shaikhdom 
of Qatar falls below 20 percent in the principal market's share of total export trade.
Michaely's findings indicate that a tendency to geographic concentration of exports 
is characteristic of small-state trading at all levels of development. But the extent of 
economic development is, nevertheless, a principal factor in determining the degree to 
which a state is dependent on particular markets. Economic development implies 
commodity diversification in export trade and as suggested earlier there is a correlation 
between levels of commodity and geographic concentration in trade. This is especially 
evident in the group of larger small states where the highest levels of concentration are in 
the lowest income groups. All but three of the 17 small states at the lowest income levels
21 Michaely, Concentration in International Trade, op. cit.
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have indices of over .400 in the direction of their export trade. These poorest states with 
little to offer will have few opportunities for market diversification.
Among micro-states, however, the impact of economic development is not clear. 
There are only a few micro-state economies which are based primarily on manufacturing. 
In the case of Luxembourg the direction of export trade is highly concentrated. For those 
micro-states with secondary but still significant manufacturing sectors the evidence is 
inconsistent. Malta and Cyprus have comparatively low indices of geographic 
concentration. But Trinidad and Tobago and St. Kitts-Nevis, both more industrialised 
than other Commonwealth Caribbean economies, nevertheless, demonstrate the same high 
levels of concentration in the direction of their exports.
Simple levels of income as measurements of prosperity rather than the structure of 
development do indicate marginal variations among micro-states, with the more affluent 
micro-states enjoying greater diversification of markets than those at the lowest income 
levels. This only reflects the world demand for whatever primary product is the basis of 
the micro-state economy, be it oil or groundnuts. For micro-states the impact of location 
and colonial affiliation are more significant in accounting for differences of geographic 
concentration of export trade.
The identity of the principal market is as important in assessing the question of 
dependence as the extent of its percentage share. No government can be comfortable if 
over 30 percent of exports are purchased by a single customer. But the implications for 
further dependence are not as great if the relationship does not also have other 
dimensions. Though Tonga relies on the Dutch market for a critical share of its copra
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exports, the Netherlands has neither the established interests nor the ambitions for 
penetration which could compromise the policies of this tiny kingdom in other issue areas. 
Nor would the Seychelles have to be anxious about the potential for economic and 
political domination from Pakistan, which accounts for 56 percent of their visible export 
trade. For most micro-states, however, the high degree of concentration in the direction 
of their export trade is a reflection of larger and continuing dependent relationships.
This is immediately evident in those micro-states which conform to Knox’s 
definition of a satellitic economy. Nineteen micro-states rely on a single dominant trading 
partner as both the principal market and the major source of supply. In four others 
comparable data was not available (Monaco, Liechtenstein, San Marino and Bhutan in the 
small state group), but clearly trade is almost entirely confined to the larger neighbouring 
states. In some micro-states dependence approximates Knox’s definition, with the 
principal market serving as the second major source of supply. In others the reverse 
pattern holds, with the principal source of supply serving as the second most important 
market. Such dual trade dependence, in Barbados and Guyana for example, is typical of 
the Commonwealth Caribbean micro-states, where the United Kingdom and the United 
States account for most visible trade between them. The greater total trade dependence 
from the import side is particularly dramatic in the case of Botswana. South Africa is 
Botswana's second most important market (23.5%) after the United Kingdom (47.3%), 
but its overwhelming importance as the major source of supply (79.7%) gives South 
Africa a preponderant share (51.6%) of Botswana's total trade.
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For most of the states in this study the question of trade dependence is one of 
persisting colonial ties. With few exceptions, export markets are primarily those of the 
former metropole: Britain in the Caribbean, the South Pacific and Anglophone Africa; 
France, in her former African colonies and the United States in Latin America. 
Metropolitan penetration of the colonial economy was so thorough and comprehensive 
that formal independence alone could not alter the exclusivity of economic relations which 
tied the colony to its distant metropole. The primary sector of colonial production and 
local financial and marketing systems were channels of the metropolitan economy.
The intensity of the colonial bond is more salient among micro-states than other 
small states. In part, this is due to the relative amiability which has characterised the new 
micro-states' relations with the colonial power. In most cases independence was not 
achieved as a result of a long nationalist struggle. As we have already noted, in some 
instances it was even resisted initially and accepted finally only because of the colonial 
power's determination to withdraw. Local elites approached independence with a 
determination to retain the economic relationship intact. Yet, even in those states where 
there was conflict- in Guinea-Bissau for example- economic ties to the metropole have 
endured. In Equatorial Guinea, where diplomatic relations with Spain were broken, the 
international economic relations of the country, to the extent that they still existed, were 
channelled almost wholly through Madrid in the early years of independence. Admittedly, 
that pattern has changed with the development of strong links to France.
In those areas where there is a dominant industrialised regional power, micro-state 
trading relationships reflect a dualistic basis of economic dependence. Though Britain is
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still the most important market for the smallest micro-states of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean, it is nearly equalled by the importance of the dominant regional power. The 
United States (and Canada) play a significant role in the economies of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean, principally in tourism, but also in banking, shipping and industrial development. 
And, these closer ties are also increasingly evident in the American and Canadian share of 
visible trade. Similarly, Australian domination of Pacific shipping and her position as the 
major industrial economy in the region has meant that Australia accounts for a significant 
share of island trade even in those economies still tied principally to the European 
metropole.
This reorientation may be seen as a process of decolonisation or it may be 
regarded simply as exchanging one form of domination, for another. For the former High 
Commission territories in southern Africa, however, during the difficult years of the 
apartheid regime next door, continuing economic ties to the former colonial power 
actually offset the pull towards further domination from Pretoria.
As the last group of dependent territories to achieve sovereignty, micro-states have 
had little time to develop alternative trading patterns. And, for some of the poorest and 
smallest among them, the prospects for diversification are not encouraging. For some 
time they may be as dependent on the metropolitan market as they were in the colonial 
period. For most very small economies with little of value to sell, the perceived security 
of existing markets is an inhibiting factor to developing alternative strategies, particularly 
when, as is often the case, exports to the metropolitan power are actually a form of 
foreign aid. Nor is it easy to abandon established marketing arrangements (and even
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familiar personnel) or to separate trade from the wider network of relations involving 
shipping, banking, aid and private investment.
Regional trade may eventually offer some potential for diversification. But, the 
problems of encouraging more than a lip-service commitment to intra-regional trade are 
well-known and thoroughly analysed in the literature of regionalism: the still small size of 
the regional market in most developing areas; the common production of principal export 
staples; the risks of export displacement in certain economies with the development of 
secondary industries in others; the suspicions of the smaller and peripheral areas towards 
the 'unfair' advantages of regional growth poles matched by the resentment of the larger 
and central countries towards 'unreasonable' demands for equalisation of investment and 
production opportunities.
Still, the picture is not as bleak as it may first appear. Some 26 micro-states have 
actually increased the geographic diversification of their export trade in the years since 
independence. Some of these are modest and statistically insignificant, to be sure. But for 
14 micro-states the pattern of diversification is dramatic, that is it represents a factor of 
more than .100 since 1975. This parallels similar patterns of commodity diversification in 
export trade. The evidence is most striking in the Commonwealth Caribbean where, as 
suggested, the former colonial power has gradually been displaced by the United States 
and Canada. Some might argue that this is simply a matter of replacing one hegemonic 
relationship with another. But a closer examination will indicate that there is also a 
significant increase in regional trade where regionalism is more advanced than in many 
parts of the world as well as with European and Asian partners. In other cases, (Malta,
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Mauritius, Cape Verde, and Fiji), micro-states have been able to overcome historically 
powerful mentor relationships as well as difficult problems of location to diversify their 
export markets dramatically.
In summary, while the international economic relations of micro-states are 
characterised by high levels of dependence in trade, higher levels than in larger small 
states, there is no overwhelming evidence that these states are doomed as permanent 
wards of the international system with no opportunities to reduce their dependence 
through diversification. They are, after all, as a group, much more recently sovereign 
states than is the case for the other small states in this comparative exercise. Some have 
already used instruments available to sovereign governments to encourage patterns of 
diversification. But like other small states, and indeed some much larger states, their 
international economic relations, particularly in the context of trade, are largely a matter of 
dependence management. And in that context, they are clearly not without opportunities.
Foreign Aid and Capital Investment Flows
No discussion of the dependence of very small economies can avoid the issue of 
aid disbursements and external capital flows. Much of the early literature on small states 
emphasised the importance and the dangers of aid, both in terms of the percentage of 
GNP accounted for by aid and, perhaps more ominously, by the geographic concentration 
of aid sources. There were similar concerns for the likely long-term dependence of so 
many new states on capital flows from the First World, particularly from multinational 
corporations that could dominate the enclave sector of a small developing economy.
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Inevitably one is drawn to the question of whether the independence of so many 
new and small states is mortally compromised because of the excessive dependence on 
external sources of capital, either through aid or through the investment of particular 
private corporations and financial institutions. Once again we return to themes of 
scepticism about micro-state sovereignty addressed in the earlier chapters of this study. It 
may be useful to consider in all of this the plight of many of these new micro-states, some 
of them clearly vulnerable in the extreme, in the context of the cycle of dependency in 
some non-sovereign jurisdictions which, nonetheless enjoy considerable levels of 
constitutional autonomy. The issue of aid, or transfer payments, is the central and 
recurring question in any discussion of potential self-reliance for so many of these 
jurisdictions. In 1993 transfer payments from one source, Ottawa, accounted for 42.6% 
of provincial revenue in Prince Edward Island and 47% in Newfoundland and Labrador.22 
This is a huge subsidy of separate jurisdictional status. It is no wonder, that in an 
increasingly threatening milieu of downsizing and fiscal devolution, these governments 
worry as much about the reality of their autonomy as they do about the stark options 
which face them over the next decade. But this, sadly, is not an untypical situation for 
many sub-national jurisdictions across the developed world. Similar pressures are felt in 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands in respect to the benign but nonetheless finally
22Province o f Prince Edward Island, 20th Annual Statistical Review 1993 (Charlottetown: Department of 
the Provincial Treasury, 1994), p. 78.
Historical Statistics o f Newfoundland and Labrador (St. John’s: Newfoundland Statistics Agency, 
Executive Council, Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1994), p. 81.
339
determining role of Copenhagen in allowing these very small jurisdictions to enjoy both 
constitutional autonomy and relatively comparable living standards to those in Denmark.23
Are there parallels between dependent very small states and their counterparts 
within larger jurisdictions? Has sovereignty made a difference or have many of these 
states simply persisted in a familiar imperial relationship with cosmetic changes; the former 
Governor now being the High Commissioner or Ambassador? Are they, in the ceremonies 
of their new-found status, simply replacing one set of transfer payment arrangements for 
another, the realities of dependence unchanged and perhaps even deepening?24
The anxieties of both Western and non-Westem scholars concerning the dangers of 
both Official Development Assistance and First World private investment in the new states 
were evident in the literature from the earliest days of decolonisation. Nearly all aid was 
seen to be political and compromising.25 Marshall Singer was typical in expressing these 
concerns:
“ H. Schmid, "The Future of the Farbe Islands: Adaptation, Innovation or Stagnation?," in Samal Trondur 
Finnson Johansen (ed.) Nordiske fiskersamfund ifremtiden, vol. 2: Sm& samfund under europceisk 
integration (Kobenhavn: Tema Nord 1995:586, Nordiske MinistenM, 1995), pp. 71-87.
Danish transfers account for over 50% of government expenditure in Greenland.
Tonnes O. K. Berthelsen, "Greenland Home Rule," Indigenous Affairs (No. 1, Jan./Feb./March, 1995), 
esp. 19-20.
Block grants from Copenhagen, which the Home Rule government can use as it sees fit, have 
more than trebled since 1980.
Greenland 1994- Statistical Yearbook (Nuuk: Greenland Bureau of Statistics, 1994), p. 18.
24The parallels and potential contrasts between autonomous sub-national micro-jurisdictions and their 
sovereign counterparts speaks to the veiy heart of the issue. Some of the French overseas departments 
and territories, for example, benefit enormously compared to their sovereign neighbours because of 
immense aid disbursements from Paris. It is not surprising that in many of these territories, even Tahiti 
in the wake of nuclear testing, independence movements are still embryonic.
“ George L. Reid, A Comparative Study o f the Foreign Policies o f Very Small States with Special 
Reference to the Commonwealth Caribbean (University of Southampton, Ph.D. dissertation, 1971), p. 
278.
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a) Aid tends to support the regime in power and the status quo. And, this in turn, 
can encourage a conservative emphasis on projecting "the right image;"26
b) Aid deepens the dependence linkage between the donor and the recipient, 
particularly through such donor self-serving practices as an insistence on expenditures of 
donor funds within the donor state,27 a practice generally presented as being consistent 
with the interests of both the incumbent administration and the principal donor state;
c) There is a "spillover" of aid relationships into other sectors through a panoply 
of concomitant relationships:
. . .  there is a mutually reinforcing quality to the ties between donor 
and recipient. The more economic aid is extended by one country to 
another, the more foreign trade there is likely to be. The more foreign aid 
and trade exists, the more economically dependent the weaker state may 
become on the more powerful, and the more likely it is to support the 
political interests of the more powerful (other things being equal). The 
more it tends to support the political interests of the more powerful state, 
the more likely it will receive more foreign aid. And so it goes.28
These anxieties became a mantra throughout much of the literature, though there 
was at the same time a recognition of the value of aid and external investment as a kick-
26Demas, op cit., p. 64.
27Singer, op. cit., pp. 254-256.
28Ibid
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start for small economies towards some degree of diversification and some measure of 
dependence-management, if not an ideal state of self-reliant development.
Was size a factor at all in these early debates? Certain disadvantages of small size 
were widely acknowledged. Many of the small states, and certainly most of the new 
micro-states, would be less attractive to both public and private investment because of 
diseconomies within the institutional and infrastructural arrangements in place. In many 
cases, this would simply mean higher costs.29 Private sector investors would not be 
inclined to view a small or very small jurisdiction as a separate unit. It was far more likely 
that decisions taken regarding operations in such small places would be within the vertical 
hierarchy of the firm’s interests, at least on a regional basis.30 Indeed, large corporations 
could shut down their operations in very small states without much attention or 
consequence. There was also a recognition that in small states more desirable aid from 
multilateral sources was not easily forthcoming simply because the scale of many of the 
ambitious and high-profile operations which these agencies support were not feasible in 
the scaled-down economies of micro-states and even in many of the small states in the 
next class.31 And, in too many cases, foreign aid was a means of budget support, or even 
"sovereignty maintenance," rather than as a source of investment in new areas of economic
29Michael Ward, "Dependent Development- Problems of Economic Planning in Small Developing 
Countries," in Percy Selwyn, Development Policy in Small Countries (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 
123.
30Percy Selwyn, "Industrial Development in Peripheral Small Countries, " in Selwyn, op. cit., 
p. 78.
31Reid, op. cit., p. 278.
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activity.32 Moreover, small economies were more likely to have a very low savings ratio 
since domestic capital is typically invested abroad.33 Expatriate banks and external 
financial institutions, usually very conservative in terms of local investment risks, are 
typically the principal agents of capital formation in small and very small economies.34 
And, even in those situations where governments seek joint ventures through industrial 
corporations, more often than not, management has to be imported because the local 
governments simply lack the experience and the expertise to man their side of these 
arrangements.35 Finally there is the problem of infrastructure. Many of the very small 
developing states simply lack the infrastructural requirements to attract foreign investment 
in projects that could significantly alter the structure of the economy.36 All of these 
concerns are particularly evident in a small economy dominated by a single enclave sector. 
This is a familiar litany of anxieties which dominated the literature in the early years of 
independence.
Yet the prospects for very small economies were not as bleak as these general 
propositions might suggest. Micro-states are not without their own advantages in this
32Jean-Luc Vellut, "Smaller States and the Problem of War and Peace: Some Consequences of the 
Emergence of Smaller States in Africa," Journal o f Peace Research III (1966), 266-267.
Moreover, as Brookfield noted, aid is often used to finance welfare, thus raising levels of demand and 
exacerbating the need for foreign exchange.
H. C. Brookfield, "Multum in Parvo: Questions About Diversity and Diversification in Small 
Countries," in Selwyn, op. cit., p. 56.
33Demas, op. cit., p. 65.
34H. C. Brookfield, Colonialism, Development and Independence: The Case o f the Melanesian Islands in 
the South Pacific (Cambridge: The University Press, 1972), p. 14.
35Selwyn, op. cit., p. 94.
36Reid, op. cit., p. 269.
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very competitive search for capital, both from public sources and the huge global private 
sector. Certainly, diversification of external capital sources is of the most urgent priority 
in virtually all of these very small jurisdictions. Widening the Official Development 
Assistance portfolio, away from bilateral arrangements, however understanding, informed 
and sensitive traditional donors may be, to a variety of sources, particularly multilateral 
agencies, will alter both the material basis of dependence and the equally important 
psychological constraints to further self-reliance. For some donor states, very small 
jurisdictions may seem to be more compliant with the donor’s agenda. This may be a 
good card to play as long as the micro-state is able to call upon other patrons in a diverse 
portfolio of external assistance and investment. Moreover, a very small jurisdiction can be 
attractive for many donors simply because a small amount of money can go a very long 
way.37 Similar contributions can be lost with larger states, but they can make a substantial 
difference in very small economies. And, if the donors have political priorities, there is an 
added incentive to consider those cases where there is a relatively high visibility pay-off 
with relativelty low commitments.38 This may be particularly persuasive if a micro-state 
has its own constituency of support within the lobbying and legislative structures of the 
donor state. When one begins to compare sources of aid with expenditures of diplomatic 
representation, the correlation between the two is clear. Equatorial Guinea, for example, 
has drifted from a residual Spanish affiliation into a new francophone Equatorial Africa.
37Demas, op. cit., 80.
38 Selwyn, "Room to Manoeuvre?," in Selwyn, op. cit., 16.
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This is reflected by almost every measure of linkages between this very poor little state 
and Europe.
As he did with trade, Marshall Singer set very formidable standards for new states 
in the context of foreign aid and dependence on foreign capital. He argued that any state 
which relied upon 20% or more of its GNP on external financial supports was truly a 
dependent society.39 When we look across the list of micro-states we find some very 
disturbingly high levels of capital dependence on the outside world. In some cases, 
obviously Tuvalu, sovereignty maintenance is being supported entirely by external funds 
which allow this tiny country to function. In too many others, the figures of capital flows 
as a percentage of GNP,40 reflect inordinately high levels of dependence on external 
financial sources. Twenty one of these micro-states depended on or called upon external 
capital flows to the extent of more than ten percent of their Gross National Product in 
1986. A close examination of those figures over several years will reveal an ongoing 
pattern among those capital dependent states, though some times with huge variations; 
Antigua and Barbuda for example. The most outstanding examples of a high dependence 
on foreign capital are, as might be expected, the poorest states in Africa and the South 
Pacific with very low levels of export income. Indeed, these states are typically 
monocultural economies dependent on resources (copra, groundnuts) which are hardly
39Singer, op. cit.t 262.
"“Table I, Appendix II.
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lucrative sources of export earnings. In cases such as these, when we examine net capital 
flows as a percentage of total exports, the figure can be as high 664 percent.41
Of course, the very small size of many of these economies would mean that 
comparatively modest grants and investments would account for an unusually high 
percentage of Gross National Product as indicated in Table I-A of Appendix II. This is 
evident when we compare these statistics to those of much larger states in Table I-B. 
Only six of the larger small states in the next population group demonstrated percentages 
above Singer’s threshold of 20%. Again most of these states are African countries which 
are among the poorest in the world. Among this group of states Panama stands apart 
since 99.5% of external capital flows in 1987 were from the private sector. Among the 
highly dependent African states official development assistance accounts for nearly the 
whole of their external funds.42
As with the issue of trade dependence, the question of a concentration of sources 
is surely the most central concern. To what extent have these states been able to diversify 
their sources of capital during the years since they achieved sovereignty?
Perhaps the most illuminating patterns are those to be found in the changing 
directions of bilateral aid to micro-states. If we look at only the major donors, that is the 
first three sources in any given year, we see that all micro-states can claim some diversity 
of portfolio. Over the fours years cited as a representative sample in Table X (Appendix 
II), no micro-state, not even little Tuvalu, is totally dependent on one source of external
41Table n , Appendix II.
42Table IX, Appendix II
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support. Indeed, efforts to diversify capital sources are surprisingly impressive. All of 
these developing micro-states call upon three to six major sources for bilateral aid.
In some cases, notably the former French colonies, the major partner is the former 
metropole. In the Comoros, Gabon and Vanuatu the French are by far the major players 
in those states’ portfolios. And the experience of these states would surely support the 
scepticism of those who view the sovereignty of many of these micro-states as a residual 
form of colonialism. In other cases, however, the colonial power seems to have vanished 
from the scene. Portugal and Spain are not major contributors of official development 
assistance in their former territories within this group of states. In Equatorial Guinea, for 
instance, France accounts for over 50% of official development assistance. France is 
similarly present in states where there is no recent colonial link but where there is a 
cultural residue: the Seychelles, Mauritius. Perhaps France has simply agreed to perform a 
neo-colonialist role for which the former metropoles no longer have any interest.
Old colonial ties are being overtaken by major regional centres in the South Pacific 
and the Caribbean. Great Britain, particularly, and Canada, secondarily, are being 
overtaken by both the United States and Japan in Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, 
Grenada. Great Britain appears to be withdrawing from many of its own former colonies. 
The British are still important in some of the more disadvantaged parts of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, Dominica, St. Kitts and St. Vincent, as they are in the most 
peripheral states of the South Pacific, Kiribati and Tuvalu. But the sovereignty option 
offers new opportunities. These very small states are now in a position to visit a number 
of bankers and lending institutions and prospective investors. And the evidence suggests
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that they have done just that. In Tonga, for example, Australia has replaced Great Britain 
as the major source of capital. Australia is the major donor in the Solomon Islands. In 
Western Samoa and Nauru there is increasing dependence on Japan. And there is the 
welcome relief of the Scandinavians, the Germans, the Dutch, Belgians and Italians in so 
many of these situations. In some micro-states with enviably diversified capital portfolios, 
these smaller players add a welcome balance: The Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, 
the Seychelles, Swaziland.
In short, there are very few sources of capital to chase: the United States, the 
former colonial power, the major regional powers, a few major external powers such as 
Japan. Most states in both groups rely on either the United States or European Union 
members. There are really no credible alternative sources. The CMEA no longer exists 
and when it did, it provided sparse pickings for both groups of states cited in this study. 
Arab support was clearly directed to Arab League states and to selected Muslim states 
beyond the Arab world. There is limited opportunity for diversification when faced with 
these few doors of opportunity. There is fierce competition from over 100 developing 
states for grants and investments from a very small coterie of donors. The competition is 
all the more difficult now given the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the new 
international priority assigned to the former Soviet and the former Communist states in 
Eastern Europe.
The patterns of aid and investment discussed thus far and outlined in the tables in 
Appendix B indicate that micro-states are not distinguished from other small states in 
terms of sources of external capital. The larger small states also depend on a portfolio of
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four to six donors with the same patterns of metropolitan and regional participation 
evident among micro-states.
Given that there are few sources of support and very limited opportunities for 
diversfication, how do micro-states stand in this competition? It is certainly clear that 
almost all of them enjoy a more diversified portfolio of external funding than they could 
possibly have entertained as ongoing dependencies of European powers. They now have 
the status to present themselves before international agencies. While multilateral 
assistance is clearly less compromising than bilateral aid, it remains a small percentage of 
the assistance package for most developing states in both population groups. Still, the 
evidence suggests that micro-states have been as successful as larger states in the queue in 
tapping these limited funds and in diversifying their assistance sources. As sovereign 
states they have the means now to approach other donors, in sometimes historically 
unconnected capitals, Stockholm, Copenhagen and Bonn, to diversify their revenue even 
further. In some cases they have been able to reach a regional partner, the United States, 
or an extra-regional partner, Japan, to offset traditional colonial relationships. And, as we 
have suggested with the "mission to civilize" mandate in French foreign policy, some 
Latin-rooted micro-states outside the immediate francophone embrace, may with 
compelling evidence of cultural aspiration, be able to draw upon the generous resources of 
Paris to diversify their own requests from the outside world.
In the first years of their independence then, micro-states were able to reach 
beyond their colonial largesse, such as it was. Once wholly dependent on funds from the 
metropolitan centre, they are now able to tap a wide range of sources, some of them
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astonishing in their reach. Indeed, in some cases, the new financial partners are rather 
surprising. Who would have thought that Sweden would have an interest in Guinea- 
Bissau? But successive Swedish governments have committed significant amounts of 
support to this former Portuguese territory as they have in what may appear to be 
eccentric choices across sub-tropical Africa.
There are concerns, to be sure. A growing Japanese presence in the economic and 
budgetary strategies of South Pacific island states will be unsettling in many quarters. The 
American embrace of the Commonwealth Caribbean states after the invasion of Grenada 
will surely arouse similar concerns. On the whole, however, micro-states have discovered 
some measure of diversification through sovereignty. They are no longer dependent on 
one Home Office for whatever budgetary assistance they may need, much less funds for 
exploiting new areas of development. They are in a position to win access to otherwise 
closed boardrooms. They are parties to be considered in the allocation of funds both from 
international bodies and from various national overseas development ministries. They can 
speak to their own case. And this is a huge advantage. It is an advantage which is 
reflected in the statistics of diversification cited in Table X.
How then might we review the fortune of these very small economies in an 
increasingly pressing global system? There is no question that the evidence brought to 
bear in this chapter powerfully suggests vulnerability and ongoing dependence. That 
vulnerability is particularly evident in the volatile growth rates of Gross Domestic Product 
set out in Appendix HI. In some cases the swings are huge. In Equatorial Guinea, for 
example, GDP grew by 7.3% in 1985 only to fall by 3.8% the following year and up again
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by 7.5% in 1987. In a few others there are several years of protracted decline, particularly 
among oil states in the mid-1980’s, when world prices fell. What is more striking, 
however, is that most micro-states have demonstrated rather hopeful patterns of continued 
growth. Some are still woefully poor, to be sure. But even among these seemingly most 
desolate micro-states there is hard evidence of growth and diversification. The Maldive 
Islands is just such a case. They have not had to earn their way by selling their strategic 
location or the former base at Gan to potential global or, more likely regional powers. It 
is a very poor society with income levels less than $1000 per annum. But the Gross 
Domestic Product of the Maldives has grown from year to year by 6.3% to 16.2%. 
Population growth in so many of these poorer micro-states inhibits the effect of such 
astonishing rates of growth. But it seems to be clear that even among these very weak 
micro-states sovereignty has not ushered in the doom and gloom that many predicted and 
first generation indigenous leaders feared.
In middle income micro-states the patterns of economic development over the 
years of independence are also encouraging. Malta, for example, has sustained enviable 
levels of annual growth by OECD standards, and certainly in comparison to other 
European states. Admittedly, Malta and Cyprus remain far behind their prospective 
European partners in all measures of economic development save those of consistent 
advance. Standards of living have more than doubled in the last decade as the economy 
has steadily grown in all sectors at rates comparable to the Asian tigers. This is hardly a 
country with any special advantage. As an off-shore island in the Mediterranean it must 
confront problems of access and expensive transportation costs. There are precious few
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resources on Malta, apart from the unparallelled pre-historic archaelogical sites and other 
tourism attractions. Even fresh water is in short supply. It is not surprising that even 
Dom MintofF, the irascible and fiercely independent Labour leader, would have considered 
Home Rule status, much like the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands, at one time as a 
secure alternative to independence.43 Indeed, independence was an unnerving prospect 
given the importance of the British base to the island economy in the early post-war years. 
Between 1960 and 1964, the base accounted for 15.1% of GDP and 16.2% of total 
employment. By 1975-1979 this percentage had fallen to 2.3% and 2.1% respectively. 
They were to disappear altogether in the 1980’s.44 Yet in the thirty-two years of 
independence, received as reluctantly as it was celebrated, Malta has managed to adjust 
within the parameters of sovereignty. It has not always been comfortable given the shock 
of the British withdrawal in the sixties, the world energy crisis and inflation in the 
seventies and worldwide recession in the eighties. But perhaps the development of the 
manufacturing sector is the most dramatic achievement. Manufacturing, mostly textiles, 
footwear and machinery, contributed 16.6% to GDP in the early sixties. That share was 
doubled by 1975-1979. Moreover, employment in manufacturing rose from 18.2% of
43Dom Mintofif, "Malta’s Road to Independence," a paper delivered at the international conference, "An 
Island Living," Prince Edward Island, September, 1992 and to be included in Barry Bartmann and T. 
N. St. John Bates (eds.), The Road to Self-Government: Patterns o f Autonomy Among North Atlantic
Islands (Charlottetown: Institute of Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island, forthcoming 
1996).
^Lino Briguglio, "The Maltese Economy," a paper presented at an international conference on Small 
Islands and Small States, sponsored by the Foundation for International Studies, University of Malta, 
Valletta, 23-25 May, 1991.
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total employment in 1960-1964 to 32.7% in 1975-1979. These figures have dropped only 
marginally in recent years.45
Tourism and construction have both contributed significantly to Malta’s ongoing 
prosperity. Tourism grew by 21% to 30% in the late eighties. It is a major factor in 
compensating for recurring deficits in merchandise trade. And it accounts for 5% of total 
employment.46 Market services account for some 34% of GDP.
Over the last decade Malta has experienced annual growth rates of between 3.9% 
and 8.4%, well above the European average.47 And now Malta is poised to join the 
European Union with credentials for Maastricht convergence on monetary union that only 
Luxembourg now consistently meets.48 The relative success of Malta speaks dramatically 
to so many of the assumptions outlined in the early pages of this study. It is an extremely 
small place geographically, even to the point that the major runway at its busy 
international airport seems to stretch half way across the major island in satellite 
photographs. It is arid and import dependent. And the Maltese themselves would be a 
relatively small or middle-sized city in other European states. Yet, this once most loyal
46Market Services Co. Ltd., The EC.-Malta at the Crossroads. Floriana: Federation of Industries, 1988, 
pp. 39, 47.
47These figures are similar to Europe’s other Mediterranean micro-state, Cyprus, which has had the 
further difficulty of coping with a seemingly intractable division of the island.
Note Appendix III to this chapter.
^Indeed, astonishingly, Malta is one of the few countries in Europe which could now meet the Maastricht 
standards for convergence. Its growth rate in 1995 was 6%, more than twice the E.U. average of 2.5%. 
And its public debt stands at 36% of GDP, lower than any other state in the Union except for 
Luxembourg!
The Economist, March 9,1996, 56.
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colony of Great Britain, which petitioned for an ongoing imperial relationship, is now 
negotiating to join the European Union from an enviable position of strength.
The experience of Malta and Cyprus, both once considered under-developed 
economies, is not repeated everywhere. But it is testament that very small economies can 
manage and prosper as sovereign states and against formidable odds. Malta particularly is 
pursuing a course of liberalisation in its efforts to meet all EU expectations.49 Far from the 
timidity which characterised much of Maltese attitudes in the late fifties and early sixties, 
this very small national community is embracing the challenge of membership with 
confidence and enthusiasm.
In short, sovereignty has not been a panacea to rescue very small economies from 
the vulnerabilities and structural disabilities which they face because of their size. On the 
other hand, it has not presented an impossible set of challenges sufficient to support early 
notions that these tiny jurisdictions would be either unviable in the end or so chronically 
dependent as to render hollow the international personality which they won for 
themselves. For most micro-states, their international economic relations are still 
characterised by tasks of dependence-management. But within those more modest 
parameters, they have done unexpectedly well.
49Edward Scicluna, The Restructuring o f the Maltese Economy (Floriana: Malta Federation of Industry, 
1993).
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TABLE 1
TRADE STATISTICS FOR SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES 
($US Million, 1986 C u rre n t D ollars)
RANKED ACCORDING TO GNP. 1986
(M ic ro -s ta te s  L is ted  in  U pper C a se )
COUNTRY GNP EXPORTS IMPORTS
1 Denmark 78888 20558.4 22725.6
2 Finland 69375 16325.2 15324.5
3 Norway 68548 18229.7 20298.2
4 Israel 28140 7135.2 9481.1
5 New Zealand 26668 3143.3 3235.9
6 Kuwait 24580 7511.9 5934.0
7 Ireland 21962 12603.7 11563.7
8 United Arab Emirates 21400 15837.1 6422.0
9 Libya 20030 5680.0 4440.4
10 Singapore 18160 22427.9 25461.4
11 Oman 8540 290.4 2384.1
12 Trinidad and Tobago 6170 1385.7 1369.8
13 Uruguay 6120 1082.1 870.0
14 LUXEMBOURG 5830 3720.5 4020.2
15 Panama 4820 326.8 1275.3
16 Jordan 4420 714.3 2412.7
17 Costa Rica 4110 1025.5 1130.1
18 QATAR 3880 1827.8 1098.9
19 El Salvador 3830 713.0 884.9
20 ICELAND 3713 1095.8 1115.3
21 BAHRAIN 3670 2343.6 2426.6
22 Mongolia 3620 675.0 1732.0
23 BRUNEI 3570 2156.0 1114.2
24 Honduras 3570 854.3 875.0
25 Paraguay 3570 232.5 578.1
26 CYPRUS 3120 306.4 1263.4
27 GABON 3010 1074.2 924.0
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TRADE STATISTICS FOR SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES
($US Million, 1986 C u rre n t D ollars)
RANKED ACCORDING TO GNP. 1986
(M ic ro -s ta te s  L isted  in U pper C a se )
COUNTRY GNP EXPORTS IMPORTS
28 Albania 2800 428.0 363.0
29 Nicaragua 2470 247.2 770.1
30 Papua New Guinea 2,400 1,048.80 931.30
31 BAHAMAS 2310 2702.2 3293.5
32 Haiti 2230 170.2 367.2
33 Jamaica 2150 587.5 971.6
34 Lebanon a.e 1800 302.9 2273.1
35 Congo 1,620 718 629
36 Somalia 1,560 105 402
37 MAURITIUS 1,400 674.5 675.4
38 MALTA 1,380 497 879.7
39 Benin 1,380 93.9 370
40 BARBADOS 1,300 277.4 593.2
41 FIJI 1,250 264.3 422.2
42 Burundi 1,250 169.3 203.4
43 Sierra Leone 1,240 144.9 276.5
44 Liberia 1,010 408.4 259
45 Botswana 990 861.3 707.1
46 SURINAME 980 336.6 317
47 Togo 950 235 350
48 Central African Republic 940 131.3 251.8
49 Yemen, P.D.R. 910 29 483
50 Chad c 810 138 162
51 Mauritania 780 349.4 221
52 Laos 660 58 205
53 Lesotho 540 24.3 425
54 SWAZILAND 460 265.5 344.4
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TRADE STATISTICS FOR SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES
($US Million, 1986 C u rre n t D ollars)
RANKED ACCORDING TO GNP. 1986
(M ic ro -s ta te s  L is ted  in U pper C a se )
COUNTRY GNP EXPORTS IMPORTS
55 LIECHTENSTEIN 450 688.8 265.4
56 DJIBOUTI b 430 13.4 188.4
57 GUYANA 390 231.2 225.6
58 BELIZE 200 90.9 107.5
59 SAINT LUCIA 190 82.9 154.8
60 ANTIGUA and BARBUDA 190 24.7 199.5
61 SEYCHELLES 190 18.4 105.5
62 GAMBIA 170 68.4 113.3
63 BHUTAN 170 25.6 89.1
64 NAURU 160 54.8 10.7
65 CAPE VERDE c 160 49.7 41.8
66 COMOROS 160 20.3 39.3
67 VANUATU 160 17.3 57.1
68 GUINEA-BISSAU 160 9.6 71.6
69 SOLOMON ISLANDS 120 66.8 63.5
70 GRENADA 120 28.8 83.5
71 SAINT VINCENT and GRENADINES 110 63.9 87.3
72 DOMINICA 110 42.3 55.7
73 WESTERN SAMOA 110 11.5 48.3
74 EQUATORIAL GUINEA a.c 107 23.5 25.1
75 SAINT KITTS-NEVIS 80 27.5 63.4
76 TONGA 70 5.8 39.8
77 MALDIVES 60 27.3 11.6
78 SAO TOME and PRINCIPE d 40 9.9 11
79 KIRIBATI 30 1.8 14
80 TUVALU 4 0.015 2.7
81 MONACO n/a n/a n/a
82 SAN MARINO n/a n/a n/a
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TABLE I
NOTES:
a GDP, not GNP 
b exports 1985 
c exports, imports 1984 
d imports 1984
e GDP, exports 1985; imports 1984
SOURCES FOR GNP:
DEVELOPING NATIONS 
Main Source:
United Nations Statistical Yearbook 
New York: United Nations, 1985-86.
Supplementary Source:
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITAN NIC A BOOK OF THE YEAR.
LONDON: BRITANNICA PUBLICATIONS, 1986-80.
Albania 1982,1985-86; EQUATORIAL GUINEA 1981,1983-86; Lebanon 1983-84; Mongolia 1985-86; 
Lebanon 1983-84; Mongolia 1985-86; NAURU 1984-86; TUVALU 1981,1984-86;
WESTERN SAMOA 1981,1985-86.
WESTERN NATIONS
WORLD TABLES, BALTIMORE: THE WORLD BANK, JOHN HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1989. (in Domestic currency)
Conversion Rates: UNITED NATIONS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK.
NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, 1985-86.
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TABLE I
SOURCES FOR EXPORTS:
Main Source:
UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK.
NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, Vol. 1,1987.
Table 3: "Trade by Principal Countries of Provenance and Destination", supplemented by:
Table 1: "Historical Series, General Trade", where value of exports in domestic currency
is converted into $US millions by using the conversion factors supplied in the Table.
Supplementary Sources:
j) HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS.
GENEVA: UNCTAD, 1988. (M icro-states only)
GABON 1986; GAMBIA 1984-86; GUINEA-BISSAU 1983-86; KIRIBAT11985-86;
MALDIVES 1983-86; SAO TOM£ and PRINCIPE 1981-85; ST. KITTS-NEVIS 1984;
ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES 1983-84; SURINAME 1981-86; SWAZILAND 1981-86.
ii) STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, BANGKOK: UNEASCAP, 1988.
Bhutan 1981-86; BRUNE11986; Laos 1981-86; NAURU 1981-84;TUVALU 1984.
iii) UNITED NATIONS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK. NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, 1985/86.
Chad 1981-84; EQUATORIAL GUINEA 1981-82,1984; Lebanon 1983-85; Paraguay 1984-85;
United Arab Emirates 1983-86; Yemen, P.D.R. 1981-86.
iV WORLD TABLES, BALTIMORE: THE WORLD BANK, JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1989.
Benin 1984-86; Congo 1986; Lesotho 1986; Ubya 1985-86; NAURU 1986;
New Zealand 1981-86; Somalia 1986; Togo 1986; TUVALU 1985.
Vi) ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR.
LONDON: BRITANNICA PUBLICATIONS, 1986-90.
Albania 1982,1985-86; LIECHTENSfEIN 1982-86; LUXEMBOURG 1982-86; Mongolia 1985-86; 
Paraguay 1986; QATAR 1986; TUVALU 1986.
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TABLE I
SOURCES FOR IMPORTS:
Main Source:
UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK.
NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, Vol. 1,1987.
Table 3: "Trade by Principal Countries of Provenance and Destination", supplemented by:
Table 1: "Historical Series, General Trade", where value of imports in domestic currency 
is converted into $US millions by using the conversion factors supplied in the Table.
Supplementary Sources:
j) STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. BANGKOK: UNEASCAP, 1988.
Bhutan 1981-86; BRUNE11986; KIRIBAT11985-86; Laos 1981-86; MALDIVES 1983-86;
NAURU 1981-84; TUVALU 1984.
ii) UNITED NATIONS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK. NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, 1985/86.
Chad 1981-84; EQUATORIAL GUINEA 1981-82,1984; Lebanon 1982,1984; Paraguay 1984-85;
ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES 1984; SURINAME 1981-82,1984-85;
United Arab Emirates 1984-85; Yemen, P.D.R.1981-86.
iii) WORLD TABLES, BALTIMORE: THE WORLD BANK, JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS,1989.
Benin 1984-86; Congo 1986; GABON 1986; GAMBIA 1984-86;GUINEA-BISSAU 1983-86;
GUYANA 1986; Haiti 1986; Kuwait 1985-86; Lesotho 1986; Libya 1983-86; NAURU 1986;
New Zealand 1981-86; Somalia 1986; SWAZILAND 1984; Togo 1986;
United Arab Emirates 1986.
iv THE EUROPA WORLD YEARBOOK: LONDON: EUROPA PUBLICATIONS, 1987.
Botswana 1984-86; Lesotho 1981-85; Paraguay 1981-83; SWAZILAND 1983,1985-86.
V ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR.
LONDON: BRITANNICA PUBLICATIONS, 1986-90.
Albania 1982,1985-86; DJIBOUT11986; Lebanon 1983;LIECHTENSTEIN 1981-86; 
LUXEMBOURG 1981,1983-86; Mongolia 1985-86; Paraguay 1986;
SAO TOME and PRiNCIPE 1984; SURINAME 1986; SWAZILAND 1982, TUVALU 1985-86
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TABLE II
SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED
ACCORDING TO RATIOS OF TOTALTRADE (X+M) TO GNP (1986)
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)
COUNTRY 1986 1985 1984
1 Singapore 263.7 267.7 275.5
2 BAHAMAS 259.6 268.8 486.4
3 LIECHTENSTEIN f 212 149 130.9
4 Botswana 158.4 148 156.6
5 Lebanon acde 143.1 143.1 177.7
6 MALDIVES 142.2 146.8 178.9
7 ST. VINCENT a n d  THE g r e n a d i n e s 137.4 129.5 130.2
8 LUXEMBOURG 132.8 116.9 111.2
9 SWAZILAND 132.6 130.1 120
10 BAHRAIN 130 161.5 167.5
11 ST. LUCIA 125.1 104.1 110.9
12 ANTIGUA and BARBUDA 118 107.9 93.4
13 GUYANA 117.1 128.2 121.7
14 ST. KITTS-NEVIS g 113.6 107.7 104.8
15 Ireland 110 125.5 121.4
16 SOLOMON ISLANDS 108.6 106.7 105.3
17 GAMBIA 106.9 112.9 94.4
18 United Arab Emirates 104 81.3 79.8
19 MALTA 99.8 104.7 100.4
20 BELIZE 99.2 121.3 115.3
21 MAURITIUS 96.4 93.1 84.5
22 GRENADA 93.6 83.3 74.2
23 BRUNEI 91.6 96 99.4
24 DOMINICA 89.1 83.8 92.7
25 Lesotho 83.2 79.1 76.4
26 Congo 83.1 86.4 86
27 Papua New Guinea 82.5 84.8 81.2
28 QATAR 75.4 95.1 100.4
29 Mauritania 73.1 90.7 79.9
30 Jamaica 72.5 96.1 93.4
362
TABLE II
SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED
ACCORDING TO RATIOS OF TOTALTRADE fX+Ml TO GNP (1986) 
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)
COUNTRY 1986 1985 1984
31 Jordan 70.7 87.4 93.6
32 TUVALU 67.9 74.8 93.6
33 Bhutan 67.5 61.2 50.7
34 BARBADOS 67 77.7 90.4
35 SURINAME 66.7 69.5 78.2
36 Mongolia 66.5 105.5 n/a
37 GABON 66.4 95.5 88.3
38 Liberia 66.1 69.9 82.9
39 SEYCHELLES 65.2 79.5 70.6
40 TONGA 65.2 77.8 71.8
41 Togo 61.6 55.6 55.7
42 ICELAND 59.6 62.4 60.6
43 Israel 59 61.9 56.4
44 CAPE VERDE be 57.1 70.3 70.3
45 Yemen, P.D.R. 56.3 70.4 74.4
46 Norway 56.2 57.5 60.8
47 FIJI 54.9 59.8 59.7
48 Denmark 54.9 61.8 61.3
49 Kuwait 54.7 63.1 71.9
50 WESTERN SAMOA f 54.4 60.3 55.1
51 KIRIBATI 52.7 65.3 106.7
52 Costa Rica 52.4 58.1 62.9
53 SAO TOME and PRINCIPE c 52.3 45.3 77.3
54 GUINEA-BISSAU 50.7 49.7 57.5
55 Libya 50.5 67.7 74.8
56 CYPRUS 50.3 70.1 86.7
57 Honduras 48.4 47.7 51.1
58 DJIBOUTI d 46.9 51.7 59.7
59 VANUATU 46.5 68 65.3
60 Finland 45.6 50.2 51.4
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TABLE II
SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED
ACCORDING TO RATIOS OF TOTALTRADE (X+M) TO GNP (1986) 
(M ic ro -s ta te s  L isted  in U pper C a se )
COUNTRY 1986 1985 1984
61 EQUATORIAL GUINEA abc 45.5 54.1 71.5
62 Trinidad and Tobago 44.7 51.4 53.8
63 El Salvador 41.7 43.5 49.2
64 Nicaragua 41.2 45.7 46.8
65 NAURU h 40.9 46.7 46.7
66 Central African Republic 40.8 28.6 26.5
67 Laos 39.8 41.2 39.1
68 COMOROS 37.2 47.6 45.5
69 Chad be 37 45.5 58.8
70 Sierra Leone 34 19.3 29.3
71 Benin 33.6 45.5 45.9
72 Panama 33.2 36.9 38.9
73 Somalia 32.5 15.7 8.8
74 Uruguay 31.9 32.1 34.8
75 Oman 31.3 39.6 39.9
76 Burundi 29.8 27.1 29.5
77 Albania 28.3 18.8 n/a
78 Haiti 24.1 30.9 36.2
79 New Zealand 23.9 28.4 32.1
80 Paraguay 22.7 26.7 29.3
81 SAN MARINO n/a n/a n/a
82 MONACO n/a n/a n/a
NOTES:
GDP, not GNP
a 1984 most recent export data, used for 1984-86 
b 1984 most recent import data, used fori 984-86 
c 1985 most recent export data, used for 1985-86 
d 1985 most recent GNP data, used for 1985-86 
e 1984 GNP missing, used 1981 
f 1984 imports missing, used 1983 
g 1985 exports, imports missing, used 1984 both years
Source: SEE NOTES TO TABLE I_________
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TABLE 111
SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE TRADE
THE RATIO OF IMPORTS TO GNP (1986) 
(M ic ro -s ta te s  L isted  in U pper C a se )
COUNTRY 1986 1985 1984
1 BAHAMAS 142.6 142.5 266.1
2 Singapore 140.2 143.2 149.8
3 Lebanon abc 126.3 126.3 152.4
4 ANTIGUA and BARBUDA 105.0 92.9 82.4
5 MALDIVES 96.7 95.8 121.2
6 ST. LUCIA 81.5 73.5 79.0
7 ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES 79.4 72.0 76.6
8 ST. KITTS-NEVIS e 79.3 76.6 74.2
9 Lesotho 78.7 75.0 72.4
10 SWAZILAND 74.9 84.5 74.7
11 Botswana 71.4 65.1 80.6
12 GRENADA 69.6 63.0 56.0
13 LUXEMBOURG 69.0 59.9 58.2
14 TUVALU 67.5 72.0 86.8
15 GAMBIA 66.6 70.0 50.1
16 BAHRAIN 66.1 83.5 87.2
17 MALTA 63.7 68.3 64.6
18 LIECHTENSTEIN d 59.0 39.9 38.1
19 GUYANA 57.8 70.8 66.4
20 TONGA 56.9 68.8 58.7
21 SEYCHELLES 55.5 62.1 54.5
22 Jordan 54.6 67.2 73.1
23 BELIZE 53.8 71.2 72.3
24 Yemen, P.D.R. 53.1 66.5 72.0
25 SOLOMON ISLANDS 52.9 53.1 43.7
26 Ireland 52.7 61.7 60.8
27 Bhutan 52.4 47.3 40.6
28 DOMINICA 50.6 55.3 64.2
29 MAURITIUS 48.2 50.9 47.2
30 Mongolia 47.8 75.8 n/a
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TABLE III
SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE TRADE
THE RATIO OF IMPORTS TO GNP (19861
(M ic ro -s ta te s  L isted  in U pper C ase)
COUNTRY 1986 1985 1984
31 KIRIBATI 46.7 50.0 68.6
32 BARBADOS 45.6 50.6 58.9
33 Jamaica 45.2 64.6 56.6
34 GUINEA-BISSAU 44.8 42.0 44.2
35 WESTERN SAMOA d 43.9 46.5 39.7
36 DJIBOUTI 43.8 48.5 56.4
37 CYPRUS 40.5 50.6 60.8
38 Congo 38.8 30.1 28.9
39 Papua New Guinea 38.8 43.4 42.3
40 Togo 36.8 33.5 32.7
41 VANUATU 35.7 47.5 42.0
42 FIJI 33.8 40.1 39.0
43 Israel 33.7 35.1 33.2
44 SURINAME 32.3 34.9 40.0
45 BRUNEI 31.2 16.4 16.2
46 Nicaragua 31.2 34.2 31.9
47 Laos 31.1 32.2 30.6
48 GABON 30.7 31.6 27.0
49 ICELAND 30.0 32.8 32.2
50 United Arab Emirates 30.0 27.7 26.9
51 Norway 29.6 25.2 25.7
52 Denmark 28.8 32.3 31.6
53 Mauritania 28.3 34.9 36.2
54 QATAR 28.3 23.2 20.6
55 Oman 27.9 35.6 35.2
56 SAO TOME and PRINCIPE b 27.5 27.5 36.7
57 Costa Rica 27.5 30.6 33.5
58 Benin 26.8 30.6 30.3
59 Central African Republic 26.8 15.8 13.4
60 Panama 26.5 30.3 32.9
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TABLE III
SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE TRADE
THE RATIO OF IMPORTS TO GNP (1986) 
(M icro -s ta tes  L isted  in U pper C a se )
COUNTRY 1986 1985 1984
61 CAPE VERDE b 26.1 32.1 32.1
62 Somalia 25.8 8.7 6.2
63 Liberia 25.6 27.6 37.1
64 COMOROS 24.5 33.4 39.1
65 Honduras 24.5 26.5 27.4
66 Kuwait 24.1 21.4 25.9
67 EQUATORIAL GUINEA ab 23.5 27.9 36.9
68 El Salvador 23.1 25.5 33.5
69 Sierra Leone 22.3 11.6 15.6
70 Trinidad and Tobago 22.2 21.3 25.3
71 Libya 22.2 24.1 32.3
72 Finland 22.1 24.7 24.6
73 Chad b 20.0 24.5 31.8
74 Haiti 16.5 22.2 26.2
75 Burundi 16.3 17.3 19.3
76 Paraguay 16.2 14.0 16.7
77 Uruguay 14.2 14.6 15.9
78 Albania 13.0 9.8 n/a
79 New Zealand 12.1 14.5 16.8
80 NAURU 6.7 5.3 5.3
81 MONACO n/a n/a n/a
82 SAN MARINO n/a n/a n/a
NOTES:
a GDP, not GNP
b 1984 most recent imports, used 1984-86 
c 1985 most recent GNP, used 1985-86 
d 1984 GNP is 1981 
e 1984 imports missing, used 1983
Source: SEE NOTES TO TABLE I
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TABLE IV
SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE TRADE
THE RATIO OF IMPORTS TO GNP (1986)
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)
COUNTRY 1986 1985  1384
1 LIECHTENSTEIN e 153.1 109.2 92.9
2 Singapore 123.5 124.5 125.7
3 BAHAMAS 117.0 126.3 220.3
4 Botswana 87.0 82.9 76.1
5 United Arab Emirates 74.0 53.6 52.9
6 BAHRAIN 63.9 78.0 80.3
7 LUXEMBOURG 63.8 57.0 53.0
8 BRUNEI 60.4 79.7 83.2
9 GUYANA 59.3 57.4 55.3
10 ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES 58.1 57.5 53.6
11 SWAZILAND 57.7 45.6 45.3
12 Ireland 57.4 63.8 60.6
13 SOLOMON ISLANDS 55.7 53.7 61.6
14 MAURITIUS 48.2 42.2 37.3
15 QATAR 47.1 72.0 79.9
16 MALDIVES 45.5 51.0 57.8
17 BELIZE 45.5 50.1 43.0
18 Mauritania 44.8 55.9 43.7
19 Congo 44.3 56.3 57.1
20 Papua New Guinea 43.7 41.4 38.9
21 ST. LUCIA 43.6 30.6 31.9
22 Liberia 40.4 42.3 45.8
23 GAMBIA 40.2 42.9 44.3
24 DOMINICA 38.5 28.4 28.5
25 MALTA 36.0 36.4 35.8
26 GABON 35.7 63.9 61.3
27 ST. KITTS-NEVIS f 34.4 31.1 30.6
28 SURINAME 34.3 34.6 38.2
29 NAURU 34.3 41.4 41.4
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TABLE IV
SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE TRADE
THE RATIO OF IMPORTS TO GNP (1986)
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)
COUNTRY 1986 1985 1984
30 CAPE VERDE b 31.0 38.2 38.2
31 Kuwait 30.6 41.7 46.0
32 ICELAND 29.5 29.6 28.4
33 Libya 28.4 43.7 42.5
34 Jamaica 27.3 31.5 36.8
35 Norway 26.6 32.3 35.1
36 Denmark 26.1 29.6 29.6
37 Israel 25.4 26.8 23.2
38 Costa Rica 25.0 27.5 29.4
39 SAO TOME and PRINCIPE 24.8 17.8 40.7
40 Togo 24.7 22.1 23.1
41 GRENADA 24.0 20.3 18.2
42 Honduras 23.9 21.2 23.7
43 Finland 23.5 25.4 26.7
44 Trinidad and Tobago 22.5 30.1 28.6
45 EQUATORIAL GUINEA ab 22.0 26.2 34.6
46 BARBADOS 21.3 27.1 31.5
47 FIJI 21.1 19.8 20.6
48 Mongolia 18.6 29.8 n/a
49 El Salvador 18.6 18.0 15.7
50 Uruguay 17.7 17.5 18.9
51 Chad b 17.0 20.9 27.1
52 Lebanon acd 16.8 16.8 25.3
53 Jordan 16.2 20.2 20.5
54 Albania 15.3 9.0 n/a
55 Bhutan 15.1 13.9 10.1
56 Central African Republic 14.0 12.8 13.1
57 Burundi 13.5 9.8 10.2
58 ANTIGUA and BARBUDA 13.0 14.9 11.0
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TABLE IV
SMALL STATE AND MICRO-STATE TRADE
THE RATIO OF IMPORTS TO GNP (1986)
(M ic ro -s ta te s  L is te d  in  U p p er C a s e )
COUNTRY 1986 1986 1984
59 COMOROS 12.7 14.3 6.4
60 New Zealand 11.8 13.8 15.3
61 Sierra Leone 11.7 7.8 13.7
62 VANUATU 10.8 20.5 23.3
63 WESTERN SAMOA e 10.5 13.8 15.4
64 Nicaragua 10.0 11.6 14.9
65 CYPRUS 9.8 19.5 25.9
66 SEYCHELLES 9.7 17.4 16.0
67 Laos 8.8 9.0 8.5
68 TONGA 8.3 9.1 13.1
69 Haiti 7.6 8.8 9.9
70 Benin 6.8 14.9 15.6
71 Panama 6.8 6.6 6.0
72 Somalia 6.7 7.0 2.7
73 Paraguay 6.5 12.8 12.6
74 KIRIBATI 6.0 15.3 38.1
75 GUINEA-BISSAU 6.0 7.7 13.4
76 Lesotho 4.5 4.1 4.0
77 Oman 3.4 3.9 4.7
78 Yemen, P.D.R. 3.2 3.9 2.4
79 DJIBOUTI c 3.1 3.3 3.3
80 TUVALU 0.4 2.8 6.9
81 MONACO n/a n/a n/a
82 SAN MARINO n/a n/a n/a
NOTES:
a GDP, not GNP
b 1984 most recent export, used for 1984-1986 
c 1985 most recent export, used for 1985-1986 
d 1985 most recent GNP, used for 1985-1986 
e 1984 GNP missing, used 1981 
f 1984 imports missing, used 1983
Source: SEE NOTES TO TABLE I
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TABLE V
SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING
TO THE
HIRSHMANN INDEX OF COMMODITY CONCENTRATION
OF
EXPORT TRADE 119861 
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)
COUNTRY* 1975
1 Libya 0.958 (0.982)
2 QATAR 0.915 (0.971)
3 MAURITIUS 0.913 (0.856)
4 Chad 0.911 (0.630)
5 Congo 0.901 (0.693)
6 United Arab Emirates 0.892 (0.939)
7 Burundi 0.884 (0.873)
8 CAPE VERDE 0.865 (0.684)
9 TUVALU 0.864 n/a
10 SEYCHELLES 0.825 (0.676)
11 SAO TOME and PRINCIPE 0.814 (0.780)
12 GABON 0.808 (0.563)
13 MALDIVES 0.791 (0.976)
14 COMOROS 0.784 (0.514)
15 EQUATORIAL GUINEA 0.755 (0.725)
16 Botswana 0.749 (0.507)
17 KIRIBATI 0.732 (0.964)
18 Yemen, P.D.R. 0.720 (0.744)
19 Mauritania 0.719 (0.625)
20 BAHAMAS 0.715 (0.698)
21 BRUNEI 0.691 (0.797)
22 ST. LUCIA 0.678 (0.666)
23 BAHRAIN 0.673 (0.747)
24 Liberia 0.646 (0.656)
25 GUINEA-BISSAU 0.632 (0.763)
26 Laos 0.606 (0.945)
27 Kuwait 0.602 (0.812)
28 Somalia 0.601 (0.586)
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TABLE V
SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING
TO THE
HIRSHMANN INDEX OF COMMODITY CONCENTRATION
OF
EXPORT TRADE M986)
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)
c o u n t r y *  -.':: i-:;; ;■ xx-■;: • 1975
29 ST. KITTS-NEVIS 0.591 (0.699)
30 Jamaica 0.590 (0.549)
31 Mongolia -  0.587 (0.506)
32 ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES 0.586 (0.567)
33 El Salvador 0.586 (0.378)
34 Paraguay 0.576 (0.224)
35 DOMINICA 0.570 (0.743)
36 SURINAME 0.568 (0.766)
37 Haiti 0.564 (0.336)
38 SOLOMON ISLANDS 0.561 (0.507)
39 GUYANA 0.560 (0.562)
40 LIECHTENSTEIN 0.557 n/a
41 VANUATU 0.541 n/a
42 GRENADA 0.539 (0.582)
43 LUXEMBOURG 0.535 (0.686)
44 FIJI. 0.528 (0.833)
45 Trinidad and Tobago 0.512 (0.623)
46 Benin 0.512 (0.333)
47 ANTIGUA and BARBUDA 0.502 (0.849)
48 Honduras 0.480 (0.283)
49 Nicaragua 0.478 (0.354)
50 Papua New Guinea 0.460 (0.618)
51 ICELAND 0.459 (0.669)
52 Lesotho 0.448 (0.556)
53 Central African Republic 0.447 (0.386)
54 Togo 0.431 (0.757)
55 BARBADOS 0.409 (0.526)
56 Costa Rica 0.406 (0.331)
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TABLE V
SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING
TO THE
HIRSHMANN INDEX OF COMMODITY CONCENTRATION
OF
EXPORT TRADE 119861 
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)
COUNTRY*
57 Jordan
1986* 1975
58 WESTERN SAMOA
59 Bhutan
60 SWAZILAND
61 Albania
62 GAMBIA
63 Sierra Leone
64 DJIBOUTI
65 MALTA
66 BELIZE
67 Panama
68 Norway
69 TONGA
70 Israel
71 Oman
72 Finland
73 New Zealand
74 Singapore
75 Uruguay
76 Lebanon
77 Ireland
78 CYPRUS
79 Denmark
80 MONACO
81 NAURU
82 SAN MARINO
0.401 (0.495)
0.400 (0.537)
0.389 n/a
0.387 (0.496)
0.381 n/a
0.374 (0.657)
0.362 (0.617)
0.360 n/a
0.355 (0.529)
0.329 n/a
0.318 (0.547)
0.306 (0.176)
0.297 (0.733)
0.289 (0.327)
0.265 (0.997)
0.242 (0.277)
0.233 (0.348)
0.229 (0.313)
0.228 (0.563)
0.219 (0.104)
0.172 (0.128)
0.152 (0.284)
0.093 (0.093)
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
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TABLE V
-  Indicates 2-digit SITC, not 3-digit.
*  Indicates 1986 or most recent year available, as indicated below:
1985: BAHAMAS. BELIZE. BRUNEI. Congo, DOMINICA,GABON, GUYANA, MALDIVES, Paraguay, QATAR. 
SEYCHELLES, Sierra Leone, SURINAME, United Arab Emirates.
1984: ANTIGUA and BARBUDA, Benin, CAPE VERDE, El Salvador, Kuwait, Lebanon, ST. KITTS-NEVIS, 
SAO TOM£ and PRlNCIPE, Somalia
1983: Chad, DJIBOUTI, GRENADA.
1982: BAHRAIN, Central African Republic.
1981: EQUATORIAL GUINEA. Lesotho.
SOURCES:
Main Source:
UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK.
NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, Vol. 1, 1987.
ANTIGUA and BARBUDA, BAHAMAS, BAHRAIN, BARBADOS, BELIZE, BRUNEI, Burundi, CAPE VERDE, 
Congo, CYPRUS, Denmark, DOMINICA, El Salvador, Finland, ICELAND, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
MALTA, Norway, Oman, SEYCHELLES, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay.
Supplementary Sources:
i) THE EUROPA WORLD YEARBOOK: LONDON: EUROPA PUBLICATIONS, 1988.
Bhutan, Botswana, Chad, Costa Rica, DJIBOUTI, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, FIJI, GRENADA, 
GUINEA-BISSAU, JAMAICA, KIRIBATI, MAURITIUS, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Solomon Islands.
ii) ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR.
LONDON: BRITANNICA PUBLICATIONS, 1986-90.
Remaining countries.
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TABLE VI
SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING
TO THE
HIRSHMANN INDEX OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
OF
EXPORT TRADE (1986)
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)
1 Bhutan -  0.991 n/a
2 Chad 0.925 (0.684)
3 BAHAMAS 0.879 (0.792)
4 Botswana 0.836 (0.572)
5 Somalia 0.788 (0.600)
6 MALDIVES 0.721 (0.641)
7 ST. LUCIA 0.715 (0.622)
8 COMOROS 0.691 (0.637)
9 Panama 0.683 (0.613)
10 NAURU 0.655 (0.645)
11 Laos 0.638 (0.743)
12 Lesotho 0.631 n/a
13 Trinidad and Tobago 0.630 (0.695)
14 Congo 0.629 (0.411)
15 TUVALU 0.621 n/a
16 ST. KITTS-NEVIS 0.578 (0.658)
17 BRUNEI 0.575 (0.785)
18 QATAR 0.575 (0.356)
19 Burundi 0.566 (0.513)
20 LIECHTENSTEIN 0.564 (0.506)
21 Haiti 0.560 (0.749)
22 BELIZE 0.556 n/a
23 ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES 0.542 (0.642)
24 Honduras 0.535 (0.540)
25 TONGA 0.531 (0.586)
26 DOMINICA 0.528 (0.784)
27 SAOTOME and PRINCIPE 0.526 (0.617)
28 Papua New Guinea 0.526 (0.452)
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TABLE VI
SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING
TO THE
HIRSHMANN INDEX OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
OF
EXPORT TRADE (1986)
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)
COUNTRY* 1975
29 EQUATORIAL GUINEA 0.520 (0.580)
30 DJIBOUTI 0.519 (0.663)
31 Central African Republic -  0.509 (0.456)
32 United Arab Emirates 0.507 (0.372)
33 GUINEA-BISSAU 0.506 (0.570)
34 KIRIBATI 0.505 (0.598)
35 MAURITIUS 0.499 (0.784)
36 SEYCHELLES 0.491 (0.586)
37 SOLOMON ISLANDS 0.475 (0.364)
38 VANUATU 0.469 n/a
39 BARBADOS 0.461 (0.418)
40 Costa Rica 0.457 (0.454)
41 El Salvador 0.455 (0.371)
42 WESTERN SAMOA 0.450 (0.542)
43 GRENADA 0.441 (0.708)
44 Jamaica 0.435 (0.469)
45 ANTIGUA and BARBUDA 0.423 (0.600)
46 Liberia 0.421 (0.371)
47 Oman 0.418 (0.453)
48 Mauritania 0.417 (0.349)
49 FIJI 0.415 (0.606)
50 CAPE VERDE 0.412 (0.648)
51 Yemen, P.D.R. 0.410 (0.695)
52 GABON 0.392 (0.491)
53 Ireland 0.386 (0.558)
54 Benin 0.384 (0.317)
55 SWAZILAND 0.378 (0.363)
56 LUXEMBOURG 0.377 (0.379)
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TABLE VI
SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING
TO THE
HIRSHMANN INDEX OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
OF
EXPORT TRADE (1986)
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)
57 MALTA 0.374 (0.389)
58 Sierra Leone 0.372 (0.655)
59 GUYANA 0.363 (0.391)
60 Norway 0.360 (0.326)
61 Israel 0.347 (0.229)
62 Nicaragua 0.328 (0.354)
63 Libya 0.323 (0.380)
64 ICELAND 0.322 (0.364)
65 Uruguay 0.319 (0.224)
66 SURINAME 0.316 (0.473)
67 Paraguay 0.3t4 (0.363)
68 Lebanon 0.309 (0.230)
69 GAMBIA 0.299 (0.479)
70 Singapore 0.299 (0.229)
71 Finland 0.291 (0.329)
72 New Zealand 0.289 (0.296)
73 CYPRUS 0.266 (0.379)
74 Jordan 0.262 (0.152)
75 Denmark 0.256 (0.287)
76 BAHRAIN 0.252 (0.318)
77 Albania 0.219 n/a
78 Kuwait 0.200 (0.307)
79 Togo 0.198 (0.524)
80 MONACO n/a n/a
81 Mongolia n/a n/a
82 SAN MARINO n/a n/a
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TABLE VI
-  Indicates 2-digit SITC, not 3-digit.
* Indicates 1986 or most recent year available, as indicated below:
1985: BAHAMAS, BAHRAIN. BELIZE, Benin, COMOROS, Congo, DOMINICA, EQUATORIAL GUINEA. 
GABON, GUINEA-BISSAU, GUYANA, Liberia, Paraguay, QATAR,
SAO TOMEi and PRiNCIPE, Sierra Leone.
1984: ANTIGUA and BARBUDA, CAPE VERDE, DJIBOUTI, El Salvador, Lebanon, Libya,
Mauitania, Nicaragua, SEYCHELLES, Somalia, United Arab Emirates.
1983: Chad, ST. KITTS-NEVIS.
1982: Central African Republic, TUVALU.
1981: Lesotho.
1977: NAURU.
SOURCES:
Main Source:
UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK.
NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, Vol. 1,1987.
ANTIGUA and BARBUDA, BAHAMAS, BARBADOS, BELIZE, Central African Republic, Congo, CYPRUS, 
Denmark, DOMINICA, El Salvador. Finland, ICELAND, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, MALDIVES, MALTA, Mauritania, 
Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Singapore, ST. KITTS-NEVIS, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay.
Supplementary Sources:
i) THE EUROPA WORLD YEARBOOK: LONDON: EUROPA PUBLICATIONS, 1988.
Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, CAPE VERDE. Chad, COMOROS, DJIBOUTI, Jamaica, MAURITIUS, 
NAURU, New Zealand.
jj) STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. BANGKOK: UNEASCAP, 1988.
BRUNEI. FIJI, Laos, Papua New Guinea, SOLOMON ISLANDS, TONGA, WESTERN SAMOA.
iii) ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR.
LONDON: BRITANNICA PUBLICATIONS, 1986-90.
Remaining Countries.
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TABLE VII
SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING
TO THE
HIRSHMANN INDEX OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
OF
IMPORT TRADE (19861 
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)
C O U N TR Y * :: 1 9 8 6 1975
1 Lesotho 0.971 n/a
2 SWAZILAND 0.902 n/a
3 Bhutan 0.872 n/a
4 Botswana 0.784 (0.808)
5 MALDIVES 0.550 (0.290)
6 Central African Republic 0.545 (0.584)
7 Laos 0.528 (0.535)
8 BAHRAIN 0.517 (0.531)
9 Jamaica 0.512 (0.431)
10 BELIZE 0.511 n/a
11 LUXEMBOURG 0.504 (0.524)
12 Papua New Guinea 0.503 (0.529)
13 TONGA 0.498 (0.444)
14 Haiti 0.487 (0.559)
15 BRUNEI 0.487 (0.383)
16 DJIBOUTI 0.480 (0.407)
17 COMOROS 0.479 (0.541)
18 GABON 0.476 (0.674)
19 Congo 0.472 (0.515)
20 KIRIBATI 0.467 (0.620)
21 SOLOMON ISLANDS 0.461 (0.422)
22 Albania 0.460 n/a
23 Ireland 0.458 (0.503)
24 Trinidad and Tobago 0.453 (0.393)
25 SAO TOME and PRINCIPE 0.451 (0.628)
26 BAHAMAS 0.450 (0.456)
27 ST. KITTS-NEVIS 0.450 (0.385)
28 FIJI 0.429 (0.388)
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TABLE VII
SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING
TO THE
HIRSHMANN INDEX OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
OF
IMPORT TRADE (1986)
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)
COUNTRY* 1986* 1975
29 BARBADOS 0.428 (0.341)
30 TUVALU 0.427 n/a
31 Paraguay 0.424 (0.351)
32 EQUATORIAL GUINEA 0.415 (0.456)
33 VANUATU 0.408 n/a
34 WESTERN SAMOA 0.403 (0.396)
35 ANTIGUA and BARBUDA 0.403 (0.360)
36 ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES 0.402 (0.366)
37 Honduras 0.401 (0.467)
38 SURINAME 0.399 (0.420)
39 El Salvador 0.399 (0.369)
40 ST. LUCIA 0.392 (0.377)
41 GUYANA 0.388 (0.416)
42 Costa Rica 0.385 (0.387)
43 Panama 0.382 (0.360)
44 Somalia 0.381 (0.386)
45 Nicaragua 0.367 (0.381)
46 MALTA 0.356 (0.354)
47 GRENADA 0.351 (0.482)
48 DOMINICA 0.346 (0.327)
49 CAPE VERDE 0.345 (0.587)
50 New Zealand 0.338 (0.333)
51 Togo 0.328 (0.397)
52 Oman 0.319 (0.323)
53 Uruguay 0.313 (0.274)
54 Libya 0.308 (0.327)
55 Liberia 0.306 (0.381)
56 Israel 0.290 (0.310)
3S0
TABLE VII
SMALL STATES AND MICRO-STATES RANKED ACCORDING
TO THE
HIRSHMANN INDEX OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
OF
IMPORT TRADE 11986)
(Micro-states Listed in Upper Case)
COUNTRY* 1986* 1975
57 Singapore 0.290 (0.292)
58 Denmark 0.286 (0.293)
59 GUINEA-BISSAU 0.284 (0.475)
60 Finland 0.279 (0.302)
61 Burundi 0.277 (0.313)
62 Norway 0.277 (0.299)
63 Mauritania 0.269 (0.423)
64 Kuwait 0.269 (0.299)
65 QATAR 0.268 (0.318)
66 Benin 0.265 (0.352)
67 United Arab Emirates 0.256 (0.302)
68 ICELAND 0.236 (0.279)
69 CYPRUS 0.235 (0.283)
70 Sierra Leone 0.233 (0.293)
71 SEYCHELLES 0.227 (0.368)
72 Lebanon 0.222 (0.248)
73 Chad 0.217 (0.503)
74 GAMBIA 0.206 (0.304)
75 Yemen, P.D.R. 0.204 (0.303)
76 MAURITIUS 0.204 (0.273)
77 Jordan 0.187 (0.242)
78 NAURU n/a (0.656)
79 LIECHTENSTEIN n/a n/a
80 MONACO n/a n/a
81 Mongolia n/a n/a
82 SAN MARINO n/a n/a
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TABLE VII
-  Indicates 2-digit SITC, not 3-digit.
* Indicates 1986 or most recent year available, as indicated below:
1985: BAHAMAS. BAHRAIN, BELIZE. Benin. COMOROS, Congo, DOMINICA, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, 
GABON, GUINEA-BISSAU, GUYANA, Liberia, Paraguay,
SAO TOME and PRlNCIPE, SEYCHELLES.
1984: ANTIGUA and BARBUDA, CAPE VERDE, DJIBOUTI, El Salvador, Lebanon, Libya,
Mauritania, Nicaragua, Somalia, United Arab Emirates.
1983: Chad, ST. KITTS-NEVIS.
1982: Albania, Central African Republic, TUVALU.
1981: Lesotho.
SOURCES:
Main Source:
UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK.
NEW YORK: UNITED NATIONS, Vol. 1,1987.
ANTIGUA and BARBUDA, BAHAMAS, BARBADOS, BELIZE, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, 
CYPRUS, Denmark.DOMINICA, El Salvador, Finland, ICELAND, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, MALDIVES, MALTA, 
Mauritania, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, SEYCHELLES, Sierra Leone, Singapore, ST. KITTS-NEVIS,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay.
Supplementary Sources:
i) THE EUROPA WORLD YEARBOOK: LONDON: EUROPA PUBLICATIONS, 1988.
Bhutan, Botswana, CAPE VERDE, COMOROS, DJIBOUTI, Jamaica, New Zealand.
Jamaica, New Zealand.
jj) STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. BANGKOK: UNEASCAP, 1988.
BRUNEI, FIJI, Laos, Papua New Guinea, SOLOMON ISLANDS, TONGA, WESTERN SAMOA.
jji) ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR.
LONDON: BRITANNICA PUBLICATIONS, 1986-90.
Remaining countries.
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TABLE VIII
RATIO OF INDICES OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
OF
TRADE fX/M) FOR SELECTED SMALL STATES (1986)
COUNTRY 1986* 1975
1
(GREATER CONCENTRATION OF EXPORTS)
Chad 4.26 (1.35)
2 Somalia 2.07 (1.55)
3 Burundi 2.04 (1-63)
4 Yemen, P.D.R. 2.01 (2.29)
5 United Arab Emirates 1.98 (1-23)
6 Panama 1.79 (1.70)
7 Sierra Leone 1.60 (2.23)
8 Mauritania 1.55 (0.82)
9 Benin 1.45 (0.90)
10 Jordan 1.40 (1.03)
11 Lebanon 1.39 (1.04)
12 Trinidad and Tobago 1.39 (1.76)
13 Liberia 1.38 (0.97)
14 Honduras 1.33 (1.15)
15 Congo 1.33 (0.79)
16 Oman 1.31 (1.40)
17 Norway 1.30 (1.09)
18 Laos 1.21 (1.38)
19 Israel 1.20 (0.81)
20 Costa Rica 1.19 (117)
21 Haiti 1.15 (1.33)
22 El Salvador 1.14 (1.00)
23 Bhutan 1.14 n/a
24 Botswana 1.07 (0.70)
25 Libya 1.05 (116)
26 Papua New Guinea 1.05 (0.85)
27 Finland 1.04 (108)
28 Singapore 1.03 (0.91)
29 Uruguay 1.02 (0.93)
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TABLE VIII
RATIO OF INDICES OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
OF
TRADE (X/M) FOR SELECTED SMALL STATES 119861
COUNTRY 1986* 1975
(GREATER CONCENTRATION OF IMPORTS)
30 Central African Republic 0.93 (0.78)
31 Denmark 0.90 (0.99)
32 Nicaragua 0.89 (0.92)
33 New Zealand 0.86 (0.89)
34 Jamaica 0.85 (1.08)
35 Ireland 0.84 (1.10)
36 Paraguay 0.74 (1.03)
37 Kuwait 0.74 (1.02)
38 Lesotho 0.65 n/a
39 Togo 0.60 (1.31)
40 Albania 0.48 n/a
41 Mongolia n/a n/a
AVERAGE RATIO: 1.28 64 .66
*  1986 or most recent year available.
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TABLE IX
RATIO OF INDICES OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
OF
TRADE (X/M) FOR SELECTED MICRO-STATES (1986)
COUNTRY 1986* 1975
1
(GREATER CONCENTRATION OF EXPORTS)
MAURITIUS 2.45 (287)
2 SEYCHELLES 2.16 (1.59)
3 QATAR 2.15 (1.11)
4 BAHAMAS 1.95 (1.73)
5 ST. LUCIA 1.82 (1.64)
S GUINEA-BISSAU 1.78 (1.20)
7 DOMINICA 1.53 (2.39)
8 TUVALU 1.45 n/a
9 GAMBIA 1.45 (1.57)
10 COMOROS 1.44 (1.17)
11 ICELAND 1.36 (1.30)
12 ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES 1.35 (1.75)
13 MALDIVES 1.31 (2.21)
14 ST. KITTS-NEVIS 1.28 (1.70)
15 GRENADA 1.26 (1.46)
16 EQUATORIAL GUINEA 1.25 (1-27)
17 CAPE VERDE 1.19 (110)
18 BRUNEI 1.18 (2.05)
19 SAOTOM£ and PRINCIPE 1.17 (0.98)
20 VANUATU 1.15 n/a
21 CYPRUS 1.13 (1.33)
22 WESTERN SAMOA 1.12 (136)
23 BELIZE 1.09 n/a
24 KIRIBATI 1.08 (0.96)
25 DJIBOUTI 1.08 (1.62)
26 BARBADOS 1.08 (1.22)
27 TONGA 1.07 (131)
28 MALTA 1.05 (1.09)
29 ANTIGUA and BARBUDA 1.05 (1.66)
30 SOLOMON ISLANDS 1.03 (0.86)
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TABLE IX
RATIO OF INDICES OF GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
OF
TRADE ITUtA) FOR SELECTED MICRO-STATES 11986)
COUNTRY 1986* 1975
31
(GREATER CONCENTRATION OF IMPORTS)
FIJI 0.97 (1.56)
32 GUYANA 0.94 (0.93)
33 GABON 0.82 (0.72)
34 SURINAME 0.77 (1.12)
35 LUXEMBOURG 0.75 (0.72)
36 BAHRAIN 0.49 (0.59)
37 SWAZILAND 0.42 n/a
38 LIECHTENSTEIN n/a n/a
39 MONACO n/a n/a
40 NAURU n/a (0.98)
41 SAN MARINO n/a n/a
AVERAGE RATIO: 1.26 59 .47
* 1986 or most recent year available.
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TABLE I-A
NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO MICRO-STATES AS % OF GNP
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
A ntigua and  B arbuda 1210.0% 490.0% 280.0% -240.0% 1260.0% 23.9%
B aham as 22.1 19.4 58.9 -6.7 • 24.1 37.8
Bahrain 5.6 15.9 12.1 8.2 8.1 3.3
B arbados 4.0 4.9 3.3 -0.2 * 2.4 2.8
Boiize 6.6 8.3 12.2 14.7 16.2 9.6
Brunei -0.7 * 0.6 0.2 -0.1 * -0.1 * -0.1
C ape Verde 42.3 48.1 49.3 49.7 54.3 70.3
C om oros 48.7 34.5 35.9 38.9 46.2 29.4
C yprus 5.9 1.9 2.0 1.0 7.3 5.7
Djibouti 19.7 16.9 17.7 32.7 25.2 18.3
Dominica 30.4 29.1 12.9 32.2 35.9 35.9
Equatorial G uinea 8.2 n/a 20.2 27.3 19.7 29.3
Fiji 7.0 6.5 5.9 2.8 2.0 3.7
G abon 2.6 5.3 8.4 1.8 6.6 10.3
Gam bia 37.6 21.3 19.1 24.2 32.6 58.8
G renada 9.4 -2.4 * 23.1 30.7 30.5 23.6
G uinea-B issau 44.7 41.3 41.5 47.4 42.2 44.9
G uyana 16.9 13.2 8.1 6.2 9.8 6.9
Kiribati 77.0 50.7 55.7 38.0 40.0 46.0
M aldives 72.7 22.5 22.5 13.8 19.6 27.0
Malta 8.1 29.3 5.0 1.0 1.9 1.4
Mauritius 8.6 7.2 4.2 6.0 2.9 3.9
Nauru n/a n/a * n/a * -0.1 * 1.4 28.6
S ao  Tom e and  Principe 20.3 33.0 29.0 37.7 31.3 31.0
Seychelles 21.3 21.1 14.5 15.4 17.5 17.7
Solom on Islands 25.1 21.9 25.8 17.0 16.9 24.9
St. Kitts-Nevis 7.0 5.7 5.3 -3.7 * 6.7 6.6
St. Lucia 10.4 7.5 5.9 3.6 4.2 6.2
St. Vincent and  G renadines 13.1 9.8 5.7 4.2 7.1 11.4
Surinam e 9.4 9.6 0.1 0.2 1.5 8.6
Swaziland 8.8 8.9 9.1 9.5 8.4 9.1
Tonga 30.0 24.9 22.4 22.4 22.7 21.6
Tuvalu 108.0 n/a n/a 137.5 82.5 110.0
V anuatu 26.8 25.5 25.4 32.4 25.7 -17.8
W estern  S am oa 19.4 n/a n/a n/a 18.5 20.8
* Indicates a  negative net receipt; that is. a  net capital outflow 
from the m icrostate to all external sou rces of bilateral and 
multilateral aid, indicating that Interest and pnncipal paym ents on 
p as t loans exceed  the pnncipal am ounts of any new  loans or grants 
received
Source G eographical Distnbution of F inancial Flows to Developing Countries 
P ans: O rganisation for Econom ic Co-operation and D evelopm ent
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TABLE l-A
NET CAPITAL FLOWS 1$US Millions)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Antigua an d  B arbuda 14.5 6.4 3.7 -3.9 22.7 45.4 10.9
B aham as 244.8 250.7 830.3 -103.1 521.1 872.9 1031.1
Bahrain 196.5 575.4 469.5 326.8 301.6 119.9 -22.9
B arbados 38 48.6 34 -1.7 28 37 12.2
Belize 11.9 13.3 20.7 26.5 29.1 19.1 23.6
Brunei -30.3 23.8 7.5 -2.5 -3.5 -4.2 2.4
C ape V erde 50.7 62.5 64.1 64.6 70.6 112.4 86.4
C om oros 53.6 37.9 39.5 42.8 50.8 47.1 53.1
C yprus 120.9 39.4 42.1 23.2 178.4 177.1 95.5
Djibouti 66.9 59.2 67.1 130.8 103.2 78.9 87.8
Dominica 21.3 20.4 10.3 29 35.9 39.5 16.4
Equatorial G uinea 11.5 9.1 12.1 17.8 17.7 31.4 45.9
FIJI 85.9 75.6 65.3 31.9 22.5 46.7 21.6
G abon 93 175.4 272.9 60.7 203.3 309.3 427.4
G am bia 86.5 42.5 38.1 48.3 48.9 100 105.2
G renada 6.6 -1.7 18.5 30.7 33.6 28.3 23.1
G uinea-B issau 67.1 66 66.4 61.6 63.3 71.9 99.6
G uyana 86 56.9 34.1 23.4 35.3 27.1 37.9
Kiribati 23.1 15.2 16.7 11.4 12 13.8 18.3
M aldives 21.8 9 9 5.5 9.8 16.2 24.1
Malta 100 366.5 57.7 11.3 20.8 19.3 27.9
Mauritius 94.7 74.4 44.1 60 30.2 54.9 93.7
Nauru 2.7 -4.3 -8 -0.2 2.3 45.7 0.8
S ao  Tom e an d  Principe 6.1 9.9 11.6 11.3 12.5 12.4 18.2
S eychelles 32 31.6 21.8 24.6 28 33.7 24.5
S olom an Islands 30.1 28.5 30.9 25.5 22 29.9 70.3
St. K itts-Nevis 4.2 3.4 3.2 -2.6 4.7 5.3 10.9
St. Lucia 13.5 9.7 8.3 5.4 7.1 11.8 15.3
St. V incent and  G renad ines 9.2 7.8 5.1 4.2 7.8 12.5 13.5
Surinam e 95.6 101.3 1.1 1.9 14.4 83.8 -32
Sw aziland 57.1 48.2 53 48.2 31.8 41.8 37.7
T o n g a 18 17.4 17.9 15.7 13.6 15.1 36.7
T uvalu 5.4 5.9 4.2 5.5 3.3 4.4 25.7
V anuatu 29.5 33.1 35.6 45.3 38.5 -28.4 35.2
W estern  S am o a 24.6 22.6 31 13.6 20.4 22.9 35.4
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TABLE I-A
QNP AT CURRENT PRICES ($US Millions)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Antigua and  B arbuda 120 130 130 160 180 190 210
B aham as 1110 1290 1410 1540 2160 2310 2550
Bahrain 3510 3620 3880 3990 3720 3670
B arbados 950 990 1040 1130 1190 1300 1350
Belize 180 160 170 180 180 200
Brunei 4330 4250 3820 3840 3730 3570
C ape V erde 120 130 130 130 130 160 170
C om oros 110 110 110 110 110 160 200
C yprus 2050 2100 2080 2220 2440 3120 3740
Djibouti 340 350 380 400 410 430
Dominica 70 70 80 90 100 110 120
Equatorial G uinea 140 60 65.2 90 107
Fiji 1230 1160 1100 1150 1100 1250 1120
G abon 3530 3340 3240 3290 3090 3010 3060
G am bia 230 200 200 200 150 170 210
G renada 70 70 80 100 110 120 130
G uinea-B issau 150 160 160 130 150 160 120
G uyana 510 430 420 380 360 390 250
Kiribati 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
M aldives 30 40 40 40 50 60 50
Malta 1240 1250 1150 1100 1100 1380 1670
Mauritius 1100 1030 1050 1000 1030 1400 1720
N aum 160 160 160 160
S ao  T om e and  Principe 30 30 40 30 40 40 20
Seychelles 150 150 150 160 160 190 220
S olom an Islands 120 130 120 150 130 120 110
St. K itts-Nevis 60 60 60 70 70 80 80
St. Lucia 130 130 140 150 170 190 210
St. V incent and  G renad ines 70 80 90 100 110 110 120
Surinam e 1020 1050 1020 980 970 980 1090
S w aziland 650 540 580 510 380 460 590
T o n g a 60 70 80 70 60 70 80
Tuvalu 5 4 4 4
V anuatu 110 130 140 140 150 160
W estern  S am o a 127 110 110
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TABLE l-B
NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO SMALL STATES AS % OF GNP
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Benin 11.50% 18.80% 9.50% 11.70% 9.60% 7.00%
Bhutan 8.20% 7.50% 7.60% 9.90% 15.10% 23.60%
B otsw ana 13.8 17.2 15.9 20.9 17.8 15.8
Burundi 14.1 15.7 16.7 16.2 14.1 14.9
Chad 8.7 11.1 17 21.9 27.3 20.1
Congo 11.7 23.3 15.5 5.5 3 2 20.7
C osta  Rica 4.3 5.1 9.6 9 11.1 8.1
El S alvador 5.6 6.6 8.8 7.5 10 8.6
Haiti 8 8.9 7.9 7.5 7.3 7.8
H onduras 8.7 6.9 8.7 12.7 11.4 8.3
Israel 5.4 7.7 10 8 10.9 8.2
Ja m aica 9 12.8 10.1 17.5 12.6 3.3
Jo rd a n 42.2 29.3 21.5 23.3 8.5 14.7
Laos 7.8 7.9 6 6.6 10.7 7.3
L ebanon 13.2 7.9 2.3 6.4 3.2 n/a
L esotho 14.6 13.5 13.6 13.9 23.9 17.1
Liberia 61.3 45.7 -13.3 * -24.9 * -27.9 * -25.4
Mauritania 33.1 35.7 32 27.5 35.1 26.6
Nicaragua 13.4 6.8 7.3 6.2 4.5 7
Om an 2.8 1.2 3 3.4 2.1 3.4
P anam a 36.6 42.5 19.3 28.7 36.6 37.2
P apua New G uinea 13.4 26.3 25.7 22.6 15.4 8.4
Paraguay 2.5 5.2 5.4 4.9 2.6 3.3
Sierra Leone 5.8 6.5 4.5 6.8 4.2 7
Singapore 10.4 6.2 1.1 6.9 -1.5 * -0.6
Som alia 34.5 51.1 30.1 21.1 28.7 38.5
Togo 5.6 12.6 16.3 14.1 11.4 14.1
Trinidad and  Tobago 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.9 -4.4 * 0.2
Uruguay 0.5 2.2 8 5.6 -2.5 * 1
Yemen, P.D.R. 9.9 18.5 7.7 8.7 11.6 6
■ Indicates a negative net receipt; that is, a net capital outflow
from the smaH slate to all external sources of bilateral and 
multilateral aid, indicating that Interest and principal payments on 
past loans exceed the prin cipa l amounts of a n y  new loans or grants 
received.
Data unavailable for Albania, Mongolia.
Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries. 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
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TABLE l-B
NET CAPITAL FLOWS ($US Millions)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Benin 119.6 192.2 90.9 110.2 98.1 96.3 86.2
B hutan 9.8 11.3 13 1 7 9 24.1 40.1 42
B otsw ana 110.7 118.6 130 182.2 158.6 156.6 215.2
Burundi 136.8 157.1 175.7 156.9 157.4 185.9 189
C had 53.9 63 93.7 111.7 180.5 162.7 198.4
C ongo 215.8 466.2 298.7 113.1 60.8 335.9 254.2
C osta  Rica 99.7 110.6 268.5 291.2 397.1 331.7 242.6
El S alvador 188.4 221.9 313.3 293.7 375.2 330.8 422.3
Haiti 116.3 131.5 126.4 135.1 145 173 211.7
H onduras 216.9 179.8 242.3 376.7 376.3 297.9 246.7
Israel 1060.5 1551 2168.3 1985.3 2548.5 2296.8 2082.2
Ja m a ica 233.2 355.6 311.2 354 219.3 70.7 243.8
Jo rd a n 1502.3 1104.4 833.1 855.9 327.3 648.5 881.8
Laos 35 38.1 30.1 35.2 64.1 48.4 59
L ebanon 515.3 198.4 113.6 95.2 58.3 124.6 76.8
L eso tho 106.3 97.4 109.8 96.2 119.3 92.1 102.4
Liberia 656.2 479.7 -128.9 -243.6 -287.5 -256.7 -274.3
M auritania 238.6 249.7 236.5 186.7 235.2 207.6 183.4
N icaragua 307.8 155.2 171.9 160.7 116.5 171.9 177.1
O m an 185.3 79.4 207.7 262.4 182.9 291.3 36
P anam a 1341.2 1681.6 796.9 1230.9 1668.6 1790.8 2314.6
P ap u a  New G uinea 323.8 600.6 574.8 521 331.8 202 305
Paraguay 124 221.4 175.1 150.3 83.2 117.1 104.5
Sierra Leone 67.8 84.9 66.4 73 57.1 86.9 93.7
S ingapore 1384.6 914.3 191.9 1314.1 -267.3 -109.4 726.8
Som alia 368.8 618.9 345.9 361.6 370 600.9 604.8
Togo 50.6 97.2 111.1 116.9 98.2 133.6 101.9
Trinidad and  Tobago 48.9 45.6 66.5 146.3 -317.8 9.4 40.7
Uruguay 60.2 202 405.6 273 -123.9 62.8 252.4
Yemen, P.D.R. 90.4 175.9 82.6 98.7 121.6 54.7 98.3
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TABLE l-B
GNP AT CURRENT PRICES f$US Millions)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Benin 1040 1020 960 940 1020 1380 1650
B hutan 120 150 170 180 160 170 200
B otsw ana 800 690 820 870 890 990 1090
Burundi 970 1000 1050 970 1120 1250 1190
Chad 620 570 550 510 660 810 960
C ongo 1840 2000 1930 2070 1930 1620 1890
C o sta  Rica 2330 2180 2810 3240 3590 4110 4090
El Salvador 3370 3370 3570 3920 3770 3830 4630
Haiti 1460 1470 1610 1800 1990 2230 2230
H onduras 2490 2590 2790 2970 3300 3570 3800
Israel 19680 20060 21770 24970 23310 28140 33450
Ja m aica 2580 2770 3070 2020 1740 2150 2530
Jo rd a n 3560 3770 3870 3680 3860 4420 4670
Laos 450 480 500 530 600 660 680
Lebanon 3894 2520 5000 1492 1800
L eso tho 730 720 810 690 500 540 640
Liberia 1070 1050 970 980 1030 1010 1060
M auritania 720 700 740 680 670 780 870
N icaragua 2290 2270 2360 2590 2610 2470 2960
Om an 6570 6900 7040 7810 8850 8540 7160
P anam a 3660 3960 4120 4290 4560 4820 5130
P apua  New G uinea 2410 2280 2240 2310 2150 2400 2760
Paraguay 4960 4280 3220 3070 3160 3570 4470
Sierra Leone 1160 1300 1460 1070 1350 1240 900
Singapore 13320 14820 16940 19130 18330 18160 20550
Som alia 1070 1210 1150 1710 1290 1560
Togo 910 770 680 830 860 950 1150
Trinidad and  Tobago 6870 7950 7590 7600 7190 6170
U ruguay 11240 9070 5070 4890 4860 6120 7220
Yemen, P.D.R. 910 950 1070 1140 1050 910 940
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TABLE fl-A
NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO MICRO-STATES AS % OF TOTAL EXPORTS
j
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Antigua and Barbuda 4240.00% 30.10% 18.70% -22.20% * 84.40% 183.80%
Bahamas 4 5.5 20.9 -3 * 19.1 32.3
Bahrain 65.2 16.1 15.1 10.2 10.4 5.1
Barbados 19.5 18.9 9.4 -0.5 * 8.7 13.3
Belize 10 14.6 26.6 34.3 32.3 21
Brunei -0.7 * 0.6 0.2 -0.1 * -0.1 * -0.2
Cape Verde 1748.3 1602.6 1834.6 130.1 n/a n/a
Comoros 326.8 193.6 202.9 607.1 323.8 232.2
Cyprus 21.8 7.1 8.5 4 37.5 57.8
Djibouti 764.7 470.6 622 993.2 771.9 n/a
Dominica 111.1 83.4 37.5 113.1 126.3 93.4
Equatorial Guinea 91.3 52.2 n/a 75.6 n/a n/a
Fiji 28.9 28.1 29.3 13.4 10.3 17.7
Gabon 5.5 11.2 18.5 3 10.3 28.8
Gambia 317.2 96.5 78.6 54.5 75.9 146.2
Grenada 34.7 -9.2 * 96.4 168.8 150.5 98.3
Guinea-Bissau 426.6 555.6 772.1 354 545.7 749
Guyana 24.8 23.6 18 11.1 17.1 11.7
Kiribati 568.7 633.3 458.4 99.7 260.9 766.7
Maldives 252 102.3 45.5 23.8 38.4 59.3
Malta 22.3 89.2 15.9 2.9 5.2 3.9
Mauritius 29.2 20.3 12 16.1 6.9 8.1
Nauru 3.1 -3.2 * -8.5 * 1 O O) * n/a 83.4
S2o Tom6 and Principe 84.7 112.5 133.3 92.6 176.1 125.3
Seychelles 616.7 115.8 59.2 95.9 100.4 182.7
Solomon Islands 45.9 49.3 50.7 27.6 31.5 44.8
St. Kitts-Nevis 18.7 19.7 18.3 -12.1 * 21.6 19.3
St. Lucia 32.7 23.3 17.5 11.3 13.6 14.2
St. Vincent and Grenadines 37.7 24.1 12.4 7.8 12.3 19.6
Suriname 20.2 23.7 0.3 0.5 4.3 24.9
Swaziland 14.7 14.9 17.4 20.9 18.3 15.7
Tonga 202 400.8 314.1 171 249.3 259.5
Tuvalu 12857.1 15945.9 6000 2037 3000 29333.3
Vanuatu 183.7 309.6 198.9 139 125.1 -163.8
W estern Samoa 220.1 169.6 166.5 69.7 134.1 198.4
'  ind ica tes  a  negative ne t rece ip t; tha t is. a  n e t capital outflow 
from th e  rm crostate to all external s o u rc e s  of bilateral and  
multilateral aid. indicating th a t in terest a n d  pnncipal paym en ts on 
p as t loans ex c eed  th e  pnncipal am ounts of an y  new  loans or grants 
rece ived
S o u rce . G eograph ical D istribution of F inancial Flows to D eveloping C oun tnes 
P a n s  O rganisation  for E conom ic C o-operation  and  D evelopm ent
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TABLE ll-A
TOTAL EXPORTS F.O.B. (SUS Millions!
1981 19B2 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Antigua and Barbuda 34.2 21.3 19.7 17.6 26.9 24.7
Bahamas b 6189.2 4534.4 3970.3 3392.7 2727.9 2702.2 2737
Bahrain 301.2 3582.8 3119.4 3204 2901.1 2343.6 2050.5
Barbados 194.4 257.3 360.8 356.3 322.2 277.4 156
Belize 119 91 77.7 77.3 90.1 90.9 99.4
Brunei 4066.4 3808.4 3385.7 3196.8 2972 2156
Cape Verde 2.9 3.9 3.5 49.7
Comoros b 16.4 19.6 19.5 7.1 15.7 20.3 11.6
Cyprus 555.7 554.7 494.2 575 476.3 306.4 621.2
Djibouti 8.7 12.6 10.8 13.2 13.4
Dominica b 19.2 24.4 27.5 25.6 28.4 42.3 46.5
Equatorial Guinea 12.6 17.4 23.5
Fiji 297.7 269.3 223.2 237.4 217.4 264.3 307.1
Gabon c 1699.9 1565.5 1475.4 2018.2 1974.5 1074.2 1286.3
Gambia e 27.3 44 48.5 88.6 64.4 68.4 68.2
Grenada 19 18.6 19.2 18.2 22.3 28.8 31.5
Guinea-Bissau d 15.7 11.9 8.6 17.4 11.6 9.6 15
Guyana 346.3 241.3 189.2 210.1 206.7 231.2
Kiribati c 4.1 2.4 3.6 11.4 4.6 1.8
Maldives d 8.7 8.8 19.8 23.1 25.5 27.3 35.3
Malta 447.5 410.8 362.7 394 400.4 497 603.2
Mauritius b 324 366.8 368.3 373 434.6 674.5 898.3
Nauru 88.3 133.5 93.7 66.2 54.8
SSo Tomi and Principe a 7.2 8.8 8.7 12.2 7.1 9.9
Seychelles 5.2 27.3 36.8 25.7 27.9 18.5
Solomon Islands 65.6 57.8 60.9 92.4 69.8 66.8
St. Kitts-Nevis f 22.4 17.2 17.4 21.4 21.8 27.5
St. Lucia 41.2 41.6 47.5 47.8 52 82.9
St. Vincent and Grenadines g 24.4 32.4 41.1 53.6 63.3 63.9
Suriname a 473.8 427.6 367.3 374.5 335.6 336.6 337.6
Swaziland a 388.3 324 303.8 230.8 173.3 265.5 363.1
Tonga b 8.9 4.3 5.7 9.2 5.5 5.8 5.8
Tuvalu 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.3 0.1 0
Vanuatu 16.1 10.7 17.9 32.6 30.8 17.3 17.7
Western Samoa 11.2 13.3 18.6 19.5 15.2 11.5 12
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TABLE ll-B
NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO SMALL STATES AS % OF TOTAL EXPORTS
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Benin 353.4% 450.9% 136.7% 75.1% 64.5% 102.6%
B hutan 49.4 66.9 81.8 98.5 108.7 156.6
B o tsw an a n/a n/a n/a 27.5 21.5 18.2
Burundi 191.7 179.4 219.5 158.7 143.7 109.8
C had 64.9 108.6 126.6 80.9 n/a n/a
C ongo 26.6 47.0 46.7 9.6 5.6 46.8
C o s ta  Rica 9.9 12.6 31.0 30.6 40.2 32.3
El S alvador 38.4 54.4 42.3 47.8 55.3 46.4
Haiti 75.9 80.9 82.2 75.6 83.2 101.7
H onduras 30.4 27.4 36.7 53.5 53.8 34.9
Israel 19.9 31.1 42.4 34.2 40.7 32.2
Jam aica 23.7 48.1 42.5 47.6 40.0 12.0
Jo rd an 205.3 146.7 149.6 113.4 41.9 90.8
Laos 152.2 95.3 73.4 78.2 118.7 83.4
Lebanon 58.2 n/a 19.1 25.2 19.2 n/a
L esotho 215.4 270.0 368.6 349.7 586.2 379.0
Liberia 125.3 101.5 -30.5 * -54.2 * -66.0 * -62.9
M auritania 91.4 107.0 77.6 62.8 62.8 59.4
N icaragua 64.7 39.7 40.1 41.6 38.6 69.5
O m an 39.5 18.0 59.4 71.6 52.5 100.3
P anam a 419.9 542.1 263.3 477.8 554.1 548.0
P ap u a  N ew  G uinea 37.5 75.9 70.7 58.0 37.3 19.3
P araguay 42.0 59.0 79.0 38.9 20.6 50.4
Sierra Leone 44.2 97.2 73.2 49.6 54.4 60.0
S ingapore 6.6 4.4 0.9 5.5 -1.2 * -0.5
Som alia 242.6 310.5 336.9 785.7 408.5 572.3
T ogo 24.5 54.9 68.4 61.1 51.7 56.9
Trinidad and  T obago 1.3 1.5 2.8 6.7 -14.7 * 0.7
U ruguay 5.0 19.7 40.2 29.5 -14.5 * 5.8
Yemen, P.D.R. 410.9 732.9 284.8 365.6 296.6 188.6
Data unavailable for Albania, Mongolia.
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TABLE ll-B
TOTAL EXPORTS F.O.B. ($US Millions)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Benin 33.84 42.62 66.52 146.70 152.00 93.90
Bhutan 19.85 16.89 15.89 18.18 22.17 25.6
Botswana 661.66 737.63 861.27
Burundi 71.37 87.59 80.03 98.87 109.57 169.28 84.34
Chad 83.00 58.00 74.00 138.00
Congo 811.07 992.15 639.85 1182.63 1087.22 718.00
Costa Rica 1010.53 876.83 866.13 951.26 988.90 1025.50
El Salvador 490.83 407.55 741.30 615.03 678.96 712.98
Haiti 153.30 162.54 153.71 178.63 174.24 170.18
Honduras 712.53 655.68 660.06 703.65 699.42 854.25
Israel 5328.90 4990.60 5111.62 5803.48 6256.39 7135.25 8474.77
Jamaica 985.34 739.19 732.28 743.05 548.50 587.54 656.52
Jordan 731.62 752.69 557.03 754.64 780.82 714.29 1468.86
Laos 23.00 40.00 41.00 45.00 54.00 58.00
Lebanon 885.97 595.01 378.13 302.92 600.60
Lesotho 49.34 36.08 29.79 27.51 20.35 24.30
Liberia 523.63 472.57 422.58 449.07 435.60 408.40
Mauritania 261.18 233.27 304.70 297.33 374.30 349.42 427.85
Nicaragua 475.91 390.72 428.79 386.65 301.50 247.17
Oman 469.57 442.07 349.5 366.59 348.11 290.43 322.29
Panama 319.42 310.21 302.63 257.61 301.16 326.80 334.90
Papua New Guinea 863.56 791.11 812.51 898.98 890.56 1048.80 1171.42
Paraguay 295.54 375.06 221.51 386 403 232.5
Sierra Leone 153.50 87.31 90.74 147.07 104.93 144.87 132.02
Singapore 20967.3 20788.1 21832.6 24055.0 22815.3 22427.9 28592.4
Somalia 152.00 199.29 102.66 46.02 90.57 105.00
Togo 206.45 177.02 162.48 191.33 190.06 235.00
Trinidad and Tobago 3763.99 3071.86 2352.66 2173.42 2160.91 1385.68 1462.40
Uruguay 1215.40 1022.90 1008.43 924.94 852.66 1082.12 1191.10
Yemen, P.D.R. 22.00 24.00 29.00 27.00 41.00 29.00
Main Source: United Nations International Trade Statistics Yearbook, Vol. 1 ,1967 .
Source: "Trade by Principal Countries of Provenance and Destination", supplemented by: 
1984-1987 data from UNCTAD; 1984 data from UNCTAD; 1983-1984 data from UNCTAD
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TABLE tll-A
NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO MICRO-STATES AS % OF TOTAL IMPORTS
1981 4982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Antigua and Barbuda 13.10% 4.60% 3.40% -3.00% « 13.60% 22.80%
Bahamas 3.4 3.9 18 -2.5 * 16.9 26.5
Bahrain 12 15.9 14.4 9.4 9.7 4.9
Barbados 6.6 8.8 5.6 -0.3 • 4.7 6.2
Belize 7.3 10.4 18.5 20.4 22.7 17.8
Brunei -5.1 * 3.3 1 -0.4 * -0.6 * -0.4
Cape Verde 71.4 87.4 133.6 154.7 n/a n/a
Comoros 165.7 116.1 114.9 99.6 138.5 119.9
Cyprus 10.4 3.2 3.5 1.7 14.5 14
Djibouti 32.6 26.2 30.4 58 51.9 41.9
Dominica 42.9 43 22.8 50.2 64.9 70.9
Equatorial Guinea 26.6 18.5 n/a 70.9 n/a n/a
Fiji 13.6 14.7 13.5 7.1 5.1 11.1
Gabon 11.1 22 39.8 6.8 20.8 33.5
Gambia 70.7 43.9 32.9 48.2 46.6 88.3
Grenada 12.1 -3 * 32.3 54.9 48.5 33.9
Guinea-Bissau 130 133.1 120.9 107.3 100.5 . 100.4
Guyana 19.7 20.3 14.8 9.3 13.9 12
Kiribati 100.9 65.4 93.6 55.4 80 98.6
Maldives 78.2 30 17.4 11.3 20.5 27.9
Malta 11.7 46.5 7.9 1.6 2.8 2.2
Mauritius 17.1 16 10 12.7 5.8 8.1
Nauru 15.7 -32.3 * -61.8 * -2.3 * n/a 427.1
Sao Tome and Principe n/a n/a n/a 102.7 n/a n/a
Seychelles 34.2 32.2 24.8 28.2 28.2 31.9
Solomon Islands 39.7 48 50.4 38.9 31.9 47.1
St. Kitts-Nevis 8.8 7.7 6.2 n/a * 8.8 8.4
St. Lucia 10.4 8.2 9.8 4.6 5.7 7.6
St. Vincent and Grenadines 15.8 12.8 n/a 5.5 9.8 14.3
Suriname 18.9 19.6 n/a 0.5 4.3 26.4
Swaziland n/a 9.3 9.7 12.7 9.9 12.1
Tonga 44.7 41.8 47.6 38.2 33 37.9
Tuvalu 181.3 200.7 157.2 158.5 114.6 163
Vanuatu 67.1 69.4 69.6 77 54.1 -49.7
Western Samoa 36 45.4 
' Indicates a negative net receipt; that Is, a net capital outflow
59 27 39.9 47.4
from the microslat* to all external sourcas of bllataral and 
muRllataral aid. Indicating that Intarost and principal paymants on 
past loans axcaad tha principal amounts of any now loans or grants 
recalvad.
Source: "Historical Sorias, Ganaral Trad*”, whara valua of Imports 
In domestic currency Is converted Into JUS millions 
by using th* conversion factors supplied In the Table.
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TABLE lll-A
TOTAL IMPORTS (C.I.F.l
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1988
A ntigua and  B arbuda 110.86 138.9 108.91 131.86 167.3 199.5
B aham as 7284.5 6348.73 4616.09 4097.74 3077.86 3293.46
Bahrain 1637.06 3615.36 3261.73 3479.38 3106.72 2426.62
B arbados 572.33 550.65 605.22 665.19 601.93 593.22
Belize 161.97 128 111.79 130.15 128.13 107.5
Brunei 596.24 731.69 725.65 621.83 610.46 1114.2
C ape  V erde 71 71.5 47.98 41.76
C om oros 32.35 32.64 34.37 42.98 36.69 39.27
C yprus 1165.24 1215.38 1207.8 1350.79 1233.55 1263.43
Djibouti 205.47 226.31 220.98 225.45 198.75 188.36
Dominica 49.67 47.48 45.08 57.82 55.32 55.7
Equatorial G uinea 43.2 49.3 25.11
Fiji 631.08 513.7 483.16 448.77 440.62 422.24
G abon 834.45 798.5 685.56 888.02 975.88 924
G am bia 122.38 96.91 115.65 100.2 105 113.3
. G renada 54.34 56.46 57.22 55.96 69.26 83.52
G uinea-B issau 51.63 49.6 54.9 57.4 63 71.6
G uyana 436.3 280.37 230.5 252.31 254.82 225.6
Kiribati 22.89 23.23 17.84 20.57 15 14
M aldives 27.86 30 51.72 48.48 47.89 58
Malta 854.99 788.84 727.3 710.8 750.95 879.73
Mauritius 554 464.2 441.65 472.44 523.83 675.39
N auru 17.15 13.3 12.95 8.54 10.7
S ao  T om e and  Principe 11
S eychelles 93.44 98.02 87.78 87.27 99.29 105.48
S olom on Islands 75.75 59.39 61.26 65.53 68.99 63.46
St. K ltts-Nevis 47.69 44.35 51.94 53.6 63.4
St. Lucia 129.24 118.04 84.59 118.52 125 154.78
St. V incent and  G renad ines 58.19 60.93 76.6 79.19 87.3
S urinam e 507 516.07 391.6 338.2 317
S w aziland 520.3 545.21 381 321.15 344.39
T onga 40.23 41.62 37.57 41.09 41.25 39.8
T uvalu 2.98 2.94 2.67 3.47 2.88 2.7
V anuatu 43.99 47.68 51.18 58.82 71.22 57.13
W este rn  S am oa 68.33 49.78 52.57 50.44 51.13 48.31
Main Source: United Nations International Trade Statistics Yearbook, Vol 1 .1987 .
1987
2419.11
515.03
142.95
1463.33
378.96
88.37
1137.67
69.57
62.21
Source: “Trade by Principal Countrlas of Provananca and Destination", supplamantad by: 
1984-1987 data from UNCTAD; 1984 data from UNCTAD; 1983-1984 data from UNCTAD
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TABLE lll-B
NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO SMALL STATES AS % OF TOTAL IMPORTS
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Benin 22.10% 40.40% 30.90% 38.70% 31.40% 26.00%
Bhutan 14.5 16.5 18 24.5 31.8 45
Botswana n/a n/a n/a 26 27.4 22.1
Burundi 84.9 73.3 95.8 83.9 81.4 91.4
Chad 49.9 57.8 80.1 69 n/a n/a
Congo 22.4 62.6 47.5 18.9 10.5 53.4
Costa Rica 7.8 11.7 27 26.8 36.2 29.4
El Salvador 18 23.5 35.1 22.4 39 37.4
Haiti 31 34.8 28.7 28.6 32.8 47.1
Honduras 23 26.1 29.4 46.3 43.1 34
Israel . 13.5 19.5 25.5 24 31.1 24.2
Jamaica 15.7 25.9 20.3 30.9 19.5 7.3
Jordan 47.7 34.1 27.6 31.8 12.6 26.9
Laos 31.8 28.9 20.2 21.7 33.2 23.6
Lebanon 14.3 6.3 3.1 4.2 n/a n/a
Lesotho 20.8 18.6 19.3 19.2 31.8 21.7
Liberia 137.4 112 -31.3 * -67.1 * -101.1 * -99.1
Mauritania 90 91.5 104.2 75.9 100.7 93.9
Nicaragua 31 20 21.3 19.5 13.1 22.3
Oman 8.1 3 8.3 9.5 5.8 12.2
Panama 85.9 107.3 56.4 87.2 120.6 140.4
Papua New Guinea 29.1 58.4 59 53.3 35.6 21.7
Paraguay 21.3 35.1 36.6 29.3 18.8 20.3
Sierra Leone 21.8 35.4 40.1 43.9 36.6 31.4
Singapore 5 3.2 0.7 4.6 -1 * -0.4
Somalia 71.9 187.5 192.7 343.8 330.2 149.5
Togo 11.6 24.9 39.2 43.1 34.1 38.2
Trinidad and Tobago 1.6 1.2 2.6 7.6 -20.7 * 0.7
Uruguay 3.7 18.2 51.5 35.2 -17.5 * 7.2
Yemen, P.D.R. 12.9 23.2 10.9 12 17.4 11.3
* Indicates a negative net receipt; that Is, a net capital outflow
from the small stata to all axlamal sources of bilateral and 
multilateral aid. Indicating that interest and principal payments on 
past loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants 
received.
Data unavailable for Albania. Mongolia
Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries. 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Imports: S ee  Notes to Trade Table I
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TABLE lll-B
TOTAL IMPORTS C.I.F. ($US Millions)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987;
Benin 542.06 475.54 293.97 285 312 370
B hutan 67.72 68.48 72.28 73.11 75.72 89.14
B o tsw ana 700.94 579.15 707.07
Bum ndl 161.21 214.22 183.33 186.94 193.43 203.37 211.5
C had 108 109 117 162
C ongo 965.41 744.32 628.99 598.57 580.23 629
C o sta  Rica 1274.16 945.22 993 1086.25 1098.2 1130.1
El S alvador 1044.51 944.84 891.5 1314.01 961.36 884.88
Haiti 375.68 378 440.3 472.08 441.56 367.2
H onduras 944.93 689.87 823.03 813.44 873.66 875.05
Israel 7847 7960.4 8500.01 8288.53 8184.01 9481.13 11751.9
Jam aica 1486.97 1373.27 1530.23 1144.26 1123.7 971.6 1207.53
Jo rd an 3149.08 3241.2 3016.3 2688.67 2593.17 2412.71 5464.79
Laos 110 132 149 162 193 205
Lebanon 3614.6 3169.7 3661.2 2273.08 1929.7
L esotho 511.36 523.41 568.53 499.84 374.92 425
Liberia 477.43 428.38 411.62 363.21 284.4 259
Mauritania 265.09 273 227 246 233.53 220.97 381.9
N icaragua 994.22 774.88 806.91 825.88 891.93 770.06
O m an 2288.07 2682.39 2492.33 2748.17 3152.67 2384.07 1822.3
P anam a 1561.85 1567.77 1412.5 1411.82 1383.34 1275.3
P ap u a  N ew  G uinea 1111.68 1028.26 973.93 977.27 932.81 931.32
P araguay 581.47 631.38 478.26 513 442 578.1
S ierra Leone 311.54 240.16 165.7 166.39 155.94 276.47 137.06
S ingapore 27607.4 28167.7 28158.4 28655.7 26249.9 25461.4 32480.2
Som alia 512.93 330.09 179.5 105.17 112.07 402
Togo 435.77 390.58 283.76 271.16 288.06 350
Trinidad an d  T obago 3109.19 3699.36 2581.97 1919.13 1533 1369.83 1218.74
U ruguay 1641.1 1110 787.45 775.72 707.76 869.98 1141.89
Yemen, P.D.R. 703 757 756 821 698 483
NOTES TO TABLE 3:
1. The sources for the Imports data ara as follows:
Main: Unltad Nations International Trade Statistics Yearbook. Vol. 1,1987:
- Table 3: 'Trade by Principal Countries of Provenance and Destination*, supplemented by: 
• Table 1: historical Series, General Trade*, where value of imports In domestic currency is 
converted Into $US millions by using the conversion factors supplied In the Table.
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TABLE IV-A
BILATERAL RECEIPTS AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO MICRO-STATES
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Antigua and Barbuda 80.00% 51.60% 32.40% 156.40% * 95.20% 98.50% 92.70%
Bahamas 98.3 97.1 99.6 103.2 * 100 98.4 99.7
Bahrain 98.4 99.5 99.7 96.8 100.4 101 94.8
Barbados 41.8 46.9 44.7 935.3 * 67.5 78.1 -30.3
Belize 73.9 57.9 80.2 86.8 81.1 87.4 85.6
Brunei 100 * 100 100 100 * 102.9 * 102.4 * 95.8
Cape Verde 72.2 71.5 71.3 62.8 59.9 72 1 72.5
Comoros 59 63.6 57.2 52.8 43.9 49.7 61
Cyprus 78.5 30.5 50.6 19.8 54.7 44.8 -31.1
Djibouti 78.2 78.7 80.9 84.6 78 72.8 75.2
Dominica 55.9 44.6 47.6 81 78.6 89.6 42.1
Equatorial Guinea 35.7 -26.4 * 31.4 58.4 43.5 64 56.2
Fiji 75.8 62.4 35.1 49.5 98.2 71.7 78.2
Gabon 90.5 92.6 94.6 80.4 94.5 93.4 93.9
Gambia 58.6 54.6 40.9 51.3 59.9 57.2 50.7
Grenada 4.5 388.2 • 63.2 82.4 87.5 60.1 52.4
Guinea<Bissau 62.1 56.5 55 58.1 47.1 61.8 46.7
Guyana 15.6 25.3 -3.5 * -4.7 * 20.4 -20.3 * 34
Kiribati 58.9 95.4 85.6 86 90 89.1 79.2
Maldives 48.2 66.7 53.3 49.1 71.4 72.2 67.2
Malta 89.7 99.6 98.4 91.2 100.5 88.6 61.3
Mauritius 64.7 69.8 53.3 49.3 5.6 83.6 71.6
Nauru 100 100 * 100 * 100 * 100 100 100
S3o Tom§ and Principe 29.5 39.4 29.3 34.5 24 56.5 25.3
Seychelles 89.7 77.2 86.2 91.5 53.6 69.4 55.5
Solomon Islands 77.4 77.5 69.9 78.4 72.3 71.9 52.1
St. Kitts-Nevis 50 55.9 46.9 176.9 * 53.2 30.2 67
St. Lucia 34.1 43.3 60.2 31.5 32.4 15.3 66.7
St. Vincent and Grenadines 38 35.9 -5.9 * 28.6 47.4 67.2 38.5
Suriname 97.1 96.9 -45.5 * -89.5 * 79.2 97.3 120.3
Swaziland 57.1 50.2 48.1 75.7 88.1 59.8 65.8
Tonga 80.6 71.3 73.7 79 77.9 76.8 83.1
Tuvalu 83.3 86.4 90.5 94.5 97 86.4 96.9
Vanuatu 79.3 91.8 93 49.4 49.9 -75 94
Western Samoa 56.1 66.8 67.4 31.6 71.1 80.3 66.1
* ind ica tes a  negative net rece ip t from bilateral so u rces , that is, 
a  net outflow of capital from the m icrostate to all so u rc e s  of 
bilateral aid, indicating that in terest and  pnncipal paym ents on p as t 
loans ex ceed  the pnncipal am ounts of any  new  loans o r g ran ts  rece ived
S o u rce  G eograph ical Distribution of F inancial Flows to Developing C ountries 
P a n s  O rganisation  for E conom ic C o-operation  and  D evelopm ent
TABLE 1V-A
BILATERAL RECEIPTS
1981 1982 1983 1934 1985 19BS 1997
Antigua and Barbuda 11.6 3.3 1.2 -6.1 21.6 44.7 10.1
Bahamas 240.7 243.4 826.7 -106.4 521.1 859.1 1028.2
Bahrain 193.3 572.6 468 316.3 302.8 121.1 -21.7
Barbados 15.9 22.8 15.2 -15.9 18.9 28.9 -3.7
Belize 8.8 7.7 16.6 23 23.6 16.7 20.2
Brunei -30.3 23.8 7.5 -2.5 -3.6 -4.3 2.3
Cape Verde 36.6 44.7 45.7 40.6 42.3 81 62.6
Comoros 31.6 24.1 22.6 22.6 22.3 23.4 32.4
Cyprus 94.9 12 21.3 4.6 97.5 794 -29.7
Djibouti 52.3 46.6 54.3 110.6 80.5 57.4 66
Dominica 11.9 9.1 4.9 23.5 28.2 35.4 6.9
Equatorial Guinea 4.1 -2.4 3.8 10.4 7.7 20.1 25.8
Fiji 65.1 47.2 22.9 15.8 22.1 33.5 16.9
Gabon 84.2 162.5 258.2 48.8 192.2 288.9 401.3
Gambia 50.7 23.2 15.6 24.8 29.3 57.2 53.3
Grenada 0.3 -6.6 11.7 25.3 29.4 17 12.1
Guinea-Bissau 41.7 37.3 36.5 35.8 29.8 44.4 46.5
Guyana 13.4 14.4 -1.2 -1.1 7.2 -5.5 12.9
Kiribati 13.6 14.5 14.3 9.8 10.8 12.3 14.5
Maldives 10.5 6 4.8 2.7 7 11.7 16.2
Malta 89.7 365 56.8 10.3 20.9 17.1 17.1
Mauritius 61.3 51.9 23.5 29.6 1.7 45.9 67.1
Nauru 2.7 -4.3 -8 -0.2 2.3 45.7 0.8
S2o Tom i and Principe 1.8 3.9 3.4 3.9 3 7 4.6
Seychelles 28.7 24.4 18.8 22.5 15 23.4 13.6
Soloman Islands 23.3 22.1 21.6 20 15.9 21.5 36.6
St. Kitts-Nevis 2.1 1.9 1.5 -4.6 2.5 1.6 7.3
St. Lucia 4.6 4.2 5 1.7 2.3 1.8 10.2
St. Vincent and Grenadines 3.5 2.8 -0.3 1.2 3.7 8.4 5.2
Suriname 92.8 98.2 -0.5 -1.7 11.4 81.5 -38.5
Swaziland 32.6 24.2 25.5 36.5 28 25 24.8
Tonga 14.5 12.4 13.2 12.4 10.6 11.6 30.5
Tuvalu 4.5 5.1 3.8 5.2 3.2 3.8 24.9
Vanuatu 23.4 30.4 33.1 22.4 19.2 21.3 33.1
W estern Samoa 13.8 15.1 20.9 4.3 14.5 18.4 23.4
S o u rces : Main. 1984-1987: United N ations C ountry-specific  inform ation
1- 1981 - 1983: extrapolated, total capital flows le ss  multilateral aid.
extrapolated for the  y e a rs  1984-1987 a s  well a s  
1981-1983: B runei, Maldives, Malta, S a o  Tom e and P n n c ip e
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TABLE IV-A
MULTILATERAL RECEIPTS
1981 1982 19B3 1984 1985 19B6 1987
Antigua and Barbuda 2.9 3.1 2.5 2.1 1.1 0.8 0.7
Bahamas 4.1 7.3 3.6 3.3 0 13.8 2.9
Bahrain 3.2 2.8 1.5 10.5 -1.1 -1.2 -1.3
Barbados 22.1 25.8 18.8 14.2 9.1 8.1 15.9
Belize 3.1 5.6 4.1 3.5 5.5 2.4 3.5
Brunei - . 0 - 0.1 0.1 0.1
Cape Verde 14.1 17.8 18.4 24 28.3 31.4 23.8
Comoros 22 13.8 16.9 20.1 28.5 23.8 20.7
Cyprus 26 27.4 20.8 18.6 81 97.8 125.2
Djibouti 14.6 12.6 12.8 20.2 22.8 21.5 21.9
Dominica 9.4 11.3 5.4 5.5 7.7 4.1 9.5
Equatorial Guinea 7.4 11.5 8.3 7.4 10 11.3 20.1
Fiji 20.8 28.4 42.4 16.1 0.4 13.3 4.7
Gabon 8.8 12.9 14.7 11.9 11.2 20.4 26.1
Gambia 35.8 19.3 22.5 23.5 19.7 42.8 51.9
Grenada 6.3 4.9 6.8 5.4 4.1 11.3 11
Guinea-Bissau 25.4 28.7 29.9 25.8 33.5 27.5 53.1
Guyana 72.6 42.5 35.3 24.5 28.1 32.6 25
Kiribati 9.5 0.7 2.4 1.6 1.2 1.5 3.8
Maldives 11.3 3 4.2 2.8 2.8 4.5 7.9
Malta 10.3 1.5 0.9 1 -0.1 2.2 10.8
Mauritius 33.4 22.5 20.6 30.5 28.5 9 26.7
Naum - . . . . .
S2o Tom6 and Principe 4.3 6 8.2 7.4 9.5 5.4 13.6
Seychelles 3.3 7.2 3 2.2 13 10.2 11
Soloman Islands 6.8 6.4 9.3 5.5 6.1 8.4 33.7
St. Kitts-Nevis 2.1 1.5 1.7 2 2.2 3.7 3.5
St. Lucia 8.9 5.5 3.3 3.7 4.8 10 5.1
St. Vincent and Grenadines 5.7 5 5.4 3.1 4.1 4.1 8.3
Suriname 2.8 3.1 1.6 3.6 3.1 2.3 6.5
Swaziland 24.5 24 27.5 11.8 3.9 16.8 12.9
Tonga 3.5 5 4.7 3.3 3 3.5 6.2
Tuvalu 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.8
Vanuatu 6.1 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.9 3.6 18.5
W estern Samoa 10.8 7.5 10.1 9.3 5.9 4.5 11.9
NOTES:
signifies no tran saction  (i.e  transaction  = nil) 
a  blank ind icates inform ation not available 
’0 O' ind icates a  small tran saction  of less than  005 $USM
S o u rc e s  Main 1- 1984 - 1987 U nited N abons C ountry -spec ific  inform abon.
2- 1981 - 1983 extrapolated, total capital flows le ss  mulblateral aid 
flows less mulblateral aid
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TABLE IV-B
BILATERAL RECEIPTS AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO SMALL STATES
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Benin 67.60% 79.80% 53.10% 66.00% 54.40% 34.30% 31.90%
Bhutan 26.5 28.3 23.1 28.5 39 55.6 44
Botswana 72.3 75.7 69.9 72.3 53.3 80.3 68.4
Burundi 59.6 70.6 57.9 56.5 58.6 49.2 47.9
Chad 47.1 59.4 53.4 49.9 52.4 61.4 60.4
Congo 113.9 92.1 88.1 65.9 23.5 92.1 78.7
Costa Rica 51.3 67.9 80 76 64.7 71.2 95.6
El Salvador 65.2 74.5 60.8 76.5 80.4 90.2 94
Haiti 65.7 62.8 56 52.7 65.3 71.8 67.6
Honduras 65.7 43.7 44.1 39.7 63.1 77.2 85.9
Israel 97.3 101.9 100.6 100 100.6 100 101
Jam aica 57.4 57.1 71.1 82.3 51.5 42.7 64.3
Jordan 92.5 90.3 93.9 94.7 76.6 87.9 89.6
Laos 48 55.4 43.2 42 66.5 40.1 51.7
Lebanon 92 77.2 59.9 79.2 54.2 89.2 87.5
Lesotho 60.7 60.7 61 62.4 57.9 65.6 54
Liberia 94 93.8 131.6 * 117.9 * 116.3 * 110.9 * 109.8
Mauritania 72.1 65.4 64.4 70.2 77.6 76.7 51.5
Nicaragua 63.8 65.1 56.5 59.9 65.8 64.7 72.9
Oman 91.7 100 96.5 88.1 88.1 93.8 68.1
Panama 97.3 95.4 86.1 90.4 95.2 94.4 100.3
Papua New Guinea 88.7 93.2 88.4 92.8 90.3 71.4 66.6
Paraguay 49.6 67.1 73.2 52.3 38.1 57.1 69.3
Sierra Leone 59.3 68.8 55.6 71.2 39.1 68.8 77.7
Singapore 100.2 100 100.3 100.7 94 * 79.3 * 104.2
Somalia 48.4 74.4 57.4 58.3 60.5 73.1 71.8
Togo 54.5 78.9 46.6 53.9 48.6 45.9 69.2
Trinidad and Tobago 89.4 98.2 102.3 100.1 100.3 * -981.9 * -2.7
Uruguay 91.2 85.5 94.6 79.5 121.7 * 28.2 65.1
Yemen, P.D.R. 59.1 62 43.1 46.4 48.7 17.2 43
'  Ind ica tes e  negative net rece ip t from bilateral so u rces ; tha t is, 
a  net outflow of capital from the  small s ta te  to  all s o u rc e s  of 
bilateral aid. indicating tha t in te res t and  principal paym ents on p ast 
loans ex ceed  the pnncipal am ounts of any  new  loans o r g ran ts rece ived
D ata unavailable for A lbania. Mongolia.
S o u rc e  G eograph ical D istribution of F inancial Flows to Developing C oun tnes  
P a n s  O rganisation  for E conom ic C o-operation  an d  D evelopm ent
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TABLE IV-B
BILATERAL RECEIPTS
19B1 1982 1983 1984 1985 1988 1987
Benin 80.9 153.3 48.3 72.7 53.4 33 27.5
Bhutan 2.6 3.2 3 5.1 9.4 22.3 18.5
Botswana 80 89.8 90.9 131.7 84.5 125.8 147.3
Burundi 81.6 110.9 101.7 88.6 92.2 91.4 90.5
Chad 25.4 37.4 50 55.7 94.6 99.9 119.8
Congo 245.7 429.4 263.2 74.5 14.3 309.4 200
Costa Rica 51.1 75.1 214.7 221.2 257.1 236.2 231.9
El Salvador 122.9 165.4 190.5 224.7 301.8 298.4 396.9
Haiti 76.4 82.6 70.8 71.2 94.7 124.2 143.1
Honduras 142.6 78.5 106.9 149.6 237.5 230.1 211.9
Israel 1031.6 1580.5 2181.8 1985.1 2562.6 2297.5 2103.4
Jamaica 133.9 202.9 221.4 291.3 112.9 30.2 156.8
Jordan 1388.9 997.4 782 810.6 250.7 570.3 790
Laos 16.8 21.1 13 14.8 42.6 19.4 30.5
Lebanon 474.2 153.2 68.1 75.4 31.6 111.2 67.2
Lesotho 64.5 59.1 67 60 69.1 60.4 55.3
Liberia 616.9 450 -169.6 -287.2 -334.5 -284.7 -301.2
Mauritania 172.1 163.2 152.4 131.1 182.5 159.3 94.5
Nicaragua 196.5 101 97.1 96.3 76.7 111.2 129.1
Oman 170 79.4 200.5 231.2 161.1 273.1 24.5
Panama 1305.6 1603.7 686.2 1112.6 1588.8 1690.3 2321.3
Papua New Guinea 287.3 559.7 507.9 483.4 299.5 144.2 203
Paraguay 61.5 148.5 128.2 78.6 31.7 66.9 72.4
Sierra Leone 40.2 58.4 36.9 52 22.3 59.8 72.8
Singapore 1387.1 914.2 192.5 1322.8 -251.2 -86.7 757.4
Somalia 178.4 460.3 198.5 210.8 223.8 439.2 434.5
Togo 27.6 76.7 51.8 63 47.7 61.3 70.5
Trinidad and Tobago 43.7 44.8 68 146.4 -318.9 -92.3 -1.1
Uruguay 54.9 172.7 383.7 217 -150.8 17.7 164.4
Yemen, P.D.R. 53.4 109.1 35.6 45.8 59.2 9.4 42.3
S o u rce  Main 1984-1987. United N ations C oun try -specific  inform ation
1981-1983: extrapolated, total capital flows less multilateral aid
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TABLE 1V-B
MULTILATERAL RECEIPTS
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1988 1987
Benin 38.7 38.9 42.6 37.4 44.7 63.3 58.7
Bhutan 7.2 8.1 10 12.8 14.7 17.8 23.5
Botswana 30.7 28.8 39.1 50.4 74.1 30.9 68
Burundi 55.2 46.2 74 68.3 65.2 94.5 98.5
Chad 28.5 25.6 43.7 56 85.9 62.8 78.7
Congo -29.9 36.8 35.5 38.6 46.4 26.5 54.3
Costa Rica 48.6 35.5 53.8 70 140.1 95.5 10.8
El Salvador 65.5 56.5 122.8 69 73.5 32.4 25.4
Haiti 39.9 48.9 55.6 63.9 50.3 48.7 68.6
Honduras 74.3 101.3 135.4 227.1 138.9 67.9 34.8
Israel 28.9 -29.5 -13.5 0.2 -14.1 -0.7 -21.2
Jamaica 99.3 152.7 89.8 62.7 106.4 40.5 87
Jordan 113.4 107 51.1 45.4 76.7 78.3 91.7
Laos 18.2 17 17.1 20.4 21.5 29 28.5
Lebanon 41.1 45.2 45.5 19.8 26.7 13.4 9.5
Lesotho 41.8 38.3 42.8 36.2 50.3 31.6 47.1
Liberia 39.3 29.7 40.7 43.7 47.1 27.9 27
Mauritania 66.5 86.5 84.1 55.7 52.8 48.3 88.9
Nicaragua 111.3 54.2 74.8 64.4 39.8 60.7 48.1
Oman 15.3 0 7.2 31.2 21.8 18.2 11.5
Panama 35.6 77.9 110.7 118.2 79.9 100.5 -6.7
Papua New Guinea 36.5 40.9 66.9 37.6 32.3 57.8 102
Paraguay 62.5 72.9 46.9 71.7 51.4 50.2 32.1
Sierra Leone 27.6 26.5 29.5 21.1 34.8 27.1 20.9
Singapore -2.5 0.1 -0.6 -8.7 -16 -22.7 -30.5
Somalia 190.4 158.6 147.4 150.8 146.2 161.6 170.3
Togo 23 20.5 59.3 53.9 50.6 72.3 31.4
Trinidad and Tobago 5.2 0.8 -1.5 -0.1 1 101.8 41.8
Uruguay 5.3 29.3 21.9 55.9 26.9 45.1 88
Yemen, P.D.R. 37 66.8 47 53 62.4 45.3 56
NOTES:
signifies no tran sac tio n  (i.e. tran saction  = ml) 
a  blank ind icates inform ation not available 
'0 O' ind ica tes  a  small tran saction  of le ss  than  005 $USM
S o u rc e s  Main: 1- 1984 - 1987: U nited N ations C ountry-specific  inform ation
2- 1981 - 1983. extrapolated, total capital flows less multilateral aid
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TABLE V-A
!
MULTILATERAL RECEIPTS AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO MICRO-STATES
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Antigua and Barbuda 20.00% 48.40% 67 60% -53.80% 4.80% 1.80% 6.40%
Bahamas 1.7 2.9 0.4 -3.2 0 1.6 0.3
Bahrain 1.6 0.5 0.3 3.2 -0.4 * -1 * 5.7
Barbados 58.2 53.1 55.3 -835.3 32.5 21.9 130.3
Belize 26.1 42.1 19.8 13.2 18.9 12.6 14.8
Brunei 0 0 0 0 -2.9 -2.4 4.2
Cape Verde 27.8 28.5 28.7 37.2 40.1 27 9 27.5
Comoros 41 36.4 42.8 47 56.1 50.5 39
Cyprus 21.5 69.5 49.4 80.2 45.4 55.2 131.1
Djibouti 21.8 21.3 19.1 15.4 22.1 27.2 24.9
Dominica 44.1 55.4 52.4 19 21.4 10.4 57.9
Equatorial Guinea 64.3 126.4 68.6 41.6 56.5 36 43.8
Fiji 24.2 37.6 64.9 50.5 1.8 28.5 21.8
Gabon 9.5 7.4 5.4 19.6 5.5 6.6 6.1
Gambia 41.4 45.4 59.1 48.7 40.3 42.8 49.3
Grenada 95.5 -288.2 36.8 17.6 12.2 39.9 47.6
Guinea-Bissau 37.9 43.5 45 41.9 52.9 38.2 53.3
Guyana 84.4 74.7 103.5 104.7 79.6 120.3 66
Kiribati 41.1 4.6 14.4 14 10 10.9 20.8
Maldives 51.8 33.3 46.7 50.9 28.6 27.8 32.8
Malta 10.3 0.4 1.6 8.8 -0.5 * 11.4 38.7
Mauritius 35.3 30.2 46.7 50.8 94.4 16.4 28.5
Nauru 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sao Tomt and Principe 70.5 60.6 70.7 65.5 76 43.5 74.7
Seychelles 10.3 22.8 13.8 8.9 46.4 30.3 44.9
Solomon Islands 22.6 22.5 30.1 21.6 27.7 28.1 47.9
St. Kitts-Nevis 50 44.1 53.1 -76.9 46.8 69.8 32.1
St. Lucia 65.9 56.7 39.8 68.5 67.6 84.7 33.3
St. Vincent and Grenadines 62 64.1 105.9 73.8 52.6 32.8 61.5
Suriname 2.9 3.1 145.5 189.5 21.5 2.7 -20.3
Swaziland 42.9 49.8 51.9 24.5 12.3 40.2 34.2
Tonga 19.4 28.7 26.3 21 22.1 23.2 16.9
Tuvalu 16.7 13.6 9.5 5.5 6.1 13.6 3.1
Vanuatu 20.7 8.2 7 5.1 7.5 -12.7 52.6
Western Samoa 43.9 33.2 32.6 68.4 28.9 19.7 33.6
* Ind icates a  negative ne t rece ip t from multilateral a g e n c ie s ; that 
is. a  net outflow of capital from the  m icrostate  to multilateral 
a g e n c ie s , indicating tha t in terest and  pnncipal p aym en ts  on past 
loans e x c eed  th e  principal am ounts of an y  new  loans or g ran ts rece ived
S o u rce  G eograph ical D istribution of F inancial Flows to D eveloping C oun tnes  
P a n s  O rganisation  for E conom ic C o-operation  and  D evelopm ent
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TABLE V-B
MULTILATERAL RECEIPTS AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO SMALL STATES
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Benin 32.40% 20.20% 46.90% 33.90% 45.60% 65.70% 68.10%
Bhutan 73.5 71.7 76.9 71.5 61 44.4 56
Botswana 27.7 24.3 30.1 27.7 46.7 19.7 31.6
Burundi 40.4 29.4 42.1 43.5 41.4 50.8 52.1
Chad 52.9 40.6 46.6 50.1 47.6 38.6 39.7
Congo -13.9 * 7.9 11.9 34.1 76.3 7.9 21.4
Costa Rica 48.7 32.1 20 24 35.3 28.8 4.5
El Salvador 34.8 25.5 39.2 23.5 19.6 9.8 6
Haiti 34.3 37.2 44 47.3 34.7 28.2 32.4
Honduras 34.3 56.3 55.9 60.3 36.9 22.8 14.1
Israel 2.7 -1.9 * -0.6 • 0 -0.6 * 0 * -1
Jamaica 42.6 42.9 28.9 17.7 48.5 57.3 35.7
Jordan 7.5 9.7 6.1 5.3 23.4 12.1 10.4
Laos 52 44.6 56.8 58 33.5 59.9 48.3
Lebanon 8 22.8 40.1 20.8 45.8 10.8 12.4
Lesotho 39.3 39.3 39 37.6 42.2 34.3 46
Liberia 6 6.2 -31.6 -17.9 -16.4 -10.9 •9.8
Mauritania 27.9 34.6 35.6 29.8 22.4 23.3 48.5
Nicaragua 36.2 34.9 43.5 40.1 34.2 35.3 27.2
Oman 8.3 0 3.5 11.9 11.9 6.2 31.9
Panama 2.7 4.6 13.9 9.6 4.8 5.6 -0.3
Papua New Guinea 11.3 6.8 11.6 7.2 9.7 28.6 33.4
Paraguay 50.4 32.9 26.8 47.7 61.8 42.9 30.7
Sierra Leone 40.7 31.2 44.4 28.9 60.9 31.2 22.3
Singapore -0.2 * 0 -0.3 » 1 O * 6 * 20.7 * -4.2
Somalia 51.6 25.6 42.6 41.7 39.5 26.9 28.2
Togo 45.5 21.1 53.4 46.1 51.5 54.1 30.8
Trinidad and Tobago 10.6 1.8 -2.3 * -0.1 * -0.3 1083 102.7
Uruguay 8.8 14.5 5.4 20.5 -21.7 71.8 34.9
Yemen, P.D.R. 40.9 38 56.9 53.7 51.3 82.8 57
* indicates a negative net receipt from multilateral agencies; that 
is. a net outflow of capital from the smaH state to multilateral 
agencies, indicating that interest and principal payments on past 
loans exceed the pnncipal amounts of any new loans or grants received
Data unavailable for Albania, Mongolia.
Source Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countnes 
Pans Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
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TABLE Vl-A
TOTAL RECEIPTS FROM ARAB STATES (COUNTRIES AND AGENCIES)
AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO MICRO-STATES
1984 1985 1988 1987
Antigua and Barbuda -12.80% 0.00% -% -%
Bahamas - - - -
Bahrain 75.5 39.7 116.3 14.4
Barbados 23.5 * -2.5 -1.6 * -
Belize - - - -
Brunei n/a n/a n/a n/a
Cape Verde 6.2 8.4 3.8 1.6
Comoros 15 17.5 13 0.6
Cyprus 9.5 1.7 0.4 4.5
Djibouti 33 18.5 45.4 13.6
Dominica 2.8 1.7 -0.3 * -
Equatorial Guinea - -1.1 -0.3 * 0.2
Fiji - - - -
Gabon -12.5 * -5.2 4.2 1.6
Gambia 2.1 2 -0.9 • -0.2
Grenada - -2.1 -2.8 * -
Guinea-Bissau 4.7 7.4 5.8 3.5
Guyana -6.4 * -1.1 - -
Kiribati - - - -
Maldives n/a n/a n/a n/a
Malta n/a n/a n/a n/a
Mauritius 6.2 4.3 - 3.1
Nauru - - •- -
Sao Tome and Principe n/a n/a n/a n/a
Seychelles - 2.5 2.4 4.5
Solomon Islands - 6.8 8.4 1.7
St. Kitts-Nevis - - - -
S t Lucia - - - -
S t Vincent and Grenadine -2.4 * -1.3 -0.8 * -
Suriname - 34.7 9.5 -25
Swaziland - -0.3 -0.2 * -0.8
Tonga -0.6 * -0.7 . * -0.7 * -
Tuvalu - - • -
Vanuatu - - • -
Western Samoa 0.7 1 0.4
* Indicates a negative net receipt from multilateral agencies; that 
is, a net outflow of capital from the micro state to multilateral 
agencies, indicating that interest and principal payments on past 
loans exceed the principal amounts of any new loans or grants received.
Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries. 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
5.9
4 1 0
TABLE Vl-A
BILATERAL RECEIPTS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES fSUS Millions)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Antigua and Barbuda .
Bahamas - - - -
Bahrain 237.5 121.7 141.5 -1.2
Barbados - - - -
Belize
Brunei
- - - -
Cape Verde 1.3 1.8 1.7 1.2
Comoros 4.5 4.3 2.4 0
Cyprus 2.2 3.1 0.7 4.3
Djibouti 33.5 12.3 28.9 10.4
Dominica - - - -
Equatorial Guinea - 0 0.1 0.1
Fiji - - - -
Gabon -7.5 -10.1 13.7 4.9
Gambia 0.9 0.8 -0.9 0
Grenada - -0.1 - -
Guinea-Bissau 2.3 3 3.6 2.7
Guyana - - - -
Kiribati
Maldives
Malta
Mauritius 3.1 2 1.7 3.5
Nauru
Sao Tom6 and Principe
- - - -
Seychelles -0.2 0.6 0 0.6
Soioman Islands 0.2 1.3 2.4 1.2
S t Kitts-Nevis - - - -
St. Lucia - - - -
St. Vincent and Grenadines - - - -
Suriname - 5 8 8
Swaziland - - - -
Tonga - - -
Tuvalu - - - -
Vanuatu - - - -
Western Samoa
Sources: Main: 1- 1984 -1987: Unttad Nations Country-spactfic information.
0.3 0.7 2.1
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TABLE Vi-A
MULTILATERAL RECEIPTS FROM ARAB AGENCIES (SUS Millions!
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Antigua and Barbuda 0.5 0 - -
Bahamas - - - -
Bahrain 9.2 -2 -2 -2.1
Barbados -0.4 -0.7 -0.6 -
Belize
Brunei
- - - -
Cape Verde 2.7 4.1 2.6 0.2
Comoros 1.9 4.6 3.7 0.3
Cyprus 0 0 - -
Djibouti 9.7 6.8 6.9 1.5
Dominica 0.8 0.6 -0.1 -
Equatorial Guinea 0 -0.2 -0.2 0
Fiji - - - -
Gabon -0.1 -0.4 -0.7 2.1
Gambia 0.1 0.2 - -0.2
Grenada 0 -0.6 -0.8 -
Guinea-Bissau 0.6 1.7 0.6 0.8
Guyana -1.5 -0.4 - -
Kiribati
Maldives
Malta
Mauritius 0.6 -0.7 -1.7 -0.6
Nauru
Sao Tome and Principe
- - - -
Seychelles 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.5
Soloman Islands -0.2 0.2 0.1 -
S t Kitts-Nevis - - - -
S t Lucia - - - -
S t Vincent and Grenadines -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -
Suriname - - - -
Swaziland - -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
Tonga -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -
Tuvalu - - - -
Vanuatu - - - -
Western Samoa 
NOTES:
0.1 -0.1 -0.6
signifies no transaction (i.a. transaction * nU) 
a blank indicatas rrfocmation not avakabla 
'0.0* indkatss a smal transaction of lass than .005 $USM
Sourcas: Main: 1- 1984-1987: United Nations Country-spscific information.
4 1 2
TABLE Vl-B
TOTAL RECEIPTS FROM ARAB STATES (COUNTRIES AND AGENCIES! 
AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOW S TO SMALL STATES
4584 1985 198« 1987
Benin 0.10% 5.10% 5.00% 2.30%
Bhutan n/a n/a n/a n/a
Botswana 5.9 4.1 -1.6 * -0.8
Burundi 8.4 5.2 6.6 11.7
Chad -0.8 * -0.6 * 1.3 0.9
Congo 9.8 0.5 0 * 0
Costa Rica 0 * 0.7 -0.1 *
El Salvador 0 # 0 *
Haiti 0.3 0.7 0.8 -
Honduras 1.5 1.2 0.2 -
Israel - - - -
Jamaica -2.7 * -5.6 * -14.1 * 0.2
Jordan 74.6 142.6 71 46.3
Laos 3.1 0.2 3.1 -
Lebanon -1.4 • 18.9 1 23.7
Lesotho 5.4 4.4 -2.2 * -1.2
Liberia -0.1 0 - -
Mauritania 37.9 36.2 30.1 12.1
Nicaragua 8.9 0.1 - -
Oman 19.4 33.5 19.6 -32.2
Panama - - - -
Papua New Guinea 0.2 0.5 0.2 -0.1
Paraguay 0.5 0.2 -0.3 •
Sierra Leone 22.5 8.6 8.5 4.7
Singapore 0 - -0.5 0
Somalia 4.5 7.6 -2.5 * -1.2
Togo 3 11.3 7 2.7
Trinidad and Tobago - - - -
Uruguay - - - -
Yemen, P.D.R. 57.2 58.3 55.2 38.5
* Indicates a nsgstivs nst rscsipt from multitatsrsi agsncjss; that 
is, a not outflow of capital from ths mierostata to muitiateraJ 
•genets*, indicating that intorsst and prindpal paymsnts on past 
loans axcsad ths principal amounts of any now loans or grants received.
Data unavailable for Afeania, Mongols.
Sourcs: Gsographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countriss. 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-opsration and Dsvsiopmsnt
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TABLE Vll-A
r~ni nrrnrrr nrrmrnn mitrmr rrrfmrirnr urn
A S % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOW S TO M CRO-STA TES
1985 1988 1987
Antigua and Barbuda 179.50% * 30.40% 24.40% 47.70%
Bahamas 32.4 * 18.2 2 -0.7
Bahrain -17.3 • 33.6 6.8 -79.9
Barbados 841.2 • 43.6 -4.6 * 18
Belize 34.3 29.6 -8.9 * 9.3
Brunei n/a n/a n/a n/a
Cape Verde 47.4 39.9 62.5 51.5
Comoros 41.8 42.1 53.3 63.8
Cyprus 51.3 42.3 36.2 -31.3
Djibouti 54.5 63 30.8 59.6
Dominica 51 46.2 85.8 29.9
Equatorial Guinea 53.4 36.7 63.1 61.9
Fiji 45.5 22.2 41.5 40.7
Gabon 139 108.3 87.2 90.3
Gambia 30 37.8 59.2 41.5
Grenada 16.6 9.2 9.9 9.5
Guinea-Bissau 45.8 31.9 42.1 32.7
Guyana -2.1 • 16.4 -1.5 • 19.5
Kiribati 49.1 41.7 41.3 31.7
Maldives n/a n/a n/a n/a
Malta n/a n/a n/a n/a
Mauritius 40 -14.6 * 55.9 63.3
Nauru -200 -34.8 * 1.3 -362.5
S io  Tom6 and Principe n/a n/a n/a n/a
Seychelles 68.7 63.9 57.6 42
Solomon Islands 47.1 39.5 23.4 50.6
SL Kitts-Nevis -46.2 31.9 49.1 60.6
St Lucia 46.3 22.5 16.1 47.7
St Vincent and Grenadine! 21.4 41 15.2 27.4
Suriname 136.8 52.1 90.9 141.6
Swaziland 63.9 44.3 30.9 31
Tonga 15.3 17.6 17.9 51.8
Tuvalu 65.5 54.5 43.2 46.7
Vanuatu 81.9 77.9 115.5 # 52.3
Western Samoa -12.5 • 14.2 14.8 28.8
* Indfcstos ■ mgrivi nst rscsipt from muMstsrsi sgsndss; M  
is, s nst outflow of cspfari from ths microststo to muKMsfsi 
agendas, iwfcrfiij thst intsrsst sid principal psymsnts on psst 
loans axcasd ths principal amounts of any now loons or grants received.
Source: Geographical Distribution of Rnancial Flows to Dsvsioping CouSries. 
Paris: Orgwtfsalion for Economic Co mwiSHon and Development
4 1 4
TABLE Vll-A
RECEIPTS FROM EEC AND MEMBER COUNTRIES fSUS Millions)
198t 1382 1983 1984 ; 1989 1988 1987
Antigua and Barbuda
Bahamas
Bahrain
Barbados
Belize
Brunei
Cape Verde
Comoros
Cyprus
Djibouti
Dominica
Equatorial Guinea
Fiji
Gabon
Gambia
Grenada
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Kiribati
Maldives
Malta
Mauritius
Nauru
SSo Tom6 and Principe 
Seychelles 
Soloman islands 
St Kitts-Nevis 
St Lucia
St Vincent and Grenadines
Suriname
Swaziland
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Western Samoa
-7 6.9 11.1 5.2
-33.4 94.8 17.1 -7.1
-56.5 101.2 8.1 18.3
-14.3 12.2 -1.7 2.2
9.1 8.6 -1.7 2.2
30.6 28.2 70.3 44.5
17.9 21.4 25.1 33.9
11.9 75.5 64.1 -29.9
71.3 65 24.3 52.3
14.8 16.6 33.9 4.9
9.5 6.5 19.8 28.4
14.5 5 19.4 8.8
84.4 220.1 269.6 386.1
14.5 18.5 59.2 43.7
5.1 3.1 2.8 2.2
28.2 20.2 30.3 32.6
-0.5 5.8 -0.4 7.4
5.6 5 5.7 5.8
24 -4.4 30.7 59.3
0.4 -0.8 0.6 -2.9
16.9 17.9 19.4 10.3
12 8.7 7 35.6
1.2 1.5 2.6 6.6
2.5 1.6 1.9 7.3
0.9 3.2 1.9 3.7
2.6 7.5 76.2 -45.3
30.8 14.1 12.9 11.7
2.4 2.4 2.7 19
3.6 1.8 1.9 12
37.1 30 -32.8 18.4
-1.7 2.9 3.4 10.2
Sourest: Main: 1- 1984-1987: Uniad Nations Country-tpaciftc information.
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TABLE Vlt-B
TOTAL RECEIPTS FROM EUROPEAN ECOWQMC COMMUNTTY (EEC) 
AS % O F TOTAL NET CAPTTAL FLOW S TO SMALL STATES
i 98* 1985 1988 1987
Benin 43.60% 53.00% 45.10% 50.30%
Bhutan n/a n/a lYa n/a
Botswana 51.9 34.3 41.4 45.2
Burundi 42.3 50 36.5 36.2
Chad 56.7 50.5 63.8 67.4
Congo 69.7 35.5 92.1 74
Costa Rica 4.4 11.6 24.1 19.6
Ei Salvador 1.7 4.6 7 8.6
Haiti 18.4 20.9 19.2 15.7
Honduras 7.6 13.9 7.8 10.7
Israel 7.5 3.5 4.5 10.8
Jamaica 19 10.6 14.4 14.1
Jordan 9.6 -56.1 * 12.9 39.3
Laos 7.7 -0.2 * 4.1 2
Lebanon 73.4 -5 * 44.1 26.3
Lesotho 23.5 31.1 39.3 28.6
Liberia 46.1 * 14.4 * 85.9 • 20
Mauritania 32.8 34.4 41.5 43.6
Nicaragua 36.7 43.2 46.1 50.8
Oman 66.2 43.1 50.8 116.9
Panama -0.5 * -3.3 * 6.5 7.1
Papua New Guinea 17.9 7.4 -24.2 * 11.4
Paraguay 32.7 20.6 35 42.3
Sierra Leone 46.6 29.8 45.8 57.2
Singapore 39.5 -47.3 -349.3 33.6
Somalia 44.8 30.9 55.3 57.7
Togo 59.4 28.7 24.5 50.9
Trinidad and Tobago - 4 2 * 2.4 * 347.9 18.7
Uruguay 7.5 -0.5 29 26
Yemen, P.D.R. 5.1 10 -7.5 * 23.8
l n Q d 8 8  IV B Q IB W  i l R  i8 C 8 ^ X  w v fn  T n U B IW V  1^8v iC I88 | V1H
I k  a  j u ^ S M i i  S f tB  Abb m bis, I  mk oudvow or rjfiiB ra n  wm mcfonM to nuiM M i 
^ m c in , M M ng htlnlMMtMd prindpd ptynwli on past 
loons oxcood I n  prindpoi amounts of ony now loons or grants racsfcrad.
Data u n M U iio  for A t o A  Mongols.
Sourcs:QsograpNcMDIiMbMfanofFlnsncaf FtowatoPawalopIng C ortrio s. 
r r a .  u r p v i m i  rar ccononvc U M p r a o n  vxv UMRipniiV
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TABLE VH-B
RECEIPTS FROM EEC AND MEMBER COUNTRIES fSUS M k n t )
m m * . m u m m B 8 5 m - *98* y J M T M :
Benin 48 52 43.4 43.4
Bhutan n/a n/a n/a nto iYb n/a n/a
Botswana 94.6 54.4 64.8 97.2
Burundi 66.3 78.7 67.9 68.5
Chad 63.3 91.1 103.8 133.8
Congo 78.8 21.6 309.4 188.2
Costa Rica 12.7 46.2 80.1 47.5
El 8alvador 5 17.1 23.2 36.2
Haiti 24.9 30.3 33.3 33.3
Honduras 28.5 52.4 23.2 26.3
israsl 148.2 89.2 102.6 224.5
Jamaica 67.1 23.3 10.2 34.3
Jordan 81.9 -183.5 83.4 346.4
Laos 2.7 -0.1 2 1.2
Lebanon 69.9 -2.9 55 20.2
Lssotho 22.6 37.1 36.2 29.3
Liberia -112.2 -41.3 -220.4 -54.9
Mauritania 61.3 81 86.1 80
Nicaragua 59 50.3 79.3 89.9
Oman 173.8 78.8 147.9 42.1
Panama -5.6 -55.5 116.9 163.8
Papua New Guinea 93.2 24.4 -48.8 34.8
Paraguay 49.1 17.1 41 44.2
Sierra Leone 34 17 39.8 53.6
Singapore 519.6 126.5 382.1 244.1
Somalia 162 114.5 332 349
Togo 69.4 28.2 32.7 51.9
Trinidad and Tobago -6.2 -7.7 32.7 7.6
Uruguay 20.6 0.6 18.2 65.7
Yemen, P.D.R. 5 12.2 -4.1 23.4
Source*: HUn: 1* 1904 • 1087: UhM NSoni Comdiy i|io  i(V information.
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TABLE Vlll-A
G R O SS RECEIPTS FROM CMEA COUNTRIES 
AS % OF TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO MICRO-STATES
1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7
A n tig u a  an d  B a rb u d a
B a h a m a s - - - -
B ah ra in - - - -
B a rb a d o s - - - -
B elize - - - -
B runei n/a n/a n/a n/a
C a p e  V erde 0.3 -  1.4 -  2.2 -
C o m o ro s - - - -
C y p ru s - - - -
D jibouti - - - -
D om in ica - - - -
E q u a to ria l G u in ea - - - -
Fiji - - - -
G ab o n - - - -
G am b ia - - - -
G re n a d a - - - -
G u in e a -B issa u 8.6 -  1.9 ~ 6.5 A 2.6
G u y an a 7.1 A 5..1 ~ 7.8
K iribati - - - -
M ald ives n/a n/a n/a n/a
M alta n/a n/a n/a n/a
M auritius - - - -
N auru - - - -
S a o  T o m e an d  P rin c ip e n/a n/a n/a n/a
S e y c h e lle s 7.5 -  3.4 -  9.7 ~ 10.3 -
6.9 A 12.3 A -
S o lo m o n  Is la n d s - - - -
S t. K itts-N ev is - - - -
S t. L ucia - - - -
S t. V in cen t an d  G re n a d in e s - - - -
S u rin a m e - - - -
S w aziland - - - -
T o n g a - - - -
T uvalu - - - -
V an u a tu - - - -
W e ste rn  S a m o a
4 1 8
TABLE VIH-A
GROSS RECBPTS FROM CMEA COUNTRIES (SUS Millions)
■x-aefut'-:- MJM
Antigua and Barbuda
MB/
Bahamas - - - -
Bahrain - - - -
Barbados - - - -
Bslizs
Brunsi
* - - -
Cape Yards 0.2 1 2.5 -
Comoros - - - -
Cyprus - - - -
Djibouti - - - -
Dominica - - - -
Equatorial Guinea - - - -
FIJI - - - -
Gabon - - - -
Gambia - - - -
Grenada - - - -
Guinea-Bissau 5.8 1.2 - 2.7
Guyana - 1.9 2.3 -
Kiribati
Maldives
Malta
Mauritius - - - -
Nauru ,
Sao Tome and Principe
- ■ ~ -
Seychelles 
Sol omen Wands
2 1 3.6 2.8
S t Kitts-Nevis - - - -
S t Lucia - - - -
S t Vincent and Grenadines - - - -
Suriname - - - -
Swaziland - - - -
Tonga - - - -
Tuvalu - - - -
Vanuatu - - - -
Western 8amoa
Source*: MWn: 1- 1904 -1987: UnSed Nation* Country tpecHk infbmWion.
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TABLE Vlll-A
~ in d ic a te s  a c tu a l  p a y m e n ts  m a d e  in a  g iv e n  y e a r  a s  d e s c r ib e d  in m e m o r a n d u m  ite m . 
P e r c e n t a g e  is c a lc u la te d  by  d iv id in g  m e m o  item  p a y m e n t by  a  re v ise d  to ta l r e c e ip ts  
d e n o m in a to r  c o n s is t in g  of to ta l r e c e ip ts  p lu s  th e  s e p a r a t e  m e m o r a n d u m  ite m  p a y m e n t.
A in d ic a te s  n o t a c tu a l  p a y m e n ts ,  b u t r a th e r  a  c o m m itm e n t  to  m a k e  fu tu re  p a y m e n ts .
T h e  C M E A  c o m m itm e n t  is  c a lc u la te d  a s  a  p e r c e n ta g e  of to ta l re lie f c o m m it te d  to  th e  
s p e c i f ic  c o u n try  by  all b ila te ra l a n d  m u ltila te ra l p a r t ie s  in a  g iv e n  y e a r.
* in d ic a te s  a  n e g a t iv e  n e t  r e c e ip t  f ro m  C M E A  s o u rc e s ;  th a t  is , a  n e t  o u tflo w  of c a p ita l
fro m  th e  m ic r o - s ta te  to  all C M E A  s o u r c e s  of a id , in d ic a tin g  th a t  in te re s t  a n d  p r in c ip a l p a y m e n ts
o n  p a s t  lo a n s  e x c e e d  th e  p r in c ip a l a m o u n ts  o f a n y  n e w  lo a n s  o r  g r a n t s  r e c e iv e d .
S o u r c e :  G e o g ra p h ic a l  D is tr ib u tio n  o f F in a n c ia l F lo w s to  D ev e lo p in g  C o u n tr ie s .
4 2 0
TABLE Vlll-B
CROSS RECBPTS FROM CMEA COUNTRIES 
AS % Of TOTAL NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO SMALL STATES
1984 1885 1988 1987
Benin - 0 A - 3.7 A
Botswana - - - -
Burundi 0.8 0.3 - 0.1 -  0.1 -
Chad - - - -
Congo 3.7 - 3.2 0.7 i o -
14 A - 1.3 A _
Costa Rica - - - -
El Salvador - - - -
Haiti - - - -
Honduraa - - - -
Israel - - - -
Jamaica - - 8.2 A
Jordan 0.1 1.6 - 0.6
Laos 71 - 63.3 - 68.7 -  67.5 -
67.8 A 81.8 A 63.1 A 51.3 A
Lebanon - 18.5 A - -
Lesotho 0.4 - 0.2 - 0.2 -
Liberia - - - -
Mauritania - - 0 A
Nicaragua 34.4 - 50.7 53.9 -  39.5 -
70 A 32.1 A 54.3 A 52.9 A
Oman - - - -
Panama - - - -
Papua New Guinea - - - -
Paraguay - - - -
Sierra Leone 2 0.2 - 6.2 -
- 1.9 A - -
Singapore - - - -
Somalia - - - -
Togo - - - -
Trinidad and Tobago - - - -
Uruguay - - - -
Yemen, P.D.R. 51.2 - 46.9 - 70.8 -  64 -
76.3 A 28 A 66.1 A 5.6 A
42 1
-  indicates actual payments made in a given year as described in memorandm ite 
Percentage is calctiated by cfvicfing memo item payment by a revised total receipts 
denominator consisting of total receipts plus the separate memorandum item payment
A indicates not actual payments, but rather a commitment to make future payments 
The CMEA commitment is calctiated as a percentage of total relef committed to the 
specific country by al bilateral and multilateral parlies in a given year.
Data unavailable for Albania, Mongofia.
Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
4 2 2
TABLE Vlll-B
GROSS RECEIPTS FROM CMEA COUNTRIES fSUS Millions)
Benin 0 0
Botswana - - - -
Burundi 1.3 0.4 0.1 0.1
Chad - - - -
Congo 4.3 2 2.2 1.8
Costa Rica - - - -
El Salvador - - - -
Haiti - - - -
Honduras - - - -
Israel - - - -
Jamaica - - - -
Jordan 0.8 5.4 3.9 -
Laos 86 110.5 106.2 122.8
Lebanon - - - -
Lesotho 0.4 0.2 0.2
Liberia - - - -
Mauritania - - 0 -
Nicaragua 84.3 119.8 200.8 115.8
Panama - - - -
Papua New Guinea - - - -
Rwanda - - - -
Sierra Leone 1.5 0.1 5.7 -
Singapore - - - -
Somalia - - - -
Togo - - - -
Trinidad and Tobago - - - -
Uruguay - - - -
Yemen, P.D.R. 103.4 107.2 132.9 174.4
Sourest: Mtin: 1- 1964 ■ 1967: Unfcsd Nsttons Counfry-spsdflc kiformStton.
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TABLE IX-A
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES
ANTIGUA and BARBUDA
Total Receipts ($U6 M) -3 9
% Private Sector 194.9%
% Official Receipts -94.9%
BAHAMAS
Total Receipts (SUS M) -103.1
% Private Sector 137.8%
% Official Receipts -37.7%
BAHRAIN
Total Receipts (JUS M) 326.8
% Private Sector 24.0%
% OfTicial Receipts 76.0%
BARBADOS
Total Receipts ($US M) -1.7
% Private Sector 1200.0%
% OfTicial Receipts -1100.0%
BELIZE
Total Receipts ($US M) 26.5
% Private Sector 36.6%
% Official Receipts 63.8%
1985 1986 1987
22.7 45.4 10.9
* 27.3% 49.6% 7.3%
72.7% 50.4% 92.7%
521.1 872.9 1031.1
* 82.3% 88.5% 100.7%
17.7% 11.5% -0.7%
301.6 119.9 -22.9
59.8% -18.3% * -25.8%
40.2% 118.3% 125.8%
28.0 37.0 12.2
* 63.2% 72.4% -9.8%
36.8% 27.6% 109.8%
29.1 19.1 23.6
5.2% -28.8% * -0.4%
94.8% 128.8% 100.4%
4 2 4
TABLE IX-A
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES
1984 1985 1986 1987
BRUNEI
Total Receipts ($US M) -2.5 -3.5 -4.2 2.4
% Private Sector n/a n/a n/a n/a
% Official Receipts n/a n/a n/a n/a
CAPE VERDE
Total Receipts ($US M) 64.6 70 8 112.4 86.4
% Private Sector 0.0% -0.4% * 1.7% -0.3% •
% Official Receipts 100.0% 100.4% 98.4% 100.3%
COMOROS
Total Receipts ($US M) 42.8 50.8 47.1 53.1
% Private Sector -0.2% * -0.2% * 0.4% 0.4%
% Official Receipts 100.2% 100.0% 99.6% 99.6%
CYPRUS
Total Receipts ($US M) 23.2 178.4 177.1 95.5
% Private Sector -40.9% * 40.8% 32.9% -56.2% *
% Official Receipts 140.9% 59.2% 67.1% 156.2%
DJIBOUTI
Total Receipts ($US M) 130.8 103.2 78.9 87.8
% Private Sector 21.9% 21.1% -45.8% * -4.3% •
% Official Receipts 78.0% 78.9% 145.9% 104.3%
4 2 5
TABLE IX-A
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES
1984 1986 1986 1987
DOMINICA
Total Receipts ($US M) 29.0 35.9 39.5 16.4
% Private Sector 43.1% 52.6% 72.2% 0.0%
% Official Receipts 56.9% 47.4% 27.6% 100.0%
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Total Receipts ($US M) 17.8 17.7 31.4 45.9
% Private Sector 13.5% 4.5% 15.0% 8.5%
% OfTicial Receipts 86.5% 95.5% 85.0% 91.3%
FUI
Total Receipts ($US M) 31.9 22.5 46.7 21.6
% Private Sector -17.6% * -5.8% * -1.3% * -29.2%
% Official Receipts 117.6% 105.3% 101.3% 129.6%
GABON
Total Receipts ($US M) 60.7 203.3 309.3 427.4
% Private Sector -28.5% * 66.7% 62.8% 14.3%
% Official Receipts 128.5% 33.3% 37.2% 85.7%
GAMBIA
Total Receipts ($US M) 48.3 48.9 100.0 105.2
% Private Sector -19.0% * -5.7% * -6.3% * 1.0%
% Official Receipts 119.0% 105.9% 106.2% 99.0%
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TABLE IX-A
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES
1984 1985 1986 1987
GRENADA
Total Receipts ($US M) 30.7 33.6 28.3 23.1
% Private Sector 4.9% -3.3% * 1.1% -3.5% a
% Official Receipts 95.1% 103.0% 99.3% 103.5%
GUINEA-BISSAU
Total Receipts ($US M) 61.6 63.3 71.9 99.6
% Private Sector 4.9% 3.6% 0.3% -3.8% •
% Official Receipts 95.1% 96.2% 99.6% 103.8%
GUYANA
Total Receipts ($US M) 23.4 35.3 27.1 37.9
% Private Sector -13.2% * 10.8% -48.3% * -2.9% a
% Official Receipts 113.2% 89.2% 148.3% 103.2%
KIRIBATI
Total Receipts ($US M) 11.4 12.0 13.8 18.3
% Private Sector -4.4% * -0.8% * 2.2% -0.5% a
% Official Receipts 104.4% 100.0% 97.1% 100.5%
MALDIVES
Total Receipts ($US M) 5.5 9.8 16.2 24.1
% Private Sector n/a n/a n/a n/a
% Official Receipts n/a n/a n/a n/a
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TABLE IX-A
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES
1984 1985 1386 1987
MALTA
Total Receipts ($US M) 11.3 20.8 19.3 27.9
% Private Sector n/a n/a n/a n/a
% OfTicial Receipts n/a n/a n/a n/a
MAURITIUS
Total Receipts ($US M) 60.0 30.2 54.9 93.7
% Private Sector -2.5% • -69.9% * -12.4% * 7.9%
% Official Receipts 102.5% 170.2% 112.4% 92.2%
NAURU
Total Receipts ($US M) -0.2 2.3 45.7 0.8
% Private Sector 100.0% * 100.0% 100.0% 87.5%
% Official Receipts 0.0% 4.3% 0.0% 12.5%
SAO TOM£ and PRiNCIPE
Total Receipts ($US M) 262.4 182.9 291.3 36.0
% Private Sector n/a n/a n/a n/a
% Official Receipts n/a n/a n/a n/a
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TABLE IX-A
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES
1884 1985 1985 1987
SEYCHELLES
Total Receipts ($US M) 24.6 28.0 33.7 24.5
% Private Sector 37.8% 11.1% 8.9% -22.9%
% Official Receipts 61.8% 88.9% 91.1% 122.9<*
SOLOMON ISLANDS
Total Receipts ($US M) 25.5 22.0 29.9 70.3
% Private Sector 3.9% 6.4% -2.7% * 3.6%
% OfTicial Receipts 95.7% 94.1% 102.7% 96.4%
ST. KITTS-NEVIS
Total Receipts ($US M) -2.6 4.7 5.3 10.9
% Private Sector 238.5% * 4.3% -1.9% * 30.3%
% Official Receipts -138.5% 95.7% 101.9% 68.8%
ST. LUCIA
Total Receipts ($US M) 5.4 7.1 11.8 15.3
% Private Sector 29.6% 1.4% -1.7% * 8.5%
% Official Receipts 70.4% 100.0% 101.7% 91.5%
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TABLE IX-A
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES
1984 1985 1988 1987
ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES
Total Receipts ($US M) 4.2 7.8 12.5 13.5
% Private Sector 2.4% 17.9% 0.8% 0.0%
% Official Receipts 100.0% 82.1% 100.0% 100.0%
SURINAME
Total Receipts ($US M) 1.9 14.4 83.8 -32.0
% Private Sector -168.4% * 22.2% 83.3% 177.5%
% OfTicial Receipts 268.4% 77.8% 16.7% -77.5%
SWAZILAND
Total Receipts ($US M) 48.2 31.8 41.8 37.7
% Private Sector 32.4% 28.3% -5.3% * -7.7%
% Official Receipts 67.6% 71.7% 105.3% 107.7%
TONGA
Total Receipts ($US M) 15.7 13.6 15.1 36.7
% Private Sector 0.0% 0.0% . 0.0% 41.7%
% Official Receipts 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 58.3%
TUVALU
Total Receipts ($US M) 5.5 3.3 4.4 25.7
% Private Sector 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
% Official Receipts 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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TABLE IX-A
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
MICRO-STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES
1984 1985 1986 1987
VANUATU
Total Receipts ($US M) 45.3 38.5 -28.4 35.2
% Private Sector 43.5% 41.0% 59.5% * -48.6%
% Official Receipts 56.5% 59.2% 40.1% 1 148.6%
WESTERN SAMOA
Total Receipts (SUS M) 13.6 20.4 22.9 35 4
% Private Sector -47.1% * 2.0% 0.4% 0.6%
% OfTicial Receipts 147.1% 98.0% 100.0% 99.4%
* indicates a negative net receipt; a net outflow of capital 
from the micro-state to total private or official aid sources.
Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
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TABLE IX-A
NET CAPITAL FLOWS. PRIVATE SECTOR (SUS Millions!
1984 1985 1986 1987
Antigua and Barbuda -7.6 6.2 22.5 0.8
Bahamas -142.1 429.1 772.8 1038.
Bahrain 78.3 180.4 -21.9 5.9
Barbados -20.4 17.7 26.8 -1.2
Belize 9.7 1.5 -5.5 -0.1
Brunei
Cape Verde 0 -0.3 1.9 -0.3
Comoros -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.2
Cyprus -9.5 72.7 58.3 -53.7
Djibouti 28.7 21.8 -36.1 -3.8
Dominica 12.5 18.9 28.5 0
Equatorial Guinea 2.4 0.8 4.7 3.9
FIJI -5.6 -1.3 -0.6 -6.3
Gabon -17.3 135.5 194.3 61
Gambia -9.2 -2.8 -6.3 1.1
Grenada 1.5 -1.1 0.3 -0.8
Guinea-Bissau 3 2.3 0.2 -3.8
Guyana -3.1 3.8 -13.1 -1.1
Kiribati -0.5 -0.1 0.3 -0.1
Maldives
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TABLE IX-A
NET CAPITAL FLOWS. PRIVATE SECTOR (SUS Millions)
1984 1985 1986 1987
Malta
Mauritius -1.5 -21.1 -6.8 7.4
Nauru -0.2 2.3 45.7 0.7
Oman 182.8 102.1 206 41.6
Sao Tome and Principe 
Seychelles 9.3 3.1 3 -5.6
Solomon Islands 1 1.4 -0.8 2.5
St. Kitts-Nevls -6.2 0.2 -0.1 3.3
St. Lucia 1.6 0.1 -0.2 1.3
St. Vincent and Grenadines 0.1 1.4 0.1 0
Suriname -3.2 3.2 69.8 -56.8
Swaziland 15.6 9 -2.2 -2.9
Tonga 0 - - 15.3
Tuvalu - - - -
Vanuatu 19.7 15.8 -16.9 -17.1
Western Samoa -6.4 0.4 0.1 0.2
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TABLE IX-A
NET CAPITAL FLOWS. OFFICIAL SOURCES (SUS Millions)
1984 1985 1986 1987
Antigua and Barbuda 3.7 16.5 22.9 10.1
Bahamas 38.9 92 100.1 -7.2
Bahrain 248.5 121.3 141.8 -28.8
Barbados 18.7 10.3 10.2 13.4
Belize
Brunei
16.9 27.6 24.6 23.7
Cape Verde 64.6 70.9 110.6 86.7
Comoros 42.9 50.8 46.9 52.9
Cyprus 32.7 105.7 118.9 149.2
Djibouti 102 81.4 115.1 91.6
Dominica 16.5 17 10.9 16.4
Equatorial Guinea 15.4 16.9 26.7 41.9
Fiji 37.5 23.7 47.3 28
Gabon 78 67.8 115 366.4
Gambia 57.5 51.8 106.2 104.1
Grenada 29.2 34.6 28.1 23.9
Guinea-Bissau 58.6 60.9 71.6 103.4
Guyana 26.5 31.5 40.2 39.1
Kiribati
Maldives
11.9 12 13.4 18.4
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TABLE IX-A
NET CAPITAL FLOWS. OFFICIAL SOURCES (SUS Millions)
1984 1985 1986 1987
Mauritius 61.5 51.4 61.7 86.4
Nauru 0 0.1 0 0.1
Oman 79.6 80.9 85.3 -5.7
Sao Tome and Principe
Seychelles 15.2 24.9 30.7 30.1
Solomon Islands 24.4 20.7 30.7 67.8
St. Kitts-Nevis 3.6 4.5 5.4 7.5
St. Lucia 3.8 7.1 12 14
St. Vincent and Grenadines 4.2 6.4 12.5 13.5
Suriname 5.1 11.2 14 24.8
Swaziland 32.6 22.8 44 40.6
Tonga 15.7 13.6 15.1 21.4
Tuvalu 5.5 3.3 4.4 25.7
Vanuatu 25.6 22.8 -11.4 52.3
Western Samoa 20 20 22.9 35.2
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TABLE IX-B
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
SMALL STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES
1984 1985 1986 1987
CONGO
Total R eceipts (SUS M) 113.1 60.8 335.9 254.2
% Private S ecto r -6.5% * -81.9% * 11.7% -35.0% *
% Official R eceip ts 106.4% 181.9% 88.3% 135.0%
COSTA RICA
Total R eceipts (SUS M) 291.2 397.1 331.7 242.6
% Private S ec to r 8.8% 0.9% 12.5% 8.0%
% Official R eceip ts 91.2% 99.1% 87.5% 92.1%
EL SALVADOR
Total R eceipts (SUS M) 293.7 375.2 330.8 422.3
% Private S ecto r -0.3% * -0.7% * -5.1% * -1.7% a
% Official R eceip ts 100.3% 100.7% 105.1% 101.8%
HAITI
Total R eceipts (SUS M) 135.1 145 173 211.7
% Private S ecto r 0.9% -4.1% * -1.3% • -2.4% *
% Official R eceip ts 99.0% 104.1% 101.3% 102.4%
HONDURAS
Total R eceipts (SUS M) 376.7 376.3 297.9 246.7
% Private S ecto r -6.0% * 8.8% -3.0% * -4.8% *
% Official R eceipts 106.0% 91.2% 103.0% 104.7%
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TABLE IX-B
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
SMALL STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES
1984
ISRAEL
Total R eceipts (SUS M) 1985.3
% Private S ec to r 37.0%
% Official R eceipts 63.0%
JAMAICA
Total R eceipts (SUS M) 354
% Private S ec to r 19.4%
% OfTicial R eceipts 80.6%
JORDAN
Total R eceipts (SUS M) 855.9
% Private S ec to r 16.9%
% Official R eceip ts 83.1%
LAOS
Total R eceip ts (SUS M) 35.2
% Private S ec to r 3.1%
% Official R eceipts 96.9%
LEBANON
Total R eceip ts (SUS M) 95.2
% Private S ec to r 40.4%
% Official R eceipts 59.6%
1985 1986 1987
2548.5 2296.8 2082.2
24.8% 18.0% 42.9%
75.2% 82.0% 57.1%
219.3 70.7 243.8
-37.5% * -181.6% * 1.2%
137.6% 281.8% 98.8%
327.3 648.5 881.8
-77.2% * 5.5% 35.4%
177.2% 94.5% 64.6%
64.1 48.4 59
42.3% 0.4% 0.2%
57.7% 99.6% 99.8%
58.3 124.6 76.8
-42.5% * 55.4% -29.8%
142.5% 44.6% 129.8%
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TABLE IX-B
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
SMALL STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES
1984 198S 1986 1987
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Total R eceip ts (SUS M) 521.0 331.8 202.0 305.0
% Private S ec to r 24.6% 22.3% -11.1% * -10.5% *
% Official R eceip ts 75.4% 77.7% 111.1% 110.5%
PARAGUAY
Total R eceip ts (SUS M) 150.3 83.2 117.1 104.5
% Private S ec to r 26.8% 12.5% 21.9% 13.0%
% Official R eceipts 73.2% 87.5% 78.1% 87.0%
SIERRA LEONE
Total R eceip ts (SUS M) 73.0 57.1 86.9 93.7
% Private S ec to r 17.5% -21.7% * -3.6% * -3.9% *
% Official R eceipts 82.5% 121.9% 103.6% 103.9%
SINGAPORE
Total R eceip ts (SUS M) 1314.1 -267.3 -109.4 726.8
% Private S ec to r 93.4% 79.1% * -72.4% 130.3%
% Official R eceip ts 6.6% 20.9% * 172.5% * -30.3% •
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TABLE IX-B
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
SMALL STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES
1984 1S85 1986 1987
SOMALIA
Total R eceip ts (SUS M) 361.6 370.0 600.9 604.8
% Private S ec to r 3.0% 5.5% 1.5% 8.8%
% Official R eceipts 97.0% 94.5% 98.5% 91.2%
TOGO
Total R eceip ts (SUS M) 116.9 98.2 133.6 101.9
% Private S ec to r -26.8% * -16.0% * -20.1% * -13.2%
% Official R eceipts 
TRINIDAD and  TOBAGO
126.8% 118.0% 120.1% 113.2%
Total R eceip ts (SUS M) 146.3 -317.8 9.4 40.7
% Private S ec to r 70.8% 97.3% * -716.0% * 41.5%
% Official R eceip ts 29.2% 2.7% ‘ 816.0% 58.5%
URUGUAY
Total R eceip ts (SUS M) 273.0 -123.9 62.8 252.4
% Private S ec to r 73.3% 127.9% * -3.8% * 61.5%
% Official R eceipts 26.7% -27.9% 103.7% 38.5%
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TABLE IX-B
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL FLOWS RECEIVED BY
SMALL STATES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND OFFICIAL SOURCES
1984 1985 1986 1987
YEMEN, P.D.R.
Total Receipts (SUS M) 98.7 121.6 54.7 98.3
% Private Sector -4.5% * 1.9% -23.9% * 13.0%
% OfTicial Receipts 104.5% 98.0% 123.9% 87.0%
* indicates a negative net receipt; a net outflow of capital 
from the small state to private or official sources of aid.
Data unavailable for Albania, Mongolia.
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TABLE IX-B
NET CAPITAL FLOWS. PRIVATE SECTOR (SUS Millions)
1984 1985 1986 1987
Benin 31.1 0.5 -42.3 -50.4
Botswana 16.1 6 -14.9 4.3
Burundi 4.6 8.3 -7 -8.6
Chad -2.2 0.8 -2.3 0.4
Congo -7.3 -49.8 39.2 -88.9
Costa Rica 25.6 3.7 41.5 19.3
Ei Salvador -0.9 -2.5 -16.9 -7.3
Haiti 1.2 -5.9 -2.2 -5.1
Honduras -22.6 33 -8.8 -11.8
Israel 733.6 631.3 414.3 892.6
Jamaica 68.8 -82.3 -128.4 2.9
Jordan 144.8 -252.7 35.9 312.3
Laos 1.1 27.1 0.2 0.1
Lebanon 38.5 -24.8 69 -22.9
Lesotho -10 11.9 2 -5.8
Liberia -399.6 -398.3 -342.4 -345.9
Mauritania 7.5 4.6 -4.5 -16.7
Nicaragua 7 3.4 6 15.8
Panama 1085.5 1555.5 1675.6 2302.8
4 4 1
TABLE IX-B
NET CAPITAL FLOWS. PRIVATE SECTOR fSUS Millions)
1984 1985 1986 1987
Papua New Guinea 128.2 74 -22.5 -31.9
Sierra Leone 12.8 -12.4 -3.1 -3.7
Singapore 1227.2 -211.4 79.2 946.9
Somalia 10.7 20.5 9.1 53.3
Togo -31.3 -15.7 -26.8 -13.5
Trinidad and Tobago 103.6 -309.1 -67.3 16.9
Uruguay 200.2 -158.5 -2.4 155.2
Yemen, P.D.R. -4.4 2.3 -13.1 12.8
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TABLE IX-B
NET CAPITAL FLOWS. OFFICIAL SOURCES (SUS Millions)
1984 1986 1986 1987
Benin 79.1 97.6 138.5 136.6
Botswana 166.1 152.7 171.5 211
Burundi 152.2 149.2 192.8 197.6
Chad 114 179.7 165 198
Congo 120.3 110.6 296.7 343.2
Costa Rica 265.6 393.4 290.2 223.4
El Salvador 294.6 377.8 347.7 429.7
Haiti 133.8 150.9 175.2 216.8
Honduras 399.3 343.3 306.7 258.4
Israel 1251.7 1917.2 1882.5 1189.6
Jamaica 285.2 301.7 199.2 240.9
Jordan 711 580.1 612.6 569.5
Laos 34.1 37 48.2 58.9
Lebanon 56.7 83.1 55.6 99.7
Lesotho 106.3 107.5 90.1 108.2
Liberia 156.1 110.8 85.6 71.5
Mauritania 179.2 230.7 212.2 200.1
Nicaragua 153.7 113.1 165.8 161.4
Panama 145.4 113.1 115.2 11.8
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TABLE IX-B
NET CAPITAL FLOWS. OFFICIAL SOURCES (SUS Millions)
1984 ^ 1987
Papua New Guinea 392.8 257.8 224.5 336.9
Sierra Leone 60.2 69.6 90 97.4
Singapore 86.9 -55.9 -188.7 -220.1
Somalia 350.9 349.5 591.8 551.5
Togo 148.2 113.9 160.4 115.4
Trinidad and Tobago 42.7 -8.7 76.7 23.8
Uruguay 72.8 34.6 65.1 97.2
Yemen, P.D.R. 103.1 119.2 67.8 85.5
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TABLE X-A
PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF BILATERAL AID TO MICRO-STATES
1954 — r
% i
— T55T T
% i
— 1ST I
% [
1987
%
ANTIGUA and BARBUDA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.K. 121.3 * Canada 63.0 Canada 38.0 Italy 29.7
2. Canada -16.4 U.K. 31.9 Japan 28.2 U.S.A. 19.8
3. Neth. -6.8 U.S.A. 4.6 U.K. 24.8 Japan 16.8
BAHAMAS
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.S.A. 156.0 * U.S.A. 42.2 Japan 94.4 Japan 129.3
2. Japan -55.2 Japan 22.0 Sweden 9.8 U.S.A. -19.4
3. France 31.8 * Sweden 17.7 Belgium 9.2 Sweden -9.3
BAHRAIN
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Arab+ 75.1 Arab+ 40.2 Arab* 116.8 France -308.8
2. Japan 39.7 France 37.0 U.K. -24.9 * Belgium 212.0
3. Italy -16.6 * Japan 30.6 Japan -23.6 * Japan 179.7
BARBADOS
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.K. 112.6 * Japan 120.1 Japan 88.9 . U.S.A. 108.1
2. Canada -18.2 Switz. -69.3 * Sweden 17.8 Sweden 89.2
3. Sweden 17.0 * U.K. 22.8 U.K. -11.4 * Canada -81.1
BELIZE
1-984 1985 1986 1987
1. Sweden 39.1 U.S.A. 55.1 U.S.A. 77.8 U.S.A. 64.4
2. U.K. 37.4 U.K. 21.2 Canada 32.9 Canada 25.7
3. U.S.A. 21.7 Belgium 11.4 Belgium -21.0 * U.K. 8.9
Canada 11.4
CAPE VERDE
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Italy 16.0 Italy 17.7 Italy 46.8 F.R.G. 21.1
2. Sweden 14.8 Sweden 15.6 U.S.A. 9.9 Italy 13.7
3. Neth. 12.8 F.R.G. 14.7 F.R.G. 7.5 Neth. 13.1
France 14.7
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TABLE X-A
PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF BILATERAL AID TO MICRO-STATES
% 1
1985 ----------T
*  i
— r m I
% f
: w
■%
COMOROS
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. France 57.5
2. Arab-*- 19.9
3. Japan 9.7
France
Arab+
Japan
62.8
19.3
5.4
France
Arab-*-
Belgium
73.5
10.3
8.1
France
Japan
F.R.G.
70.4
10.2
9.3
CYPRUS
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. F.R.G. 928.3
2. France -578.3 *
3. U.K. -191 .3*
F.R.G.
France
U.S.A.
41.1
34.8
17.4
France
U.K.
U.S.A.
41.6
33.0
21.4
France
U.S.A.
U.K.
196.6
-30.3
19.5
DJIBOUTI
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. France 51.1
2. Arab**- 30.3
3. U.K. 8.3
France
U.K.
Arab+
57.1
15.4
15.3
Arab+
Italy
France
U.S.A.
50.3
26.8
7.0
7.0
France
Arab*
Italy
65.8
15.8 
9.4
DOMINICA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.K. 59.1
2. Canada 26.8
3. Japan 11.1
U.K.
Switz.
Canada
42.9
31.2
22.0
U.K.
France
Canada
68.4
21.5 
6.5
Canada
U.K.
France
56.5
18.8
15.9
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. France 75.0
2. F.R.G. 14.4
3. U.S.A. 9.6
France
F.R.G.
Italy
55.8
15.6
15.6
Italy
France
Belgium
58.7
31.3
-8.0
France
Italy
Neth.
55.8
14.0
8.1
FIJI
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.K. 30.4
2. N.Zeal. 21.5
3. Austrl. 12.7
Austrl.
Japan
N.Zeal.
57.9
21.3
15.4
Austrl.
Japan
U.K.
33.1
31.8
20.0
Japan
Austrl.
N.Zeal.
39.1
34.9
22.5
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TABLE X-A
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GABON
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. France
2. Belgium
3. Japan
90.2
63.9
-58.2
France
U.K.
Japan
73.2
15.8
-14.1
France
F.R.G.
U.K.
71.1
15.3
10.5
France
F.R.G.
Italy
74.3
9.8
4.8
GAMBIA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.S.A.
2. F.R.G.
3. Japan
40.3
33.1
13.7
U.S.A.
F.R.G.
France
34.1
17.7
12.3
Italy
France
U.K.
26.7
19.8 
15.7
U.K.
U.S.A.
Italy
20.1
18.8
15.9
GRENADA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.S.A.
2. Canada
3. Belgium
83.0
7.5
6.3
U.S.A.
Canada
U.K.
81.6
15.0
2.7
U.S.A.
Canada
U.K.
64.7
24.7 
7.1
Canada
U.S.A.
U.K.
67.8
24.8 
5.8
GUINEA-BISSAU
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Neth.
2. Sweden
3. France
26.8
19.8
14.0
Sweden
France
Neth.
29.5
22.8
14.4
Sweden
Italy
Neth.
25.0
23.6
14.2
Sweden
Italy
Neth.
27.3 
22.8
20.4
GUYANA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Japan
2. U.S.A.
3. U.K.
209.1 
181.8 * 
154.5
U.K.
Japan
F.R.G.
54.2
50.0
-6.9
U.K.
Japan
U.S.A.
210.9 *
-56.4
-54.5
U.S.A.
Canada
F.R.G.
54.3
37.2
4.7
KIRIBATI
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.K.
2. Japan
3. Austrl.
54.1
26.5
19.4
U.K.
Japan
Austrl.
42.6
25.9
24.1
U.K.
Japan
Austrl.
37.4 
35.0
19.5
Japan
U.K.
Austrl.
44.8
24.8 
17.2
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MAURITIUS i
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. France 71.6
2. Arab+ 10.5
3. Japan 7.8
U.K.
France
U.S.A.
-647.1 * 
317.6 
294.1
France
Japan
U.K.
63.4 
25.1 
-10.5 *
U.K.
France
Japan
30.1
28.9
13.0
NAURU
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Japan 300.0 *
2. F.R.G. -200.0
3. Austrl. 0.0
Japan
F.R.G.
AustJ
134.8 
-34.8 * 
4.3
Japan
F.R.G.
Austrl.
98.5
1.3
0.2
Japan
F.R.G.
Austrl.
462.5
-382.5
12.5
SEYCHELLES
1984 1985 1986 1987
1 Belgium 37.3
2 France 19.6
3 U.K. 15.1
France
U.S.A.
U.K.
52.7
13.3
12
Belgium
France
U .S A
32.9
32.1
17.1
France
U.K.
Japan
105.9
-44.1
9.6
SOLOMON ISLANDS
1984 1985 1986 1987
1 U.K. 49.0
2 Austrl. 28.5
3 Japan 12
Austrl.
U.K.
Belgium
35.2 
32.1
11.3
Austrl.
U.K.
Belgium
49.8 
24.7 
-17.2 *
Austrl.
U.K.
Japan
50.3
21.6
14.5
ST. KITTS- NEVIS
1984 1985 1986 1987
1 Sweden 134.8 *
2 U.K. -23.9
3 Canada -8.7
U.K.
Canada
Austrl.
52
48
0
U.K.
Canada
Austrl.
62.5
31.3
0
U.K.
France
Canada
43.8
31.5
23.3
ST. LUCIA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1 U.K. 88.2 Canada 39.1
2 Canada 5.9 France 34.8
3 Austrl. 0 U.K. 21.7
ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES
Canada
U.K.
Austrl.
F.R.G.
France
50
38.9
5.6
5.6
5.6
U.K.
Canada
Japan
59.8
37.3
2
1984 1985 1986 1987
1 U.K. 50
2 Canada 33.3
3 Austrl. 8.3 
F.R.G. 8.3
U.K.
F.R.G.
Canada
40.5 
37.8
21.6
Canada
U .S A
U.K.
60.7
23.8
11.9
U .S A
U.K.
Canada
38.5
28.8
26.9
SURINAME
1984 1985 1986 1987
1 Japan 76.5 *
2 Neth. 64.7 *
3 Belgium -47.1
Arab*
Italy
France
43.9
28.1
14
Neth.
Arab*-
Belgium
88.3
9.8
2.3
Neth.
Italy
Arab+
101.8
23.4
-20.8
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SWAZILAND
1984 1985 1986 1987
1 U.K. 81.1 U.K. 35 U.S.A. 32 U.S.A. 48.4
2 U.S.A. 19.2 U.S.A. 28.6 U.K. 15.2 Denmark 26.6
3 Sweden 9.3 Canada 13.6 F.R.G. 10 F.R.G. 15.3
Sweden 10
TONGA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1 Austrl. 33.9 Austrl. 46.2 Austrl. 37.9 France 45.9
2 Japan 26.6 N.Zeal. 25.5 Japan 31 Austrl. 23.6
3 N.Zeal. 24.2 Japan 12.3 N.Zeal. 18.1 Japan 16.7
TUVALU
1984 1985 1986 1987
1 U.K. 67.3 U.K. 53.1 U.K. 42.1 U.K. 26.1
2 Austrl. 21.2 Austrl. 28.1 N.Zeal. 31.6 N.Zeal. 25.7
3 N.Zeal. 9.6 N.Zeal. 12.5 Austrl. 23.7 Austrl. 21.5
VANUATU
1984 1985 1988 1987
1 France 59.8 France 57.9 France 131.9 • Austrl. 54.5
2 U.K. 24.7 U.K. 22.5 U.K. -24.1 U.K. 53.3
3 Austrl. 12.1 Austrl. 11.8 Austrl. -16.6 France -28.1
WESTERN SAMOA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1 U.K. -148.8 * Austrl. 37.3 Japan 52 Japan 32.4
2 N.Zeal. 88.4 N.Zeal. 26.8 Austrl. 19.2 Austrl. 28.2
3 Austrl. 65.1 Japan 15.5 N.Zeal. 19.2 N.Zeal. 18.3
* Indicates a negative net receipt; that is, a net capital outflow 
from the microstate to the souyrce of bilateral aid, indicating 
that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the 
principal amounts of any new grants or loans received.
+ Arab countries in aggregate
Data unavailable for BRUNEI, MALDIVES MALTA, SAO TOM£ and PRlNCIPE
Source: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
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BENIN
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Belgium
2. Norway
3. F.R.G.
32.2
30.5
16.1
F.R.G.
Belgium
Neth.
32.8 
24.3
12.9
F.R.G.
France
Norway
81.2 
72.1 
-44.5 *
F.R.G.
Norway
U.K.
110.9
-59.3
-43.3
BOTSWANA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.K.
2. F.R.G.
3. U.S.A.
30.1
30.0
9.9
F.R.G.
U.K.
Norway
28.0
20.8
13.1
F.R.G.
Canada
Sweden
34.3 
18.7
17.3
F.R.G.
U.S.A.
Denmark
26.6
14.3
12.6
BURUNDI
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. France
2. Belgium
3. F.R.G.
23.8
20.9
15.9
France
Belgium
Italy
21.0
20.0
18.1
Belgium
F.R.G.
France
21.0
15.4
13.5
Belgium
France
F.R.G.
19.3
18.9
17.1
CHAD
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. France
2. U.S.A.
3. Italy
60.0
19.7
8.3
France
Italy
U.S.A.
35.4
26.5 
20.1
France
Italy
U.S.A.
46.7 . 
24.3 
10.0
France
U.S.A.
Neth.
61.9
13.4
7.3
CONGO
1984 1965 1986 1987
1. France
2. Belgium
3. Arab+
77.6
13.3
11.9
France
U.K.
Canada
-184.6 * 
144.1 
60.8
France
F.R.G.
U.K.
68.5
17.1
7.7
France
Italy
F.R.G.
84.5
9.6
-5.0
COSTA RICA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.S.A.
2. Japan
3. Canada
79.1
15.0
2.4
U.S.A.
U.K.
Neth.
77.4
6.1
4.6
U.S.A.
France
Japan
59.3
11.3 
8.4
U.S.A.
Neth.
Canada
69.4
7.8
6.7
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EL SALVADOR
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.S.A.
2. Neth.
3. Canada
97.5
1.7
0.9
U.S.A.
Italy
F.R.G.
94.4
3.0
2.6
U.S.A.
F.R.G.
France
90.8
7.6
-4.9 *
U.S.A.
Italy
F.R.G.
89.7
3.3
2.5
HAITI
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.S.A.
2. F.R.G.
3. Canada
57.6
11.2
11.2
U.S.A.
France
F.R.G.
57.0
21.3
8.1
U.S.A.
France
F.R.G.
67.6
13.8
8.1
U.S.A.
France
F.R.G.
64.3
13.5
7.5
HONDURAS
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.S.A.
2. Neth.
3. Canada
79.5
5.0
4.6
U.S.A.
Italy
Switz.
67.4
8.0
5.5
U.S.A.
Japan
F.R.G.
76.1
12.3
5.4
U.S.A.
Japan
F.R.G.
72.2
12.4
5.9
ISRAEL
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.S.A.
2. F.R.G.
3. Belgium
93.1
4.6
1.7
U.S.A.
F.R.G.
Swttz.
96.4
2.8
1.0
U.S.A.
F.R.G.
Canada
97.1
2.7
0.8
U.S.A.
F.R.G.
Belgium
88.5
6.9
3.1
JAMAICA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.S.A.
2. Italy
3. Canada
68.3
6.9
6.2
U.S.A.
Japan
Canada
51.4
22.6
14.8
Canada
Japan
Arab+
77.8 
47.0 
-25.5 *
U.S.A.
Canada
F.R.G.
60.6
17.2
9.6
JORDAN
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Arab+
2. Japan
3. U.K.
77.5
14.2
7.8
Arab+
U.K.
Italy
180.6 
-95.1 * 
10.3
Arab*
France
Japan
80.4
6.8
5.2
Arab*
France
F.R.G.
49.9
20.9 
12.6
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LAOS
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Sweden 45.9 Switz. 71.1 Sweden 46.9 Japan 45 9
2. Japan 18.9 Sweden 12.2 Japan 26.8 Sweden 41.0
3. Austrl. 18.9 Japan 10.6 Austrl. 18.0 Austrl. 13.8
LEBANON
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. France 78.5 Italy -76.3 * U.S.A. 61.2 U.S.A. 31.1
2. Italy 5.8 U.S.A. 66.6 France 37.6 Arab-*- 27.1
3. F.R.G. 4.5 France 40.5 Norway -14.6 Italy 14.9
LESOTHO
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.S.A. 53.3 U.S.A. 27.5 U.S.A. 31.5 U.S.A. 34.4
2. F.R.G. 19.3 U.K. 22.0 F.R.G. 24.2 F.R.G. 18.6
3. U.K. -6.7 Sweden 14.3 U.K. 12.4 Sweden 14.6
LIBERIA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Japan 59.5 * Japan 71.6 * Belgium 32.9 * Japan 88.7
2. France 26.5 * U.S.A. 12.3 * France 25.9 * Belgium 32.8
3. U.K. 21.8 * Belgium -12.0 U.S.A. 24.9 * France -25.3
U.K. 12 *
MAURITANIA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Arab-*- 41.8 Arab-*- 37.9 Arab-*- 35.8 France 40.4
2. France 18.8 France 23.6 France 19.4 Italy 11.4
3. U.S.A. 17.5 U.S.A. 20.3 Italy 12.6 Denmark 11.2
NICARAGUA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Neth. 26.2 Sweden 22.9 France 20.6 Neth. 25.3
2. Sweden 16.9 Neth. 22.4 Neth. 17.3 Sweden 18.8
3. Arab-*- 15.6 Italy 12.4 Italy 12.8 France 14.9
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PARAGUAY •
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. France 43.5
2. Japan 40.2
3. Neth. 6.2
PANAMA
France
U.K.
Japan
65.0 
-42.3 * 
41.6
Japan
France
U.K.
43.0
35.9
17.5
F.R.G.
Japan
France
80.7 
38.6 
-14.2 *
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Japan 128.3
2. U.S.A. -27.8 *
3. Belgium, 1.9
Japan
U.S.A.
Belgium
112.0 
-7.7 * 
-3.4 *
Japan
F.R.G.
U.K.
92.6 
8.4 
-1.1 *
Japan
U .SA
Neth.
69.9
20.9 
5.5
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Austrl. 82.1
2. U.K. 10.2
3. F.R.G. 8.1
Austrl.
Japan
F.R.G.
84.7
8.9
4.3
Austrl.
U.K.
Canada
158.7 
-61.0 * 
-7.2 *
Austrl.
U.K.
Japan
104.9 
-25.6 * 
8.8
SIERRA LEONE
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. F.R.G. 31.0
2. Arab+ 26.2
3. U.S.A. 17.3
U.S.A.
F.R.G.
Japan
44.8
38.1
9.9
U.S.A.
Italy
F.R.G.
20.1
18.4
13.7
F.R.G.
U .SA
Italy
28.2
15.1
12.9
SINGAPORE
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.S.A. 36.2
2. U.K. 20.0
3. Japan 18.6
U.S.A.
Japan
Belgium
213.4 *
-61.4
-22.4
U.S.A.
F.R.G.
Japan
694.7 * 
-439.3 
-202.8
Japan
U.S.A.
Austrl.
52.8 
42.2 
-27.9 *
SOMALIA
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Italy 4.6
2. U.S.A. 24.2
3. F.R.G. 17.0
U.S.A.
Italy
F.R.G.
25.5 
23.7
19.6
Italy
U .SA
F.R.G.
56.7
18.7 
10.6
Italy
F.R.G.
U.S.A.
44.9
26.5
12.0
TOGO
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. France 58.7
2. F.R.G. 29.5
3. U.S.A. 11.1
F.R.G.
Arab+
Canada
24.5
19.1
18.0
Japan
F.R.G.
U .SA
31.3
22.3
18.3
F.R.G.
France
U.S.A.
35.0
24.1 
17.0
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TRINIDAD and TOBAGO
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Japan 80.3
2. Canada 15.0
3. U .SA  11.6
U.S.A.
Japan
U.K.
120.4 * 
-20.4 
7.3
U.SA
F.R.G.
Japan
96.4 * 
-29.7 
19.8
U.S.A.
Japan
F.R.G.
6090.9
-5918.2
-3400.0
URUGUAY
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. U.S.A. 89.9
2. Belgium 7.0
3. Italy 5.2
U . S A .
F.R.G.
Neth.
Sweden
102.8 * 
-4.0 
-2.7 
-2.7
F.R.G.
Canada
Sweden
111.9 
-68.4 * 
35.6
U.S.A.
Neth.
France
56.0 
25.9
11.0
YEMEN, P.D.R.
1984 1985 1986 1987
1. Arab+ 78.5
2. France 5.8
3. Japan 4.5
Arab*
France
Denmark
-76.3 *
66.5
40.5
Arab*
Japan
Italy
61.2
37.8
-14.6
Italy
Arab+
Denmark
31.3
27.1
14.9
Indicates a negative net receipt; that is, a net capital outflow
from the microstate to the souyrce of bilateral aid, indicating 
that interest and principal payments on past loans exceed the 
principal amounts of any new grants or loans received.
+ Arab countries in aggregate
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TABLE I
MICRO-STATE GDP. RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS
a GDP at current prices 
b per capita
c GDP at constant prices 
d growth rates
1984 1985 1986 198? 1988 1969 1990 1991 mm
ANDORRA a) 202 212 317 408 498 548 712 766 836
b) 4695 4943 6895 8870 10595 11657 15145 16289 17781
c) 487 519 557 596 656 685 712 732 738
d) 10 6.5 7.3 7.1 10 4.5 3.9 2.9 08
ANTIGUA a) 173 200 238 277 341 370 412 423 439
b) 2754 3179 3715 4326 5328 5685 6333 6404 6646
c) 274 295 320 348 374 398 412 429 436
d) 7.5 7.7 8.4 8.7 7.6 6.3 3.5 4.3 1.7
BAHAMAS a) 1824 2110 2370 2625 2913 3006 3134 3090 3059
b) 7967 9057 9956 10848 11841 11976 12290 11885 11587
c) 2329 2644 2740 2866 2932 2990 3134 3034 3064
d) 2.9 13.5 3.6 4.6 2.3 2 4.8 -3.2 1
BAHRAIN a) 3906 3705 3187 3170 3359 3584 3903 4250 4364
b) 9457 8635 7161 6891 7086 7344 7759 8204 8188
c) 3564 3492 3548 3504 3762 3856 3903 4075 4156
d) 4.9 -2 1.6 -1.2 7.3 2.5 1.2 4.4 2
BARBADOS a) 1145 1198 1316 1449 1541 1698 1711 1687 1574
b) 4544 4737 5180 5704 6044 6632 6656 6539 6078
c) 1411 1420 1566 1672 1731 1790 1711 1662 1596
d) 2.4 0.7 10.3 6.8 3.5 3.4 -4.4 -2.8 -4
TABLE I
MICRO-STATE GDP. RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS
a GOP at current prices 
b per capita
c GDP at constant prices 
d growth rates
1984 1985 1986 198* 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
BELIZE a) 211 209 228 277 315 363 396 430 468
b) 1302 1260 1333 1580 1749 1962 2098 2219 2364
c) 252 254 266 297 323 363 396 413 443
d) 2.0 1 4.6 11.6 9 12.2 9.3 4.2 7.2
BRUNEI a) 3769 3482 2314 2753 2689 2996 3590 3816 3919
b) 17132 15407 9972 11518 10977 11936 13969 14456 14516
c) 3574 3521 3425 3494 3532 3494 3590 3721 3683
d) -0.1 -1.5 -27 2 1.1 -1.1 2.7 3.6 -1
CAPE VERDE a) 136 143 194 248 286 282 328 341 385
b) 431 441 586 734 828 798 905 913 1002
c) 234 254 261 280 302 317 328 346 363
d) 3.7 8.5 2.7 7.6 7.6 4.9 3.7 5.3 5.1
COMOROS a) 107 114 162 196 207 199 244 245 273
b) 245 252 345 403 411 379 449 435 466
c) 225 231 235 239 246 242 244 248 252
d) 4.2 2.7 2.1 1.6 2.7 -1.6 0.8 1.8 1.4
CYPRUS a) 2279 2430 3094 3701 4276 4568 5511 5743 6639
b) 3463 3653 4598 5442 6215 6573 7850 8101 9273
c) 3787 3965 4116 4404 4781 5176 5511 5567 6042
d) 8.8 4.7 3.8 7 85 83 6.5 1 8.5
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TABLE I
MICRO-STATE GDP. RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS
a GDP at current prices 
b per capita
c GDP at constant prices 
d growth rates
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1890 1991 199?
DJIBOUTI a) 401 417 431 460 497 509 552 554 578
b) 1096 1096 1097 1136 1194 1192 1255 1222 1238
c) 450 457 463 493 523 531 552 546 563
d) -0.6 1.6 1.2 65 6.1 1.4 4 -11 3
DOMINICA a) 90 99 112 126 146 157 167 177 187
b) 1214 1350 1535 1721 1995 2174 2323 2463 2594
c) 126 127 136 147 160 159 167 170 175
d) 5.5 1.3 7.1 7.6 8.7 -0.4 5.3 1.8 2.7
EQUATORIAL GUINEA a) 68 85 107 131 144 132 163 165 185
b) 230 272 332 393 423 384 463 457 507
c) 137 147 142 152 160 156 163 168 178
d) 2.3 7.3 -3.8 7.5 53 -2.8 4.4 3.4 2.9
FIJI a) 1178 1141 1290 1178 1110 1255 1228 1311 1407
b) 1709 1632 1825 1625 1548 1740 1691 1791 1904
c) 1056 1014 1083 1013 1031 1168 1228 1235 1280
d) 8.3 -3.9 68 -65 1.8 13.2 5.1 06 3.6
GABON a) 3561 3663 3468 3396 3403 3662 4431 4438 4864
b) 3748 3719 3404 3225 3131 3263 3823 3708 3932
c) 6018 6078 5166 4346 4200 4305 4431 4515 4607
d) 2.0 1 -15 -15.9 -3.4 2.5 2.9 19 2
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TABLE I
MICRO-STATE GDP, RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS
a GOP at current prices 
b per capita
c GOP at constant prices 
d growth rates
1084 1985 1986 1987 1988 1980 1990 1991 1992
GAMBIA a) 172 201 156 210 244 256 298 306 339
b) 238 270 204 266 300 306 346 346 374
c) 245 249 259 267 271 283 298 304 318
d) -8.2 1.6 4.1 2.8 1.7 43 5.2 2.3 4.5
GRENADA a) 102 115 130 150 166 182 200 210 217
b) 1131 1281 1442 1671 1847 2000 2202 2309 2380
c) 140 152 158 166 177 188 200 206 208
d) 4.7 8.2 3.9 5.1 6.8 6.2 6 7 3 0.6
GUINEA-BISSAU a) 264 248 230 165 155 198 235 251 134
b) 307 284 259 182 167 210 243 255 133
c) 191 184 193 203 217 227 235 242 249
d) 7.0 -3.5 4.6 5.6 6.9 4.5 3.3 3 2.9
GUYANA a) 444 462 520 349 414 256 256 219 239
b) 564 585 656 441 522 323 322 274 296
c) 300 303 305 306 296 285 256 272 293
d) 2.2 1 0.4 0.3 -3.3 -3.5 -10.1 6 7.7
ICELAND a) 2762 2871 3843 5336 5891 5335 6024 6490 6613
b) 11558 11914 15750 21604 23657 21251 23622 25252 25436
c) 5000 5182 5519 6003 5982 5993 6024 6085 5854
d) 4.1 36 6.5 8.8 -0 3 02 05 1 -3.8
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TABLE I
MICRO-STATE GDP. RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS
a GDP at current prices 
b per capita
c GDP at constant prices 
d growth rates
1834 1886 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
KIRIBATI a) 25 20 20 22 30 33 37 39 39
b) 399 306 315 328 440 478 514 544 528
c) 33 30 29 29 35 37 37 37 38
d) 2.2 -9.3 -0.6 -1.2 21 4.1 -0.3 1.9 25
LIECHTENSTEIN a) 509 529 807 1049 1162 1124 1432 1462 1529
b) 18862 18862 19956 38853 41491 40149 51126 52224 54607
c) 1041 1123 1203 1262 1347 1399 1432 1431 1430
d) 3.8 7.9 7.2 4.9 6.8 3.9 2.3 0 -0.1
LUXEMBOURG a) 3352 3457 4999 6095 6805 7178 8989 9336 11848
b) 9157 9419 13584 16517 18392 19347 24100 24896 31343
c) 6961 7164 7506 7727 8168 8712 8989 9265 9438
d) 6.2 2.9 4.8 2.9 5.7 6.7 3.2 3.1 1.9
MALDIVES a) 77 86 98 94 116 120 143 156 178
b) 433 472 516 482 578 580 673 708 782
c) 77 88 95 104 113 123 143 154 164
d) 13.0 13.8 8.6 8.9 8.7 9.3 16.2 7.6 6.3
MALTA a) 1001 1018 1304 1592 1835 1924 2316 2467 2786
b) 2936 2959 3759 4560 5242 5466 6544 6929 7536
c) 1672 1715 1782 1855 2011 2176 2316 2446 2553
d) 0.9 2.6 3.9 4.1 8.4 8 2 65 5.6 4.4
TABLE I
MICRO-STATE GDP. RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS
a GDP at current prices 
b per capita
c GDP at constant prices 
d growth rates
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
MARSHALL ISLANDS a) 44 43 55 62 69 71 77 72 79
b) 1224 1128 1402 1501 1643 1615 1664 1528 1618
c) 48 47 57 65 71 72 77 69 69
d) 2.7 -2.5 22.4 13.2 9.3 0.8 7 -9.8 0.1
MAURITIUS a) 1041 1076 1463 1831 2069 2116 2556 2731 3036
b) 1030 1055 1419 1757 1965 1988 2378 2515 2765
c) 1654 1767 1940 2137 2281 2385 2556 2670 2825
d) 4.8 6.9 9.7 10.2 6.8 46 7.2 4.5 7.8
MICRONESIA a) 119 109 119 144 184 215 242 269 273
b) 1414 1249 1327 1545 1920 2169 2351 2516 2484
c) 144 156 167 182 199 223 242 • 251 254
d) 2.1 8.3 67 9 9.1 12.1 8.8 3.7 1
MONACO a) 246 256 356 430 463 462 569 588 646
b) 9094 9482 13193 15912 17154 17107 21064 20992 23082
c) 493 499 509 517 538 557 569 591 596
d) 0.8 1.4 2 1.7 3.9 3.7 2 4 0.8
QATAR a) 6870 6153 5053 5446 6038 6488 7360 6884 7473
b) 20570 17188 13403 13894 14946 15634 17238 15644 16497
c) 24200 17188 13403 13894 14946 15634 17238 15644 16497
d) 28 -22 -3.7 0 ‘ 4.7 5.3 27 -0.8 4
TABLE 1
MICRO-STATE GDP. RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS
a GDP at current prices 
b per capita
c GDP at constant prices 
d growth rates
•u
O n
K>
1984 1985 1989 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
ST. KITTS a) 62 67 83 93 108 117 126 121 131
b) 1440 1552 1938 2167 2578 2797 2999 2880 3114
c) 2112 2205 2304 2307 2308 2383 2335 2360 2394
d) 9.0 5.6 62 7.4 7 5.1 3 3.7 3.6
ST. LUCIA a) 151 167 183 191 217 241 257 275 302
b) 1239 1343 1450 1491 1682 1842 1932 2037 2206
c) 184 195 206 211 236 247 257 261 278
d) 5.0 6 5.8 2.1 12.1 46 3.9 1.6 66
ST. VINCENT a) 103 113 127 142 161 174 194 178 193
b) 1017 1106 1236 1366 1530 1640 1817 1648 1771
c) 131 137 147 156 170 182 194 203 213
d) 5.7 4.4 7.3 6.3 8.7 7 7 46 4.7
SAN MARINO a) 159 163 242 304 336 347 435 457 485
b) 7245 7429 10542 13229 14592 15096 18916 19857 21099
c) 337 346 377 391 413 425 435 442 476
d) 4.3 2.9 8.9 3 7 5.7 2.9 2.3 16 7.6
SAO TOME and PRINCIPE a) 36 37 64 55 49 46 54 42 27
b) 354 349 595 499 433 397 454 349 218
c) 51 51 51 50 51 52 54 56 57
d) -4.1 -1.6 1 -1.5 2 1.5 3.8 35 2
TABLE I
MICRO-STATE GDP. RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS
a GDP at current prices 
b per capita
c GDP at constant prices 
d growth rates
1084 1986 1987 4988 1 9 8 C 1890 1991 1992
SEYCHELLES a) 151 169 209 249 284 308 373 373 409
b) 2293 2521 3071 3613 4113 4405 5254 5260 5684
c) 256 283 286 299 315 347 373 381 395
d) 8.0 10.3 1.2 4.4 5.3 10.3 7.5 2.2 3.5
SOLOMON ISLANDS a) 174 160 145 146 176 179 177 195 207
b) 667 593 520 506 589 576 554 589 606
c) 141 145 144 148 155 166 177 184 200
d) 7.2 2.8 -0.7 2.3 5.4 69 6.7 4 8.2
SURINAME a) 968 978 998 1098 1301 1520 1728 2077 2807
b) 2582 2555 2560 2578 3204 3680 4096 4830 6408
c) 1595 1627 1639 1537 1658 1728 1728 1782 1863
d) -1.9 2 0.8 -6.2 7.8 4.2 0 3.1 4.5
SWAZILAND a) 507 367 463 559 576 672 751 821 955
b) 793 558 684 804 807 918 1000 1065 1205'
c) 558 580 632 616 656 699 751 770 792
d) 8.0 39 9 -2.5 66 6.5 7.5 2.5 2.8
TONGA a) 65 56 67 74 88 97 101 122 124
b) 696 594 711 783 924 1013 1053 1262 1280
c) 92 97 95 99 102 103 101 106 108
d) 2.5 5.4 -2.3 4.3 2.5 1.6 -2 5.3 1.9
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TABLE I
MICRO-STATE GDP. RATES OF GROWTH AND PER CAPITAL INCOME LEVELS
a GDP at current prices 
b per capita
c GDP at constant prices 
d growth rates
1084 198$ 1986 1988 1989 19901987 1991 1992
TUVALU a) 5 5 5 6 8 8 8 9 9
b) 550 559 543 647 702 690 673 751 713
c) 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 9
d) 7.3 -2 -0.6 10 10.4 -43 2.5 4.8 1
VANUATU a) 124 118 115 122 144 141 154 179 180
b) 964 889 844 878 1005 966 1024 1171 1149
c) 140 141 138 139 140 146 154 160 160
d) 6.9 1.1 -2 0.4 0.6 4.5 5.2 4.1 0
WESTERN SAMOA a) 99 85 90 100 119 109 113 120 123
b) 628 543 573 634 755 693 713 759 777
c) 108 115 115 117 116 118 113 112 106
d) 1.3 6 0.6 1 -0.2 1.3 -4.5 -0.5 -5
CONCLUSION
The proliferation of many small states, especially between the J960’s and the 
1990’s, appeared at odds with the aspirations of liberal internationalists in the 1940’s for 
greater integration at both the regional and international levels. Perhaps what may not 
have been appreciated then is the symbiotic relationship between centripetal and 
centrifugal forces in the international system. The establishment of regional communities 
yrith ever expanding areas of concern, the elaboration of international regimes, the post­
war extension of international functionalism across scores of intergovernmental 
organisations and agencies have all served to bolster and reinforce the sovereignty of the 
nation-state, and most dramatically for those smallest states whose separate independence 
would have seemed impossible only forty years ago. The forces of integration and 
fragmentation are not in contention as much as they are mutually reinforcing,
A recognition of this complementarity has implications for the relevance of the 
viability question which attended the initial decolonisation of so many very small 
dependencies. In the introduction we noted the persistence of the notion of viability both 
in the process of decolonisation itself and in the early academic literature of micro-states. 
Though it was basically a metropolitan and tendentious concept, it shaped initial 
discussion about the future of very small states even among timid elites within the small 
territories themselves. If anything is now clear, it is that micro-states have survived, some 
of them have even thrived, in an international climate which has offered as many
opportunities as it has posed constraints. Initial scepticism about the prospects for micro­
states has been largely diminished by their experience in an increasingly supportive world.
This is not to suggest, of course, that micro-states do not continue to face some 
Severe problems, sometimes chronic, that are directly related to their very small size and 
the concomitant disabilities of insularity, remoteness, and a paucity of resources. The 
vulnerabilities which are so acutely experienced in micro-states have understandably 
dominated the literature, particularly since the Grenada Crisis which dramatically 
demonstrated the fragility of their security. And for many micro-states these vulnerabilities 
remain formidable challenges to the achievement of genuine self-reliance and a secure path 
of economic development.
However, their survival as equal and recognised members of the international 
system is not in question. If we are to understand viability as survivability then these 
states are survivors and are indeed viable. The quality of their separate statehood may still 
be an issue of concern. But their survival and their acceptance generally are not. Micro- 
states arc no longer viewed as curiosities or anomalies. The ever lowering threshold of the 
decolonisation process set the stage for even the smallest European micro-states to 
assume a full role in international diplomacy and organisation.
The separate independence of so many very small communities is, of course, a 
further demonstration of a global resurgence of localism and particularism manifest in a 
variety of movements: the revival of national languages and cultures, the pressures for 
devolution among regions across Europe, the heightened or new political consciousness 
among aboriginal peoples, the continuing clamour for autonomy in the former Communist
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states of Eurasia, and the vitality of secessionist movements, many of them emboldened by 
the successful independence of micro-states and by a recognition of the regional and 
international support systems which have reinforced their statehood. Quebec nationalists, 
for example, find federalist arguments against their independence galling when they 
consider the sovereignty of so many micro-states in their own hemisphere let alone 
elsewhere. Micro-statehood then is in part an expression of the politics of identity, an 
increasingly urgent subject of inquiiy across the social sciences.
Full acceptance of micro-states in the international system has done much to settle 
issues of status and legitimacy which we considered at length in the first section of the 
study. These were central concerns in much of the literature which focused on the special 
problems of micro-state security. Clearly, veiy small size provoked questions of status for 
micro-states which in many cases frustrated their decolonisation and marred their 
independence.. In some instances, the status of micro-states or would-be micro-states was 
controversial because of the belief that very small size was seen to preclude the powers 
and capabilities for actual independence implicit in the legal principle of sovereignty; the 
viability argument again. In other cases, very small size was concomitant with a 
fragmentary territorial identity which weakened the claim for national self-determination 
through separate statehood. In these situations micro-states and very small dependencies 
aspiring to statehood were and are likely to be viewed as local communities of a 
neighbouring state rather than as national societies unto themselves.
Clearly, issues of status and acceptance continue to be principal concerns for 
micro-states, even those states which do not face major security threats. The government
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of Liechtenstein, for example, has identified the assertion of its sovereignty and the 
acceptance of its statehood as its principal foreign policy objective. It is not surprising 
that the Principality’s delegation to the United Nations gives priority to the Legal 
Committee. A prevailing international ‘climate’ of extantism has encouraged a respect for 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, even the smallest. Even in those cases 
where states have been victims of invasion and gross interference, the offending state 
tended to defend its action in the context of respect for the legal international personality 
of the victim state. Iraq’s policy in Kuwait was a dramatic exception.
All micro-states give great importance to the consolidation of their separate 
Statehood in the norms and organised relations of the international system. Collective 
legitimisation and the recognition of formal sovereignty in themselves provide no small 
measure of security for even the most endangered micro-states. Much better to be Belize 
than East Timor. Indeed, Belize is a striking example of how status itself can be used to 
enhance a state’s security in the face of a determined irredentist threat. Belize enjoyed 
some measure of foreign policy authority even prior to independence. This allowed the 
government of Belize to present its case at the United Nations albeit with the staunch 
support of Great Britain and the Commonwealth Caribbean states. Belize’s security 
position is all the more reinforced by its full sovereignty and membership in CARICOM, 
the Commonwealth, the United Nations and now the OAS. Guyana too has successfully 
used membership in these bodies and especially effectively in the Non-Aligned Movement 
to build a constituency of support in her territorial dispute with Venezuela. Malta was 
able to take its conflict with Libya over the continental shelf directly to the U.N. Security
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Council In short, while sovereign status and recognised membership in international 
councils cannot in the end deter determined adversaries, as the case of Kuwait well 
illustrates, it is an inhibiting consideration for those governments which may threaten their 
smaller neighbours.
One of the conventional assumptions about small state security was the notion that 
small states were better positioned in a bi-polar system where they could play one power 
bloc off against another. It might be assumed, then, that the end of the Cold War, 
however welcome in other respects, represents an unfavourable development for small 
states in that their salience and leverage is weakened. Certainly, in recent years, there has 
been growing concern in the literature about the marginalisation of small states, 
particularly in Africa, but also in the Caribbean. This reflects the new urgency given in the 
post-Cold War period to the security and development interests of the Central and Eastern 
European states.
At the same time the end of the Cold War has brought favourable changes for 
many very small states. Fears of a Soviet-American struggle in the Pacific, for instance, 
with its attendant dangers of militarisation, have been put to rest, though other security 
concerns remain. Similarly in the Caribbean, while the United States will continue to be 
vigilant about developments in the region, particularly given their continuing unease with 
Cuba, many of the concerns surrounding the events in Grenada have receded.
The end of the Cold War rivalry in the Security Council led finally to the 
acceptance of the former U.S. Trusteeship Territories in the Pacific, even Palau, into the 
United Nations. Similarly, the admission without controversy of the smallest European
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micro-states might not have been possible when Cold War rivalries had tainted so many 
issues not least of which was the admission of new members. Indeed, the tentative but 
real consensus between Russia and the United States, evident in the Kuwait crisis, may 
well serve the interests of very small states in the long run in spite of warnings from a 
number of Third World states about the dangers of condominium.
In short, the structures and the norms of the international system serve the status 
reinforcement and security interests of very small states. They do not provide a full 
security blanket, of course, particularly when the security threats to these states are of an 
order which are not easily addressed by a resort to intergovernmental organisations. The 
security threats that many micro-states are more likely to face are those of the drugs trade, 
money launderers and other criminal elements, resource piracy in their unprotected 
exclusive economic zones, a flow of refugees and migrants, and coups instigated by 
foreign based dissidents and supported by mercenaries. But even in these situations there 
is considerable scope for micro-states to call upon both regional and international sources 
for support. The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, for example, has been 
instrumental in enforcing better regulation of vessels. With United Nations support, it was 
able to persuade Japanese compliance with efforts to rid the region of driftnets, the “walls 
of death.” The Commonwealth Consultative Group recognised the enormous potential for 
regional co-operation and Commonwealth and United Nations assistance to meet many of 
these threats: regional co-operation in intelligence gathering, surveillance and even 
policing; international assistance in terms of training programmes and infrastructural
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support. Problems remain, to be sure, but the international system offers a wide range of 
supports for its smallest members in securing their mpst vital interests.
While both the structure of the international system and the climate of 
opinion now provide micro-states with new opportunities for status reinforcement and 
security enhancement, very small size imposes undeniable limitations on the extent to 
which micro-states can exploit the diplomatic prerogatives of their status to take 
advantage of those opportunities.. Here, as we discovered in the second section of our 
study, the contrasts with larger small states are particularly dramatic. Apart from the oil 
rich economies, micro-states can mount only a modest diplomatic presence typically 
confined to mentor states, a few secondary capitals which are increasingly within their 
regions, and the United Nations and the Commonwealth. Similarly, micro-states can not 
expect to attract the diplomatic attention of other states in their own capitals. Even the 
major powers are inclined to rely on non-resident accreditation to represent their interests 
in most micro-states. Non-resident accreditation, the use of roving ambassadors and 
home-based ‘foreign’ missions, and particularly consular representation, are the typical 
mainstays of micro-state diplomacy in sharp contrast to even the poorest of the small 
states in the next population class.
The international relations of micro-states usually are conducted by a very small 
.group of individuals with generalist rather than specialised skills. A discreet use of 
expatriates, or more typically, quiet advice from mentors and friends will supplement the
diplomatic reach of micro-states. Do such obvious disabilities rule out anything but
*>
ceremonial diplomacy for these very small states? Certainly the problems of mounting an
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effective diplomatic presence are regularly cited in the now large literature, particularly 
that of the 1980’s, which focused on the vulnerabilities of very small states. Such 
concerns were and are wholly justified, given that the capacity to engage the international 
diplomatic community is one of the core privileges of sovereign statehood. Moreover, 
engaging the international system, even in selected issue areas, imposes enormous 
demands on the capacities of micro-states, not just in terms of personnel and costs, but 
perhaps more critically in information and intelligence so vital to an effective promotion of 
a state’s interests in other capitals and in relevant international bodies.
Once again, however, the scppe for micro-state diplomacy is more encouraging 
than initial impressions would suggest. Even with limited resources, the smallest and the 
poorest micro-states engage in a surprising range of relationships. In the case of the South 
Pacific and Caribbean states, for instance, regional organisations provide a major forum 
for both inter-regional diplomacy and contact with the outside world. Students of these 
micro-state regions, such as Paul Sutton and Anthony Payne, have consistently stressed 
the need for regional coordination in foreign policy and the presentation of regional 
solidarity to the outside world on common vital interests. As with regional co-operation in 
intelligence gathering and policing, regional diplomacy requires extreme sensitivity to 
national sensibilities and the constant cultivation of consensus. Where those are present, 
regional solidarity can do much to supplement and reinforce the diplomatic initiatives of 
individual states. This is particularly the case when a regional organisation can win 
Commonwealth and/or United Nations support for its initiatives as was the case with the 
South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency.
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One of the keys to successful representation is a skilled and well trained foreign 
service, however small. Many scholars of the Commonwealth Caribbean, for instance, 
have stressed the importance of the talent available to most governments in the region. It 
has led to an effective articulation of their interests at all levels. This is also evident in 
such micro-states as Iceland and Malta which have been particularly well served by gifted 
individuals. As we have seen, all the European micro-states have enlisted the service of 
talented and dedicated individuals to represent their interests in an astonishing range of 
capitals, albeit in honourary positions. As so many studies have stressed, micro-states can 
make up in a skilful, adroit, even manipulative diplomacy what they lack in terms of 
numbers and financial resources.
Again the Commonwealth Consultative Group emphasised the importance of 
training and assistance in this area. Certainly the Commonwealth and UNITAR training 
programmes for those entering the diplomatic service of micro-states are valuable means 
of strengthening the representational capacities of these states. So too is the 
Commonwealth initiative in setting up joint office facilities in New York for a number of 
its very small member states.
Once again the structure of the international system is very accommodating for 
micro-states, even in this critical area of sovereign responsibility. The United Nations
itself, admittedly an expensive commitment, provides a setting where states can reach
• i '
virtually the entire international community from one mission. Similarly, tlie 
Commonwealth provides an outreach to much of the world for those Pacific island micro- 
sfiAtes which have chosen not to undertake the burdens of full United Nations membership.
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(Most of even these states, however, belong to a number of U.N. specialised agencies.) 
The experience of micro-states suggests that it is possible to have a very long reach with 
.minimal investment.
Nor should it be assumed, as one finds in the writings of Holsti, for example, that 
tnicro-states are doomed to be local powers with virtually no impact on the larger global 
agenda. Iceland’s assertion and defence of an extended economic zone to protect the 
lifeline of her fishery was eventually incorporated into the Law of the Sea. Malta’s 
Ambassador Pardo was an inspiring leader of “the common heritage of man” principles 
which govern the Law of the Sea. Indeed, Malta’s role in this area and in the efforts to 
establish a Mediterranean Convention powerfully demonstrate the potential for micro-state 
leadership. Fiji’s initiatives have contributed to the concept of the archipelagic state in 
maritime law. And Vanuatu’s leadership was critical in establishing the Association of 
Small Island States within the United Nations thus raising enormously the visibility of 
environmental and ecological concerns in very small islands. The recent United Nations 
conference in Toronto which focused on the dangers of global warming, a conference 
which drew many heads of government, is a testament to the potential for micro-state 
diplomatic initiative and achievement.
Though the capacity to represent your state’s interests has always been viewed as 
a benchmark of sovereignty, most attention concerning the future of micro-states has been 
directed to their international economic relationships. It may seem axiomatic that countries 
of a few hundred thousand people, or less,
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could hardly constitute national economies in any meaningful sense. The structural 
disabilities of limited resources and diseconomies of scale would seem to suggest 
inevitable patterns of extreme dependence barely disguised by the cosmetics of 
constitutional autonomy. Indeed, in most jurisdictions of similar size within existing 
states, notions of economic and political autonomy would seem sheer madness given the 
prevailing logic of national integration.
Most of the literature on micro-states in the last two decades has stressed the 
disturbing structural weaknesses which place these economies at such a disadvantage. 
When reviewing the indices of vulnerability outlined in the introduction we are constantly 
struck by the narrow range for maonoeuvre and the excessive dependence on external 
forces well beyond the control of the very small state. Limited to a narrow range of 
economic activities, and usually to a single export product, they have little impact on their 
own markets and on their terms of trade. Moreover, they are at a bargaining disadvantage 
\yith all the players central to their own economic development: multinational 
corporations, foreign banks, external sources of official development assistance, and 
foreign owned shipping lines and import-export firms. Even in those areas promising for 
diversification, such rentier activities as off-shore finances, philately, remittances from 
migrants, and tourism, we are constantly reminded that these too are dependent on the 
regulatory and tax regimes of other countries, a volatile and perhaps declining philatelic 
market, the immigration controls of neighbouring states and the changing consumption 
patterns of metropolitan tourist markets. It sometimes reads as an impossible trap.
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It is clear, as we indicated in the third section of this study, that micro-states do 
demonstrate yery high levels of economic dependence by almost every measure, though 
this does not mean that micro-states have bought their sovereignty at the expense of a 
decline in prosperity or retrenchment on the peripheries of the international economy. 
Breaking the secure ties of colonial and protective relationships in a fiercely competitive 
world has not resulted in isolation and decline as so many cautious pre-independence 
leaders feared. Excluding the oil rich micro-states, which face serious problems of wealth 
management, and the European micro-states, which have all demonstrated enormous 
.growth and prosperity in the post-war years, most micro-states enjoy relatively high levels 
of per capita income among developing economies. Indeed this actually works to their 
disadvantage in official development assistance which is so often predicated on per capita 
income levels. To be sure, some micro-states, certain South Pacific islands and sub- 
Saharan African states, are clearly classed among the least developed economies. 
Independence has brought little relief from chronic poverty. But in some cases at least, 
the explanations for their lack of progress in meeting development objectives lie as much 
in a history of colonial neglect, in the corruption and criminality of post-independence 
regimes and in Marxist-inspired strategies of limited world market engagement as in the 
disabilities of very small size and remoteness.
Micro-states as a class are not particularly disadvantaged compared to much larger 
small states in the next population group. Indeed, the differences between the small and 
the very small are not as pronounced as might be expected. While they share familiar 
problems of debt management, unfavourable terms of trade, and dependence on external
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sources of capital, the combination of very small size and sovereignty has not put them at 
a marked disadvantage in comparison to larger neighbours or larger states with similar 
economic characteristics. This eyidence in itself justifies our decision to view the 
economic performance of micro-states not against generalised abstractions rooted as they 
are in theories of development more relevant to the metropolitan states but rather to a 
large group of small economies in the next population class. This comparison gives 
empirical weight to any assessment of the consequences of very small size.
Certainly the resilience of the small economy and the flexibility of factors of 
production stressed by Keohane, Payne and others are evident in the most encouraging 
examples of micro-state economies. Malta, for example, has had to self-consciously 
pursue policies of restructuring which have seen the core areas of the economy shift from 
the defence sector, to shipbuilding and ship repair and servicing, and lately to an 
increasingly important high value export oriented manufacturing sector directed to 
European Union markets. For the past decade Malta has enjoyed the highest growth rates 
in Europe.
Iceland too is a model example of small economy jesilience, The Icelandic 
workforce is educated, multilingual and versatile. It is not unusual for Icelanders to pursue 
two or three jobs simultaneously. Icelandic educational policy encourages graduates to 
study abroad, particularly in Great Britain, Scandinavia and North America. They return 
with a pool of “global knowledge and skills” which further strengthens the country’s 
ability to adjust to external shocks. Certainly the decline in the North Atlantic cod was an 
external shock of extraordinary proportions and potentially catastrophic consequence.
That this particular case is so neglected in the literature on micro-state vulnerability only 
reinforces the importance of a more inclusive basis for comparative analysis.
The dramatic decline in cod stocks did not push Icelandic outports into a cycle of 
dependence and the national government into a crisis of welfare support. Either large 
sections of the communities where fishing plants closed moved on to other locations, 
usually the greater Reykjavik area, or existing plants were converted to alternative species. 
This is in complete contrast to the plight of the hapless fishing community in 
Newfoundland which now survives on a massive programme of federal transfers to the 
island’s depressed outports. The post-crisis Icelandic fishery was characterised by even 
ipore stringent management of existing stocks, a greater exploitation of other species for 
discreet markets in the Far East and a renewed emphasis on quality which alone gives 
Iceland a huge advantage in high value markets. The Newfoundland fishery largely 
ignored alternative species, and did little to diversify its low value block product. Of 
course, this once again illustrates the power of jurisdiction. Iceland, as a sovereign state, 
was in a position to manage its fishery just as its policies on foreign investment insured 
tbat the industry in all aspects was domestically owned. Neither of these conditions 
applied to Newfoundland.
A further comment on the Icelandic gift of resilience is in order In recent years 
Icelanders, recognising the absolute limit on the fishery’s capacity to sustain expdtifed
i
growth levels, have turned instead to the export of knowledge-based services, ifi this 
sense they are indeed in the vanguard of post-industrial societies. Now their-export of fish 
and fi$h products is supplemented by the export of their historical experience and
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how in all areas of the fishery, from nets and trawler designs to processing techniques and 
computerised weigh scales to allow for on-board freezing and packaging. This export of 
expertise, encouraged in various programmes by the Icelandic government, is evident ip 
scores of joint ventures from the Falklands to Namibia, from the Baltic states to the 
eastern most shores of Russia. A similar export of “know hpw” in other areas central to 
ihe Icelandic experience, central heating systems, local government, health care 
administration, hydroelectric and geothermal systems, is supplementing King Cod to 
ensure Iceland’s continued competitiveness in the global economy. Icelanders, because of 
their cosmopolitan education and their language skills, are well placed to exploit the new 
environment in spite of all the conventional disadvantages: very small size, remote 
location, a narrow resource base and inhospitable living conditions.
Indeed, even in terms of the last factor, Iceland is pursuing an aggressive campaign 
to promote tourism, particularly convention tourism “at the top of the world.” It is a 
.skilful manipulation of the international tourist market which sees Reykjavik hotels fully 
booked ip the dark days of Christmas week as visitors come to witness the largest 
fireworks display in Europe, swing at Europe’s largest disco, go on shopping binges in 
Reykjavik’s elegant but competitively priced boutiques and hold smart formal dinners on a 
glacier! Convention tourism has boomed as Iceland has marketed its unique northern 
landscape as a dramatic alternative to more familiar settings. In short, Iceland is a classic 
case of small economy flexibility and resilience even against such enormous odds of 
distance, size and climate.
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There is also the invisibility factor which Keohane has stressed. Some years ago 
Shridath Ramphal worried about the lack of attention given to the world’s smallest states. 
And John Kaminarides wondered if a cluster of states which represented only .03 of the 
world’s population would continue to command any attention in the literature. It is safe 
to say that in terms of both the international public policy and academic communities the 
interests of these very small states do command now an attention disproportionate to their 
constituency in the global society. However, as Keohane and others have noted, there is 
an advantage to this invisibility or marginalisation. Some micro-states have been able to 
pursue development strategies which may be annoying in metropolitan states but which 
are mute enough to protect them from countervailing measures. The Isle of Man is just 
such an example. Though it is not a sovereign state, the fact that it is not a part of the 
United Kingdom, that it enjoys its own fiscal regime, independent even of the European 
Union, has opened areas of strategic development in the services sector. The success of 
these strategies has reversed the island’s declining economy and its outward migration, the 
export of the brightest of its youth, a seemingly intractable problem until the 1970’s. 
From time to time Members of Parliament at Westminster complain about the Isle of Man 
and the losses which its haven represents fox the Exchequer. There are even ominous 
soundings of bringing the island into line, although convention would strengthen the Manx 
government’s insistence on the recognition of its constitutional autonomy. In general, 
however, the Manx strategy has survived because it is too small to provoke a national 
debate or to win support for countervailing measures. Similarly, Luxembourg has been 
able thus far, in spite of increasingly hostile noises from Germany, to preserve its own
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banking and financial service sector . Because the Grand Duchy is a full member of the 
Union it is well placed to argue its case: if Luxembourg were to lose its financial services 
autonomy, then money would simply move to the many alternative European off-shore 
centres. Luxembourg’s loss would not be Europe’s or Germany’s gain. It would be to the 
advantage of Liechtenstein, Andorra, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.
Very small jurisdictions, even the state of Delaware, have tapped largely into the 
hugely expanding international off-shore financial services market. It is not a strategy 
without considerable risk. As Mark Hampton has pointed out, this is a sector which begs 
for regulatory vigilance and impeccable legal accountability. Its attractiveness to the most 
reliable market depends on its credibility in terms of these standards of integrity. The more 
established off-shore centres have an advantage in the respect of their credentials. It is not 
a sure ticket to micro-state Nirvana. But given the growth of the sector it continues to be 
an attractive and credible source of diversification. Consider the case of San Marino. This 
once again illustrates the importance of jurisdiction and status which alone make the 
development of this sector possible. A recent IMF report on the San Marino economy 
was on the whole positive and encouraging. The panel noted the dramatic diversification 
of the economy especially in terms of high value manufacturing and an intelligent 
expansion of the services sector. The financial and insurance sectors of the economy have 
grown impressively, directly as a result of the lack of confidence in the political stability of 
its all surrounding neighbour, Italy. As the political crisis in Italy deepened there was 
increasingly a lack of confidence in virtually every dimension of the system and Italians 
moved their assets to this little republic. For Italians anxious about their financial security
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San Marino may seem to be a ‘local’ solution. But in an historical context and in 
constitutional arrangements it is very much a place apart. Just as San Marino was an 
asylum to over 100,000 refugees from Italian fascism, a huge strain on its territory, 
population and natural resources, so it is now once again a refuge of security for Italians 
who have lost confidence in their own institutions.
Tourism continues to be an encouraging area of development for most micro­
states. The inherent problems of the tourism sector are well known and have been cited 
already in this study. Even so, tourism is the largest industry in the world and growing at 
an astonishing rate, particularly in Pacific Rim markets. Micro-states may feel inclined to 
engage the mainstream tourist market- McWorld as Samuel Barber recently presented it. 
There are certainly familiar risks of excessive leakage, environmental degradation and 
cultural compromise in such a strategy of Marriott-like engagement. But because the 
market is so huge and growing at a breathtaking rate, the opportunities for micro-states to 
offer a particular and discreet experience, especially at the high end of the market, are 
more favourable than ever. For every ten metropolitan tourists who want the familiar 
securities of the Marriott experience, there are one or two who will thrive on something 
very different. Tlis represents an opportunity for the very small economy. A niche, a true 
niche, whether ir tourism or a variety of other economic opportunities can yield large 
rewards even wih a tiny penetration of the market. The growing number of tourists, 
especially Germais, for example, who are anxious to see the seabird cliffs in the Faeroe 
islands, a unique experience to be sure, are small in number but an increasingly important 
contribution to he growing Faroese tourism market.. The expansion of markets,
particularly in the newly industrialised societies, lends diversification potential to the 
marketing of a country as a tourism destination. Prince Edward Island, for example, is 
increasingly sensitive to the growing Japanese tourism market, particularly in the shoulder 
season and for its high expenditure value. And this is not mass tourism of the Marriott 
variety. Rather it is rooted in the Island’s distinct cultural heritage, albeit the life and times 
of a fictional little red-haired girl.
Some micro-states are better positioned to offer a unique experience than others. 
Malta is increasingly emphasising its archaeological sites, among the richest in Europe, 
and its history as a confluence of virtually every major Eurasian civilisation, to attract a 
more educated and higher value tourism market. The sun and sand destinations may find 
such alternatives to mainstream tourism more difficult though there is increasing emphasis 
on cultural heritage and authenticity in most of these societies to tap into a more 
discriminating market.
Services on all fronts continue to offer enormous potential for diversification in 
micro-state economies. Commonwealth Caribbean countries, for example, can exploit 
their literacy and educational levels to promote such sectors as data processing. It may 
seem a cliche but Internet is levelling the playing field. It is not surprising that so much 
attention now in the Association of Small Island States is given to strengthening the 
network facilities and capacities of member states. Their islandness and remoteness are 
increasingly less important. These states are well placed to take advantage of their 
neighbourhood. NAFTA may offer a more impressive list of opportunities for very small 
jurisdictions than it does disincentives and barriers.
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In Luxembourg the growth of the financial services sector has largely compensated 
for a decline in steel production, the country’s major industry. Revenues from the 
financial sector now account for over a third of the government’s income. Services in 
Malta have grown at a rate of more than ten percent a year. Tourism alone has generated 
growth in a variety of tourism related services such as transport, real estate, and retail 
trade. Invisible earnings continue to be the principal props of the MIRAB economies of 
the South Pacific. While it is true that these sources of income are dependent on 
favourable external conditions, they are, as Geoffrey Bertram argued, the foundations for 
sustainable development in the islands. In any case, in the emerging global economy it is 
difficult for most states to be protected from external shocks.
Manufacturing continues to present formidable obstacles for many micro-states, 
particularly the smallest and most remote island states. For these states the structural 
impediments to diversification through manufacturing, as identified -for example- in Lino 
Briguglio’s Vulnerability Index, will continue to frustrate efforts to develop a 
manufacturing sector in all but basic activities such as food processing. In those states 
where there has been considerable success it is because government has actively targeted 
the sector with a variety of export oriented programmes, Mauritius is a particularly 
encouraging example. With the establishment in 1971 of an Export Processing Zone 
supported by tax holidays, duty free imports and low-interest loans, Mauritius has been 
able to reduce its excessive dependence on sugar. The sector has witnessed enviable 
growth rates in employment and direct foreign investment. In 1995 EPZ export earnings 
accounted for nearly 70 percent of total export revenue, turning Mauritius into something
of an African tiger. While most of this production was in clothing and textiles, the 
^government’s efforts to diversify have resulted in the development of such products as 
watches and precision instruments, precious stones, jewellery and electronics.
The growth of the manufacturing sector in St. Lucia, now about 13 percent of 
Gross Domestic Product, has also depended on a variety of development incentives similar 
to those of Mauritius. Infrastructural development such as the new container base and 
deepwater port in Vieux Fort, has also encouraged direct foreign investment. In Malta the 
government has been particularly successful in encouraging high value export oriented 
industries through the Malta Development Corporation which is home to a variety of 
programmes including not only familiar incentives but rent-subsidized and government 
built factories and training grants. Especially targeted are high technology electronics and 
information technology companies. Traditional industries, textiles and footwear, have 
declined relatively in a climate of liberalisation while the high value sector, particularly 
electronics, has increased its share of output. Much of the success of Malta is attributable 
to the policies of liberalisation which have been vigorously pursued over the last decade. 
The government of Liechtenstein attributes its remarkable success in developing a high 
value manufacturing sector to the liberal climate in the country, the absence of red tape 
and its attractive setting for foreign investors. The Isle of Man government too 
emphasises the quality of life on the island as it woos particular targeted companies from 
the mainland.
Nonetheless there remain serious problems for most micro-states in their efforts to 
diversify their economies. Access to metropolitan markets is one serious hurdle. Some
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micro-states do benefit from preferential trade through such agreements as Lome, 
SP ARTEC A and the Caribbean Basin Initiative. However, these arrangements tend to 
favour traditional products, bananas and sugar, for example, over manufactures. They are 
further compromised by the existence of many loopholes and the strength of domestic 
interest groups in the metropolitan countries. While smaller countries tend to benefit from 
.higher levels of per capita official development assistance, there are risks of declining aid 
levels given the current redirection of aid to Central and Eastern Europe, and the inability 
tp access certain kinds of assistance because of per capita income thresholds.
Marine resources offer enormous potential for many very small island states in 
terms of artisanal fishing, aquaculture and marine agriculture but there remain formidable 
problems of investment and development exploitation. This is also true of the Exclusive 
Economic Zones which in terms of raising revenues for the near future are likely to be 
confined to licensing arrangements and access fees. Nevertheless, as the experience of the 
Falkland Islands illustrates, this can be a major source of revenue.
The opportunities for regional co-operation as an instrument of diversification are 
pot generally encouraging. The most intractable problem for any regional community is to 
ensure the visible equitable distribution of resources across its membership. That has been 
one of the successes of CACM and may suggest narrower parameters for regional co­
operation. In both the Caribbean and the South Pacific regional co-operation has not been 
all that successful in terms of trade. After all these small states are not complementary 
economies; they are indeed competitors in the larger global economy. Nor does there seem 
to be any real interest in pursuing a European approach to integration in these regions. At
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the same time, there is ample scope for regional co-operation across a variety of critical 
areas; education, shipping, aviation, health care, research and development and a score of 
other activities which reduces the burdens for individual states while reinforcing their 
sovereignty. Perhaps most important, as Persaud noted, is the decentralisation of 
development banking which has strengthened the role and widened the opportunities for 
regional development banks.
In general, as we were able to see in the third section of this study, micro-states 
have fared relatively well in their years of independence, particularly when compared with 
larger and similarly situated small states in the next population class. As the 
Commonwealth Consultative Group noted, small does not mean helpless. And as 
sovereign states, micro-state governments have had a number of useful policy levers at 
their disposal. There are very encouraging examples of diversification in both indices of 
commodity concentration and geographic direction of trade as well as in sources of private 
sector capital and official development assistance. It is important to remind ourselves of 
the comparative context. As Godfrey Baldacchino and a growing number of scholars are 
emphasising it is not at all helpful to measure micro-state performance against abstract 
standards or models of development which are irrelevant and inappropriate for their 
experience. When compared to other small states, however, the micro-state experience has 
been modestly encouraging.
This relatively favourable picture of the micro-state experience would not suggest 
the sovereignty option to all very small communities. There is very little support for 
independence in the remaining overseas French territories for example. In many very small
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dependencies there is, as Mike Faber pointed out, the counter appeal of “rights of access” 
and “subsidized services ” The people of these territories benefit enormously from the 
generous largesse of the French state and a lack of autonomy is a small price to pay for the 
benefits they receive. Similarly, the people of Aruba, now very conscious about security 
threats, particularly the drugs trade, have had second thoughts about independence and 
successfully petitioned the Dutch government to continue the terms of association. In 
other very small dependencies, such as Bermuda or the Cook Islands or the Isle of Man, 
continued association with the metropolitan power provides a reassuring presence for 
foreign investment and a measure of security. In any case these governments enjoy 
genuine independence in those areas critical to their own economic well being.
Other very small jurisdictions would not be so sanguine about limitations to their 
jurisdictional competence. Newfoundlanders, for example, deeply resent federal control 
over their offshore resources. The Faroese are increasingly impatient with the Danish 
government in the wake of the 1992 banking debacle. Nationalist sentiments are 
increasing across all political parties in the islands save the Unionists. Certainly, existing 
micro-states would not trade in their sovereignty. They are all committed to the 
protection of their identity and to the exercise of those prerogatives which sovereignty 
confers. Icelandic government leaders and Icelandic academics continually point to the 
island’s sovereignty, the capacity to protect their waters and to manage their own 
Qurrency, as the single most important factor in Iceland’s post-war economic success.
For Iceland and for all micro-states this is simply a recognition of jurisdiction as a 
resource in itself. Many of these very small states were wholly dependent in their trade
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relations on the metropolitan centre. Certainly they were dependent on that centre 
exclusively for sources of capital investment. Now they are able to present themselves to 
foreign governments, international corporations and multilateral organisations directly and 
on their own terms. Their status is an entry card into the world’s boardrooms. These very 
small states function within a large network of supports and opportunities. Their 
vulnerabilities remain and for many their objectives will be confined to dependence 
management. There are dangers too which should not be underestimated.
In these closing years of the second millennium, however, when Lilliput and 
Brobdingnag mingle in the same corridors and share the same tables of international 
diplomacy, there are many reasons for tentative optimism.
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